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The study analyses the manner in which the Parliament adopted the first organization law of the armed forces following the Great Union of 1918. This particular piece of legislation was very important for Romania, but it could be adopted only after the Constitution came into effect, promulgated on March 29, 1923. The legislative process began in February 1924, with the Senate being the first chamber to review it, voting on February 29, 1924. The Chamber of Deputies followed, giving its final vote on May 27 of the same year. The law was published in the "Official Gazette" No. 134 on June 24, 1934. It was effectively in force throughout the inter-war period, with minimal amendments in 1930 and 1932. Parliamentary debates were lively, with senators and deputies making various proposals that were ultimately not included in the law's content. It was approved in both chambers with only one vote against, reflecting the legislative body's care and responsibility for national defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study analyses the position expressed between 1933 and 1944 by Gheorghe I. Brătianu regarding the Black Sea Straits Question. Through the works published during those years, he established himself as one of the greatest Romanian historians, his scientific interests focusing on the evolution of Romanians in the Middle Ages as well as on the role of the Black Sea in all international relations. In this context, as a Professor at the University of Bucharest, between 1941-1943, he taught a course at the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy on The Black Sea Question, in which he extensively developed his concepts. They can be summarized in the phrase according to which Romania has faced the Pontus Euxinus “Straits fatalism” throughout its existence. At the same time, as a politician and party leader, Gheorghe I. Brătianu opposed Nicolae Titulescu’s policy of envisaging a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union, a country that had not recognised the unification of Basarabia with Romania. As such, he criticized the position adopted by Romania at the Montreux Conference (22 June-21 July 1936), which modified the status of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, according to Moscow’s interests. By the Convention signed on 20 July 1936, the access of non-littoral military ships was severely restricted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study analyses the position expressed between 1933 and 1944 by Gheorghe I. Brătianu regarding the Black Sea Straits Question. Through the works published during those years, he established himself as one of the greatest Romanian historians, his scientific interests focusing on the evolution of Romanians in the Middle Ages as well as on the role of the Black Sea in all international relations. In this context, as a Professor at the University of Bucharest, between 1941-1943, he taught a course at the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy on The Black Sea Question, in which he extensively developed his concepts. They can be summarized in the phrase according to which Romania has faced the Pontus Euxinus "Straits fatalism" throughout its existence. At the same time, as a politician and party leader, Gheorghe I. Brătianu opposed Nicolae Titulescu's policy of envisaging a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union, a country that had not recognised the unification of Bessarabia with Romania. As such, he criticized the position adopted by Romania at the Montreux Conference (22 June-21 July 1936), which modified the status of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, according to Moscow's interests. By the Convention signed on 20 July 1936, the access of non-littoral military ships was severely restricted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This study analyses the Romanian viewpoint on the Battle of Stalingrad, focusing on some relevant issues, such as: the decision taken by Ion Antonescu to participate with large numbers in the Wehrmacht campaign of 1942; the reactions to reject this decision by some of the high-level political and military leaders; the movement of the expeditionary troops to the front; the organization of the deployment, equipment and training of the two armies deployed in the great bend of the Don and the Kalmyk Steppe; the defence operation carried out by the Romanian forces, etc. It is clearly mentioned that the plan for the "Uranus" operation was established by the Soviet General Staff before the deployment of the 3rd and 4th Armies, which invalidates the widely circulated thesis in historiography according to which the enemy's main strikes had as start point the disposition of the Romanian troops on the flanks of the 6th German Army, the main group operating in town. At the same time, the study concludes that the main responsibility for the serious failure in this confrontation fell on the German High Command, under whose authority the big Romanian units acted under. It did not fulfil its commitment made in the winter of 1942 - that of equipping the Romanian troops on the front -, it drastically limited the freedom of movement of the Romanian commands, and did not take into account the multiple information indicating the preparation for a counter-offensive from the enemy's side. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses the opinions of the future general Alexandru Socec (1859-1928) about the Great Eastern Crisis of 1877-1878, which led to a new war between the Russian and Ottoman empires. Romania entered the conflict on the side of Russia, the war waged by its army consecrating on the battlefield the independence proclaimed on May 9-10, 1877. A teenager at that time, Alexandru Socec recorded his impressions, but also those circulated in the public space about this conflict, in which he would have wanted to participate as a volunteer, but for which he was too young to be enlisted. The readers are thus presented with less known facts that bring about new nuances in recreating the atmosphere of the Romanian society during an essential moment for the Romanian nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study presents the organization and functioning of the strategic planning process during between September 1940, when power was seized by General Ion Antonescu, who became the leader of the Romanian state, temporarily associating himself with the Legionary Movement, and June 22, 1941, when Romania joined Germany in "Operation Barbarossa" with the goal of liberating Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, both annexed by the Soviet Union the year before. Romania's most important strategic objective was to defend its eastern borders, specifically the region between River Prut and Eastern Carpathians, the Danube mouths and the Romanian littoral at the Black Sea. In spite of the guarantees offered by Germany and Italy on August 30, 1940, the Soviet Union maintained an aggressive conduct. This fact triggered the deployment to this region of the most important forces, the erection of important fortification, such as the Focani-Nămoloasa-Brăila fortified line, and the elaboration of projects aiming to repel a potential aggressive action. After the arrival of the German Military Mission and Romania becoming a member of the Tripartite Pact, the plans of the General Staff were adjusted in accordance with German needs, represented by the two major operations, "Marita" and "Barbarossa". If, in what the former was concerned, Romania only had a modest role, in the latter Bucharest had a major interest, Ion Antonescu believing that the reclamation of the two provinces could only be achieved with German help. As a consequence, the General Staff, which was the structure tasked with strategic planning, followed the directives of the German High Command, taking steps to prepare the Romanian forces for action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The study analyses the competition for the position of Chief of the General Staff during the Balkan crisis (1912-1913) and during Romania's neutrality (1914-1916). The position was very important and enjoyed an increased prestige, because it created the conditions for standing out on the battlefield and, implicitly, for winning military glory. Therefore, the number of competitors was quite high. However, the major decision-maker regarding the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff, which, during the war, was transformed into the General Headquarters, was the political factor, namely the ruling party and the king, who was "the head of the armed power". The solution chosen at the beginning of the world conflict, which worked even after Romania entered the war, with General Vasile Zottu as Chief and General Dumitru Iliescu as Deputy Chief, actually leading the Romanian armed forces operations, was inefficient. The right person to lead the General Headquarters, namely General Constantin Prezan, was found only at the beginning of December 1916. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyses the Romanian military system in the period between the two world wars, commonly known as the interwar period. During this time, it developed according to the experience of World War I, something that was very noticeable in the debates pertaining to the organization of the military body. In other words, Romania undeniably suffered from the "syndrome of the last war". Another major influence was the French military model, which was adopted by the Romanian army in the period 1916-1918 and preserved during the interwar period. The military body has gone through several stages, consistent with the developments on the international stage. Thus, in the period 1919-1924, the military structures of unified Romania were brought together, a process not without its own challenges: the integration of a significant number of military personnel from the former Austro-Hungarian and Russian armies; the expansion of the military infrastructure in the territories that united with Romania in 1918; the creation of a legislative framework attuned to the new realities, etc. This was followed by roughly a decade in which the pace of the reforms was modest, meaning that the army suffered serious setbacks in terms of training and equipment. By the mid-1930s, concomitantly with the worsening of the international environment and the prospect of a new war, Romania launched a race against time for strengthening the army. However, the army was not able to avoid the dismantling of the country's borders in the summer of 1940. Furthermore, it found itself in a humiliating position, being forced to withdraw from Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, north-eastern Transylvania and from the Quadrilater without opposing any resistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study analyses the role of the military in the collapse of the country's borders in June-September 1940. In this period, Romania found itself isolated, politically and militarily, and the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact (August 23, 1939) placed it at the discretion of the two totalitarian powers - Germany and USSR. The rapid defeat of France in just six weeks (May 10 - June 22, 1940) represented a huge surprise for the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, who expected a prolonged war, similar to that of 1914-1918. Thus, the Soviet Union kept its forces intact and were in the position to tip the balance of victory on the Western front. The new circumstances allowed Moscow to materialize its old strategic objectives. Stalin decided to act forcefully and, by two ultimatums, he demanded Bessarabia, as stipulated in the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, and in addition Northern Bukovina, a claim which created the first breach in the German-Soviet friendship. Although Soviet preparations and intentions were well known, the leadership in Bucharest did not have a clear stance on whether to defend or evacuate Bessarabia. Under these circumstances, the army was placed in a humiliating position, being forced to surrender without a fight the territory between Dniester and Prut and Northern Bukovina. In addition, the military leadership (the minister of war and the chief of staff) invoked the unfavourable forces ratio and opted for evacuation. The same situation repeated in the wake of the Vienna Diktat of August 30, 1940, the arguments invoked being once again the difficult military situation and the prospective dissolution of the Romanian state. Again, the army was ordered to evacuate northeastern Transylvania without a fight, but the withdrawal was slightly more organized. While the decision to accept the ultimatums and the diktats was primarily political, the army, despite having a secondary role in this drama, became one of its prime victims. It was put in the position to evacuate without a fight an important part of the national territory. Thus, the leadership opted for the formula "we cede territories to keep the state" instead of armed resistance, as it would have been the case. The non-combat approach from the summer of 1940 had and still has major consequences over the Romanian psyche. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study examines the cooperation within the two warring coalitions in World War 1. It starts from the hypothesis - which was confirmed numerous times in history - that collaboration within coalitions is always a difficult task, given the divergent or even contradictory interests of the actors involved. The Great War was no exception. Within the Central Powers, Germany succeeded, but not without difficulties, to coordinate the efforts of the allies, this fact being facilitated by the territorial continuity achieved after the defeat of Serbia (1915). German hegemony over the command of the operations was not sufficient to achieve victory, as the First World War was, in the words of Erich Ludendorff, a total war. The combined potential of the Entente was significantly larger than the one of the Central Powers. Also, Russia's exit from the war was compensated by the entry of the United States as an associated power. However, the Entente, in three years and a half, has not managed to create a unitary command of the operations, something that reflected on the battlefield, the Entente suffering many defeats in France, Italy and the Balkans. It was as late as March-April 1918 when, in the context of the German offensive, the allies managed to put behind their national pride, appointing Ferdinand Foch as the commander-in-chief of the allied forces, something that represented one of the decisive factors behind the victory from October-November 1918. As for the operations of the Romanian army, they unfolded under national command in the autumn of 1916, in December same year being created the Romanian Front, a joint structure headed by King Ferdinand. Nevertheless, the cooperation between the Romanian and the Russian armies at the command level went through tensioned moments. Also, an important role was played the French Military Mission, headed by General Henri Mathias Berthelot. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While some of the memoirs of General Gheorghe Berdan, a participant in the two world wars, entered the scientific circuit, there are still unpublished pages that refer to the childhood years and the First World War. The author was one of the "war graduates", which comprised the young men who, after graduating school, received the rank of second lieutenant in the summer of 1917. They received their "baptism by fire" in the battles of Mărăști, Mărășești and Oituz and some them, including Gheorghe Berdan, left written testimonies about their first experience of war. The pages below were previously unpublished and they refer to the battles of Mărăști and Mărășești, seen by the author - and rightfully so - as landmarks of Romanian heroism. They combine the personal experience of the author on the battlefield with extensive readings about these confrontations. The result is an interesting analysis, worthy of being brought to the attention of today's generation in the context of the centenary of these great battles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyses the manner in which the political regime in Bucharest, which was installed following Romania's entry into the Soviet sphere of influence, commemorated in August 1957 four decades since the Battle of Mărăşeşti by inviting a group of former members of the French Military Mission who were active on the Romanian Front between October 1916 and March 1918. The group of the former French combatants was led by General Victor Pétin, the chief of staff of the French Mission and subsequently the military attaché in Romania. The visit of the French veterans highlighted a certain openness of the regime in Bucharest towards Western countries and especially towards France, for whom Romanians had a special fondness. At the same time, the organizing of the commemoration of the Battle of Mărăşeşti, marking four decades since the largest Romanian military confrontation during the Great War, symbolizes the beginning of a delimitation from the Stalinist vulgate of the 1950s regarding the character of Romania's participation to the confragration and the events that eventually led to the establishment of the national unitary state in 1918. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the campaign of 1916 that ended with a great military defeat, the Romanian Army was subjected to a vast reorganization, restructuring, instruction, and endowment program under very difficult conditions during the winter of 1917. The recovery was performed with the support of the French Military Mission that arrived in Romania at the beginning of October 1916 and was led by General Henri Mathias Berthelot. The new Romanian Army was capable to carry out offensive actions, as was the one in Mărăşti, and to reject the repeated attempts of the Armed Forces of the Central Powers at Mărăşeşti and Oituz, meant to exclude Romania from the war. These victories were obtained under circumstances in which the Russian Military Forces had diminished their combative capacity as a consequence of the Revolution of February 1917. The victories of the Romanian Army at Mărăşti, Mărăşeşti, and Oituz were among the most important ones of the Entente during 1917. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The study analyses the preparation, unfolding and consequences of the Battle of Verdun (February 21st - December 18th 1916). The initiative belonged to the German High Command, which, with regards to the year of 1916, changed its strategic priorities. Erich von Falkenhayn considered that, in order to take France out of the war, a severe blow was needed on the Western Front. With this purpose in mind, he chose Verdun for its historical symbolism and value. The German concentration of forces was enormous, but with moderate success, as the French resistance fared much better than expected. The Battle of Verdun went through four major phases. The first, which unfolded between February 21st and March 1st, consisted in a swift and concentrated German offensive, which involved impressive forces, totalling 17 divisions. This massive attack failed and, from March 2nd to April 15th, 1916, there was a generalized offensive on both banks of the River Meuse, which again failed to reach its goals. This was followed by the attrition phase, between April 15th and July 1st. From July 1st until December, in the context of the Battle of Somme, of the Brusilov offensive, of the Italian counteroffensive and of Romania's entry into the war, the confrontation entered in its last phase, that of recoil and stabilization. To a large extent, it was the Battle of Verdun that prompted Romania to enter the war alongside the Entente. Confronted with the huge pressure at Verdun, France took the initiative to negotiate with Bucharest, something that was, until that moment, left to the Russian Empire, by accepting its requests and persuading it to enter the war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study analyses the methods of training staff officers abroad in the period between the War of Independence and the Second World War. The phenomenon depended to a large extent on the culture and civilisation model followed by Romania in the particular period. The staff officers who were trained abroad played an important role in the modernisation of the Romanian military body, occupying positions of great responsibility such as ministers of war, chiefs of general staff, commanders of army corps and divisions, directors or professors at the Superior War School as well as noted military theoreticians. Among them we can mention Alexandru Averescu, Grigore Crãiniceanu, Constantin Christescu, Leon Mavrocordat, Constantin Prezan, Constantin Iancovescu, Alexandru Iarca. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study analyzes the organization and functioning of the Army Headquarters during the period 1914-1916, when the Romanian state stayed out of the conflict. It presents the structures of the central military administration (the Ministry of War, the General Secretariat) together with those of strategic and operational command (the General Staff, the army commands -- which were to be established during mobilization) and those of the army corps. With regard to the relevant department, the function was exerted by Ion I.C. Brătianu, who also was the head of the government. A greater role was assigned to the General Secretariat, led by General Dumitru Iliescu, a friend of the prime minister. During the entire period of neutrality, the Chief of the General Staff was General Vasile Zottu. The most important role was given to the General Secretariat of the Ministry of War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study analyses the methods of training staff officers abroad in the period between the War of Independence and the Second World War. The phenomenon depended to a large extent on the culture and civilisation model followed by Romania in the particular period. The staff officers who were trained abroad played an important role in the modernisation of the Romanian military body, occupying positions of great responsibility such as ministers of war, chiefs of general staff, commanders of army corps and divisions, directors or professors at the Superior School of War as well as noted military theoreticians. Among them we can mention Alexandru Averescu, Grigore Cr`iniceanu, Constantin Christescu, Leon Mavrocordat, Constantin Prezan, Constantin Iancovescu, Alexandru Iarca. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study analyzes the manner in which the Romanian historiography reflected the personality and activity of Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey. According to our investigations, these historiographical demarches conducted by Romanian historians can be divided into a number of stages. The first such stage occurred during the lifetime of the Turkish leader and, for the most part, coincided with the period between the two world wars. Given the very good relations between Romania and the new Turkish state, the Romanian public opinion was particularly interested in the phenomena and processes initiated and coordinated by Mustafa Kemal, who was transforming a centuries-old empire from its foundations. In its turn, the Romanian historiography attempted to provide a coherent perspective on the transformations taking place in Turkey and on the person behind these. This is the period in which the first monographs and solid studies regarding Atatürk's activity started to be published, such as the one authored by Petre Ghiață. The second stage coincided with World War 2, when the two countries had a different status - Turkey remained neutral, while Romania was first Germany's ally, then a de facto member of the Coalition of the United Nations. During this period, there was no groundbreaking work, the research remaining at the same parameters as in the previous years. After World War 2, for nearly a quarter of a century, the Romanian historiography largely ignored the topics of Romanian-Turkish relations and the personality of Kemal Atatürk In the early 1970s, given the improvement in the Romanian-Turkish relations, the personality of the founder of modern Turkey returned to the attention of Romanian historiography, the most important moment being the centennial of his birth. After 1989, the historiographical interest remained at a high level, the Romanian historians analyzing various aspects of Atatürk's work in papers, studies and doctoral theses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study records that, in 2014, the Romanian Armed Forces celebrate two significant moments in their history -155 years since the birth of Marshal Alexandra Averescu and 155 years since the establishment of the General Staff. The study documents the role of Alexandru Averescu in the staff structures, including as the Chief of the General Staff between 1911 and 1913. In this capacity, he prepared and led the campaign of the Romanian Armed Forces duringthe Second Balkan War (1913). During the First World War, Alexandru Averescu led the Second Army, with whom he achieved the brilliant victory of Mărăsti. Then, he opted for a political career, being Prime Minister in 1920-1921 and in 1926-1927. Alexandru Averescu remains in the national history as one of the most prominent military leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]