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Artykuł poświęcony jest etycznym aspektom erystyki i – ogólniej – trudnościom, jakie napotykamy, gdy próbujemy oceniać walkę na argumenty w kategoriach moralnych. Uproszczone, powierzchowne postrzeganie zjawisk na tym polu prowadzi do nieadekwatnych ocen. Autor opowiada się przeciw stereotypowi erystyki jako sztuki nieuczciwej dyskusji, twierdząc, że nie da się chwytów erystycznych rozpatrywać simpliciter jako uczciwych bądź nieuczciwych bez brania pod uwagę okoliczności, w których dochodzi do wymiany argumentów. W tekście przedstawione są przykłady posunięć argumentacyjnych, które z jednej strony mają charakter podstępu, z drugiej jednak przyczyniają się do zwycięstwa tego, co słuszne. Porównanie walki erystycznej do zmagań wojennych pozwala na uwypuklenie trudności w formułowaniu sądów moralnych dotyczących prowadzenia sporów.

Purpose: The article discusses selected methodological issues of natural and social sciences with particular consideration of behavioural economics to highlight the significance of experimental research. Design approach: The order of the issues covered is as follows: (a) science as a product of a research community, (b) basic cognitive activities in science, (c) a short description of social sciences, (d) a discussion on the methods applied in behavioural economics. Findings: The article offers a description of research procedure, its objectives and the methods applied therein; it has been stressed that testing theories and hypotheses involves exposing them to falsification; it has been emphasised that research conducted within the framework of social sciences is more difficult than in the case of natural sciences because of the large number of independent variables and the possible interaction between the researcher and research participants. Practical implications: The content presented in the article highlights the value of scientific findings as opposed to common-sense knowledge adopted with the disregard of the principles of proper methodology. Value: The authors believe that the emergence of behavioural economics was an attempt to overcome certain deficiencies in the methodology of classical economics by means of experimental research.

Building on our diverse research traditions in the study of reasoning, language and communication, the Polish School of Argumentation integrates various disciplines and institutions across Poland in which scholars are dedicated to understanding the phenomenon of the force of argument. Our primary goal is to craft a methodological programme and establish organisational infrastructure: this is the first key step in facilitating and fostering our research movement, which joins people with a common research focus, complementary skills and an enthusiasm to work together. This statement—the Manifesto—lays the foundations for the research programme of the Polish School of Argumentation.

In her paper “Argumentation theory and the conception of epistemic justification”, Lilian Bermejo-Luque presents a critique of deductivism in argumentation theory, as well as her own concept of epistemic justification inspired by the views of Stephen Toulmin. Reading this paper induced me to reflect on the mutual relation between the notions of justification and argumentation. In this work I would like to first draw the reader’s attention to a few issues which seem debatable to me, or which I find worth presenting from a slightly different point of view than that of Lilian Bermejo-Luque. I agree that deductivism is not suitable for a general theory of evaluation of arguments although the critique of deductivism presented by the Author appears as not fully adequate to me. Then I proceed to presenting my doubts about the “conception of justification as a proper outcome of good argumentation” presented in the work. I need to emphasise that due to a broad range of topics addressed by me in this short paper, the description of some of them will be neither fully precise nor exhaustive.