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In this paper, I introduce a novel methodology to conduct surveys. The priced survey methodology. Like standard surveys, priced surveys are easy to implement, and measure invisible assets such as feelings, happiness, knowledge, views, and attitudes on numerical scales. Unlike standard surveys, priced surveys allow to leverage decades of research on revealed preference and consumer demand in the analysis of invisible assets.

To speak of leximetry in the context of an impact analysis in contract law would consist in applying econometric principles to legal problems in order to empirically test different provisions and to interpret their understanding by the actors of the economic system. In this context, a general research problem could be formulated: is the reform of contract law a source of clarification or, on the contrary, of incomprehension for legal practitioners with regard to the judicial reading? The aim would be to examine the underlying issues, in particular the understanding of the reform by drafters of contracts, by introducing a quantitative analysis of the number of appeals at first instance on the issues arising from the reform, and its proper application by judges, by reference, for example, to the number of appeals lodged by the parties after referral to the court, as well as to the number of appeals to the Court of Cassation and the number of judgments in favour of, or against, resolution of the dispute. To this end, the present research methodology project aims to introduce to the jurist and the economist, different perspectives of mathematical analysis in Python 3.8, in order to lay the foundations of a new discipline in France, with great potential for the consolidation of legal security and the interpretation in terms of efficiency, of the production of law by the legislator. Table of contents : 1- Fractality of the legal phenomenon and mathematization of practice: an infinitely fragmented and statistically appropriable science ; 1.1- Ambiguity, legal security and statistical modeling: a common paradigm for law and computer science ; 1. 2- From the standardization of a large set of categorical variables to the realization of unbiased indicators of legal effectiveness ; 2- Towards a leximetry methodology for impact analysis of reforms: the example of ordinary least squares regression ; 2.1- Simple linear regression and OLS estimator, analysis of both strengths and limitations ; 2.2- Introduction to multiple regression by gradient descent algorithm .; Parler de leximétrie dans le cadre d'une analyse d'impact en droit des contrats consisterait à appliquer des principes économétriques à des problèmes juridiques afin de tester empiriquement différentes dispositions et d'interpréter leur compréhension par les acteurs du système économique. Dans ce contexte, une problématique générale de recherche pourrait être formulée : la réforme du droit des contrats est-elle une source de clarification ou, au contraire, d'incompréhension pour les praticiens du droit au regard de la lecture judiciaire ? Il s'agirait d'examiner les enjeux sous-jacents, notamment la compréhension de la réforme par les rédacteurs de contrats, en mettant en place une analyse quantitative du nombre de recours en première instance sur les questions issues de la réforme, et de sa bonne application par les juges, en se référant par exemple au nombre de recours formés par les parties après saisine de la juridiction, ainsi qu'au nombre de recours en cassation et au nombre d'arrêts favorables ou défavorables à la résolution du litige. A cette fin, le présent projet de méthodologie de recherche vise à présenter au juriste et à l'économiste, différentes perspectives de l'analyse mathématique en Python 3.8 afin de poser les fondamentaux d’une discipline nouvelle en France et porteuse d’un grand potentiel pour la consolidation de la sécurité juridique et l’interpretation en terme d’efficacité, de la production du droit par le législateur. Table des matières : 1- Fractalité du phénomène juridique et mathématisation de la pratique : une science infiniment fragmentée et statistiquement appropriable ; 1.1- Ambiguïté, sécurité juridique et modélisation statistique : un paradigme commun au droit et à l'informatique ; 1. 2- De la standardisation d'un large ensemble de variables catégorielles à la réalisation d'indicateurs non biaisés d'efficacité juridique ; 2- Vers une méthodologie leximétrique pour l'analyse d'impact des réformes : l'exemple de la régression par moindres carrés ordinaires ; 2.1- Régression linéaire simple et estimateur MCO, analyse des forces et des limites ; 2.2- Introduction à la régression multiple par algorithme de descente de gradient.

International audience; The design of employee performance feedback policies is complex for organizations because their purpose is both to signal competence and possible needs for remediation, and to motivate employees. The most important decisions are whether to conceal information or provide feedback on the employees' performance, and whether this feedback should be in terms of absolute performance or relative to co-workers' output, depending on the incentive schemes in use. The literature has identified a number of biases from the perspective of both the evaluators and those being evaluated. After highlighting the issues and questions raised by performance feedback policies, the discussion focuses on current theoretical and empirical evidence about their beneficial and detrimental effects. Directions for future research are then discussed.

International audience; The current publication system in economics has encouraged the inflation of positive results in empirical papers. Registered Reports, also called Pre-Results Reviews, are a new submission format for empirical work that takes pre-registration one step further. In Registered Reports, researchers write their papers before running the study and commit to a detailed data collection process and analysis plan. After a first-stage review, a journal can give an In-Principle-Acceptance guaranteeing that the paper will be published if the authors carry out their data collection and analysis as pre-specified. We here propose a practical guide to Registered Reports for empirical economists. We illustrate the major problems that Registered Reports address (phacking, HARKing, forking, and publication bias), and present practical guidelines on how to write and review Registered Reports (e.g., the data-analysis plan, power analysis, and correction for multiple-hypothesis testing), with R and STATA codes. We provide specific examples for experimental economics, and show how research design can be improved to maximize statistical power. Last, we discuss some tools that authors, editors, and referees can use to evaluate Registered Reports (checklist, study-design table, and quality assessment).

This paper reviews the recent literature on cheating and corruption to demonstrate the value that experimental methods hold for studying dishonesty in developing countries. Emphasizing the diversity of experimental methods, the chapter highlights the contributions of laboratory and field experiments to the measurement of crosscountry differences and to the identification of select causes of corruption and cheating. This body of literature has provided evidence of the causal effects of social norms, institutions, group identity, and social status concerns. Moreover, the existing research has also delivered practical policy recommendations to ethics-related development problems.

In response to the pandemic of COVID-19 and in lack of pharmaceutical solutions, many countries have introduced social and physical distancing regulations to contain the transmission of the virus. These measures are effective insofar as they are able to quickly change people's habits. This is achieved by changing the monetary incentives of rule violators but also by shifting people's perception regarding the appropriateness of socialization. We studied the effect of introducing, and then lifting, distancing regulations on the perceived norm regarding social encounters. We conducted an online incentivized experiment in France where we elicited the same participants' perceived norm and social distancing behavior every week for three months. We found that people shifted behavior and norm perception as soon as the government introduced or removed distancing measures. This effect was fast acting and long lasting. This is informative for future interventions, especially in light of a possible COVID-19 recurrence.

International audience; Does giving taxpayers a voice over the destination of tax revenues lead to more honest income declarations? Previous experiments have shown that giving participants the opportunity to select the organization that receives their tax funds tends to increase tax compliance. The aim of this paper is to assess whether this increase in compliance is induced by the sole fact of giving subjects a choice—a “direct democracy effect”. To that aim, we ask participants to a tax evasion game to choose, in a collective or individual choice setting, between two very similar organizations which provide the same social (ecological) benefits. We elicit compliance for both organizations before the choice is made so as to control for the counter-factual compliance decision. We find that democracy does not increase compliance, and even observe a slight negative effect—in particular for women. Our results confirm the existence of a commitment effect of democracy, leading to favor more the selected organization when it was actively chosen. The commitment effect of democracy is however not enough to overcome the decrease in the level of compliance. Thanks to response times data, we show that prior choice on similar options as compared to a purely random selection weakens the preference for honesty. One important field application of our results is that democracy in tax spending must offer real choices to tax payers to improve compliance.

International audience; Beyond a summary of the paper, this review of "Group Identity and Social Preferences" by Yan Chen and Sherry X. Li highlights its exceptional impact on our understanding of group-contingent social preferences. This paper has made an important theoretical contribution by introducing group identity in the Charness and Rabin (2002)'s model of social preferences. The core of the contribution is to show experimentally that social identity influences distributional preferences, reciprocity and welfare-maximizing behavior. In particular, charity increases and envy decreases when people are matched with an in-group compared to an out-group, and people are more likely to reward and less likely to punish an ingroup than an out-group match. This paper has also contributed to the methodological debates about the use of minimal group identity in laboratory experiments. It has inspired many research programs on the role of group-contingent preferences in various dimensions of decision-making in society. It is also important to emphasize its policy implications regarding how groupcontingent social preferences could be activated to improve efficiency and the quality of social interactions in our segmented societies. This research agenda is more relevant than ever.

International audience; "As one of the first expenditure programmes of the European Union (EU), the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is regularly monitored and evaluated. Ex ante evaluation is a legal requirement of the EU’s Financial Regulation, responding to well-established guidelines under the ‘integrated impact assessment’ system. It is directly conducted by the European Commission (EC) and assesses the cost-effectiveness and the distributional consequences of proposed CAP reform scenarios. Ex post (retrospective) evaluation seeks to measure the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of CAP measures. Ex-post evaluation of the CAP is co-ordinated by the Commission’s Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development, in relation with MemberStates and is often carried out by independent experts, both at European leveland at national and/or regional levels..."

International audience; The Fintech industry has facilitated the development of companies using blockchain technology. The use of this technology inside banking system and industry opens the route to several questions regarding the business activity, legal environment, and insurance devices. In this paper, considering the creation of small companies interested to develop their business with a public blockchain, we analyse from different aspects why a company (in banking or insurance system, and industry) decides that a blockchain protocol is more legitimate than another one for the business which it wants to develop looking at the legal (in case of dispute) points of view. We associate with each blockchain a probative value which permits to assure in case of dispute that a transaction has been really done. We illustrate our proposal using 13 blockchains providing in that case a ranking between these blockchains for their use in business environment. We associate with this probative value some main characteristics of any blockchain as market capitalization and log-return volatilities that the investors need to also take into account with the new probative value for their managerial strategy.

International audience; We estimate the hidden cost of social obligations to redistribute exploiting data from a controlled setting in urban Senegal, which combines lab-in-the-field measures and out-of-lab follow-up data. We estimate a social tax of about 9 percent. When given the opportunity to get hidden income, individuals decrease by 26 percent the share of gains they transfer to kin — mostly outside the household — and increase health and personal expenses. We expand on prior literature by both identifying the individual cost of informal redistribution and then relating it to postexperiment resource-allocation decisions, and by disentangling intra- and interhousehold redistributive pressure.

International audience; We propose a structural econometric model that incorporates altruism towards other household members into the willingness to pay for a public good. The model distinguishes preferences for public good improvements for oneself from preferences for improvements for other household members. We test for three different types of altruism - ‘pure self-interest’, ‘pure altruism’ and ‘public-good-focused non-pure altruism’. Using French contingent valuation data regarding air quality improvements, we find positive and significant degrees of concern for children under the age of 18, which are explained by determinants related to health and subjective air quality assessment. All other forms of pure or air-quality-focused altruism within the family are insignificant, including for children over 18, siblings, spouses, and parents. This result suggests that benefit estimates that do not consider altruism could undervalue improvements in air quality in France.

International audience

International audience; In order to keep pace with the evolution of the objectives and means of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, evaluation tools also need to adapt. A set of tools that have proved highly effective in other policy fields is economic xperiments. These allow the testing of a new policy before its implementation, provide evidence of its specific effects, and identify behavioural dimensions that can influence policy outcomes. We argue that agricultural policy should be subject to economic experiments, providing examples to illustrate how they can inform CAP design. We identify the additional efforts needed to establish further proof-of- concept, by running more –and more robust –experiments related to the CAP. This can happen only by integrating experimental evaluation results within the policy cycle and addressing ethical and practical challenges seriously. To do so, researchers would benefit from a concerted European effort to promote the methodology across the EU; organise the replication in time and across Europ of experiments relevant for the CAP; and build a multi-national panel of farmers willing to participate in experiments. Steps are being taken in this direction by the Research Network of Economics Experiments for CAP evaluation (REECAP).; Face à l’évolution des objectifs et des moyens de la politique agricole commune de l’Union européenne, les outils d’évaluation doivent également s’adapter. Les expérimentations économiques sont un ensemble d’outils qui se sont avérés très efficaces dans d’autres domaine d’action des pouvoirs publics. Elles permettent de tester une nouvelle politique avant sa mise en oeuvre, fournissent des informations sur les effets spécifiques de cette politique et identifient les dimensions comportementales qui peuvent influencer ses résultats. Nous soutenons que la politique agricole devrait être l’objet d’expérimentations économiques et fournissons des exemples pour illustrer comment celles-ci peuvent éclairer la formulation de la PAC. Nous identifions les efforts supplémentaires nécessaires pour établir d’autres preuves de concept, en menant des expérimentations liées à la PAC plus nombreuses -et plus robustes. Cela ne peut se faire qu’en intégrant les résultats des évaluations expérimentales dans le cycle de la politique et en s’attaquant sérieusement aux défis éthiques et pratiques. Pour ce faire, les chercheurs bénéficieraient d’un effort européen concerté pour promouvoir la méthodologie à travers l’Union européenne ; organiser la réplication dans le temps et à travers l’Europe d’expérimentations pertinentes pour la PAC ; et constituer un panel multinational d’agriculteurs désireux de participer à ces expérimentations. Des mesures sont prises dans ce sens par le Réseau de recherche sur les expérimentations économiques pour l’évaluation de la PAC (REECAP).

International audience; Catch-and-release (C&R) could be an interesting management tool in recreational fisheries as long as mortality remains low and the anglers' well-being does not drop. We used a choice experiment to examine the potential of C&R angling as a monitoring tool for the salmon recreational fishery in Brittany (France) in summer 2017. Anglers were asked to choose between hypothetical fishing day trips differing in terms of their combination of relevant attributes and levels and distance to travel. From the analysis of respondents' trade-offs between the fishing trip's attributes, willingness-to-pay was estimated for each level of attribute. Our results show that anglers prefer unrestrictive regulations. On average, we observe that C&R has a depressive effect on the valuation of the fishing day. However, some socioeconomic groups positively value C&R. All in all, the majority of the anglers nonetheless hold a positive valuation of a C&R fishing day, which could therefore be used to generate economic returns for the river once the total admissible capture (TAC) is reached. Lastly, the fishing season, and especially the level of river use, impacts more on the value of fishing than C&R.

Présenté par Marie Claire VillevalBecause of the pandemic of COVID-19, we had to cancel all our regional and world ESA meetings in 2020. We hope to resume face-to-face meetings in 2021. In the meantime, to promote continuing engagement, we are very pleased to announce a massive global online meeting!; International audience

This paper reviews studies conducted in naturally-occurring work environments or in the laboratory on the impact of performance feedback provision and peer effects on individuals' performance. First, it discusses to which extent feedback on absolute performance affects individuals' effort for cognitive or motivational reasons, and how evaluations can be distorted strategically. Second, this paper highlights the positive and negative effects of feedback on relative performance and rank on individuals' productivity and persistence, but also on the occurrence of antisocial behavior. Relative feedback stimulates effort by informing on the marginal return or the marginal cost of effort, and by activating behavioral forces even in the absence of monetary incentives. These behavioral mechanisms relate to self-esteem, status concerns, competitive preferences and social learning. Relative feedback sometimes discourages or distorts effort, notably if people collude or are disappointment averse. In addition to incentive schemes and social preferences, the management of self-confidence affects the way relative feedback impacts productivity. Third, the paper addresses the question of the identification of peer effects on employees' performance, their size, their direction and their heterogeneity along the hierarchy. The mechanisms behind peer effects include conformism, social pressure, rivalry, social learning and distributional preferences, depending on the presence of payoff externalities or technological and organizational externalities..

International audience; Using two earned income/tax declaration experimental designs we show that only partial liars are affected by a truth-telling oath, a non-price commitment device. Under oath, we see no change in the number of chronic liars and fewer partial liars. Rather than smoothly increasing their compliance, we also observe that partial liars who respond to the oath, respond by becoming fully honest under oath. Based on both response times data and the consistency of subjects when several compliance decisions are made in a row, we show that partial lying arises as the result of weak preferences towards profitable honesty. The oath only transforms people with weak preferences for lying into being committed to the truth.

We would like to thank the editor Stefan Trautmann, the two anonymous reviewers, Hélène Huber for their helpful comments and the LEMMA, University Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas for its financial support.; International audience; Money illusion is usually defined as the inability of individuals to correctly account for inflation or deflation when making decisions. Empirical evidence shows that money illusion matters in financial decisions, particularly those made by households. In this article, we analyze money illusion at the individual level within the context of financial choices and study its relationship with numeracy and financial literacy. To do so, we propose an original measure of money illusion via an experimental task. This task consists of a series of choices between a pair of simple bonds whose returns are affected only by inflation (or deflation). We provide a fine-grained measure of money illusion that is correlated with typical measures (questionnaires) of it. Moreover, we show that money illusion depends on the choice context (e.g., inflation or deflation) and participants’ abilities. Individuals with financial knowledge are less sensitive to money illusion than others, while there is no evidence of an impact of numeracy.

Catch-and-release (C&R) could be an interesting management tool in recreational fisheries as long as mortality remains low and the anglers’ well-being does not drop. We used a choice experiment to examine the potential of C&R angling as a monitoring tool for the salmon recreational fishery in Brittany (France). Anglers were asked to choose between hypothetical fishing day trips differing in terms of their combination of relevant attributes and levels. From the analysis of respondents’ trade-offs between the fishing trip’s attributes, willingness-to-pay were estimated for each level of attribute. Our results show that anglers prefer unrestrictive regulations. All in all, the majority of the anglers nonetheless hold a positive valuation of a C&R fishing day, which could therefore be used to generate economic returns for the river once the TAC is reached. Lastly, the fishing season, and especially the level of river use, impact more on the value of fishing than C&R.; La remise à l’eau des prises peut être une mesure de gestion intéressante dans le cas de la pêche récréative tant que la mortalité demeure faible et que le bien-être des pêcheurs ne diminue pas. Une enquête a été conduite en 2017 auprès des pêcheurs de saumons des trois départements de l'ouest breton, dans le but de leur faire révéler leur consentement à payer pour différents paramètres de gestion de la pêche : saison, total autorisé de capture (TAC), mode de pêche, no-kill, fréquentation. Il était demandé aux pêcheurs de choisir entre des destinations de pêche hypothétiques différant par la combinaison des paramètres de gestion et la distance pour s'y rendre. En moyenne, on observe que le no-kill a un effet dépressif sur la valorisation de la journée de pêche. Cependant, certaines CSP valorisent positivement le no-kill. Au total, il faut retenir que la majorité des pêcheurs conservent néanmoins une valorisation positive de la journée de pêche en no-kill, ce qui permettrait donc de valoriser la rivière après la clôture du TAC. Enfin, la saison de pêche et surtout la fréquentation impactent davantage la valeur de la pêche que le no-kill.

We investigate the effects of group identity on hiring decisions with adverse selection problems. We run a laboratory experiment in which employers cannot observe a worker’s ability or verify the veracity of the ability the worker claims to have. We evaluate whether sharing an identity results in employers discriminating in favor of ingroup workers and whether it helps workers and employers overcome the adverse selection problem. We induce identities using the minimal group paradigm and study two settings: one in which workers cannot change their identity and one in which they can. Although sharing a common identity does not make the worker’s claims more honest, employers strongly discriminate in favor of ingroup workers when identities are fixed. Discrimination cannot be explained by employers’ beliefs and, hence, seems to be taste-based. When possible, few workers change their identity. However, the mere possibility of changing identities erodes the employers’ trust toward ingroup workers and eliminates discrimination. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

International audience; In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to analyze the effect of social preferences in a coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Inequality is increased by increasing the coordination payoffs of some subjects while the coordination payoffs of others remain unchanged. Theoretically, in this setting, inequality aversion may lead to a negative relationship between inequality and coordination success, while total payoff motivations lead to a positive relationship. Using a within-subject experimental design, we find that more inequality unambiguously yields a higher level of coordination success. Furthermore, this result holds even for subjects whose payoffs remain unchanged. Our results suggest that total payoff motivations drive the positive relationship between inequality and coordination success found in this experiment. Moreover, our data highlight that the order of treatment matters. Groups facing over time a reduction in inequalities reach the efficient outcome more often, over the entire experiment, compared to groups facing over time an increase in inequalities. This study thus contributes to understanding whether social preferences and variations in inequality affect the outcome of coordination problems.

National audience; While teaching in economics at the university is mainly based on passive pedagogy, this paper argues in favor of active pedagogical methods, using experimental classroom games. The issue is illustrated by focusing the article on the analysis of the firms’ competitive strategies in different market structures (i.e. perfect competition, monopoly and oligopoly). We first explain the bases of experimental methods and then present some protocols allowing to implement classroom games corresponding to the market structures which are considered. A survey of the literature is exposed to provide an exhaustive view of the different games that can be used by teachers.; Partant du constat d’un enseignement de l’économie à l’université fondé sur des méthodes principalement passives, cet article plaide en faveur d’une pédagogie active fondée sur les jeux pédagogiques expérimentaux avec une application à la thématique des structures de marché. Il fournit les clés pour l’utilisation de tels jeux en exposant les bases de l’économie expérimentale et les éléments pratiques de la mise en œuvre d’un jeu pédagogique. L’enseignement des trois principales structures de marché (concurrence pure et parfaite, monopole et oligopole) est proposé à travers la présentation d’un jeu détaillé par structure, complété par une revue de la littérature liée aux expériences pédagogiques existant sur chacune d’entre elles.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, individuals frequently transfer a substantial share of their resources to members of their social networks. Social pressure to redistribute, however, can induce disincentive effects on resource allocation decisions. This paper measures and characterizes the costs of redistributive pressure by estimating individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) to hide their income. The study estimates a social tax due to informal redistribution of 10 percent. Moreover, it shows that individuals are willing to escape from the redistributive pressure exerted mainly by extended family members.

International audience; This paper offers further experimental evidence on the nature of fair behaviour, investigating the effects of different splitting options on offers and rejection rates of low offers in ultimatum games. The experiment provides a robustness check of the validity of the results in the literature concerning the behaviour of the proposer and questions the reliability of interdependent preferences for explaining rejection rates. We test whether the introduction of a 50–50 splitting option combined with observability by a third-party may have an impact on offers and rejection rates of low offers. We find similar results as previous studies regarding the impact on offers by introducing the 50–50 option, consistent with a “regard for others” effect. We show that the impact appears to be enhanced by introducing observability, consistent with a “regard by others” effect. Introducing a 50–50 splitting option seems to increase the rejection rate for low offers as in previous studies, but turns out not significant. The introduction of the 50–50 option combined with observability may have some impact on the rejection rate, albeit not highly significant.

Theory suggests that a form of Kantian morality has evolutionary founda-tions. To investigate the relative importance of Kantian morality and social preferences, we run a laboratory experiment on strategic interaction in social dilemmas. We struc-turally estimate social preferences and Kantian morality at the individual and aggregate level. We observe considerable heterogeneity in preferences. Finite mixture analyses show that the subject pool is well described as consisting of two or three types: all display a Kantian moral concern, which they combine with aheadness aversion, behindness aver-sion, or both. The value of adding Kantian morality to well-established preference classes is also evaluated.

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2019.07 - ISSN : 1955-611X; Using discrete choices to elicit preferences is a major tool to help guide public policy. Although Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) remains by far the most popular mechanism used to elicit preferences, its reliability still is questionable. Using an induced value experimental design, we show that standard benchmarks achieve no more than 56% (hypothetical answers with no monetary incentives) to 60% (real monetary incentives) of payoff maximizing choices. Herein we demonstrate that having respondents sign a the truth-telling oath reduces non-payoff maximizing choices by nearly 50% relative to these benchmarks. The explicit and voluntary commitment to honesty improved decisions. Further, we show that it is the explicit commitment to honesty induced by the truth-telling oath improves choices, not just any oath mechanism, i.e., an oath to task or to duty did not improve choices.

Why do people pay taxes? Rational choice theory has fallen short in answering this question. Another explanation, called “tax morale”, has been promoted. Tax morale captures the behavioral idea that non-monetary preferences (like norm-submission, moral emotions and moral judgments) might be better determinants of tax compliance than monetary trade-offs. Herein we report on two lab experiments designed to assess whether norm-submission, moral emotions (e.g. affective empathy, cognitive empathy, propensity to feel guilt and shame) or moral judgments (e.g. ethics principles, integrity, and moralization of everyday life) can help explain compliance behavior. Although we find statistically significant correlations of tax compliance behavior with empathy and shame, the economic significance of these correlations are low–—more than 80% of the variability in compliance remains unexplained. These results suggest that tax authorities should focus on the institutional context, rather than individual preference characteristics, to handle tax evasion.

International audience; In this article we investigate and compare the effect of a collective sanction (namely, an increase of the tax burden) with a recommendation, both from a third-party, in a public good game “à la Andreoni [1993]” where crowding-out is possible. Furthermore, we test for the correlation between the incentives and the social orientation of subjects on cooperation by using a social value orientation (SVO) test. Our results show that, in general, the sanction is more powerful than the recommendation but also that the threat of punishment has a disciplinary impact by enhancing cooperation. Moreover, we show that both sanction and its threat have a different impact according to the social orientation of subjects: contrary to individua-lists and competitors, prosocials are not significantly sensitive to both.; Cet article étudie et compare l’impact d’une sanction monétaire collective (par le biais d’une augmentation de la pression fiscale) par rapport à celui d’une recommandation par un tiers dans le cadre d’un jeu de bien public « à la Andreoni [1993] »autorisant la possibilité d’effet d’éviction. Nous testons également la corrélation entre l’effet des incitations et l’orientation sociale des sujets (au moyen d’un test SVO) sur les dispositions à contribuer au bien collectif. Nos résultats montrent que globalement la sanction est plus efficace que la recommandation et qu’en outre la menace de sanction a un effet disciplinant. Cependant, la sanction ainsi que sa menace ont un impact différencié selon l’orientation sociale des sujets. En particulier,contrairement aux individualistes et aux compétiteurs, les individus prosociaux n’y sont pas significativement sensibles.

In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether decentralized upfront investments increase cooperation in settings where there is no enforcement mechanism and cooperation is not easily sustained voluntarily. Such investments are a cost that individuals incur before deciding whether to cooperate or not, and increase the payoff resulting from the choice to cooperate. We study whether the effect of investments on cooperation depends on the investments being voluntary or mandatory. While cooperation rarely emerges spontaneously when investments are not possible, we show that introducing investment opportunities boosts overall cooperation levels. If investments are low and voluntary, cooperation is lower than when the same investments are mandatory. For high investments, cooperation is not significantly different between the two conditions. This is consistent with low investments being interpreted as a signal for unwillingness to cooperate, triggering non-cooperative choices.

As any nascent discipline, neuroeconomics raises many questions. The article reports on the main debates andcontroversies that neuroeconomics has aroused in the literature. Three major issues relating to the status ofknowledge produced are addressed. Are results reliable? Are they scientifically legitimate? What is their usefulnessfor an economist? This framework allows to assess the main criticisms addressed to neuroeconomics and the natureof the parades which can be deployed.; Comme toute discipline émergente, la neuroéconomie soulève bon nombre de questions donnant lieu à débats et controverses. L’article en rend compte en les regroupant autour de trois questions majeures qui portent sur le statut des connaissances à ce jour produites : Des connaissances certaines ? Des connaissances scientifiquement justifiées ? Des connaissances utiles à l’économiste ? Sans prétendre à l’exhaustivité, ce cadre d’analyse permet d’apprécier les lignes de force des principales critiques adressées à la neuroéconomie en même temps que la nature des parades susceptibles d’être déployées

Using an original survey-experimental protocol, we study the normative acceptability of the trade-off between immoral profit (discrimination) and costly morality (non-discrimination). We test the causal influence of three factors: i) the origin of discrimination, ii) the steepness of the morality/profit trade-off and iii) anti-discriminatory moral injunctions. Contrasting with past experimental and attitudinal studies, we find that a significant minority of respondents believe that labor market discrimination is acceptable when morality results in profit loss. We also find that the three tested factors have significant effects on normative opinions. Respondents are more likely to choose profit over morality when discrimination is taste-based than when it is caused by imperfect information. Discrimination’s acceptability rises with the cost of non discrimination. Anti-discriminatory moral injunctions sharply reduces the acceptability of profitable discrimination., À l'aide d'un protocole d'enquête expérimental original, nous étudions l'acceptabilité normative de l'arbitrage entre un profit immoral (la discrimination) et une moralité coûteuse (la non-discrimination). Nous testons l'influence causale de trois facteurs : i) l'origine de la discrimination, ii) l'importance de l'arbitrage morale/profit et iii) des injonctions morales anti-discriminatoires. Contrairement aux études expérimentales et attitudinales antérieures, nous constatons qu'une minorité importante de répondants estime que la discrimination sur le marché du travail est acceptable lorsqu’il s’agit d’éviter une perte de profit. Nous constatons également que les trois facteurs testés ont des effets significatifs sur les opinions normatives des répondants. Nous trouvons que les répondants sont plus susceptibles d’arbitrer en faveur du profit contre la morale lorsque la discrimination est fondée sur le goût des clients que lorsqu'elle est causée par une information imparfaite du décideur. Par ailleurs, l'acceptabilité de la discrimination augmente avec le coût de la non-discrimination. Enfin, des injonctions morales anti-discriminatoires réduisent considérablement l'acceptabilité de la discrimination aux yeux des répondants.

This chapter lays out in what ways laboratory experiments can be useful for macroeconomics and discusses some of the methods used in such experiments. Among the main advantages are: bench-testing of alternative policies, capturing strategic uncertainty and biases from standard preferences or Bayesian updating, and accounting for heterogeneity in agents’ expectations and behavior. It is explained how DSGE models are implemented in laboratory experiments and how heuristic switching models can be used to analyze expectations out of equilibrium. A short literature review provides some results from direct tests of the various elements of microfoundation on which DSGE models are built. The methods of testing consumption smoothing and informational frictions are discussed in more detail. While experimental macroeconomics is a growing field, which has been useful in many respects, this chapter also discusses its challenges and limitations.

First online; International audience; Fish sustainability raises many questions regarding the impact of both generic information and ecolabels on citizens’ consumption. An experiment was conducted in France to evaluate the impact of different types of information on participants’ WTP for canned fish. For starting the experiment, participants bid for canned tuna and sardines, sold without any quality labels. Explanatory messages on health and sustainability were delivered by balancing positive and negative information, and varying the order of information across subgroups. It is shown that only negative descriptions, including the ones on sustainability, lead to significant reductions in WTP for both tuna and sardines. In the second part of the experiment, participants received a new set of canned tuna, with or without quality labels. We observe a significantly higher WTP for canned tuna sold with the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) label compared to the WTP for canned tuna sold without any label. This positive premium for such a label indicating the fish sustainability differs from results in the first part of the experiment, in which, for sardines, the only significant message leads to a reduction in WTP, even if sardines are relatively healthy and sustainable.; La durabilité des poissons soulève de nombreuses questions concernant l’impact des informations et des écolabels sur la consommation des citoyens. Une expérience a été menée en France pour évaluer l’impact de différents types d’informations sur les dispositions à payer (DAP) des participants pour des poissons vendus en conserve. Pour commencer l'expérience, les participants ont donné leur DAP pour du thon et des sardines vendues en conserve sans label de qualité. Les messages explicatifs sur la santé et la durabilité ont été révélés en équilibrant les informations positives et négatives, et en faisant varier l'ordre des informations entre les sous-groupes. On montre que seules les descriptions négatives, y compris celles sur la durabilité, entraînent des réductions significatives des DAP pour le thon et les sardines. Dans la deuxième partie de l'expérience, les participants ont reçu un nouvel ensemble de conserves de thon, avec ou sans label de qualité. Nous observons une DAP nettement plus élevée pour le thon en conserve vendu avec l’étiquette du Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) par rapport à la DAP pour le thon vendu sans label de qualité. Cette prime positive pour ce label indiquant la durabilité du poisson diffère des résultats de la première partie de l'expérience, dans laquelle, pour les sardines, le seul message avec un impact significatif conduit à une réduction des DAP, même si les sardines sont relativement saines et durables.

The paper is an overview of the main significant advances in the knowledge of brain functioning by modern neuroscience that have contributed to the emergence of neuroeconomics and its rise over the past two decades. These advances are grouped over three non-independent topics referred to as the "emo-rational” brain, "social" brain, and "computational" brain. For each topic, it emphasizes findings considered as critical to the birth and development of neuroeconomics while highlighting some of prominent questions about which knowledge should be improved by future research. In parallel, it shows that the boundaries between neuroeconomics and several recent subfields of cognitive neuroscience, such as affective, social, and more generally, decision neuroscience, are rather porous. It suggests that a greater autonomy of neuroeconomics should perhaps come from the development of studies about more economic policy-oriented concerns. In order to make the paper accessible to a large audience the various neuroscientific notions used are defined and briefly explained. In the same way, for economists not specialized in experimental and behavioral economics, the definition of the main economic models referred to in the text is recalled.

International audience; Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a popular elicitation mechanism promoted in non-market valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we observe that people who sign an oath are significantly less likely to vote for the public good in a hypothetical referenda. We complement this evidence with a self-reported measure of honesty which confirms that the oath increases truthfulness in answers. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab and beyond.

International audience; We describe a classroom experimental game focusing on some key economic concepts surrounding water management. The game shows the case of an asymmetric common-pool resource: an irrigation system where players represent irrigating farmers. Dilemmas between individual and collective interests arise, and asymmetry of access to the resource renders it more difficult to reach a cooperative equilibrium. The game is used to test hypotheses about the influence of communication and of water availability on players’ cooperation, hence on the group’s ability to reach equilibrium. The game was used in multiple postgraduate teaching contexts. We show the example of a session played in Tunisia, where communication had a strong and positive impact on cooperation, and compare the results of that session with those of another played in South Africa, where different outcomes emerged from the game. We then discuss the advantages and the limitations of such an experimental game for teaching purposes.

International audience; Markets are often viewed as a tool for aggregating disparate private knowledge, a stance supported by past laboratory experiments. However, traders' acquisition cost of information has typically been ignored. Results from a laboratory experiment involving six treatments varying the cost of acquiring signals of an asset's value suggest that when information is costly, markets do not succeed in aggregating it. At an individual level, having information improves trading performance, but not enough to offset the cost of obtaining the information. Although males earn more through trading than females, this differential is offset by the greater propensity of males to buy information such that total profit is similar for males and females. Looking at individual skills, we find that higher theory of mind is associated with greater trading profit, greater overall profit, and an increased likelihood of acquiring information while cognitive reflection is associated with greater profit but not a greater propensity to acquire information.

This chapter lays out in which respects laboratory experiments can be useful for macroeconomics and discusses some of the methods used in such experiments.

Experimental economics is increasingly used in the field of agricultural economics. This article reports the main insights of a summer school organized in 2015 by the INRA SAE2 Department (Social Sciences, Agriculture and Food, Rural Development and Environment) in order to review existing research using experiments and to discuss the relevance of experimental methods in this area. We discuss the main methodological issues like financial incentives and the hypothetical bias, internal and external validity, and deception. We also show the relevance of economic experiments in helping public decision-makers and firms. We argue that economic experiments are a promising method in this field.; L’économie expérimentale est de plus en plus utilisée en économie agricole. Cet article rend compte d’une École Chercheurs organisée en 2015 par le Département SAE2 (Sciences Sociales, Agriculture et Alimentation, Espace et Environnement) de l’INRA afin de faire un état des lieux des travaux employant cette méthode et de discuter de son apport à l’économie agricole. Les auteurs examinent les défis méthodologiques comme les incitations monétaires et le biais hypothétique, les validités interne et externe ainsi que l’utilisation de la tromperie en lien avec les spécificités de la recherche en économie agricole, puis la portée académique et sociétale de travaux expérimentaux. Encore jeune dans ce champ, l’économie expérimentale ouvre la voie à des questions de recherche prometteuses.

International audience; Experimental economics is increasingly used in the field of agricultural economics. This article reports the main insights of a summer school organized in 2015 by the INRA SAE2 Department (Social Sciences, Agriculture and Food, Rural Development and Environment) in order to review existing research using experiments and to discuss the relevance of experimental methods in this area. We discuss the main methodological issues like financial incentives and the hypothetical bias, internal and external validity, and deception. We also show the relevance of economic experiments in helping public decision-makers and firms. We argue that economic experiments are a promising method in this field.; L’économie expérimentale est de plus en plus utilisée en économie agricole. Cet article rend compte d’une École Chercheurs organisée en 2015 par le Département SAE2 (Sciences Sociales, Agriculture et Alimentation, Espace et Environnement) de l’INRA afin de faire un état des lieux des travaux employant cette méthode et de discuter de son apport à l’économie agricole. Les auteurs examinent les défis méthodologiques comme les incitations monétaires et le biais hypothétique, les validités interne et externe ainsi que l’utilisation de la tromperie en lien avec les spécificités de la recherche en économie agricole, puis la portée académique et sociétale de travaux expérimentaux. Encore jeune dans ce champ, l’économie expérimentale ouvre la voie à des questions de recherche prometteuses.

International audience; Le financement participatif permet à des artistes de financer la production de leur projet grâce au soutien d’un grand nombre de contributeurs en échange d’éventuelles contreparties préalablement définies. Les contributeurs sont des « prosommateurs », à la fois consommateurs et producteurs du produit dont ils font l’acquisition. Du fait de la nature préliminaire du projet au moment de la contribution, ils font face à une incertitude concernant la qualité du bien finalement produit ainsi qu’à une incertitude portant sur la livraison du produit. De ce fait, leur attitude face au risque détermine le montant de leurs contributions. Dans cet article, nous élicitons les coefficients d’aversion au risque de véritables contributeurs d’une plate-forme de financement participatif brésilienne (Catarse) au moyen de la procédure de choix de Holt et Laury [2002]. Nous montrons que l’aversion au risque prédit négativement le niveau des contributions à des projets musicaux lorsque le contributeur est géographiquement distant du porteur du projet, c’est-à-dire lorsque le contributeur est fortement exposé à une incertitude quant à la qualité du projet et aux compétences du créateur.

This paper analyzes gender differences in access to competitive positions. We implement an experiment where workers can apply for a job promotion by sending a signal to their employer. We control for gender differences in anticipation of discrimination in a treatment where a computer randomly recruits. Discriminatory behavior by the employer is isolated in a treatment where workers cannot send signals. We find that gender disparity among promoted workers is highest when workers can apply for promotion and employers recruit. Strikingly, the gender composition in competitive position is balanced in the absence of a signaling institution. When signaling is possible, we observe that female workers who do not request a promotion arediscriminated against.

Plusieurs études récentes ont montré que les investisseurs sur les marchés d'actifs formaient leurs anticipations en extrapolant l'évolution la plus récente du prix d'un actif. Le but de l'expérience est de confronter des individus supposés « rationnels » à des « extrapolateurs » afin de caractériser les comportements de prévision et de voir si la présence d'« extrapolateurs » affecte le comportement des personnes « rationnelles ». Pour cela nous avons simulé le prix d'un actif sur quinze périodes qui fluctue autour de sa valeur fondamentale. L'expérience est composée de cinq traitements. Afin de différencier les deux types de participants, nous faisons varier l'information dont ils disposent pour effectuer leur prévision du prix : les participants dits « extrapolateurs » n'ont accès qu'à une fenêtre de cinq périodes précédentes alors que les participants dits « rationnels » ont accès à l'historique complet jusqu'à la période de prévision. Aussi, nous posons deux modes de rémunération : l'un basé sur la précision des prévisions et l'autre basé sur l'écart par rapport à la prévision moyenne. Ainsi, un groupe de chaque type de participants aura un mode de rémunération différent ; correspondant à quatre traitements. Enfin, le dernier groupe sera composé, à proportions égales, d'« extrapolateurs » et de « rationnels » et aura un objectif d'écart avec la prévision moyenne. Celui-ci nous permettra de voir si les « rationnels » corrigent leur prévision quand ils sont en présence d''« extrapolateurs ».

International audience; This article assesses the potential contribution of economic experiments to evidence-based policy making in the field of agriculture, with a special focus on the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP evaluation mostly relies on standard tools such as farm and market simulation models, calibrated with EU-wide statistical data; statistical and econometric analysis of survey data; and a range of qualitative methods such as interviews with stakeholders, focus group or internet-based public consultation. Yet, the CAP has changed considerably over the past decades, requiring adaptations of its evaluation toolbox. A detailed review of existing studies using economic experiments for designing and evaluating agricultural policies provides the backbone for a comprehensive assessment of the complementarity of experimental approaches with standard evaluation tools. The article further provides recommendations aiming at facilitating inclusion of economic experiments into the CAP evaluation toolbox based on conclusions drawn from a workshop organized with experts, academics, and policy makers of Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Commission.; Cet article étudie la contribution potentielle des méthodes expérimentales pour l'élaboration de politiques agricoles fondée sur des données probantes, en considérant en particulier le cas de la politique agricole commune de l'UE (PAC). L’évaluation de la PAC repose principalement sur des outils standard tels que des modèles de simulation d’exploitations et de marchés agricoles, calibrés avec des données récoltées à l’échelle de l'UE; des analyses statistiques et économétriques sur des données d'enquête; et une série de méthodes qualitatives telles que des entretiens avec les parties prenantes, des groupes de discussion ou des consultations publiques sur Internet. Pourtant, la PAC a considérablement changé ces dernières décennies, ce qui nécessite d’adapter ses méthodes d’évaluation. Un examen détaillé des études existantes mobilisant les approches expérimentales pour la conception et l'évaluation de politiques agricoles permet d’analyser la complémentarité des méthodes expérimentales avec les outils d'évaluation standards. A partir des conclusions d'un atelier organisé avec des experts, des universitaires et des décideurs politiques de la Direction générale de l'agriculture et du développement rural de la Commission européenne, cet article propose en outre des recommandations pour faciliter l'intégration des approches expérimentales dans les méthodes d'évaluation de la PAC.

International audience; Malgré un intérêt croissant pour les déterminants non-monétaires des comportements fiscaux (tax morale), la littérature récente apporte peu d'éléments empiriques sur le lien entre les caractéristiques de personnalité reliées à la moralité et la propension à l'évasion fiscale. Or de telles mesures sont nécessaires pour comprendre les canaux de transmission des dispositifs de lutte contre l'évasion fiscale. Pour pallier cette lacune, le présent article rend compte d'une expérience en laboratoire permettant d'observer à la fois les comportements de déclaration de revenu des participants et des mesures psychologiques issues de la littérature en psychométrie : soumission à la norme, empathie affective et cognitive, et propension à ressentir la honte et la culpabilité. Ces mesures sont combinées à l'aide d'une analyse en composantes principales afin d'en extraire les facteurs indépendants. Nos résultats montrent que la décision de frauder comme son intensité sont fortement liées à l'empathie affective, l'empathie cognitive et la dimension publique de la moralité (mesurée par la soumission à la norme et la propension à la honte). La propension à ressentir la culpabilité, en revanche, est sans effet. Surtout, le pouvoir explicatif global de ces mesures de moralité individuelles est relativement faible. Ce résultat remet en cause l'hypothèse d'une moralité fiscale intrinsèque, et met l'accent sur l'importance du contexte institutionnel pour comprendre les comportements d'évasion.; Despite an increasing interest in the non-monetary determinants of tax behaviors (also known as tax morale), the recent literature offers few empirical elements on the link between moral personality characters and tax evasion propensity. However, such measures are necessary to understand the transmission channels of policies targeted at fighting against tax evasion. To fill this gap, this paper reports a lab experiment allowing to observe participants' behaviors of income declaration and psychological measures from the psychometric literature: norm-submission, affective empathy, cognitive empathy, propensity to feel guilt and shame. These measures are combined through a Principal Component Analysis to extract independent factors. Results show that the decision to evade as well as its intensity are very highly related to affective empathy, cognitive empathy and public dimension of morality (measured by norm submission and propensity to feel shame). The propensity to feel guiltiness is, however, without significant effects. More importantly, the explanatory power of these individual morality measures is rather weak. This result challenges the assumption of an intrinsical tax morale and highlights the importance of the institutional context to understand evasion behaviors.

International audience; Can a company attract a different type of employee by changing its compensation scheme? Is it sufficient to pay more to increase employees’ motivation? Should a firm provide evaluation feedback to employees based on their absolute or their relative performance? Laboratory experiments can help address these questions by identifying the causal impact of variations in personnel policy on employees’ productivity and mobility. Although they arecollected in an artificial environment, the qualitative external validity of findings from the lab is now well recognized.

Les opinions exprimées dans la série des Documents de travail GREDEG sont celles des auteurs et ne reflèlent pas nécessairement celles de l'institution. Les documents n'ont pas été soumis à un rapport formel et sont donc inclus dans cette série pour obtenir des commentaires et encourager la discussion. Les droits sur les documents appartiennent aux auteurs. within the J-PAL, promote the use of randomization as an efficient way of fighting poverty. Mainly, J-PAL's project aims at testing what can be assimilated to nudging devices through randomization. Nevertheless, Duflo recently changed her perspective from a kind of libertarian paternalism toward a stronger paternalistic view. The paper methodologically explains such a shift through the incapacity of J-PAL's use of randomization to give access to the whole process of poverty since it focuses only on the individual decision-making process. Our claim in this paper is that this shift for a stronger paternalism can be explained by a twofold failure of focusing only on the use of randomization: (1) the incapacity to show how individual behaviors are related to poverty, (2) randomization alone does not give access to an important determinant of the decision-making process, namely the social framework that embeds it.

Cet article est une revue de la littérature sur les expérimentations de vote qui étudient les comportements des votants et les propriétés des modes de scrutin. Tout d’abord, nous décrivons les expérimentations menées en laboratoire autour de trois aspects principaux : résultats agrégés selon le mode de scrutin, vote stratégique, paradoxe du vote. Nous abordons ensuite les expérimentations In Situ, typiques de l’étude expérimentale du vote, consistant à tester en marge d’élections officielles d’envergure des méthodes de vote alternatives. Nous étudions le protocole expérimental, deux enseignements généraux – l’accueil et les réactions des électeurs – ainsi que deux enseignements spécifiques – la comparaison des résultats agrégés et la description de l’offre politique telle que perçue par les électeurs.

Wording has been widely shown to affect decision making. In this paper, we investigate experimentally whether and to what extent, cooperative behaviour in a Game of Chicken may be impated by a very basic change in the labelling of the strategies. Our within-subject experimental design involves two treatments. The only difference between them is that we introduce either a socially-oriented wording (‘I cooperate'/‘I do not cooperate') or colours (red/blue) to designate strategies. The level of cooperation appears to be higher in the socially-oriented context, but only when the uncertainty as regards the type of the partner is manipulated, and especially among females., On connaît l'importance des mots sur la perception des messages. L'impact de la terminologie employée sur la prise de décision a ainsi été largement docummenté. Dans cet article, nous tentons de répondre expérimentalement à la question suivante : dans quelle mesure le comportement de coopération dans un jeu de la poule mouillée est-il affecté par un changement mineur dans la dénomination des stratégies ? Notre protocole expérimental met en jeu deux traitements (soumis aux mêmes sujets). La seule différence entre ces traitements est que l'un utilise une terminologie qui met l'accent sur l'aspect relationnel des stratégies (‘je coopère'/‘je ne coopère pas'), tandis que l'autre opte pour une dénomination plus neutre de ce point de vue en recourant à des couleurs (rouge/bleu). Le principal résultat de l'étude est que les sujets tendent à coopérer davantage dans le contexte "relationnel", mais seulement lorsque l'incertitude concernant le type du partenaire dans le jeu varie, et les femmes plus que les hommes.