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Between April 2020 and May 2021, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) awarded more than $40 billion to health departments nationwide for COVID-19 prevention and response activities. One of the identified priorities for this investment was improving infection prevention and control (IPC) in nursing homes.CDC developed a virtual course to train new and less experienced public health staff in core healthcare IPC principles and in the application of CDC COVID-19 healthcare IPC guidance for nursing homes.From October 2020 to August 2021, the CDC led training sessions for 12 cohorts of public health staff using pretraining reading materials, case-based scenarios, didactic presentations, peer-learning opportunities, and subject matter expert-led discussions. Multiple electronic assessments were distributed to learners over time to measure changes in self-reported knowledge and confidence and to collect feedback on the course. Participating public health programs were also assessed to measure overall course impact.Among 182 enrolled learners, 94% completed the training. Most learners were infection preventionists (42%) or epidemiologists (38%), had less than 1 year of experience in their health department role (75%), and had less than 1 year of subject matter experience (54%). After training, learners reported increased knowledge and confidence in applying the CDC COVID-19 healthcare IPC guidance for nursing homes (≥81%) with the greatest increase in performing COVID-19 IPC consultations and assessments (87%). The majority of participating programs agreed that the course provided an overall benefit (88%) and reduced training burden (72%).The CDC's virtual course was effective in increasing public health capacity for COVID-19 healthcare IPC in nursing homes and provides a possible model to increase IPC capacity for other infectious diseases and other healthcare settings. Future virtual healthcare IPC courses could be enhanced by tailoring materials to health department needs, reinforcing training through applied learning experiences, and supporting mechanisms to retain trained staff.

Listeria monocytogenes is a foodborne pathogen that disproportionally affects pregnant females, older adults, and immunocompromised individuals. Using U.S. Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet) surveillance data, we examined listeriosis incidence rates and rate ratios (RRs) by age, sex, race/ethnicity, and pregnancy status across three periods from 2008 to 2016, as recent incidence trends in U.S. subgroups had not been evaluated. The invasive listeriosis annual incidence rate per 100,000 for 2008–2016 was 0.28 cases among the general population (excluding pregnant females), and 3.73 cases among pregnant females. For adults ≥70 years, the annual incidence rate per 100,000 was 1.33 cases. No significant change in estimated listeriosis incidence was found over the 2008–2016 period, except for a small, but significantly lower pregnancy-associated rate in 2011–2013 when compared with 2008–2010. Among the nonpregnancy-associated cases, RRs increased with age from 0.43 (95% confidence interval: 0.25–0.73) for 0- to 14-year olds to 44.9 (33.5–60.0) for ≥85-year olds, compared with 15- to 44-year olds. Males had an incidence of 1.28 (1.12–1.45) times that of females. Compared with non-Hispanic whites, the incidence was 1.57 (1.18–1.20) times higher among non-Hispanic Asians, 1.49 (1.22–1.83) among non-Hispanic blacks, and 1.73 (1.15–2.62) among Hispanics. Among females of childbearing age, non-Hispanic Asian females had 2.72 (1.51–4.89) and Hispanic females 3.13 (2.12–4.89) times higher incidence than non-Hispanic whites. We observed a higher percentage of deaths among older patient groups compared with 15- to 44-year olds. This study is the first characterizing higher RRs for listeriosis in the United States among non-Hispanic blacks and Asians compared with non-Hispanic whites. This information for public health risk managers may spur further research to understand if differences in listeriosis rates relate to differences in consumption patterns of foods with higher contamination levels, food handling practices, comorbidities, immunodeficiencies, health care access, or other factors.

A suspected outbreak of influenza A and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) at a long-term care facility in Los Angeles County was, months later, determined to not involve influenza. To prevent inadvertent transmission of infections, facilities should use highly specific influenza diagnostics and follow Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines that specifically address infection control challenges.

Objectives Widespread global transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the virus causing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), continues. Many questions remain about asymptomatic or atypical infections and transmission dynamics. We used comprehensive contact tracing of the first 2 confirmed patients in Illinois with COVID-19 and serologic SARS-CoV-2 antibody testing to determine whether contacts had evidence of undetected COVID-19. Methods Contacts were eligible for serologic follow-up if previously tested for COVID-19 during an initial investigation or had greater-risk exposures. Contacts completed a standardized questionnaire during the initial investigation. We classified exposure risk as high, medium, or low based on interactions with 2 index patients and use of personal protective equipment (PPE). Serologic testing used a SARS-CoV-2 spike enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay on serum specimens collected from participants approximately 6 weeks after initial exposure to either index patient. The 2 index patients provided serum specimens throughout their illness. We collected data on demographic, exposure, and epidemiologic characteristics. Results Of 347 contacts, 110 were eligible for serologic follow-up; 59 (17% of all contacts) enrolled. Of these, 53 (90%) were health care personnel and 6 (10%) were community contacts. Seventeen (29%) reported high-risk exposures, 15 (25%) medium-risk, and 27 (46%) low-risk. No participant had evidence of SARS-CoV-2 antibodies. The 2 index patients had antibodies detected at dilutions >1:6400 within 4 weeks after symptom onset. Conclusions In serologic follow-up of the first 2 known patients in Illinois with COVID-19, we found no secondary transmission among tested contacts. Lack of seroconversion among these contacts adds to our understanding of conditions (ie, use of PPE) under which SARS-CoV-2 infections might not result in transmission and demonstrates that SARS-CoV-2 antibody testing is a useful tool to verify epidemiologic findings.

Background Cohorts of severely ill patients with COVID-19 have been described in several countries around the globe, but to date there have been few published reports from the United Kingdom (UK). Understanding the characteristics of the affected population admitted to intensive care units (ICUs) in the UK is crucial to inform clinical decision making, research and planning for future waves of infection. Methods We conducted a prospective observational cohort study of all patients with COVID-19 admitted to a large UK ICU from March to May 2020 with follow-up to June 2020. Data were collected from health records using a standardised template. We used multivariable logistic regression to analyse the factors associated with ICU survival. Results Of the 156 patients included, 112 (72%) were male, 89 (57%) were overweight or obese, 68 (44%) were from ethnic minorities, and 89 (57%) were aged over 60 years of age. 136 (87%) received mechanical ventilation, 77 (57% of those intubated) were placed in the prone position and 95 (70% of those intubated) received neuromuscular blockade. 154 (99%) patients required cardiovascular support and 44 (28%) required renal replacement therapy. Of the 130 patients with completed ICU episodes, 38 (29%) died and 92 (71%) were discharged alive from ICU. In multivariable models, age (OR 1.13 [95% CI 1.07–1.21]), obesity (OR 3.06 [95% CI 1.16–8.74]), lowest P/F ratio on the first day of admission (OR 0.82 [95% CI 0.67–0.98]) and PaCO2 (OR 1.52 [95% CI 1.01–2.39]) were independently associated with ICU death. Conclusions Age, obesity and severity of respiratory failure were key determinants of survival in this cohort. Multiorgan failure was prevalent. These findings are important for guiding future research and should be taken into consideration during future healthcare planning in the UK.

IntroductionMore than 93,000 cases of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) have been reported worldwide. We describe the epidemiology, clinical course, and virologic characteristics of the first 12 U.S. patients with COVID-19.MethodsWe collected demographic, exposure, and clinical information from 12 patients confirmed by CDC during January 20–February 5, 2020 to have COVID-19. Respiratory, stool, serum, and urine specimens were submitted for SARS-CoV-2 rRT-PCR testing, virus culture, and whole genome sequencing.ResultsAmong the 12 patients, median age was 53 years (range: 21–68); 8 were male, 10 had traveled to China, and two were contacts of patients in this series. Commonly reported signs and symptoms at illness onset were fever (n=7) and cough (n=8). Seven patients were hospitalized with radiographic evidence of pneumonia and demonstrated clinical or laboratory signs of worsening during the second week of illness. Three were treated with the investigational antiviral remdesivir. All patients had SARS-CoV-2 RNA detected in respiratory specimens, typically for 2–3 weeks after illness onset, with lowest rRT-PCR Ct values often detected in the first week. SARS-CoV-2 RNA was detected after reported symptom resolution in seven patients. SARS-CoV-2 was cultured from respiratory specimens, and SARS-CoV-2 RNA was detected in stool from 7/10 patients.ConclusionsIn 12 patients with mild to moderately severe illness, SARS-CoV-2 RNA and viable virus were detected early, and prolonged RNA detection suggests the window for diagnosis is long. Hospitalized patients showed signs of worsening in the second week after illness onset.

Background Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), first detected in China in December, 2019. In January, 2020, state, local, and federal public health agencies investigated the first case of COVID-19 in Illinois, USA. Methods Patients with confirmed COVID-19 were defined as those with a positive SARS-CoV-2 test. Contacts were people with exposure to a patient with COVID-19 on or after the patient's symptom onset date. Contacts underwent active symptom monitoring for 14 days following their last exposure. Contacts who developed fever, cough, or shortness of breath became persons under investigation and were tested for SARS-CoV-2. A convenience sample of 32 asymptomatic health-care personnel contacts were also tested. Findings Patient 1-a woman in her 60s-returned from China in mid-January, 2020. One week later, she was hospitalised with pneumonia and tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. Her husband (Patient 2) did not travel but had frequent close contact with his wife. He was admitted 8 days later and tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. Overall, 372 contacts of both cases were identified; 347 underwent active symptom monitoring, including 152 community contacts and 195 health-care personnel. Of monitored contacts, 43 became persons under investigation, in addition to Patient 2. These 43 persons under investigation and all 32 asymptomatic health-care personnel tested negative for SARS-CoV-2. Interpretation Person-to-person transmission of SARS-CoV-2 occurred between two people with prolonged, unprotected exposure while Patient 1 was symptomatic. Despite active symptom monitoring and testing of symptomatic and some asymptomatic contacts, no further transmission was detected. Funding None.

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), the respiratory disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), was first identified in Wuhan, China and has since become pandemic. In response to the first cases identified in the United States, close contacts of confirmed COVID-19 cases were investigated to enable early identification and isolation of additional cases and to learn more about risk factors for transmission. Close contacts of nine early travel-related cases in the United States were identified and monitored daily for development of symptoms (active monitoring). Selected close contacts (including those with exposures categorized as higher risk) were targeted for collection of additional exposure information and respiratory samples. Respiratory samples were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Four hundred four close contacts were actively monitored in the jurisdictions that managed the travel-related cases. Three hundred thirty-eight of the 404 close contacts provided at least basic exposure information, of whom 159 close contacts had ≥1 set of respiratory samples collected and tested. Across all actively monitored close contacts, two additional symptomatic COVID-19 cases (i.e., secondary cases) were identified; both secondary cases were in spouses of travel-associated case patients. When considering only household members, all of whom had ≥1 respiratory sample tested for SARS-CoV-2, the secondary attack rate (i.e., the number of secondary cases as a proportion of total close contacts) was 13% (95% CI: 4-38%). The results from these contact tracing investigations suggest that household members, especially significant others, of COVID-19 cases are at highest risk of becoming infected. The importance of personal protective equipment for healthcare workers is also underlined. Isolation of persons with COVID-19, in combination with quarantine of exposed close contacts and practice of everyday preventive behaviors, is important to mitigate spread of COVID-19.

Since 2006, the number of reported US listeriosis outbreaks associated with cheese made under unsanitary conditions has increased. Two-thirds were linked to Latin-style soft cheese, often affecting pregnant Hispanic women and their newborns. Adherence to pasteurization protocols and sanitation measures to avoid contamination after pasteurization can reduce future outbreaks.

Early detection and adherence to infection prevention recommendations are necessary to avoid transmission., Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infections sharply increased in the Arabian Peninsula during spring 2014. In Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, these infections occurred primarily among healthcare workers and patients. To identify and describe epidemiologic and clinical characteristics of persons with healthcare-associated infection, we reviewed laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV cases reported to the Health Authority of Abu Dhabi during January 1, 2013–May 9, 2014. Of 65 case-patients identified with MERS-CoV infection, 27 (42%) had healthcare-associated cases. Epidemiologic and genetic sequencing findings suggest that 3 healthcare clusters of MERS-CoV infection occurred, including 1 that resulted in 20 infected persons in 1 hospital. MERS-CoV in healthcare settings spread predominantly before MERS-CoV infection was diagnosed, underscoring the importance of increasing awareness and infection control measures at first points of entry to healthcare facilities.

We found that this virus may be detected in mildly ill and asymptomatic case-patients., In January 2013, several months after Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was first identified in Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, began surveillance for MERS-CoV. We analyzed medical chart and laboratory data collected by the Health Authority–Abu Dhabi during January 2013–May 2014. Using real-time reverse transcription PCR, we tested respiratory tract samples for MERS-CoV and identified 65 case-patients. Of these patients, 23 (35%) were asymptomatic at the time of testing, and 4 (6%) showed positive test results for >3 weeks (1 had severe symptoms and 3 had mild symptoms). We also identified 6 clusters of MERS-CoV cases. This report highlights the potential for virus shedding by mildly ill and asymptomatic case-patients. These findings will be useful for MERS-CoV management and infection prevention strategies.

Background: Domestically, the integration of public health into healthcare-associated infection (HAI) and antibiotic resistance (AR) prevention activities represents a major development. We describe CDC Funding: of public health HAI/AR programs through the Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity (ELC) cooperative agreement to improve local capacity to prevent HAIs and detect and contain the spread of AR threats. Methods: We reviewed ELC budget reports and program documents to summarize the evolution of funded activities and programs from 2009 to 2018. Results: In 2009, 51 programs (49 states, 2 cities and territories) received US$35.8 million through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act for an initial 28-month period. These funds supported each jurisdiction to establish an HAI coordinator and a multidisciplinary HAI advisory group, coordinate and report HAI prevention efforts, conduct surveillance and report HAI data, and maintain an HAI plan; ~27 programs were also funded to coordinate multicenter HAI prevention collaboratives among acute-care hospitals. Through 2011, 188 state or local HAI/AR program positions were at least partially funded by the CDC. From 2011 to 2015, investments from the Affordable Care Act (~US$10–11 million annually) were used to maintain the HAI/AR programs, with some expansion of program goals related to non–acute-care settings and antibiotic stewardship. In 2015, following the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, supplemental ELC funds were awarded to 61 programs (50 states, 11 cities and territories) totaling US$85 million over 36 months. These awards marked an expansion of HAI/AR program activities to develop healthcare provider inventories, to conduct data-driven education and training, and to perform onsite infection control assessments in healthcare facilities. In 2016, through its AR Solutions Initiative, CDC invested US$57.3 million in Funding: to 57 programs (50 states, 7 cities and territories), expanding laboratory capacities for AR threat detection (via the AR Laboratory Network) and epidemiologic activities to rapidly contain novel and targeted multidrug-resistant organisms. As of 2018, >500 state or local HAI/AR program positions were at least partially funded by the CDC. Conclusions: State and local HAI/AR programs have grown substantially over the 10 years of their existence, as reflected in major increases in funding, staffing, scope, and partnerships. CDC investments and guidance have supported the development of HAI/AR epidemiology prevention and response capacity.Funding: NoneDisclosures: None

Background: Health departments have been increasingly called upon to monitor healthcare associated-infections (HAIs) at the hospital- or facility-level and provide targeted assistance when high rates are identified. Health department capacity to effectively respond to these types of signals depends not only on technical expertise but also the legal and regulatory authority to intervene. Methods: We reviewed annual reports describing HAI and antibiotic resistance (HAI/AR) activities from CDC-funded HAI/AR programs for August 2017 through July 2018. We performed a qualitative data analysis on all 50 state health department responses to a question about their regulatory and legal authority to intervene or assist facilities without invitation when outbreaks are suspected (as determined by the health department) or high HAI rates have been identified (eg, based on NHSN data). Results: When an outbreak is identified, 31 health departments (62%) indicated that they have the authority to intervene without invitation from a facility and 8 (16%) did not specify. Among the 11 health departments (22%) that indicated that they do not have this authority, 5 (45%) states noted that they operate under decentralized systems in which the local health department can intervene in outbreak situations and the state health department is available to assist. When a health department identifies high HAI rates, 14 health departments (28%) indicated that they have the authority to intervene without invitation, 22 (44%) indicated that they do not, and 14 (28%) did not specify. Among those in the latter categories, 3 stated they can work through their local health departments, which do have this authority and 8 described working through partners (eg, State Hospital Association, n = 3 or State Healthcare Licensing Agency, n = 5). Discussion: Assistance from state health departments (eg, HAI/AR programs) in the context of outbreaks and high HAI rates has value that is usually well recognized and welcomed by healthcare facilities. Nonetheless, there are occasions when a health department might need to exert its authority to intervene. The preliminary analysis described here indicated that this authority was more commonly self-reported in the context of outbreaks than when high HAI rates are identified. These 2 situations are connected, as high rates might be indicative of unrecognized or unreported outbreak activity, and these issues may benefit from further analysis.Funding: NoneDisclosures: None

As the disease spread, the scale of the epidemic required a multi-faceted public health response., Over the span of a few weeks during July and August 2014, events in West Africa changed perceptions of Ebola virus disease (EVD) from an exotic tropical disease to a priority for global health security. We describe observations during that time of a field team from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and personnel of the Liberian Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. We outline the early epidemiology of EVD within Liberia, including the practical limitations on surveillance and the effect on the country’s health care system, such as infections among health care workers. During this time, priorities included strengthening EVD surveillance; establishing safe settings for EVD patient care (and considering alternative isolation and care models when Ebola Treatment Units were overwhelmed); improving infection control practices; establishing an incident management system; and working with Liberian airport authorities to implement EVD screening of departing passengers.

Background On September 20, 2017 Category 4 Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico (PR), causing widespread flooding, power outages, and lack of water service. Given the potential for infectious disease outbreaks, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention established enhanced surveillance to actively monitor priority infections at VA facilities. Methods We queried VA data sources from August 27, 2017 to February 3, 2018 (pre-storm dates included to establish baselines). Trends in infectious disease ICD-10 syndrome groupings (respiratory illness/pneumonia, Influenza-like illness (ILI), gastrointestinal illness, conjunctivitis, rash-like Illness, jaundice) as a percent of total emergency department (ED) visits were tracked. The total number of laboratory tests performed, and percent positive per week, for influenza, hepatitis A, dengue (DENV), zika (ZIKV), leptospirosis, and chikungunya (CHIKV) were calculated. Results ILI increased from 9.3% to 12.6% during the surveillance period (peak epi week 52: 15.7%) (Figure 1), while other ICD-10–based syndromes remained relatively stable. Weekly influenza testing increased shortly after landfall averaging 105 rapid influenza tests per week (epi weeks 41–4) (Figure 2). Influenza positivity increased in epi weeks 41 and 42 (7%), dropping the following weeks, and peaked at 15% in epi week 2 (Figure 3). Four acute infections were detected: 2 + leptospirosis DNA, 1 + CHIKV RNA, and 1 + Hepatitis A IgM. The remaining 34 positive tests were ZIKV, CHIKV, or DENV IgM positive or equivocal, awaiting confirmation (Figure 3). Conclusion We quickly established a simple surveillance system to monitor trends in priority infectious diseases. Increases in ILI, weekly influenza testing volume, and percent positive of influenza tests coincided with onset of influenza season. Diseases of public health importance were identified through laboratory-based surveillance. The impact of Maria on VA healthcare operations, including clinic closures, power outages, and disrupted care seeking patterns limited this system. However, the timeliness and flexibility of this surveillance system provides a model for disease monitoring following future natural disasters. Figure 1. Figure 2. Figure 3. Disclosures All authors: No reported disclosures.

Objective The number of persons living with HIV/AIDS, the number of new infections and the number of persons at risk for HIV infection are the foundations of evidence-based prevention, treatment and care planning. However, few jurisdictions have complete and accurate estimates of these indicators. HIV/AIDS case reporting, which includes only persons diagnosed with infection and reported to health departments, does not reflect all HIV/AIDS cases, thus underestimating the true size of the epidemic. Obtaining direct measures of HIV incidence is methodologically challenging. Moreover, no censuses exist for the number of persons at highest risk for infection, including men who have sex with men (MSM). Method We present an approach of triangulation that draws upon multiple empirical and overlapping sources of information through different methods to synthesise data-based estimates of the prevalence, incidence and denominator of MSM at risk for infection in San Francisco. We further use existing data to establish plausible upper and lower bounds for each estimate. Result We arrived at an overall population size of 66 487 of MSM in San Francisco as of 31 December 2010. The number of MSM living with HIV/AIDS was 15 873, corresponding to an HIV prevalence of 23.9%. We projected 806 new cases in 2010, translating to an incidence rate of 1.59% per year. Conclusions While not without limitations, our estimates provide useful information for the purpose of HIV/AIDS prevention and care planning, drawing from diverse sources that may be available in local health jurisdictions. We believe that our approach enhances the credibility of such estimates by mitigating bias from only one source of data or one methodological approach.

NIV is widely used in acute care, including A&E and acute medical wards. Expertise regarding NIV varies widely in these settings, and decisions around management of NIV are frequently taken by non-respiratory specialists. Methods: We retrospectively analysed notes from 22 admissions requiring NIV in a central London teaching hospital over four months, to assess decisions made in acute and emergency care. Results: Only 50.0% of admissions receiving NIV for a COPD exacerbation received appropriate maximal medical therapy with bronchodilators, corticosteroids and antibiotics (if indicated) prior to initiation of NIV. No cases were discussed with a respiratory specialist prior to commencing NIV. 68.2% of decisions made around changing NIV parameters based on the response to therapy were in accordance with BTS guidelines. Just 51.9% of admissions had a documented treatment escalation plan, or discussion of the need for one. Of those documented as being not for attempted resuscitation in notes, 18.2% did not have a signed DNAR form. Discussion: More education is needed in acute and emergency care settings on management of acute hypercapnic respiratory failure. Respiratory specialists should play a greater role in initiation and ongoing management of NIV, and all patients should have a clear treatment escalation plan prior to initiation of treatment.

Background. Approximately 4 million Americans receive nursing home (NH) care annually. Nursing home residents commonly have risk factors for Clostridium difficile infection (CDI), including advanced age and antibiotic exposures. We estimated national incidence of NH-onset (NHO) CDI and patient outcomes. Methods. We identified NHO-CDI cases from population-based surveillance of 10 geographic areas in the United States. Cases were defined by C difficile-positive stool collected in an NH (or from NH residents in outpatient settings or ≤3 days after hospital admission) without a positive stool in the prior 8 weeks. Medical records were reviewed on a sample of cases. Incidence was estimated using regression models accounting for age and laboratory testing method; sampling weights were applied to estimate hospitalizations, recurrences, and deaths. Results. A total of 3503 NHO-CDI cases were identified. Among 262 sampled cases, median age was 82 years, 76% received antibiotics in the 12 weeks prior to the C difficile-positive specimen, and 57% were discharged from a hospital in the month before specimen collection. After adjusting for age and testing method, the 2012 national estimate for NHO-CDI incidence was 112 800 cases (95% confidence interval [CI], 93 400–131 800); 31 400 (28%) were hospitalized within 7 days after a positive specimen (95% CI, 25 500–37 300), 20 900 (19%) recurred within 14–60 days (95% CI, 14 600–27 100), and 8700 (8%) died within 30 days (95% CI, 6600–10 700). Conclusions. Nursing home onset CDI is associated with substantial morbidity and mortality. Strategies focused on infection prevention in NHs and appropriate antibiotic use in both NHs and acute care settings may decrease the burden of NHO CDI.

Background From 2004–2015, CDC received 82 reports of patients with Listeria monocytogenes (Lm) cultured from non-sterile sites. Whereas invasive listeriosis (Lm isolated from typically sterile sites) is nationally notifiable and well described, information about patients with “noninvasive” Lm (isolated from other sites) is limited to a small number of case reports. We summarize the demographic and clinical characteristics of a convenience sample of patients with noninvasive Lm and compare to patients with invasive Lm reported through routine surveillance. Methods The Listeria Initiative (LI) is a national surveillance system that collects demographic, clinical, laboratory, and food exposure information on laboratory-confirmed listeriosis cases in the United States. While not nationally notifiable, public health agencies can also submit similar information to LI for patients with noninvasive Lm. We reviewed all reports to LI from 2004–2015 and used a standardized approach to characterize isolate sources as invasive or noninvasive. We then compared demographic and clinical factors between patients with invasive and noninvasive Lm using Fisher’s exact and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. Results The most common sources of noninvasive isolates (n = 82) were skin or soft tissue (n = 35, 43%), urine (n = 19, 23%), and stool (n = 17, 21%). Compared with patients with noninvasive Lm, patients with invasive Lm (n = 4599) were more likely to be older than 65 years (66% vs. 54% P = 0.03), to be associated with an outbreak (17% vs. 7%, P = 0.02), to be hospitalized (92% vs. 54%, P < 0.01), and to die (20% vs. 4%, P

Following hospitalization of the first patient with Ebola virus disease diagnosed in the United States on 28 September 2014, contact tracing methods for Ebola were implemented.To identify, risk-stratify, and monitor contacts of patients with Ebola.Descriptive investigation.Dallas County, Texas, September to November 2014.Contacts of symptomatic patients with Ebola.Contact identification, exposure risk classification, symptom development, and Ebola.The investigation identified 179 contacts, 139 of whom were contacts of the index patient. Of 112 health care personnel (HCP) contacts of the index case, 22 (20%) had known unprotected exposures and 37 (30%) did not have known unprotected exposures but interacted with a patient or contaminated environment on multiple days. Transmission was confirmed in 2 HCP who had substantial interaction with the patient while wearing personal protective equipment. These HCP had 40 additional contacts. Of 20 community contacts of the index patient or the 2 HCP, 4 had high-risk exposures. Movement restrictions were extended to all 179 contacts; 7 contacts were quarantined. Seven percent (14 of 179) of contacts (1 community contact and 13 health care contacts) were evaluated for Ebola during the monitoring period.Data cannot be used to infer whether in-person direct active monitoring is superior to active monitoring alone for early detection of symptomatic contacts.Contact tracing and monitoring approaches for Ebola were adapted to account for the evolving understanding of risks for unrecognized HCP transmission. HCP contacts in the United States without known unprotected exposures should be considered as having a low (but not zero) risk for Ebola and should be actively monitored for symptoms. Core challenges of contact tracing for high-consequence communicable diseases included rapid comprehensive contact identification, large-scale direct active monitoring of contacts, large-scale application of movement restrictions, and necessity of humanitarian support services to meet nonclinical needs of contacts.None.

On December 23, 2014, the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) was notified of adverse health events in two patients who had been inadvertently administered nonsterile, simulation 0.9% sodium chloride intravenous (IV) fluids at an urgent care facility. Simulation saline is a nonsterile product not meant for human or animal use; it is intended for use by medical trainees practicing IV administration of saline on mannequins or other training devices. Both patients experienced a febrile illness during product administration and were hospitalized; one patient developed sepsis and disseminated intravascular coagulation. Neither patient died. Staff members at the clinic reported having ordered the product through their normal medical supply distributor and not recognizing during administration that it was not intended for human use.

Context Extreme weather events, unpredictable and often far-reaching, constitute a persistent challenge for public health preparedness. Objective The goal of this research is to inform public health systems improvement through examination of extreme weather events, comparing across cases to identify recurring patterns in event and response characteristics. Design Structured telephone-based interviews were conducted with representatives from health departments to assess characteristics of recent extreme weather events and agencies' responses. Response activities were assessed using the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Public Health Emergency Preparedness Capabilities framework. Challenges that are typical of this response environment are reported. Setting Forty-five local health departments in 20 US states. Results Respondents described public health system responses to 45 events involving tornadoes, flooding, wildfires, winter weather, hurricanes, and other storms. Events of similar scale were infrequent for a majority (62%) of the communities involved; disruption to critical infrastructure was universal. Public Health Emergency Preparedness Capabilities considered most essential involved environmental health investigations, mass care and sheltering, surveillance and epidemiology, information sharing, and public information and warning. Unanticipated response activities or operational constraints were common. Conclusions We characterize extreme weather events as a "quadruple threat" because (1) direct threats to population health are accompanied by damage to public health protective and community infrastructure, (2) event characteristics often impose novel and pervasive burdens on communities, (3) responses rely on critical infrastructures whose failure both creates new burdens and diminishes response capacity, and (4) their infrequency and scale further compromise response capacity. Given the challenges associated with extreme weather events, we suggest opportunities for organizational learning and preparedness improvements.

Public health surveillance and epidemiologic investigations are critical functions for the control and prevention of infectious diseases. The activities associated with these functions, including case and contact investigations, public health surveillance, and data analysis, are conducted by trained personnel in response to a variety of infectious disease threats, including those with pandemic potential, such as novel influenza.1–3 According to the 2010 National Profile of Local Health Departments, 92% of local health departments (LHDs) in the United States conduct epidemiology and surveillance for communicable diseases, while 77% conduct these activities for environmental health issues.4 In 2005, approximately 25% of all LHDs employed one or more epidemiologists, and epidemiologic activities were conducted by individuals with a wide range of backgrounds and training.5 For many LHDs that do not employ epidemiologists, other public health professionals (e.g., health officers, public health nurses, or environmental health staff) may fulfill epidemiologic functions within the LHD. To create and maintain sustainable preparedness and response systems, the public health workforce must have the proper skills, capabilities, and adequate staffing levels to respond successfully in a public health emergency.6 In 2007, the results of a survey of LHDs in California demonstrated that not all disease investigation staff had received basic epidemiology training and not all staff that might supply surge capacity for disease investigations had received formal disease investigation training.7 In 2005, 12 of 56 (21%) LHDs reported having a formal agreement with neighboring jurisdictions to secure services of qualified epidemiologists in an emergency.8 From 2006 to 2010, cuts to bioterrorism and emergency response funding resulted in substantial decreases in epidemiology capacity among state health departments nationally.9 Despite the decrease in preparedness and response funding, public health preparedness and emergency response remains an area of critical importance for LHDs; maintaining the public health capacity to detect, investigate, and respond to infectious disease threats is an essential component of preparedness efforts.10 The purpose of this study was to describe the public health workforce involved in public health surveillance and epidemiologic activities among LHDs in California. Other studies such as the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) Epidemiology Capacity Assessments (ECAs)11–15 have attempted to enumerate and assess the epidemiology capacity among LHDs in the United States. Our goals were to describe the functional epidemiology capacity among California LHDs, understand the internal and external networks that are used to support epidemiologic and surveillance functions, and find out how health departments recruit additional epidemiologic support during infectious disease emergency events. For the purposes of this study, we have defined “functional epidemiology capacity” to mean the ability of the organization to conduct epidemiology-related tasks, regardless of the personnel performing them. An in-depth understanding of the sources of epidemiologic support during infectious disease emergencies and ensuring these individuals are trained to meet the functional needs are essential to an effective public health response.

The ongoing Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic in West Africa, like previous Ebola outbreaks, has been characterized by amplification in health care settings and increased risk for health care workers (HCWs), who often do not have access to appropriate personal protective equipment. In many locations, Ebola treatment units (ETUs) have been established to optimize care of patients with Ebola while maintaining infection control procedures to prevent transmission of Ebola virus. These ETUs are considered essential to containment of the epidemic. In July 2014, CDC assisted the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare of Liberia in investigating a cluster of five Ebola cases among HCWs who became ill while working in an ETU, an adjacent general hospital, or both. No common source of exposure or chain of transmission was identified. However, multiple opportunities existed for transmission of Ebola virus to HCWs, including exposure to patients with undetected Ebola in the hospital, inadequate use of personal protective equipment during cleaning and disinfection of environmental surfaces in the hospital, and potential transmission from an ill HCW to another HCW. No evidence was found of a previously unrecognized mode of transmission. Prevention recommendations included reinforcement of existing infection control guidance for both ETUs and general medical care settings, including measures to prevent cross-transmission in co-located facilities.

Deciding when an individual with dementia must reduce or stop driving can be a stressful issue for family caregivers. The purpose of this study was to develop a group intervention to assist these caregivers with driving issues and to provide a preliminary evaluation of the comparative effectiveness of this At the Crossroads intervention. Participants were randomized to one of three arms: (1) active intervention (four 2-hour manualized educational/support group meetings; n = 31); (2) written materials only (participants received written materials after a pretest; n = 23); and (3)control (participants received written materials after a posttest; n = 12).Participants were administered a battery of self-report and interview-based questionnaires at baseline and again 2 months later. At follow-up, the active intervention group scored significantly better than both other groups on key outcome variables, including self-efficacy, communication, and preparedness. The At the Crossroads caregiver intervention appears to effectively provide education and support needed for caregivers to address driving-related issues with their loved ones.

INTRODUCTION Viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) refer to a group of illnesses caused by several families of viruses, including: Filoviridae (Ebola and Marburg viruses) Arenaviridae (Lassa fever and New World hemorrhagic fever) Bunyaviridae (Rift Valley fever, Crimean-Congo fever, and agents of “hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome” [HFRS]) Flaviviridae (yellow fever, Omsk hemorrhagic fever, Kyasanur Forest disease, and dengue) Many VHF viruses are virulent, and some are highly infectious (e.g., filoviruses and arenaviruses) with person-to-person transmission from direct contact with infected blood and bodily secretions. Effective therapies and prophylaxis are extremely limited for VHF; therefore, early detection and strict adherence to infection control measures are essential. The Working Group for Civilian Biodefense considers some hemorrhagic fever (HF) viruses to pose a serious threat as potential biological weapons based on their risk of morbidity and mortality, feasibility of production, and their ability to cause infection through aerosol dissemination. These include Ebola, Marburg, Lassa fever, New World arenaviruses, Rift Valley fever, yellow fever, Omsk hemorrhagic fever, and Kyasanur Forest disease. This chapter will focus only on these VHF viruses and will not include a discussion of dengue fever (see Chapter 54, Fever in the Returning Traveler), hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (see Chapter 70, Hantavirus), and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fevers.

Importance Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) producing the New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase (NDM) are rare in the United States, but have the potential to add to the increasing CRE burden. Previous NDM-producing CRE clusters have been attributed to person-to-person transmission in health care facilities. Objective To identify a source for, and interrupt transmission of, NDM-producing CRE in a northeastern Illinois hospital. Design, Setting, and Participants Outbreak investigation among 39 case patients at a tertiary care hospital in northeastern Illinois, including a case-control study, infection control assessment, and collection of environmental and device cultures; patient and environmental isolate relatedness was evaluated with pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE). Following identification of a likely source, targeted patient notification and CRE screening cultures were performed. Main Outcomes and Measures Association between exposure and acquisition of NDM-producing CRE; results of environmental cultures and organism typing. Results In total, 39 case patients were identified from January 2013 through December 2013, 35 with duodenoscope exposure in 1 hospital. No lapses in duodenoscope reprocessing were identified; however, NDM-producingEscherichia coliwas recovered from a reprocessed duodenoscope and shared more than 92% similarity to all case patient isolates by PFGE. Based on the case-control study, case patients had significantly higher odds of being exposed to a duodenoscope (odds ratio [OR], 78 [95% CI, 6.0-1008],P Conclusions and Relevance In this investigation, exposure to duodenoscopes with bacterial contamination was associated with apparent transmission of NDM-producingE coliamong patients at 1 hospital. Bacterial contamination of duodenoscopes appeared to persist despite the absence of recognized reprocessing lapses. Facilities should be aware of the potential for transmission of bacteria including antimicrobial-resistant organisms via this route and should conduct regular reviews of their duodenoscope reprocessing procedures to ensure optimal manual cleaning and disinfection.

Background On Friday March 11, 2011 a 9.0 magnitude earthquake triggered a tsunami off the eastern coast of Japan, resulting in thousands of lives lost and billions of dollars in damage around the Pacific Rim. The tsunami first reached the California coast on Friday, March 11th, causing more than $70 million in damage and at least one death. While the tsunami's impact on California pales in comparison to the destruction caused in Japan and other areas of the Pacific, the event tested emergency responders' ability to rapidly communicate and coordinate a response to a potential threat. Methods To evaluate the local public health system emergency response to the tsunami threat in California, we surveyed all local public health, emergency medical services (EMS), and emergency management agencies in coastal or floodplain counties about several domains related to the tsunami threat in California, including: (1) the extent to which their community was affected by the tsunami, (2) when and how they received notification of the event, (3) which public health response activities were carried out to address the tsunami threat in their community, and (4) which organizations contributed to the response. Public health activities were characterized using the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Public Health Preparedness Capabilities (PHEP) framework. Findings The tsunami's impact on coastal communities in California ranged widely, both in terms of the economic consequences and the response activities. Based on estimates from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), ten jurisdictions in California reported tsunami-related damage, which ranged from $15,000 to $35 million. Respondents first became aware of the tsunami threat in California between the hours of 10:00pm Pacific Standard Time (PST) on Thursday March 10th and 2:00pm PST on Friday March 11th, a range of 16 hours, with notification occurring through both formal and informal channels. In response to this threat, the activities most commonly reported by the local government agencies included in this study were: emergency public information and warning, emergency operations coordination, and inter-organizational information sharing, which were reported by 86%, 75%, and 65% of all respondents, respectively. When looking at the distribution of responsibility, emergency management agencies were the most likely to report assuming a lead role in these common activities as well as those related to evacuation and community recovery. While activated less frequently, public health agencies carried out emergency response functions related to surveillance and epidemiology, environmental health, and mental health/psychological support. Both local public health and EMS agencies took part in mass care and medical material management activities. A large network of organizations contributed to response activities, with emergency management, law enforcement, fire, public health, public works, EMS, and media cited by more than half of respondents. Conclusions In response to the tsunami threat in California, we found that emergency management agencies assumed a lead role in the local response efforts. While public health and medical agencies played a supporting role in the response, they uniquely contributed to a number of specific activities. If the response to the recent tsunami is any indication, these support activities can be anticipated in planning for future events with similar characteristics to the tsunami threat. Additionally, we found that many respondents first learned of the tsunami through the media, rather than through rapid notification systems, which suggests that government agencies must continue to develop and maintain the ability to rapidly aggregate and analyze information in order to provide accurate assessments and guidance to a potentially well-informed public. Citation: Hunter JC, Crawley AW, Petrie M, Yang JE, Aragon TJ. Local Public Health System Response to the Tsunami Threat in Coastal California following the Tōhoku Earthquake. PLoS Currents Disasters. 2012 Jul 16. Language: en

Background Due to the uncommon nature of large-scale disasters and emergencies, public health practitioners often turn to simulated emergencies, known as “exercises”, for preparedness assessment and improvement. Under the right conditions, exercises can also be used to conduct original public health systems research. This paper describes the integration of a research framework into a statewide operations-based exercise program in California as a systems-based approach for studying public health emergency preparedness and response. Methods We developed a research framework based on the premise that operations-based exercises conducted by medical and public health agencies can be described using epidemiologic concepts. Using this framework, we conducted a survey of key local and regional medical and health agencies throughout California following the 2010 Statewide Medical and Health Exercise. The survey evaluated: (1) the emergency preparedness capabilities activated and functions performed in response to the emergency scenario, and (2) the major challenges to inter-organizational communications and information management. Results Thirty-five local health departments (LHDs), 24 local emergency medical services (EMS) agencies, 121 hospitals, and 5 Regional Disaster Medical and Health Coordinators/Specialists (RDMHC) responded to our survey, representing 57%, 77%, 26% and 83%, respectively, of target agencies in California. We found two sets of response capabilities were activated during the 2010 Statewide Exercise: a set of core capabilities that were common across all agencies, and a set of agency-specific capabilities that were more common among certain agency types. With respect to one response capability in particular, inter-organizational information sharing, we found that the majority of respondents’ comments were related to the complete or partial failure of communications equipment or systems. Conclusions Using the 2010 Statewide Exercise in California as an opportunity to develop our research framework, we characterized several aspects of the public health and medical system’s response to a standardized emergency scenario. From a research perspective, this study provides a potential new framework for conducting exercise-based research. From a practitioner’s perspective, our results provide a starting point for preparedness professionals’ dialogue about expected and actual organizational roles, responsibilities, and resource capacities within the public health system. Additionally, the identification of specific challenges to inter-organizational communications and information management offer specific areas for intervention.