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International conflict and its subsequent costs significantly affect domestic politics in the form of public opinion, executive approval, and even the policy positions of elected officials. However most of this research focuses solely on the US and little of it ties international conflicts to meaning political behaviors such as voting. To address these voids we examine the extent to which the cost of conflict, in terms of casualties and the number of conflicts, affects the larger political system. We argue that increases in the overall costs of conflict (i.e., more casualties) leads a decline in electoral volatility within the political system. However, this decrease in volatility is contextually dependent on the number of conflicts fought in a given election cycle and the issue of the conflict. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do variations in the electoral rules, specifically term limits and the constitutional inter-election period (CIEP), affect the conflict behavior of leaders? If leaders know that they have a fixed time in office we argue that they are more likely to engage in conflict given their shortened policy time horizon and that they do not have to face reselection. We develop a framework of how the CIEP has differing effects depending on the possibility of leader reselection. Leaders that do not face terms limits should be more conflict prone early in the CIEP. However leaders with term limits will be less likely to engage in conflicts early in the CIEP. We test our hypotheses by analyzing both monadic and dyadic leader year data. The results suggest that term limits alter the conflict calculation of democratic leaders, both for propensity as well as timing. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As women make greater gains in politics how do these gains translate into substantive differences in policy preferences and outcomes? To answer this question we exmaine whether proportion of women in legislatures affects whether states substiture foreign aid for other tools, such as military spending and conflict initiation. We use the two goods model of foreign policy and simulatenous equations. The results show that as the percentage of women in a legislature increases, so to does the use of aid at the expense of other tools. The results have implications for both influence of gender on policy as well as the broader question of what drives states prefernces for foreign policy ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

: Do the costs associated with government removal effect decisions to escalate disputes. I develop a framework of government decisions making in parliamentary systems focusing on the costs that parties face when considering government change. I argue that leaders act primarily to maintain office but are constrained or encouraged by the opportunity and transaction costs that emerge from the larger political system. I tie this into the audience costs literature and focus on how variation in different parliamentary systems? removal costs effect both government policy choice as well as its signaling capability. I not only focus in escalation but also disputes that settle short of escalation. If governments are able to use audience costs to signal credibility and resolve some disputes should actually never escalate and instead settle quickly. The work in this field has tended to focus on democracy as a present or absent condition. I argue that it is just as important to understand how cohesive and divisive oppositions and partisan politics can effect policy choices. I empirically assess my theoretical expectations with data of 18 parliamentary governments and oppositions between the years of 1945 and 1992 using the SHERFACS dataset. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the mass-level, there is a substantial body of evidence to suggest that men and women view issues of security and conflict differently, but the effect of gender on elite-level foreign policy decision-making is less developed. To test the relationship between gender and foreign policy behavior, we analyze 25 democratic countries between 1975 and 2000. Our results reveal that even after controlling for partisanship, as the proportion of women in the legislature increases, the proportion of the budget devoted to defense spending decreases, and the general foreign policy tone of a state becomes less conflictual. Consistent with previous work, we also find evidence that female executives are more aggressive then male executives in foreign policy. However, our research is unique in that it reveals that the effect of female executives is mediated by the presence of women in the legislature. As the proportion of women in the legislature increases, female executives' foreign policy behavior becomes less conflictual. These results suggest that as women gain greater acceptance in the realm of politics, female executives may feel less pressure to "prove" themselves as capable of being hawkish in the realm of national security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the mass-level, there is a substantial body of evidence to suggest that men and women view issues of security and conflict differently, but the effect of gender on elite-level foreign policy decision-making is less developed. To test the relationship between gender and foreign policy behavior, we analyze 25 democratic countries between 1975 and 2000. Our results reveal that even after controlling for partisanship, as the proportion of women in the legislature increases, the proportion of the budget devoted to defense spending decreases, and the general foreign policy tone of a state becomes less conflictual. Consistent with previous work, we also find evidence that female executives are more aggressive then male executives in foreign policy. However, our research is unique in that it reveals that the effect of female executives is mediated by the presence of women in the legislature. As the proportion of women in the legislature increases, female executives' foreign policy behavior becomes less conflictual. These results suggest that as women gain greater acceptance in the realm of politics, female executives may feel less pressure to "prove" themselves as capable of being hawkish in the realm of national security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ability of a government to prevent violence and threats against the state and its citizens often depends on its ability to deter its enemies from engaging in such tactics. Because deterrence is based both on capability and credibility it is not clear that all governments, even those that emerge within the same state, will always be similarly effective at deterring its enemies. In this paper I examine a number of factors both political and military to asses their impact on how they effect terroristsÂ’ decisions to attack states, specifically civilian populations. Specifically I examine whether credibility in regards to deterring terrorist attacks is affected by partisan politics as well as the decision to use force against an enemy or those thought to be associated with an enemy. I test my expectations using data drawn from the Israeli- Palestine conflict between the years 1979 and 1996. The results suggest that governments of the right are more effective at using force to deter future attacks both in regards to frequency and lethality but more moderate governments are less likely to be the target of terrorist attacks given the absence of the use of force. Additionally, government of the right are more likely, once they begin to use force, to be the targets or encourage spectacular events such as suicide bombings while governments of the left are less likely to see such occurrences.more or less likely to target a state or government. To do this I first develop an ?opportunity? model of factors that are likely to increase the probability or a terrorist attack including economic ties, diplomatic and security ties as well as cultural and past colonial relationships. I then develop a ?willingness? model that focuses directly on the state?s capacity to respond to terrorist activities accounting for both a government?s military prowess as well as its political capacity to act including those factors that might lead to government failure. I combine the two models using a split population model to account for these processes simultaneously. I test these models using data drawn from the Database of Political Institutions the ITERATE terrorism data set, Fearon and Laitin?s data on civil conflicts as well as a number of economic data sources. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]