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Nel dibattito prevalente sulle determinanti dei conflitti militari, sembra mancare un'indagine sulle possibili cause ‘materiali’ tra i fattori che alimentano gli odierni venti di guerra. In particolare, occorre valutare quanto contino gli squilibri nelle relazioni commerciali e finanziarie, le tendenze verso la centralizzazione dei capitali e le relative svolte nell’ordine economico globale dal libero scambio al protezionismo. Un dialogo tra il Governatore onorario della Banca d’Italia Ignazio Visco e l’economista Emiliano Brancaccio, promotore dell’appello su “le condizioni economiche per la pace”.

A prominent feature within the sphere of international macroeconomics surrounds the notion of the domestic economy succumbing to a "sudden stop" — i.e. the point at which creditors are no longer willing to enter into fresh exposures vis-à-vis debtors. One avenue which has been increasingly adopted as a means to survey a nation's external sustainability (i.e. its vulnerability to sudden stops) is through the net international investment position (NIIP) — the difference between stocks of cross-border claims and liabilities. On the basis that financial account transactions are larger than current account transactions in terms of both volume and value, this paper by conjoining several strands of the international macroeconomics literature presents three motivations to suggest that the notion of external sustainability can be decoupled from the NIIP, namely that while a nation may in theory be a net creditor vis-à-vis the rest of the world in accordance with its NIIP, in reality, its susceptibility to sudden stops may be larger than an economy which is a net debtor as a consequence of (1) stock or (2) flow effects. Moreover, should the domestic economy succumb to a sudden stop as a result of either stock or flow effects, (3) this may not translate into changes to NIIP, thereby masking the fact that even though the domestic economy has succumbed to balance of payments difficulties, it continues to appear as a net creditor. To achieve its objectives, each motivative factor is presented through systems of financial accounts. Separate annexes also disseminate how delays between payment and settlement result in credit risks, in addition to how exchange rate fluctuations can impose accounting losses/gains on the balance sheets of counterparties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

America's current-account deficit has grown significantly since 2020, reaching 3.6% of GDP last year – its highest level since 2008. At the same time, its net foreign debt reached a staggering $18 trillion, or 78% of GDP. And fast-rising inflation has prompted the US Federal Reserve to begin raising interest rates and reducing its holdings of Treasury securities – moves that are likely to impede growth and increase the government's borrowing cost. Will America's "external sustainability" be at risk again? To answer that question, we must consider the four variables on which external sustainability depends: the gap between private saving and private investment, the size of the budget deficit, investment-income levels, and the rate of GDP growth. Geopolitics might compound the challenges ahead. The US has avoided a balance-of- payments and dollar crisis in the past largely because Asian central banks and oil- exporting countries have tirelessly purchased US government bonds and Treasury bills. But amid rising geopolitical tensions, these buyers might decide – or be forced – to rethink their purchases. It is against this backdrop that the Fed is pursuing rather aggressive interest-rate hikes and quantitative tightening. But increased demand for foreign capital to finance the trade deficit, together with greater reluctance by foreign investors to purchase US government bonds and Treasuries, might put America in a quandary. It is likely that America's external balance will deteriorate significantly, unless US GDP growth slows significantly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]