1. Supply chain coordination based on revenue-sharing contract with a loss-averse retailer and capital constraint.
- Author
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Wu, Chengfeng, Zhao, Qiuhong, Lin, Shuaicheng, and Xu, Chunfeng
- Subjects
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SUPPLY chains , *BOUNDED rationality , *EXPECTED utility , *CONTRACTS , *RETAIL industry - Abstract
The paper aims to provide a theoretical basis for the application of revenue-sharing contract under bounded rationality and capital constraints. We consider an uncooperative ordering model in a supplier-Stackelberg game and coordination strategy with revenue-sharing contract for a loss-averse and capital-constrained retailer. We drive the existence and uniqueness conditions of the optimal solutions under bank financing and revenue-sharing contract. We also develop a series of propositions and corollaries to determine the optimal solutions and offer some managerial insights. The key contribution of the paper is to deepen and expand the revenue-sharing contract under the risk-neutral assumption, and to provide a theoretical basis for the application of revenue-sharing contract under bounded rationality and capital constraints. We find that the revenue-sharing ratio of loss-averse and capital-constrained retailer is larger than that of neutral retailer and the expected utility of loss-averse and capital-constrained retailer is larger than that of neutral retailer under coordination strategy with revenue-sharing contract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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