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Most Favored Nation (MFN) Treatment in investor-state arbitration is a contentious issue. Although there is much tension between the “text” and the “intent” camps, it is largely beyond dispute that the clear and unambiguous text— the plain meaning—of a treaty trumps background principles of international law. This is entirely in keeping with the axiom in investor-state arbitration that even the default rules of an arbitral forum such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) may be superseded by the specific terms of a treaty. Party autonomy’s privileged status in investor-state arbitration explains this phenomenon. Unlike the jurisdictional rules in United States federal courts—loosely described as top-down because they are derived from the United States Constitution, laws, or the pertinent federal rules of appellate, criminal or civil procedure—investor-state arbitration works more in a bottom-up manner. In the latter, specific signatories to a treaty want primacy over what the less granular concepts of international law or even forum rules indicate. In this respect, treaty interpretation in investor-state arbitration differs from the way legal instruments tend to be construed by United States’s federal courts, where the parties’ agreement alone may not usually displace the core rules of how the court operates or its Article III jurisdiction to resolve a case or controversy. That said, there is a sense in which treaty interpretation in investor-state arbitration is similar to the way that legal instruments are interpreted by U.S. federal courts: both debate whether to give priority to the intentions of the parties over the plain text and vice versa. What emerges is that, among the general principles of international law, there are hierarchically organized categories. Party autonomy belongs at or near the top where treaty interpretation is concerned— certainly eclipsing any role of general international law principles or even forum rules. Another important proposition—also derived from party autonomy—is that where a treaty’s text is silent on the matter (or it so directs), an MFN guarantee imports the substantive and jurisdictional benefits afforded, in theory or reality, third parties by any of the signatories of the treaty in question. This is true even where such benefits have not actually been bestowed upon an identifiable thirdparty investor. The mere possibility that a third-party investor might get a better deal from any of the signatories than each other’s investors is enough to constitute an MFN breach. In 2008, the United States Supreme Court held that a non-self-executing treaty is not enforceable federal law that can trump states’ prerogative of executing their lawfully attained judgments. The case was Medellín v. Texas. 1 In Medellín, the principal question concerned whether the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) determination that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) precluded the application of a country’s default rules (concerning consular access to the foreign arrestees within a State) must be given domestic legal effect by federal and state courts within the United States.2 Since the norm was not “self-executing,” it could not be given operative legal effect, the Supreme Court held.3 This keeps alive the possibility that a “treaty still may be selfexecuting if its terms indicate that the President and Senate so intended.”4 Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Medellín reaffirmed the Court’s willingness to utilize interpretive tools beyond the plain text of treaties but only when the text is ambiguous. The Medellín Court observed that, although treaty interpretation should “begin with [the treaty’s] text,” a ratified treaty is essentially “an agreement among sovereign powers.”5 Fundamentally, a treaty is a contract— as the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed.6 Remarkably, Justice Breyer, who dissented in Medellín, pursued a contract analogy to explain why, in his view, the relevant treaties should be analyzed in a particular way.7 To the Court, this meant that it was entitled to consult the “negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as ‘the postratification understanding’ of signatory nations.”8 In the Supreme Court’s own words, treaty “interpretation normally is, like a contract’s interpretation, a matter of determining the parties’ intent.”9 This article points out that where investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is concerned, it is ordinarily the treaty that will prevail over the general principles of international law and most forum rules. This is true of both jurisdictional matters and substantive claims. The general principles pertinent to this inquiry often are derived from customary international law, opinio juris, and judgments and awards of international tribunals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to introduce the reader to the knowledge of basic aspects related to the most favored Nation Clause in the Conv entions to avoid double taxation, such as its origin, the studies carried out by the United Nations Organization to try the codify it and include it in the Multilateral Agreement on the Law of Treaties, as well as the concept, essential elements, and typology of said legal figure. To prepare a typology of the Clause, the group of countries that make up the Latin American Region was chosen as a representative sample, the official pages of each of the American States were consulted, taking as the selection variable the CDI signed to date. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most-favored-nation (MFN) provisions have formed the center of a jurisdictional dispute that has plagued international arbitration for the past two decades. Since the Maffezini decision in 2000, holding that MFN clauses can be used to import jurisdictional provisions, the international arbitral system has seen a long succession of inconsistent and irreconcilable arbitral decisions, some following Maffezini's approach and others rejecting it. The result is a jurisdictional crisis in international arbitration that has consumed opposing parties' time and money, undermined the international arbitral system's legitimacy, and called into question the very reasons for the system's existence. However, a glimmer of hope has emerged: A new variety of MFN clauses has begun to appear that explicitly specify that they do not apply to procedural issues. Despite their potential to solve one of international arbitration's most intractable problems, these jurisdiction-limiting MFN clauses have largely escaped serious analysis. This Note fills this gap in scholarship by providing the first academic analysis focused exclusively on these new jurisdiction-limiting provisions, analyzing the trend towards the increased use of these provisions, the form the provisions take, their reception in arbitrated cases, and the implications that these provisions carry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Türkiye Adalet Akademisi Dergisi is the property of Justice Academy of Turkey and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Bilateral investment treaties signed by the Cuban State contain a set of substantive and procedural standards of mandatory compliance for the contracting parties. Among these is the most favored nation clause, a commitment that obliges the States to grant, both to foreign investors and to their investments, the most favorable treatment fundamentally in material matters. From the analysis of this clause, the main theoretical and normative deficiencies were identified, which could place the State in a situation of vulnerability before an eventual investment arbitration, as well as hinder the management of any local development project with the presence of foreign investment. The objective of this paper is to formulate theoretical assumptions for the improvement of the most favored nation clause of the bilateral investment treaties concluded by Cuba. The methods used were analysissynthesis, inductive-deductive, historical-legal analysis, theoretical-legal analysis and exegeticallegal analysis. The research was also carried out on the basis of the bibliographical review and the analysis of documents, which allowed the critical analysis and the taking of theoretical positions with respect to the institution studied, which will favor a better management and application of these agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bilateral investment treaties signed by the Cuban State contain a set of substantive and procedural standards of mandatory compliance for the contracting parties. Among these is the most favored nation clause, a commitment that obliges the States to grant, both to foreign investors and to their investments, the most favorable treatment fundamentally in material matters. From the analysis of this clause, the main theoretical and normative deficiencies were identified, which could place the State in a situation of vulnerability before an eventual investment arbitration, as well as hinder the management of any local development project with the presence of foreign investment. The objective of this paper is to formulate theoretical assumptions for the improvement of the most favored nation clause of the bilateral investment treaties concluded by Cuba. The methods used were analysissynthesis, inductive-deductive, historical-legal analysis, theoretical-legal analysis and exegeticallegal analysis. The research was also carried out on the basis of the bibliographical review and the analysis of documents, which allowed the critical analysis and the taking of theoretical positions with respect to the institution studied, which will favor a better management and application of these agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Commentators and some Justices suggest that religious activity is accorded a kind of Most Favored Nation status under #ee exercise guarantees-ifa statutory exception is made for a relevantly similar secular activity. tben an exception must also be made for religious activity. Sucb an approach would require a careful consideration of wbicb secular activities were relevantly similar to religious activities to warrant protecting tbe latter. But tbe Most Favored Nation approach involves a miscbaracterization of the past jurisprudence. Furtber, as is evidenced in the COVID cases, tbe U.S. Supreme Court does not engage in a nuanced consideration of wbicb activities are relevantly similar. misapplying the overly protective approach tbat it bas invented. Given the great diversity of religious belief and practice in our country. it will be impossible to apply this Most Favored Nation status across all religious beliefs and practices, wbicb will mean tbat tbe courts will have to pick and choose which religious practices to protect. The Court's current approach cannot belp but undermine religious fteedom and respect for the Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on the most favored nation clause is becoming more prevalent every day. The complexity of the relations of the States in the commercial and investment scenario makes it necessary to protect both the interests of the State and those of foreign investors. Therefore, in this essay the origins and subsequent evolution of the clause will be analyzed, which will make it possible to reflect on the need to articulate both interests, based on the improvement of the clause of the most favored nation of the agreements for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments. For such purposes, some theoretical assumptions will be proposed that could contribute to the redesign of this standard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Tandon v. Newsom which predicted a devastating change in First Amendment jurisprudence and most favored nation test for religious exemptions actually differs from the one employed.

The article explores the state of international trade, international law, and the world order of 1919. Topics discussed include the use of most-favored-nations clauses in the world economy before 1914 and its re-adoption after the First World War, significant changes in the relationship between states and markets by 1919, and the Anglo-American conflict over empire and the making of multilateralism, as well as the politicization of international law which was marked by the Austro-German customs union.

Consumer researchers have commonly analyzed marketplace performances as liminal events structured by context-specific role playing, norms of reciprocity, and cocreative collaborations. As a consequence, this literature remains theoretically mute on questions related to the sociological disparities that arise when marketplace performances forge relationships between affluent consumers and underclass service workers: a circumstance becoming increasingly commonplace owing to trends in the service-oriented global economy. To redress this gap, we analyze how such sociocultural differences are manifested and mediated in the provisions of skilled marketplace performances. Building upon Bourdieu's logic of field analysis, our resulting theoretical framework illuminates a network of structural relations that reconfigures the asymmetrical distribution of class-based resources between these class factions. Rather than being cooperative endeavors conducive to the formation of commercial friendships, we show that these class-stratified marketplace performances produce interdependent status games, subtly manifested power struggles, and contested forms of symbolic capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When two Member States enter into an agreement to enhance free movement of goods, persons, companies, services or capital, this may cause distortion of the functioning of the internal market. Consequently, the Member States must observe EU law when they adopt such an agreement. This article analyses how the free movement rights may affect such agreements, and it concludes that Member States should be careful not to adopt restrictions tofree movement under an agreement. Furthermore, they should be careful not to unjustly exclude goods, persons and companies from Member States that are not party to the agreement from benefiting from the agreement. The most important question is, however, whether the Member States must observe the requirement for most favoured nation treatment when adopting such an agreement. After analysing the existing case law--including the non-conclusive recent judgement in Achmea--it is concluded that Member States are likely to avoid intra-EU agreements being scrutinised under this principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Canton Trade Fair offers an excellent opportunity for enriching U.S.-China trade relations. This article reports a visitor's impressions of the fair and his experience in dealing with Chinese businessmen. The author also suggests how a business representative might prepare for a trip to the People's Republic of China and what he may anticipate upon arriving there. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the multinational business system in three geographic divisions--Industrial West, Sub-industrial South, and Communist East. The focus in industrialized countries is on trade liberalization, the European Economic Community's common market, and Treaty of Rome. Underdeveloped countries, where there is poverty and instability, need industrial development. Soviet bloc countries are a potential market. The 1962 Trade Expansion Act, supranational economic unions, shift from foreign trade to multinational operations, organizational structures based on the export process, on parent companies with separate foreign affiliates, on integrated multinational corporations with integrated foreign and domestic operations, and on a World Company structure are mentioned.

Antitrust enforcement against anticompetitive platform most favored nations (MFN) provisions (also termed pricing parity provisions) can help protect competition in online markets. An online platform imposes a platform MFN when it requires that providers using its platform not offer their products or services at a lower price on other platforms. These contractual provisions may be employed by a variety of online platforms offering, for example, hotel and transportation bookings, consumer goods, digital goods, or handmade craft products. They have been the subject of antitrust enforcement in Europe but have drawn only limited antitrust scrutiny in the United States. Our Feature explains why MFNs employed by online platforms can harm competition by keeping prices high and discouraging the entry of new platform rivals, through both exclusionary and collusive mechanisms, notwithstanding the possibility that some MFNs may facilitate investment by limiting customer freeriding. We discuss ways by which government enforcers in the United States and private plaintiffs could potentially reach anticompetitive platform MFNs under the Sherman Act, and the litigation challenges such cases present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the persistent stalemate in the WTO's Doha Round negotiations, various smaller-scale options have drawn attention in recent years, including the negotiation of plurilateral agreements (PAs) among interested governments. There are essentially two types of such agreements, an exclusive and an open variant. While the former apply among the signatories only, the latter are implemented on a Most-favoured-Nation (MFN) basis. To preclude 'free riding', the entry into force of such open PAs is usually conditioned on the participation of a 'critical mass' of countries, representing market shares of some 80% or more - quite a challenging benchmark. To promote more frequent use of PAs, given the plethora of pressing policy concerns, whether investment-, competition- or labour-related, the negotiation of exclusive agreements is being (re-)considered in current discussions. However, the entry into force of any non-MFN-based agreement would need to be accepted by consensus among all 160-odd WTO Members, and this may prove virtually impossible to achieve. This article thus proposes, based on past experience, to further explore the potential for open PAs among interested Members in the form of co-ordinated improvements of current commitments or, if not covered by the existing WTO framework, by way of 'WTOextra' understandings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we argue that the world trading system could do without preferential rules of origin. Preferences can be granted on the basis of most favoured nation (MFN) rules of origin anyway. Empirical literature suggests that, if the purpose for enacting preferential rules of origin was to facilitate commerce or promote inward investment, then their implementation has in practice defeated the purpose. Beneficiaries of preferences often prefer to trade using MFN rules of origin, rather than going though cumbersome procedures to show that they can 'benefit' from preferential rules. Thus, in the end, preferential rules of origin are neither necessary for preferences to be granted, nor have they facilitated trade or investment. Our policy recommendation for the negotiators of the Harmonized Working Programme (HWP), which aims to establish common rules of origin for all WTO members, is to also decide to outlaw preferential rules of origin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Estudios Internacionales is the property of Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on development and content of the conventional wisdom in investment treaty jurisprudence on the application of most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses to better substantive standards of treatment and the conventional wisdom in investment arbitration.

This article challenges the conventional wisdom thatMFNclauses in investment treaties can always be used to "import" substantive standards of treatment (e.g. FET). It argues that most tribunals permitting this use of MFN clauses have relied on presumptions and have ignored meaningful variations among clauses. It also points out that states are increasingly questioning the conventional view, and that a recent arbitral award has firmly rejected an attempt to use an MFN clause to import substantive standards. It concludes by sketching the terms of the new MFN debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Apple's economic role in the Publisher conspiracy to increase Amazon's below cost pricing of e-books is examined in a hub-and-spoke conspiracy framework. The five major e-book publisher defendants ("the Publishers") conspired because of their concern that Amazon's low prices would adversely affect physical book demand and prices and also create an Amazon retail monopoly under which Amazon would negotiate substantially lower wholesale e-book prices. The Publisher conspiracy successfully moved Amazon to an agency relationship and gained control over e-book retail pricing. The Publishers accomplished this by jointly threatening Amazon with windowing (delaying the release of new ebook titles), which imposed a significant potential cost on Amazon in the face of Apple's scheduled entry without windowing. Apple therefore economically facilitated the Publisher conspiracy solely through its entry, not through any of its iBookstore contract terms. Contrary to the court, the most favored nation (MFN) and maximum price terms in the Apple contracts had no effect in facilitating the Publisher conspiracy. In fact, if Apple had entered without these contract terms, e-book prices would have been substantially higher. Consequently, Apple's contracts should not have been evaluated under a per se standard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Direito Internacional Econômico e Tributário (RDIET) is the property of Revista de Direito Internacional Economico e Tributario (RDIET) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

I provide an analysis of vertical relations in markets with imperfect competition at both layers of the supply chain and where exchange is intermediated either with wholesale prices or revenue-sharing contracts. Revenue-sharing is extremely attractive to firms that are able to set the revenue shares but often makes the firms that set retail prices worse off. This is so whether revenue-sharing lowers or raises industry profits. These results are strengthened when a market moves from "the wholesale model" of sales to "the agency model" of sales, which results in retailers setting revenue shares and suppliers setting retail prices. I also show that retail price-parity restrictions raise industry prices. These results provide a potential explanation for why many online retailers have adopted the agency model and retail price-parity clauses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Direito Internacional is the property of Revista de Direito Internacional and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The legal framing of a firm's pricing strategy can determine whether it constitutes online resale price maintenance (RPM) or online most favored nation (MFN). Together, cases that involve online RPM and MFN can be viewed as a natural experiment of how antitrust economics and law may adapt to an online world. Thus far, legal theories that have been inconsistent with economic theories have dictated enforcement across jurisdictions, which has led to confusion that thwarts potentially efficient business practices. This paper distinguishes issues of online RPM from traditional RPM and online RPM from online MFN. We apply the economics learning to RPM and analyze the antitrust cases of online RPM and MFN to date in the United States, Europe, and Australia. Finally, we offer policy recommendations that reduce the confusion in current legal doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article scrutinises the significance of the most-favoured-nation (MFN) treaty in promoting the development of commercial activity and its results in transnational trade. As cardinal agents of trade policy, governments act as ‘umpires’ in formulating and guarding the rules of international trade, while the ‘players’ are private corporations which conduct commercial operations in the playing field of international trade. Within the framework of Finno-Japanese trade relations, the players established and developed their trade networks (corporate interconnections) regardless of the umpires and their official rules, meaning the commercial treaties. Through a close examination of the early trade policy relations between Finland and Japan along with the formation and development of the Finnish forest industry’s sales networks into the Japanese market in the early twentieth century, this study demonstrates that there was no explicit causal connection between MFN treaties and the evolution of the Finnish forest industry’s export efforts – and their results. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on parity clauses and competition law in online hotel booking and mentions most favoured nation (MFN) clauses, Article 101 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and Competition and Markets Authority.

The article reports on the statistical analysis of reciprocal foreign trade agreements. The author explains that the United States' trade with foreign countries is correlated between trade agreement countries and non-trade agreement countries. A chart is presented which tracks the changes in value of foreign trade between 1934-1939 for both agreement countries and non-agreement countries. Another chart evaluates the amount of imports between the United States and foreign countries depending if they are agreement or non-agreement countries.

We develop a three-country two-firm model to examine the superiority of most favored nation (MFN) vs tariff discrimination in global welfare by taking into account the cross ownership between exporters. We obtain several interesting results as follows. First, given cross ownership of financial interests and linear demand, the government of the importing country will impose a lower (higher) tariff on the low-cost (high-cost) firm and the global welfare under tariff discrimination will be higher than that under MFN, regardless of whether the mode of competition is Cournot or Bertrand competition, when the magnitude of cross ownership is relatively large compared with the cost difference. Second, given the cross ownership of corporate control and linear demand, the global welfare under tariff discrimination will be identical to that under MFN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pakistan and India are two neighboring countries, whose inhabitants share a long history and have many commonalities, but relations between both the countries have been strained by different activities and issues since birth of the two. Like other relations the Trade relations between Pakistan and India have never been good and productive since last six decades. This has hampered the economy of Pakistan and India, and has contributed a lot to the increasing level of poverty in both the countries. Using the lens of commercial peace theory, this study explores that Trade relations between Pakistan and India need a revival to combat the economic problems of the people on both sides of the border. Also it argues that trade, in spite of its economic benefits will contribute to peace between the countries and the region. It explains that there is a long list of issues contributing to this situation, needing focus to achieve the target of peaceful trade relations. This study focuses only three important of these i.e. Chabahar Port Project verses Gawadar Port, Most Favored Nation status (MFN) issue and Regional Politics involved in this regard. Furthermore this paper will give a list of suggestions important for improving the present status of Pak-India trade relations. It subsequently argues that both the countries shall enhance bilateral trade to foster peace in the region, as is advocated by commercial peace theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prevalent use of 'most favored nation' (MFN) clauses in commercial agreements has garnered significant attention in the economics and legal literature and by practitioners and enforcement agencies. From an antitrust standpoint, there is a strong consensus that while MFN provisions can lead to procompetitive outcomes or at least play a competitively neutral role, they may also result in competitive harm and a loss of consumer welfare. Therefore, US and EU enforcement agencies and courts have held that MFNs should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, considering the specific characteristics of both the contractual provision and the industry. While a case-by-case approach is valid, it is not ideal from a variety of standpoints: that of the competition authorities seeking to make best use of their limited resources and that of practitioners seeking to advise their clients. Accordingly, published guidelines on the use of MFNs, containing presumptions and safe harbors, would be both efficient and useful. The paper argues that it would increase the efficiency and accuracy of antitrust enforcement if one of the leading competition authorities issued MFN guidelines. The paper suggests a set of presumptions and safe harbors that should be included in any such guidelines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper empirically investigates whether developing countries may use trade policy as an alternative to environmental policies in order to control carbon emission. It measures the effectiveness of the existing 'Most Favored Nations' (MFN) tariff rates applicable to lower-middle income countries and for countries sorted on the basis of manufacturing-to-trade shares, in lowering carbon emission. By applying a fixed effects panel regression method over 16 years, it is found that the MFN tariff rate helps these economies to reduce carbon emission substantially. In addition, the role of foreign direct investment as purveyor of clean products is explored at the cross-country level. The results, at least on the ground of better environmental standards, indicate the need to re-evaluate the choice for protection under the domain of multilateral trade negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article demonstrate the continued legality of Most Favored Nation Clause (MFN) when used by Indiana employers to provide health insurance for their employees, present MFNs as a safe and viable option for certain Indiana employers to pursue. Topics discussed include antitrust issues that Indiana employers should avoid when implementing MFNs into contracts with health care providers; the class action lawsuit against Blue Cross Blue Shield; and the Sherman Antitrust Act.

The article discusses broad retail price Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause, which requires that the publishers price their e-Books no higher on Apple's iBook platform. It mentions that the clauses form a key component of the U.S. Department of Justice's action against Apple and several publishers. It also reveals that Retail Price MFN clauses can be distinguished from standard wholesale price MFN clauses.

The article focuses on the development of post-Maffezini practice of interpretation and application of most-favoured-nation clauses in international investment law. Although such clauses differ as to their precise formulation, the traditional view was that they applied to substantive treatment only. The decision of the arbitral tribunal in Majfezini was a point of change that gave a new, unpredicted dynamic to the interpretation of MFN clauses in bits . The aim of this article is to shed a light on the development of international investment jurisprudence in order to confirm or to question the sustainable nature of the shift in interpretation of MFN clauses. The analysis also draws from the recent work of the Study Group of the UN International Law Commission. Some recent and drafted investment agreements are also taken into consideration with a view to completing the interpretation of MFN clauses by investment tribunals and the ILC report. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), how disputes arising from such agreements are resolved by arbitral tribunals, and how such agreements do not provide enough clarity to guide arbitration efforts. Topics include the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the concept of Most Favored Nation Treatment (MFN), and the legal use of the fair and equitable standard and the standard of full protection and security.

In the context of sellers who sell their products through intermediary platforms, a platform most-favored-nation (PMFN) clause is a contractual restriction requiring that a particular seller will not sell at a lower price through a platform other than the one with which it has the PMFN agreement. Contractual restrictions observed in markets for e-books and travel services, among other settings, can be viewed as examples of this phenomenon. We show that PMFN clauses typically raise platform fees and retail prices and curtail entry or skew positioning decisions by potential entrants pursuing low-end business models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]