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In the third decade of the 21st century, new information and communication technologies significantly affect the development of many areas of life and work of modern man and business. Old paradigms are a thing of the past and new ones are developing new (business) models that combine modern achievements of scientific research and innovation. With the application of new technologies (data clouds, GPS, AI, AR, 3D printing, etc.), the world is globalizing again, in a new way. New political and economic relations are being built between states and between companies. Declaratively and really many borders have been erased and barriers have disappeared. In this and such a world, for many products and services, the distinction between local, regional and international markets has disappeared. The competition is intensifying, because knowledge is being transferred at a speed that was inconceivable until yesterday. Entrepreneurs who understand the latest trends in the economy are turning to new business models, the application of new technologies. Thus, they became global players in the provision of products and services, and this then caused changes even among those who did not plan to change so soon. New relationships are being established not only between countries and companies but also between customers and consumers. With the development of social networks, their power has grown so much that they have become an important factor in shaping supply chains and business models in modern conditions. By exchanging data, giving personal judgments and recommendations, customers and consumers have contributed to the development of many marketing channels, especially communication. These changes have significantly affected the development of business processes in companies that require new competencies, knowledge and skills, which is a special challenge for new leaders, both in companies and society as a whole.

The rise of China was closely associated with the strategic opportunity offered by a wave of globalization dating from the 1970s. As China grew, western growth was not restored. Soon after the arrival of the unipolar moment with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world confronted a succession of crises that western countries struggled to handle and will lead to a shift in the centre of economic gravity to Asia and a multipolar world. In this world in which China's continuing rise was already perceived as a strategic challenge, the COVID-19 pandemic saw further examples of liberal capitalist governance failure. Notwithstanding attempts to preserve western hegemony and a western liberal world order, the COVID-19 pandemic will accelerate and intensify the trends towards a global reset, the arrival of a multipolar world and new global development paths., Highlights • Analysis of the reasons for the conflict between the United States and China, examining productivity growth, productive investment and technology, financialization, international trade and de-dollarization • Analysis of the relative success of liberal and meritocratic governance systems in handing the impacts of COVID-19 and responding to economic crisis • Identifying forces leading to a transformation from a unipolar to a polycentric or multipolar global order. • Identification of the need for international co-operation

Submitted by GUSTAVO DA SILVA DINIZ (silva.diniz@unesp.br) on 2020-10-20T21:11:01Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese. Doutorado em Geografia. Gustavo da Silva Diniz..pdf: 18287031 bytes, checksum: 3483b45f22bf2d9430e8420b0e6e4593 (MD5) Rejected by Adriana Ap. Puerta Buzzá (dripuerta@rc.unesp.br), reason: Prezado Gustavo, O envio da submissão foi rejeitado por o agradecimento a Capes esta incompleto. Necessário incluir a frase como consta na portaria. Sem incluir e excluir qualquer palavra. O correto é : O presente trabalho foi realizado com o apoio da Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) - Código de Financiamento 001. No formulário, faltou adicionar a Capes além do CNPq. Aguardamos o envio do novo arquivo. Atenciosamente, Biblioteca Campus de Rio Claro on 2020-10-28T02:25:16Z (GMT) Submitted by GUSTAVO DA SILVA DINIZ (silva.diniz@unesp.br) on 2020-10-29T20:19:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese de Doutorado em Geografia. Gustavo da Silva Diniz..pdf: 18438054 bytes, checksum: b75e1d7c2efff25d2cc727a80608fec9 (MD5) Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Ap. Puerta Buzzá (dripuerta@rc.unesp.br) on 2020-11-02T20:55:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 diniz_gs_dr_rcla.pdf: 18438054 bytes, checksum: b75e1d7c2efff25d2cc727a80608fec9 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2020-11-02T20:55:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 diniz_gs_dr_rcla.pdf: 18438054 bytes, checksum: b75e1d7c2efff25d2cc727a80608fec9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020-05-28 Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) As transformações no espaço industrial derivadas da Revolução Digital na Fabricação e de uma nova fase técnica da indústria – Digitécnica - requerem, para sua compreensão, a análise de conceitos como Fabricação Digital, Manufatura Aditiva e Indústria 4.0, todos no contexto de uma “Nova Revolução Industrial” ou “Quarta Revolução Industrial”. Para melhor compreender as mutações na relação entre espaço e indústria, propõe-se o conceito de “Espaços da Nova Revolução Industrial” e a análise dos Fab Labs, espaços de educação, inovação, fabricação e serviços, caracterizados por sistemas de objetos relacionados às tecnologias de fabricação digital e sistemas de ações abertos e colaborativos, conectados a uma rede mundial distribuída de laboratórios locais. Nesta perspectiva, a pesquisa realizada teve como objetivo geral caracterizar o que são os “Espaços da Nova Revolução Industrial” e analisar se os Fab Labs podem ser considerados “Espaços da Nova Revolução Industrial”. O recorte espacial da investigação científica foram os Fab Labs na cidade de São Paulo - SP - Brasil, município que concentra a maior quantidade de laboratórios no país. O método de análise empregado é o proposto por Santos (2004), buscando-se compreender os sistemas de ações e os sistemas de objetos presentes nos Fab Labs em São Paulo, bem como suas dinâmicas de uso, redes e conexões estabelecidas. Como resultado, são identificadas quatro principais características dos “Espaços da Nova Revolução Industrial”: sua dinâmica de dados mundiais e produção local; as potencialidades para uma fabricação pessoal e personalizada, relacionadas à cultura maker; a emergência de uma fabricação aberta, democratizada e colaborativa, derivada da cultura open, de códigos abertos; e a relação dialética e contraditória entre um capitalismo digital sem atritos e as tecnologias de fabricação digital para emancipação humana. Conclui-se que os Fab Labs são Espaços da Nova Revolução Industrial, corroborando a hipótese de pesquisa, sendo possível verificar a presença dos principais elementos dos Espaços da Nova Revolução Industrial nos espaços dos Fab Labs. Por fim, evidenciam-se as relações entre as análises teóricas e empíricas desenvolvidas por meio da identificação de temas e perspectivas para os Fab Labs, os quais demonstram que uma Nova Revolução Industrial pode se desenvolver em vias mais includentes e emancipatórias, por meio de uma fabricação e inovação abertas, democratizadas e colaborativas. The transformations in the industrial space derived from the Digital Revolution in Manufacturing and a new technical phase of the industry – Digi Technique - require, for its understanding, the analysis of concepts such as Digital Fabrication, Additive Manufacturing and Industry 4.0, all in the context of a “New Industrial Revolution" or "Fourth Industrial Revolution". To better understand the mutations in the relationship between space and industry, it is proposed the concept of “Spaces of the New Industrial Revolution” and the analysis of Fab Labs, spaces for education, innovation, manufacturing and services, characterized by object systems related to digital manufacturing technologies and open and collaborative action systems, connected to a worldwide distributed network of local laboratories. In this perspective, the research carried out had the general objective to characterize what are the “Spaces of the New Industrial Revolution” and to analyze whether the Fab Labs can be considered “Spaces of the New Industrial Revolution”. The spatial clipping of the scientific investigation was the Fab Labs in the city of São Paulo - SP - Brazil, a municipality that concentrates the largest number of laboratories in the country. The method of analysis employed is the one proposed by Santos (2004), seeking to understand the systems of actions and the systems of objects present in the Fab Labs in São Paulo, as well as their dynamics of use, networks and established connections. As a result, four main characteristics of the “Spaces of the New Industrial Revolution" are identified: its dynamics of world data and local production; the potentialities for personal and personalized manufacturing, related to the maker culture; the emergence of an open, democratized and collaborative manufacturing, derived from the open culture, of open codes; and the dialectical and contradictory relationship between frictionless digital capitalism and digital fabrication technologies for human emancipation. It is concluded that the Fab Labs are Spaces of the New Industrial Revolution, corroborating the research hypothesis, being possible to verify the presence of the main elements of the Spaces of the New Industrial Revolution in the spaces of the Fab Labs. Finally, it is evidenced that the relationships between the theoretical and empirical analysis developed through the identification of themes and perspectives for the Fab Labs, which demonstrate that a New Industrial Revolution can develop itself in more inclusive and emancipatory ways, by means of open, democratized and collaborative fabrication and innovation. CAPES: 001. CNPq: 167754/2018-1.

China took over the G20 2016 presidency from Turkey during a period of subdued economic activity and diminished global growth. Growth in China was expected to slow to 6.3% in 2016 and 6.0% in 2017, primarily reflecting weaker investment growth as the economy continued to rebalance. Acknowledging that lower growth rates have become the “new normal,” the Chinese leadership set the annual target growth rate for China at no less than 6.5% in its 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020). The Plan redefined China’s development paradigm, de-emphasizing speed in favour of quality based on innovation, coordination, green development, openness and sharing. This vision constituted the foundation of China’s concept and priorities for the G20 presidency. The article reviews the main outcomes of the Chinese G20 presidency, focusing on major results which reflect China’s priorities for domestic development and international cooperation. Using qualitative and quantitative analysis of the G20 2016 documents and the documents of international organizations, the author highlights the key decisions made at the Hangzhou summit and trends in G20 engagement with international institutions. The findings indicate that the Chinese presidency’s priorities of development, innovation and trade received unprecedented attention, with development reaching an almost 43% share in the discourse (compared to the average of 15% for the eleven summits), innovation rising tenfold to about 7% (compared to 0.75% for the eleven summits) and trade peaking to 7.3% (compared to the average rate of 2.8%). At 2.2%, the share of the G20 discourse dedicated to the environment was higher than the overall average (1.42%) and higher than at any other summit except Cannes and Los Cabos. While energy issue-related discourse (about 4%) ranked lower than for Brisbane and Antalya, the metric was comparable to the average for the period (3.4%). Discussion dedicated to economic issues (25%) was close to the average for the period (27%). In line with the historical trend, the share of finance issues in the G20 discourse continued to decline, reflecting the G20’s role in the division of labour with regards to the regulation of financial markets. The intensity of G20 engagement with international organizations was higher than the average since the Washington summit. The choice of organizations was defined by the presidency’s priorities and established trends. Given the UN’s role in setting Sustainable Development Goals, and China’s commitment to the UN as the central element of a fair and peaceful multilateral system, it came as no surprise that the intensity of references to the UN was twice as high as the average for G20 summits and significantly higher than in any other summit. A similar trend was observed with respect to the WTO and UNCTAD. The G20’s reliance on OECD expertise continued to rise. The intensity of G20 engagement with the IMF and the World Bank was slightly lower than during the previous presidencies. Last but not least, China consolidated the G20’s dialogue with engagement groups, most notably with B20 and L20. Drawing on the results of qualitative and quantitative analysis, the author concludes that China’s G20 presidency contributed to the country’s development priorities, reflected China’s role in the evolving world order, and consolidated the G20’s status as the premier forum for economic cooperation and making globalization work for everyone. The author asserts that China managed to ensure its imprint on future G20 cooperation. First, it did so by integrating innovation, the new industrial revolution and the digital economy into its core agenda, generating 137 commitments to innovative growth and setting up the relevant international mechanisms. Second, with respect to trade and investment, it facilitated development and the adoption of two documents defining guiding principles for global investment policymaking, and promoting inclusive trade and global value chains. Third, under China’s stewardship, the G20 agreed to three action plans on energy cooperation, including Enhancing Energy Access in Asia and the Pacific: Key Challenges and G20 Voluntary Collaboration Action Plan, the G20 Voluntary Action Plan on Renewable Energy, and the G20 Energy Efficiency Leading Program (EELP), making further progress to address energy access, a cleaner energy future, energy efficiency, global energy architecture, energy security, as well as market transparency. Fourth, China advanced further G20 cooperation on development based on the Action Plan of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Fifth, the presidency committed to establish three China-based G20 centres, thus creating opportunities to enhance its influence in the G20 process through an evidence base, research and the exchange of knowledge in key policy areas. China struck a good balance between continuity and innovation regarding the G20 agenda, contributed to its legitimacy and effectiveness through productive engagement with key international organizations and dialogues with the engagement groups, and consolidated the G20’s capacity for direction setting, decision making and delivery.

В статье обосновывается доминантное значение структурно-технологического фактора в достижении высоких темпов роста производительности труда и экономики в целом в условиях активной интеграции российской экономики с мировым хозяйством, кризисных явлений, высокой энтропии рыночных процессов и ускорения темпов технологического развития. Подчеркивается необходимость активной государственной промышленной политики, ставящей задачу глубокой структурной модернизации посредством установления оптимальных макроэкономических пропорций, соответствующих четвертой промышленной революции. Автором показана возможность сетевого характера новой парадигмы промышленной политики, в рамках которой определены две группы структурных приоритетов., We substantiate the dominance of structural-technological factor in achieving high rate of growth of productivity and economy as a whole under active integration of Russian economy into the world economy, crisis manifestations, high entropy of market processes and acceleration of technological development. We stress the need for active governmental industrial policy aimed at deep structural modernization via setting optimal macroeconomic proportions in accordance with the Fourth industrial revolution. The author shows the possibility of network character of the new paradigm of industrial policy and distinguish two groups of structural priorities within the policy in question., ЖУРНАЛ ПРАВОВЫХ И ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ, Выпуск 3 2020

Предложена методика оценки конкурентоспособности российских регионов с точки зрения соответствия экономического и технологического развития мировым трендам, характерным для четвертой промышленной революции (Индустрия 4.0). В качестве примера, иллюстрирующего предложенный подход, проведена оценка конкурентоспособности и потенциала Москвы и Московской области. На основе проведенного анализа определены основные направления региональной политики в условиях четвертой индустриальной революции., A method for assessing the competitiveness of Russian regions in terms of the conformity of economic and technological development with the global trends characteristic of the fourth industrial revolution (Industry 4.0) is proposed. As an example illustrating the proposed approach, an assessment of the competitiveness and potential of Moscow and the Moscow Region are carried out. On the basis of the analysis, the main directions of regional policy in the conditions of the fourth industrial revolution are determined., №1 (2019)

There is a lot of talk lately about new industrial revolution (NIR), emerging technologies and economic metamorphosis and how they impact our professional and private lives. Many experts think that in order to respond successfully to our sociocultural evolution, organisations should be set up in a more decentralized and flexible way while relying on strong change management, cluster dynamics, interdisciplinary thinking, competency shift and dynamic digital environment, to name a few. They believe that our existing value chain will be quite disrupted by new driving forces. But how do we respond? It is understandable that we need to rethink our educational and business models, but does that make us fully ready to meet this revolutionary paradigm shift? Is there a roadmap for information institutions to successfully participate in these new ecosystems? What are the incentives, actions and programs that best leverage all the change that awaits us?

Rozdział z: Functioning of the Local Production Systems in Central and Eastern European Countries and Siberia. Case Studies and Comparative Studies, ed. Mariusz E. Sokołowicz. The paper presents the mapping of potential next industrial revolution clusters in Poland and Siberia. Deindustrialization of the cities and struggles with its consequences are one of the fundamental economic problems in current global economy. Some hope to find an answer to that problem is associated with the idea of next industrial revolution and reindustrialization initiatives. In the paper, projects aimed at developing next industrial revolution clusters are analyzed. The objective of the research was to examine new industrial revolution paradigm as a platform for establishing university-based trans-border industry clusters in Poland and Siberia47 and to raise awareness of next industry revolution initiatives. Monograph financed under a contract of execution of the international scientific project within 7th Framework Programme of the European Union, co-financed by Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education (title: “Functioning of the Local Production Systems in the Conditions of Economic Crisis (Comparative Analysis and Benchmarking for the EU and Beyond”)). Monografia sfinansowana w oparciu o umowę o wykonanie projektu między narodowego w ramach 7. Programu Ramowego UE, współfinansowanego ze środków Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego (tytuł projektu: „Funkcjonowanie lokalnych systemów produkcyjnych w warunkach kryzysu gospodarczego (analiza porównawcza i benchmarking w wybranych krajach UE oraz krajach trzecich”)).