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The article explores cultural nostalgia in Persia as a means of political dissent. Noted is how the political and social culture in the country has changed since the founding of Iran's Islamic Republic in 1979, which shifted the country's ancient culture to a theocratic dictatorship. Other topics include nostalgia for the Persian Empire's pre-Islamic past among Iranian exiles and an extensive look a survey that took place in California that aimed to gather more data about Iranian-American views of the Islamic Republic.

Although the ulama have lost their traditional roles in many parts of the Islamic world as a result of the modernization process of the social and political structure, the Iranian ulama not only have played a pivotal role in many important events in the recent history of Iran, but also emerged as the most powerful socio-political class since the Iranian revolution of 1979. In this article, I aim to understand major factors that facilitate the development of the ulama as the most powerful political actor in Iranian polity. Drawing on the analysis of two highly crucial historical events (the Constitutional Revolution and the Iranian Revolution of 1979), I point out four major factors for the development of an influential ulama class: The reconstruction of Shi'i Islam for the rule of the ulama in the absence of the Hidden Imam, the political and economic independence of the ulama from the state, the close relationship between the ulama and the urban middle class, and the weakness of the central governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, sought to chart out an independent course for Iran in regional and global affairs: 'neither East, nor West, the Islamic Republic.' Khomeini's successors have often attempted to compromise with the West by undertaking economic reforms aimed at reintegrating Iran into the imperialistic capitalist world economy. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed in mid-July 2015, brings Iran new opportunities but it also greatly compromises the ideological, philosophical and economic foundations of Khomeini's Islamic Republic. After four decades of anti-imperialist struggle, Iran has now largely come back to the fold of imperialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In November 1986 a Lebanese newspaper revealed the secret arms-for-hostages deal between Tehran and Washington that subsequently became known as the Iran-Contra-Affair. The newspaper had been tipped off by friends of the Iranian radical Mehdi Hashemi who had been arrested shortly before in Iran. This article explores the link between the arrest of the ardent supporter of the then deputy leader Hossein-Ali Montazeri and the secret talks with the US government. The article will show that his arrest was not only an attempt of the then dominant faction around Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to bring the future leader Montazeri under its control, but also an attempt to eliminate a rival actor opposing the rapprochement with the USA and threatening to disrupt the arms-for-hostages deal. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The thirteen years Khomeini spent in exile in the Iraqi shrine city of Najaf is still a littleknown page of his life. Based on a collection of published interviews with Iranian clerics, this article explores the social mechanisms of his growing authority, both as a religious scholar and a revolutionary figure. His leadership practices were, the article argues, a mirror of his position of in-betweenness characterized by his physical presence in Najaf and his continued attachment to the home country. The social dynamics at work inside the Iraqi seminaries are explored first to situate Khomeini in his place of exile. While he was kept at a distance by Najaf's most influential clerical groups, he also had access to a social base of his own, a group of supporters composed mainly of Iranian students and low-ranking scholars. The local and transnational development of Khomeini's religio-political leadership is addressed next. His scholarly and social activities among Najaf's community of learning allowed him to consolidate and spread his religious influence. His political activities were less overt than generally assumed; he kept a low profile in Najaf's public sphere yet maintained a political presence transnationally through his network. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines US covert operations toward Iran from February until November 1979. It focuses especially on whether the CIA was trying to undermine or overthrow Iran's nascent Islamic regime, as many Iranians believed. The article details the extensive covert contacts the CIA and other US personnel established in this period with Iranian officials and various Iranian opposition factions. Its main conclusion is that US officials established these contacts for the purpose of gathering intelligence about the rapidly changing situation in Iran, rather than to undermine the Islamic regime. Indeed, US personnel never encouraged these Iranian contacts to plot against the regime and often explicitly discouraged them from doing so. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the role of student activism in enhancing or weakening democratization in authoritarian contexts, focusing on the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It contends that while numerous studies indicate that student activism has been crucial in processes of regime change, insufficient attention has been paid to the circumstances under which it contributes to strengthening authoritarian rule. The case of Iran demonstrates that there are two different ways in which this occurs. First, much like many other civil society actors, student activism can be co-opted and at times willingly so because of a coincidence of material and/or ideological interests. Second, even when student activism genuinely pushes for democratization and becomes independent and autonomous from political power, the authoritarian constraints in place can contribute to marginalize it and defeat it. The Iranian case highlights the problems student activism faces when it attempts to disengage from the dominant structures of authoritarian politics, and in line with Jamal's findings, demonstrates how authoritarian structural constraints can undermine the democratic aspirations of well-organised groups. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

On 3 December 1979, almost one year after Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi left Iran, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran replaced the monarchical constitution of 1906. The new constitution was to guarantee that the monarchy was abolished and the Islamic Republic system of government was enforced in its place. The constitution was to observe the Islamic and the nationalistic aims of the revolution with regard to the demands of a public that came from various social, religious, ethnic, and political backgrounds. Thus the 1979 constitution included differing components, which necessitated the amendments and the modifications that were added to the constitution in 1989. The constitution and its development are subjects that have been discussed in detail by scholars of modern Iran, among whom Asghar Schirazi stands out for his comprehensive study of the constitution. The following translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran highlights the relationship between the 1979 text of the constitution and the 1989 amendments in an attempt to contribute to the ongoing discussions on this subject. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

While dealing with the human rights issue, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), which used to be the main opposition group that fought the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), did not realize that this sensitive struggle would cost it a ‘triple exclusion’. The MKO wished to use international agencies and diplomatic bodies, such as the European Union, the European Parliament, the UN and others, in order to raise the issue of human rights violations in Iran. In general, the aim was to topple the IRI by putting pressure on it through international sanctions and by gathering diplomatic support to replace the IRI with a democratic MKO government. The use of the human rights issue as a tool to gain support resulted in the opposite of what they wished. They became discriminated against by the IRI and excluded from the Iranian and international political spheres. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses international relations, with a focus on the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013, the victory of Hassan Rouhani, and Western policymakers' misconceptions about Iran's governing elites and political reforms. Topics include elections between moderate and fundamentalist candidates, regime oppression and brutality, and the rise of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as president in 1989. Additional information is presented on postwar reconstruction, relations between Germany and Iran, and international pressure.

The early drafts of the constitution of 1979 have represented a crucial moment in the creation of the post-revolutionary Iranian state. This article makes use of primary sources of the time and recently revealed material in order to provide a systematic analysis of the events which led to the production of the key versions of the draft constitution and the reaction to them by the multitude of political movements which were then active. The aim of this study is to clarify events and processes which have been left unexplored by the existing academic literature. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper aims to understand the consequences of US-led sanctions on two important industries in Iran: the oil and gas industry and power plant construction. Using qualitative methods and providing empirical evidence, this paper demonstrates the shortcomings of the pro-sanctions argument in the Iranian context. This paper argues that pro-sanctions literature is more inclined towards American politics; it ignores socially recurring effects such as empowering self-reliance in the target country. In the Iranian context, while sanctions regimes are beyond the control or power of industry managers, they have acted as a double-edged sword. On one hand, the sanctions have imposed extra costs on domestic companies in acquiring technological knowledge. On the other hand, they have stimulated policy-makers' determination and empowered a self-reliance doctrine amongst them. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article describes a US initiative to provide intelligence to Iran in 1979, as radical Islamists were becoming increasingly powerful there and tensions were escalating with the United States. This initiative began in May 1979, when Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and other Iranian officials asked US embassy personnel for information on ethnically based uprisings that threatened the new Islamic regime. It culminated when a CIA officer gave two briefings in mid-October warning Iran's leaders that Iraq was making preparations for a possible invasion of Iran. It ended abruptly in November 1979, when radical Islamist students seized the US embassy in Tehran. Iran's leaders did not heed the US warning and were entirely unprepared for the Iraqi invasion of September 1980, which had a devastating impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the political power of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the era of Iranian history following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Specific focus is given to the general militarization of Iranian politics and society during this period. The author identifies the Iranian military state as a "praetorian" one. The authors discuss the social upheavals and protests following the June 12, 2009 elections in Iran, emphasizing the role of civil society in them. They detail the political stability of Iran while describing difficulties caused by this stability for the international community.

The Iran-Iraq war remains one of the longest conflicts in the history of the modern Middle East. The war would define Iran's foreign policy orientation, as the exigencies of the conflict conditioned its approach to the United States, the Arab world, and even Israel. Along the way, Iran's leaders made a series of mistakes and miscalculations that ensured a stalemated conflict. Subordinating strategy to ideology and misplaced hopes that Iraq's population would rise to welcome Iranians as liberators contributed to prolonging a devastating war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does Washington care about freedom in Iran? On the surface, it seems like a silly question, since Ruhollah Khomeini to in 1979, Ever Ayatollah swept power Washington policymakers of all political stripes have been holding out hope that a kinder, gentler regime would emerge in Tehran. Republican and Democratic administrations alike have expressed their support for freedom within the Islamic Republic, and both sides of the political aisle have condemned the regime's repressive domestic practices. Yet, concrete proof of the U.S. commitment to pluralism in Iran is hard to come by. The strategies by which the United States can assist Iran's opposition remain poorly understood and even less effectively implemented. This is unfortunate, since with the proper vision and political will, the United States can harness economic, diplomatic and informational strategies to significantly affect the unfolding struggle for Iran's soul. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The primary aim of this article is to examine the policies of the elite in Iran in relation to political parties and organizations that have emerged between 1979 and 2009. It also attempts to argue that the politics of factionalism has proven to be incapable of creating a viable political system. On the other hand, it has been difficult to anticipate the emergence of a system based on party politics in Iran more than three decades after the revolution. The findings of this article demonstrate how determined the elite were in shaping politics in Iran, and will also show that the move away from factionalism to a system based on party politics between 1997 and 2009 faced stiff opposition from the conservative elite. The situation polarized politics in Iran and further increased intra-elite factionalism. This article relies mostly on Iranian primary sources, accessing opinions that have not yet been published or discussed. The focus is on examining the relationship between high-ranking members of the elite and organizations representing different interests within the system that came to existence either before or immediately after the revolution in 1979. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the foreign policy of the government of Iran, as of January 2010. It focuses on Iran's efforts to become a nuclear power, and the efforts of the U.S. to prevent this, particularly through imposing sanctions. The antagonistic relationship between Iran and the U.S. which has prevailed since the late 20th century is discussed, and issues related to U.S. President Barack Obama's foreign policy initiatives are analyzed in this context. It is argued that sanctions have some effect on public opinion, but will not produce direct changes in the policy of Iran's rulers.

The article discusses the foreign policy of the government of Iran, as of January 2010. It focuses on Iran's efforts to become a nuclear power, and the efforts of the U.S. to prevent this. The antagonistic relationship between Iran and the U.S. which has prevailed since the late 20th century is discussed, and issues related to U.S. President Barack Obama's foreign policy initiatives are analyzed in this context. The Iranian people are said to have shown a desire to normalize relations with the rest of the world. However, it is argued that the country's rulers are more interested in propping up their anti-democratic regime through repressive political violence and electoral fraud.

The article discusses the foreign policy of the government of Iran, as of January 2010. It focuses on the antagonistic relationship between Iran and the U.S. which has prevailed since the late 20th century, and the question of whether Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and U.S. President Barack Obama will be able to negotiate some form of detente. Iran's attempts to become a nuclear power, and U.S. military operations in two of Iran's neighboring countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, are discussed in this context.

This examination of the changes that have occurred in the relationship between the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the supreme guide during the past 30 years suggests that the Islamic Republic as a theological entity died just before noon on June 19, 2009. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'Alawis of Syria are part of the Shi'a stream; this has led to an alliance with Iran, the center of Shi'ite Islam. This alliance aggravated the oppositionist Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), whose members have been in exile since 1982. According to them, the alliance is a stage in a Shi'ite scheme to take over the Sunni countries, including Syria. However, during the past year the MB has changed their strategy, and we are currently witnessing a rapprochement between the Brotherhood and Damascus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses events surrounding the June 12, 2009 election in Iran. It states that the election results represent the end of the political stalemate that followed the 1989 death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the beginning of a period of confusion, predicting a nuclear explosion in the desert. It notes the installation of Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1921 with Western help, and his son Mohammed Reza in 1953. The son ordered Khomeini into exile in 1964 in an attempt to demolish political influence of the clergy. Khomeini came to power in the revolution of 1978-1979. Mir Hossein Mousavi, a 2009 candidate for president, was then an influential newspaper editor. The 2009 election retained Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in power but is widely considered to have been fraudulent and unrest persists.

The article discusses the 10th presidential election in Iran. The author examines how the inherent contradiction in the postrevolutionary constitution became the point of reference for both the idea of republicanism and autocratic theocracy. The author talks about how the basic principles of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 are seriously contested. Subjects of the article also include the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Iran's development of nuclear energy, and religious codes since the revolution.

Why do states stay revolutionary for so long? The question of why and how some political players of a country successfully pursue a revisionist strife against the status quo has neither theoretically nor empirically received systematic attention. I use a current policy issue, the crisis regarding Iran, as a single-case study to examine the issue. This article argues that answers are found in the interconnected realms of domestic politics and revolutionary ideas. In Iranian politics specifically, it is both the ideological conservative faction's occupation of key constitutional positions and pursuit of revolutionary ideas, which have caused the recurring and large degree of revolutionary zeal. In turn, this has had a significant effect on the extent of the Islamic Republic's socialization to regional and international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anti-Semitism is deeply ingrained in Shi `i Iran, both religiously and historically. Apart from being the first enemies of Prophet Muhammad, Jews have been been the subject of gross accusations, such as having a desire for world control, exaggerating the dimensions of the Holocaust, committing genocide, using blood in making unleavened bread, and distorting Holy Scriptures. The establishment of a Jewish state, Israel, added a political dimension to the already hostile religious attitude towards the Jews. This hostile religious-political attitude was contained to a large extent under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, but it burst out with vigour after Khomeini and his fellow clerics took over the reins of power in 1979. Faced with the constraints of international game rules and the pressure of a Western public opinion sensitive to expressions of anti-Semitism, the ruling clerics attempted to conceal their anti-Semitism by adopting a number of tactics, such as issuing far fewer public anti-Semitic statements, or by allowing others, through 'freedom of speech', to 'freely' express their anti-Semitic views. This is in line with taqiyyah (concealment) -- one of the basic principles of Shi `i Islam. The primary purpose of this article is to show that in spite of its repeated public announcements in differentiating between 'Jews' and 'Judaism' (the religious dimension), on the one hand, and 'Zionism' and 'Israel' (the political dimension) on the other, the Islamic regime in Iran not only fails to make such a differentiation, but actually often identifies the two as one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines political developments in Iran, where the ruling regime of mullahs will achieve 30 years in power in 2009. The author discusses the mixture of religious dogma and Iranian nationalism that creates a tension within the country. There is also a strain of western liberalization present that complicates issues of economic prosperity.

Ayatollah Montazeri was a Khomeinist who came to regret being Khomeini's unabashed protege. Though he has never abandoned the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, he has sought to reconceptualize it by furnishing it with democratic principles. In this, he has not been credible, although he has managed to portray himself as a reformer among some Iranian activists who themselves have credible reformist credentials, such as Akbar Ganji. But other reformists believe that the principles of the mandate of the jurist permit authoritarian abuses. And those among them who seek a mujtahid's support for overthrowing that doctrine would prefer to turn to the writings of Ayatollah Dr. Mehdi Ha'iri (d. 1999). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a tendency in Western capitals to dismiss adversarial Iranian behavior as the work of rogue regime factions, which are not representative of Tehran's true intentions. Following a Baghdad press conference providing evidence of Iranian weapons shipments to Iraq, U.S. officials raised doubts about Iran's actual culpability. The weapons shipments do "not translate to that the Iranian government per se, for sure, is directly involved in doing this," Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted the next day. On February 14, 2007, President George W. Bush said, "What we don't know is whether or not the head leaders of Iran ordered the Qods Force to do what they did." Likewise, when the lslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seized fifteen British sailors patrolling a waterway between Iran and Iraq, commentators suggested that responsibility may rest more with freelancing commanders than the Iranian government. Identifying the true decision-makers in the Islamic Republic is essential not only for accountability but also to ensure that any Western diplomatic outreach is targeted at those who have the power to affect regime behavior. Unfortunately, as U.S. officials again debate negotiations with the Islamic Republic, they simultaneously embrace Iranian reformists and dismiss pariah behavior as the actions of isolated rogue elements. Such an assessment is backwards, though. The IRGC represents the core of the Iranian state, and Iran's reformists are those who, by acting on their own without either state support or any ability to deliver on promises are, in the Iranian context, the true rogue elements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article advocates the use of institutional theory study the development of Islamist political parties. The author notes that civic institutions are weak in Muslim countries generally, magnifying the threat posed by Islamist political organizing. The problem of developing civil society is presented as a function of the authoritarian political systems of Muslim countries. The examples of politicized Islam in the authoritarian states of Iran and Saudi Arabia presented as instances where the Shari'a law and ideas about the politicisation of Islam have served to undermine democratic principles.

The article discusses the reasons why Iran is not a good representative of Islamic civilization. Details about Iran's Persian past and the influences of Persian culture on Islamic states are provided. The dialogue between Islamic states and the West is explored and the domination of Western culture is examined. The religionization of modern nation-states and their role in the recognition of universal values are described. The adaptation of Iran to the modern world and modern values is also discussed.

Since its revival in 1989, the reproductive health and family planning program of Iran has made great strides in raising the contraceptive prevalence rate and reducing fertility. The majority of couples are using modern methods promoted and provided by the national program, although a sizable proportion of couples continue to depend on the traditional method of withdrawal. The longstanding urban-rural gap in contraceptive prevalence rates has been reduced to about 10 percent, which is mainly the result of better-educated urban couples' continued practice of withdrawal. Despite its enormous success in meeting the needs of married couples, in narrowing the urban-rural gap in access to and use of modern contraceptives, and in reducing fertility, the Iranian family planning program is open to criticism for confining its target audience to married couples and failing to address the issue of abortion. The restrictive aspects of the program are often justified on the grounds of religious values and fear of encouraging sexual promiscuity. Because of the theocratic nature of the political system and the immense power enjoyed by Shiite ulama (religious leaders), no step can be taken to address these restrictions without their implicit support and approval. This study describes some of the ethical issues facing the reproductive health program of Iran and indicates how pragmatic approaches adopted by the ruling Shiite ulama to solve some of the social and medical challenges of a rapidly modernizing society may be extended to overcome ethical hurdles faced by the reproductive health program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the possibility of a confrontation between Iran and the U.S. U.S. President George W. Bush labeled Iran as evil due to its nuclear program and support of terrorism. He comments that hardliners prevented former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami from enacting social reforms and have oppressed Iranian citizens. The election of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad led to increasing defiance by Iran toward the international community and attempts to influence Iraqi politics.

This article focuses on the two political factions in Iran, the Jihadi (traditionalist combative) and the Ijithadi (creatively interpretive) and their competition and accommodation since the Revolution. The author argues that US-policy and developments in the region have favoured the Jihadis and enabled President Ahmadinejad to act more intransigently and assertively than would otherwise been the case. At a time of profound shift in the sectarian and strategic balance in the region, the challenge for the US and its allies is to widen the arena for Ijithadis within Iranian politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Offers observations on the state of science in Iran as of November 24, 2000. Effects of the reign of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on scientific research in Iran; Efforts to rebuild science and technology departments in Iranian universities.

Offers an analysis of political rivalry in Iran under the presidency of Muhammad Khatami. Political factions in Iran; Ideology of Islamists; Islamic pluralism; Significance of the 1997 presidential election that catapulted Khatami into power.

Analyzes the debate over the Islamic leadership and the role of Velayet-e Faqih in Iran in the era of President Muhammad Khatami. Basic tenets of the Iranian Revolution and its contradictions; Prevalence of the political state over religion; Political, religious and clerical crisis.

Presents a case study of Iran sixteen years after the Islamic Revolution. Iran's claim to the islands of Bahrain archipelago; Iran's military reconstruction and pursuit of a nuclear strategy; International relations.

The article presents a discussion related to the fundamental contradictions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. There has been a common tendency among many western commentators to see the outward manifestation of the state in the Islamic Republic of Iran as made up of different factions. The executive branch led by President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is believed to represent a moderate faction, while the former speaker of the Majlis, the Iranian Parliament, who until recently controlled the legislature, is supposed to be the leader of the radicals. The views of the radical faction are usually presented in a variety of newspapers published in Tehran, namely "Salaam, Jahan-e Islam," and "Bayan." Rafsanjani is also labeled as a reformist president as well as a pragmatist. The moderate faction controls the radio and television in the country, as well as a number of newspapers and periodicals, such as "Ettelaat," "Jomhuri-e Islami," and the "Tehran Times." Some Iranian observers have also pointed to another, a conservative faction, purportedly led by the powerful clergyman Azari Qomi, whose views are usually advocated in the daily newspaper "Resalat."