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Betel quid (pān) chewing has prevailed in South Asian and South East Asian countries since ancient times as a sociocultural tradition for promoting health, strengthening relationships and personal beautification. Today over 600 million people worldwide are estimated to chew betel quid on a daily basis and it is recognized as a public health concern. Biomedical research links the growing cases of head and neck cancers in the subcontinent with the consumption of the highly addictive betel quid ingredients, areca nut and tobacco. An anthropological approach towards betel quid chewing practices suggests the biomedical perspective ignores the heterogeneity of the quid and the context wherein the consumers’ subjective and objective experiences are driven by personal, social and cultural motivations. This thesis explores the contemporary habits of betel quid consumers in Karachi and Lahore in Pakistan to find out what social and cultural factors influence initiation, continuation or discontinuation of pān chewing; what risk/benefit factors are associated with it; and how public health hazard warnings affect the behavior of consumers and traders.

This research project examines how technology-based practices may shape human lives in general, and healthcare in particular. Telemedicine is a relatively new development in which doctors and patients can interact despite being physically apart, by using information and communication technologies. This way of giving medical care is often seen as beneficial for countries such as Pakistan, where healthcare is distributed unevenly, and parts of the population have no or little access to sufficient care. My research question is: How do telemedicine and inherent practices shape interactions between doctors and patients? The thesis is based on one month of fieldwork in Pakistan, where I conducted unstructured interviews with healthcare professionals and people working with telemedicine. The fieldwork findings are analysed in a heuristic way, by using four different philosophical and anthropological concepts regarding a specific aspect, namely surfaces. Surfaces shape the way that we are in and interact with our surroundings. They influence the way in which we perceive and are perceived. Thus, surfaces have an impact on knowledge and knowledge generation. I use surfaces as spaces and textures to think with, and to show multiple layers of telemedicine. The fieldwork findings illustrate that there is not one singular kind of telemedicine, but many and often incompatible ways in which telemedicine is practised. Through surfaces it becomes clear how these practices are connected while at the same time being mutually exclusive. First, I discuss aspects of telemedicine which are obvious and immediately visible, e.g. that certain types of medical care rely on technology. Second, I show that there are sides to telemedicine which remain hidden. Drawing on actor-network theory, healthcare can be conceptualized as a network. This network is complicated by adding technology, due to uncontrollable and invisible components. Third, I explain how telemedicine, by neglecting some human sen

Last month, Pakistani Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan was ousted in a parliamentary no-confidence vote, ending several weeks of political crises. Khan had faced public discontent with his mismanagement of the economy and foreign policy – which were combined with a growingly authoritarian style of governance. The removal from office of the former PM – who used every available means, mostly both unconstitutional and illegal, to stay in power – trough parliamentary proceedings was made possible by Supreme Court action. The phenomenon was widely described as ‘a step forward for Pakistan’s democracy’. Nevertheless, there is a common understanding among experts that the army top brass played a crucial role in toppling Khan’s government. It is argued that Khan - who initially enjoyed much goodwill – ended up losing support by the military leadership. […]

On February 23, Pakistan’s Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan arrived in Moscow for a two-days visit. According to open sources, the PM’s Russia trip was for a ‘exchange of views on major regional and international issues’1, aiming at a reset of bilateral ties and ‘expanding cooperation in the energy sector’. When opening the discussions, Imran Khan chose a remarkably peculiar statement. Referring to the then current situation, he said: ‘What a time I have come, so much excitement’. Putin’s “bullying” of the Ukraine reached at that very moment and once again a dramatic peak (after the illegal annexation of Ukrainian Crimea in 2014). Even before Khan’s departure to Moscow it was well-known that Russia is again taking unprovoked, coercive measures against Ukraine. For example, the unacceptable threatening of the Ukrainian government and its people by a massive build-up of forces along the country’s borders, or pushing the level of violations to the Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty to new heights. Making the situation worse, just a few hours after Khan’s dubious remark, Russia conducted a full-scale invasion of its neighbor, an independent European country. As such, it does not come by surprise that Khan’s appearance in Moscow raised criticisms. […]

Pakistan is witnessing a most severe political crisis, as the government is strongly challenged by both state and society. It is not the first time that Imran Khan, as Pakistan’s Prime Minister (PM), is facing severe criticisms; it is not the first time that a wide array of oppositional forces gather to demand his resignation. Short-lived and unstable governments, the army’s and secret service’s dominant role in the country’s decision-making, and a growing leverage by Islamist forces within the institutional-administrative structure are most noteworthy characteristics of Pakistan’s political arena. In fact, the ousting of successive ruling administrations ‘is as old as Pakistan itself’. According to observers, almost all political and religious parties were involved in the toppling of governments in the past. PM Khan, too, faces frequent pressure from the opposition, Islamist clerics, and other domestic socio-political actors. […]

For the whole eleven years during which I have been actively engaged in South Asia, nothing touched me more than the Bangladeshi people’s struggle for memory, justice, and accountability regarding the Genocide perpetrated against Bangladesh by the Pakistani military authorities. This genocide, organised in tandem with Islamic fanatic organisations from both West and East Pakistan, was meant to destroy the Bengali identity by murdering elites, destroying religious diversity, and raping women. […]

After weeks of political turmoil, the opposition overthrew the government in Pakistan. In a no-vote of confidence, Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan – who used every available means, mostly unconstitutional and illegal, to stay in power – was forced out of office. Opposition leader Mian Mohammad Shahbaz Sharif, President of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz/PML-N, member of an influential industrial-political dynasty and staunch critic of Khan, was elected as new PM. […]

The European Union’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences+ (GSP+) trade scheme intends to promote sustainable development through trade for those countries that deserve some trade promotion for their special achievements regarding fundamental political goals. Whereas the political achievements specifically contemplated by the preferential trade scheme are normally the ones under direct scrutiny, it is also important to evaluate a country’s dynamics according to other criteria: the global environmental impact is a case in point. This paper aims to analyse the EU’s indirect incentive to Pakistan’s exports of red meat – specifically, beef. Pakistan, already a major casings provider to the EU, started exporting red meat amidst the GSP+’s implementation – and has been seeking to further integrate the European’s red meat market. Whereas it might make sense to maintain those existing derogations under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that provide incentives to red meat production which follows a range of high environmental and rural development standards, there are several reasons to disincentivise these productions. Red meat production carries considerable damaging environmental effects – including the depletion of water resources and reduction of water quality. Here Pakistan constitutes a case in point because of its water-stress situation – that alone justifies restrictions, not incentives, to red meat production in the country. International institutions such as the FAO warn us yet and again about the unsustainability of both the production and consumption of red meat due to its impacts on water resources. The EU so aligns its public discourse. However, after reviewing numerous academic papers, reports, and official documentation, we find that actual policy fails to match the rhetoric. Lifting custom duties for various animal products under the GSP+ without proper environmental impact assessments constitutes a telling example. Furthermore, the funding of ‘pro-mea

It seems that relations between Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia lie in extraordinary flux. This SADF Working Paper starts by analysing the causes and consequences of that fact. The paper sheds light not only on possible dynamics in Pakistan’s foreign policy in relation to Saudi Arabia but also on the repercussions of said foreign policy for the region. It is argued that Islamabad is currently realigning some foreign policy parameters, foremost so as to reduce its dependency on Riyadh and readjust some of its bilateral relations, particularly as regards Iran and Turkey. This Pakistani ambition is in line with Chinese interests and is thus supported by Beijing. The paper predicts a fundamental deterioration in the ties between Riyadh and Islamabad due to a substantial clash in interests; this deterioration is to be matched by new Pakistani initiatives aiming to engage collaboration with both Iran on Afghanistan.

On November 26, 2008, terrorists belonging to the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) conducted coordinated terrorist attacks against multiple targets in Mumbai. The three-day carnage in India’s financial and economic centre, principal port city and second-most populous urban area in the country led to the killing of around 165 people and wounding of over 300 additional victims – in one of the most significant acts of international terrorism since 9/11. According to former intelligence officer and senior analyst Bruce Riedel, the Mumbai attacks (also known as 26/11) became ‘a milestone in global Jihad’, setting the ‘gold standard’ for terrorists assaults for the following decade. The 2013 Westgate-Mall attacks in the Kenyan capital Nairobi and the 2015 Paris massacre are just two horrific examples ‘modelled on Mumbai’. […]

Islamabad’s political circles experienced a tumultuous week, even for Pakistani standards. On Saturday, March 6, 2021, Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan asked lawmakers from the lower house of the country’s parliament for a vote of confidence. The PM secured 178 votes out of the 171 currently required to win the open ballot. Khan obviously felt that this move was necessary after a ‘surprise’ electoral defeat in the Senate polls three days earlier. Opposition parties – foremost the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) of former PM Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of former president Asif Ali Zardari – were able to achieve majority (53 seats vis-à-vis 47 for the ruling alliance) in the upper house. Put simply and somewhat downplaying the whole complexity of electoral regulations, Senate elections seek legislators in the provincial assemblies to elect senators to represent their provinces – the National Assembly/NA also elects a Senator to represent the capital, Islamabad. It goes without saying that such elections, especially for the capital’s Senate seat, are extraordinary contested. […]

India-Pakistan relations recently experienced a new low – expressed in a sharpened public rhetoric, the frequent occurrence of cease-fire violations at the ‘Line of Control’ (LoC), contestation over influence in Afghanistan, and other dynamics. The decades-old bilateral tensions gathered particular steam in August 2019 as New Delhi abrogated Article 370, which granted the Indian-administered State of Jammu and Kashmir a special, autonomous constitutional status. Since then, New Delhi has conducted a series of measures to operationalize the administrative aspects of the territory’s reconstitution, for example the ‘Kashmir domicile law’. In response, Pakistan launched a major public diplomacy campaign, apparently including elements of disinformation, so as to internationalize the Kashmir conflict. In November 2020, Pakistan presented a dossier allegedly revealing ‘irrefutable evidence’ of India’s involvement in sponsoring terrorism and attempts to destabilize Pakistan. More concretely, Pakistan accused India of supporting ‘various tactical terrorist campaigns aimed at reviving the greatly diminished insurgencies in the restive Balochistan province and the tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province’, among several other issues. These accusations also have implications for Afghanistan-Pakistan ties, since the dossier claims that India is ‘running dozens of training camps in Afghanistan for multiple, globally outlawed militant groups to plot terrorism on Pakistani soil’. The Indian embassy and consulates in Afghanistan are allegedly responsible for conducting such activities. The report claims that Indian intelligence officers operate ‘under the diplomatic cover from consulates in Afghanistan’. […]

Since Imran Khan took office as Pakistan’s Prime Minister (PM) in August 2018, there has been an obvious improvement in the ties between the civilian government and the country’s armed forces. It is argued here that this new civil-military cordiality led to a constructive, less tensed working relationship between the army’s top brass and the civilian administration; however, it did not translate into any reduction in the military’s political influence, particularly over foreign affairs. […]

After the takeover of Kabul by the Pakistan-sponsored Taliban, one can speculate regarding which role will Islamabad play in Afghanistan’s future. This will depend of course on Islamabad’s ties with the wider Taliban in general and with the factions traditionally close to Pakistan in particular, namely the Haqqani Network. Considering the manifold support offered to the Taliban during the last two decades, ‘Pakistan has reason to anticipate a more friendly regime in Kabul’. In fact, ‘Pakistan was one of the first countries to welcome the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan,’ celebrating the event as a ‘strategic victory’. However, there are also reasons to believe that relations between the Taliban government and Islamabad will be not as easy as hoped by the Pakistani leadership. [...]

Chinese and Pakistani authorities celebrated on the past 21st of May the 70th anniversary of their diplomatic relations. A series of events and ceremonies included the launching of the song ‘Pakistan has stolen my heart’, which reportedly instantaneously ‘became viral’ (Global Times, 21st of May, 2021), a commemorative coin (Xinhua, 10th of June, 2021) and a “‘Culture Day’ launched in Beijing to celebrate China-Pakistan relations” (Global Times, 6 of June, 2021). Since the early 1950s, China and Pakistan developed what has been called an ‘all- weather’ friendship. Historically, relations between the two nations were based on their common enmity towards India; they materialised in a strong security and defence cooperation (Chaudury, R, 2017). The 1963 agreement ceding a part of Pakistani-occupied Kashmir to China led to a significant consolidation of the alliance. Said alliance gained a strategic dimension through the pivotal role by Pakistan in facilitating the Sino-US rapprochement, which also led to further Sino-Pakistani military cooperation, particularly nuclear cooperation (Hassan, 2017, p.2). […]

Seventy-three years ago, the United Nations (2020) approved its first human-rights treaty – also known as the Genocide convention, because it mainly concerns the crime of genocide. The 9th of December, the day of its original approval, has been celebrated since 2015 as ‘the International Day of Commemoration and Dignity of the Victims of the Crime of Genocide and of the Prevention of this Crime’. Remembering crimes and honouring victims is indeed crucial to prevent new instances of genocide. This is why SADF has repeatedly (Casaca, 2018) analysed the Bangladesh 1971 Genocide perpetrated by Pakistani armed forces (in cooperation with local Islamist fanatics). SADF accompanied the determined and praiseworthy efforts by the Bangladeshi authorities and the civil society (South Asian Democratic Forum, 2015) to bring those responsible for the 1971 occurrences to justice. Such efforts included the reestablishment of the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh – a move strongly resisted by powerful revisionist lobbies, some of which despicably covered their actions under claims of ‘human rights’ principles and actions. […]

Pakistan is in the process of realigning its foreign policy parameters. Since last year, it became clear that Islamabad is trying to achieve more independence from Saudi Arabia in order to enlarge the room for collaboration with Iran. Currently, in a second major move to change the paradigm in its foreign affairs, Pakistan is envisaging a fundamental reset of its relations with the U.S. Islamabad now expresses its interests in an engaged cooperation with Washington. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi is convinced that there is (still) a ‘convergence of interests’ between his country and the U.S. However, Pakistan does not want to be seen anymore solely through the ‘Afghan lens‘. Islamabad wishes Afghanistan to cease “exclusively” determining the framework of future collaboration between Islamabad and Washington. Instead, the Pakistani leadership aims to focus on economics, trade, and other investments, particularly within the larger framework of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor/CPEC (Wolf, 2019). […]

This SADF working paper sheds light on the flaws within Pakistan’s judicial system and its ramifications for the country’s political and economic development. The paper considers judicial risk assessments for potential foreign investors looking to engage in Pakistan, especially in the context of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). After elaborating on the institutional imbroglio in Pakistan’s political system, it is argued that at no point in the country’s history was a functional, effective separation of power in place that could enable the emergence of a fully independent judiciary. Due to corruption, manipulation, and partisan interests, the judiciary branch not only failed to avoid extra-constitutional regime changes - namely military coups - but also endorsed and abetted the consolidation of illegally gained power and ancient, reactionary feudal-tribal structures. Moreover, by allowing the enactment of discriminatory (blasphemy) laws, the superior court failed to protect democratic processes in general and political & human rights in particular. Compromised by political chicanery from the two other branches of governance, internally corrupted by influential socio-economic pressure groups and religious fanatics, the judiciary is more engaged with safeguarding its corporate interests than carrying out necessary reforms to improve the efficiencies of its courts. Judicial practices are thus perceived by experts as very far indeed from the notions of justice and fair trails. They definitely fail to mirror the ‘highest standards of judicial independence’ recently claimed by Pakistani authorities. Despite the judiciary’s relative ability to preserve the rule of law, its failures certainly fail to provide an enabling environment for foreign investments. Not only the general public but also members of its highest benches doubt the judiciary’s credibility and accountability, which cannot be seen but as the clear sign of a deep crisis – a crisis that profoundly a

As discussed in an earlier SADF Comment, one of the immediate aims of Pakistan’s Afghan policy is the establishment of an interim government in Kabul. In March 2018, Prime Minister Imran Khan presented the idea of forming a transitional authority ‘representing the entire people of Afghanistan’. This call for a ‘new government’, combined with the portraying of the then head of the so-called National Unity Government Ashraf Ghani as a major obstacle for national reconciliation and peace negotiations in Afghanistan, created harsh criticisms among the country’s political leadership. However, Pakistani authorities still and persistently broach the topic – especially in times of rising tensions between Islamabad and Kabul. Now, amidst the current debate among decision makers in the US and NATO regarding either a troop withdrawal or a potential extension of military presence, and faced with a stalled process of talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, the notion of an interim government becomes crucial. […]

If one is to believe both those involved as well as relatively distant international observers, Afghanistan is currently witnessing an ‘historic opportunity’ to end an endless war. However, whether a sustainable peace process is feasible depends on numerous factors. One concerns whether neighbouring states will be able to play a constructive role in the process – or whether they will continue to spoil intra-national reconciliation. It is common knowledge that Pakistan has the longest record of interference in the internal affairs of its western neighbour. As discussed in an earlier SADF publication, the Doha peace agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban dated February 29, 2020 offered new opportunities to Pakistan. Ongoing Intra-Afghan Peace Talks (or Negotiations, IAN) between the Taliban (TB) and the Afghan government (GIROA) under President of Ashraf Ghani are constantly facing new challenges. These are leading to slowdowns - if not to an actual stalemate, thus providing Pakistani authorities with additional room to manoeuvre and ultimately extend their leverage over Afghanistan. In fact, Pakistan intensified and even broadened its engagement in Afghanistan through a twofold strategy: continuing its close collaboration with the TB through both military and political-diplomatic means, and reaching out to other political and militant actors within Afghanistan. [...]

For nearly a month, the coastal town of Gwadar has been witnessing the emergence of a protest movement called the Gwadar Ko Huqooq Do Tehreek (Give Rights to Gwadar Movement), ‘considered one of the largest in Baluchistan’s history’. The movement is led by Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). Baluchistan’s General Secretary and religious scholar Maulana Hidayat-ur-Rehman Baloch is rallying against various issues, from the presence of large illegal fishing trawlers and the ban on locals from engaging on deep-sea trawling to the lack of health facilities, adequate educational centres, and drinking water. In brief, protesters are demanding the basic rights denied to them by the central government and its subservient provincial administration since the country came into existence. The Baloch feeling of social and economic marginalisation as well as political side-lining gained additional momentum since the launch of the Beijing’s initiated China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), roughly six years ago (Wolf, 2019). For regional communities in Gwadar and beyond, it becomes increasingly obvious that instead of the promised employments and improved overall living conditions, Chinese development projects (foremost the CPEC) increase socio-economic aberrations (especially the exploitation of local resources without adequate returns for autochthonous populations) and generally deteriorate living conditions. For experts, such massive protests do not come by surprise; however, the composition, timing, and leadership structure of these movement do raise some questions. […]

According to several reports, it appears that the stage is set for the long-awaited intra-Afghan negotiations (IAN) between rival factions. Both the Afghan Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan expressed their readiness to start their first official direct talks, which will be held in Qatar. After contributing to the U.S.-Taliban peace deal – which is commonly recognised as an essential step towards the start of the IAN – Pakistan aims to take on a central role in Afghanistan’s future political developments. Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership are therefore trying to normalise their tense relations with the Afghan government. So far, Islamabad continues to support the peace deal between Washington and the Afghan Taliban – and the notion of a power-sharing agreement between the insurgency group and the political leadership in Kabul. However, Islamabad’s interests and policy remain unchanged and are not conducive for an understanding between the major actors in Afghanistan. Pakistan will thus continue to damage peace and stability in its western neighbourhood. Afghanistan will furthermore not only be increasingly affected by the Pakistan-India conflict but also become a new theatre in the evolving India-China conflict.

Recently, after abrogating Kashmir's semi-autonomous status, India declared a new domicile law for Kashmir. Pakistan has reacted strongly against this new law accusing India’s Hindu-nationalist government of harbouring schemes to alter the demography of Kashmir in order to change its Muslim-majority character. In this article, it is argued that Pakistan’s criticism is ethically unjustified because of its own blemished record of demographic engineering in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) and ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ (‘AJK’). State-led demographic engineering in ‘AJK’ and GB is discussed, arguing that such attempts have marginalized the local Shi’a community. Pakistan has settled Sunni extremists in GB and ‘AJK’. As of result, today, the region is home to intense sectarian violence and Sunni terrorist groups like Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar–i-Taiba. This article also points to these demographic engineering projects, being not merely Pakistani projects: China has tremendous stakes in the demographic engineering of GB to secure its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Pakistan yet again featured on global headlines when on Tuesday, May 21 2020, a journalist, relatively critical of the country’s military and security agencies, was kidnapped in broad daylight by men in police uniforms. Matiullah Jan, who works in Islamabad, was picked up at around 11 a.m. by 10 men after he arrived at a school to drop off his wife for work. The kidnapping became the headline on the country’s social media – with journalist associations, civil society and opposition politicians demanding Jan’s release. Twelve hours after his kidnapping, and after consistent pressure exerted by civil society on social media, Jan posted on his Twitter account that he was back at home safe: I am back home safe & sound. God has been kind to me & my family. I am grateful to friends, national & int. journalist community, political parties, social media & rights activists, lawyers’ bodies, the judiciary for their quick response which made it possible, Jan tweeted. While narrating the ordeal of his kidnapping on his YouTube channel, Jan explained how men in Police uniforms picked him up from outside his wife’s school. He further explained that soon after he was picked up, he was kept in a cell in an unknown location with his face and eyes covered. He believed that his kidnappers were the same people ‘who have always remained against democracy and the country’s constitution’. […]

During the last few months, the security situation in Balochistan witnessed an increase in militancy. It seems that the escalating violence in the region is linked with the growing Chinese presence and intensified activities by the Pakistani armed forces and the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). This SADF Comment subscribes to the following rationale: Locals feel exploited and deprived from the benefits obtained from the use of their provincial resources, as well as politically marginalized by the Pakistani state. The rising numbers of Chinese development projects, companies, workers and security personnel in Balochistan are perceived as threatening to the social and economic conditions of the Baloch people seem to be directly provoking further armed responses. The situation becomes more complicated due to the persistent suppression of the freedom of expression (along with other political and human rights) and the lack of a fair, adequate representation of the Baloch people and their interests on the national level – which prevents them from translating their concerns into the country’s political processes. Chinese development projects in the framework of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) are increasingly identified by the Baloch people as tools of exploitation (Wolf, 2019) of their natural resources (Coal, Oil, Copper, Gold etc.) – but also as measures supporting the central government’s grip over the province. Chinese assets are becoming the main targets of Baloch guerrillas, through actions understood as retaliation measures. […]

In North-West Pakistan, that is in the global epicentre of Jihadism, Islamic extremism, and militancy, a new peaceful, socio-political movement has emerged. Facing a double threat, from regional and international terrorists on one side and from the federal government and its security sector agents on the other, local Pashtuns articulated their grievances and launched the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (Movement for the protection of Pashtuns, PTM). Led by liberal and secular politicians and activists, the civic grassroots initiative PTM gained much popularity in the region during the last few years and translated the human suffering incurred by the Pashtuns into a national discourse with growing international significance. Today, the PTM is one of the ‘most powerful human rights voices’ in Pakistan. […]

Narco-terrorism is one of today’s buzzwords in both foreign and domestic policy in South Asia, especially in the context of the contentious India-Pakistan relations. Pakistan’s involvement in state-terrorism (Wolf, 2017) and sponsorship of international Jihadism are well-known and documented. Moreover, there are increasingly numerous reports regarding Islamabad’s engagement in a phenomenon described as narco-terrorism. The notion of narco-terrorism originates from an understanding that the two occurrences of trafficking in narcotics and terrorism are interconnected. Narco-terrorism is here understood as an integral component of Pakistan’s state-sponsorship of cross-border terrorism (Wolf, 2017) used so as to fund and conduct asymmetric warfare against its neighbours -foremost India- and achieve certain foreign policy goals. The United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) is paying increasingly attention to the fact that ‘terrorist organisations use narcotics trafficking for the purpose of gaining revenue’ and fund their activities. It is argued here that, although state-sponsorship of terrorism is already deeply entrenched within Islamabad’s policies towards New Delhi, the ‘Narco-type’ not only constitutes one of its most brutal forms (due to its far reaching and long-lasting consequences) but is also rapidly intensifying. Moreover, one can state that narco-terrorism in the Pakistani context blurs the line between narcotic traffickers, criminal networks (f. ex. D-Company), terrorists (f. ex. Lashkar-e-Taiba/LeT), and state agencies - foremost the country’s military and intelligence services (Inter-Service Intelligence/ISI). […]

On June 25, 2020, Pakistan’s military-backed Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan made a statement in the National Assembly in which he glorified Osama Bin Laden (OBL) as a ‘martyr’, using the term shaheed. This is without doubt a landmark event which needs a closer assessment. This SADF Comment aims to shed light on the rationale behind PM Khan’s eulogy of the former Al Qaeda leader and contextualise it within both domestic and regional trajectories. In order to do so, the following points should be highlighted: By describing OBL as a martyr, PM Khan suggests that he ‘was a victim rather than an aggressor’. This glorification of Jihadism and international terrorism was not just a slip of the tongue. The fact that there is no official clarification from the PM’s office - nor a public comment by the country’s powerful military – reveals that the remark indeed reflects the view held by most of the country’s leading political decision-makers. Even more: it is a confirmation of the military’s official policy, of the national political leadership’s inclinations, and that of relevant state institutions. This is already well-known. What is new, however, is that such statements are proclaimed publicly - and in the national parliament, no less. […]

The recently released 2019 United States State Department’s annual country report on terrorism has once again sparked tensions between America and Pakistan. Despite the recent appreciation and acknowledgment of Islamabad’s facilitation of the United States-Taliban peace talks, the State Department in its 2019 report slammed Pakistan for its continued support to certain regionally focussed terrorist groups. Much like what happened in 2018, the 2019 report claims that Pakistan provides support to militant groups within the country and accuses the state of “allowing groups targeting Afghanistan, including the Afghan Taliban and affiliated HQN [Haqqani network], as well as groups targeting India, including LeT [Lashkar-e-Taiba] and its affiliated front organisations, and JeM [Jaish-e-Mohammed], to operate from its territory.” (US. Department of State, 2020). It further indicates that the pledges and commitments made by the Pakistani government in its National Action Plan – including commitments to dismantle all terrorist organisations without delay and end discrimination - remain unfulfilled. The report’s assertions were not new – in fact, they were mostly in sync with concerns by successive American governments regarding the Pakistani State and its links to terrorism. President Trump had made remarks in its South Asia policy regarding Pakistan’s bluff and double game in the fight against terrorism. He expressed America's discontentment over “Pakistan’s harbouring of militants and terrorists who target U.S. service members and officials.” (The White House Press Release, 2017). The Trump administration had even suspended military aid to Pakistan in 2018, to push the state to undertake “consistent and irreversible” steps against terrorism (Syed, 2019). […]

The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic in Pakistan is not only leading to severe economic and social impacts but is also accompanied by negative political ramifications, particularly for the country’s civil-military relations. Pakistan is also presently hit by one of the worst locust plagues in decades. The federal government’s incapability to adequately handle the affairs of the state is perceived as the cause for the slump in most formal sectors and the collapse of the informal economy. The latter is leading to a severe disruption in the livelihoods of large sections of Pakistan’s society, especially the poor – those most vulnerable to political and religious radicalisation. Experiencing an advancing Islamisation, embedded in Prime Minister Imran Khan’s growing authoritarian style of governance and in a notable seizing of power by the military at the expense of civilian institutions, Pakistan is once again at the edge of a critical juncture. Observers start to put in question the stability of the current civilian set-up in the light of one of the most severe crises in the history of this South Asian country.

Since the end of the British colonial rule over the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the subsequent restructuring of the political map of the region, and the transfer of power to the successor states, the former principle state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) turned into the major flashpoint in South Asia. Despite the fact that the then ruler of J&K declared its accession to India, Pakistan not only illegally holds large parts of the territory but also questions India’s legitimate claims over said territory and tries to systematically destabilise Kashmir, the region under New Delhi’s administration. Islamabad did realise that the dispute over Kashmir is in a political stalemate. Furthermore, Pakistan was not only defeated in all conventional armed confrontations with India but also was forced to realise that a military ‘solution’ is impossible due to the tremendous asymmetries in available economic and financial resources. In consequence, Pakistan started a three-fold strategy in its Kashmir approach: (1) To support destabilising activities in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir; (2) To portray India on the international level as a repressive force in Kashmir forced to conduct extra-ordinary security measures so as to maintain law and order; and (3) To portray itself as a ‘protector’ of the Kashmiri people. This article argues that there is a clear discrepancy between the Pakistani government’s claims and true ambitions when it comes to the well-being of the Kashmiri people. The Pakistani leadership claims to be the ‘champion of the right to self-determination’ and other political freedoms as well as human rights of the Kashmiri people. Yet Islamabad denies these same rights to the citizenry living within its own administration – in Kashmir and elsewhere. It also systematically suppresses local communities. It seems clear that Pakistan’s Kashmir agenda only aims to destabilise India, challenge its territorial integrity and target the basis of India’s statehood, governance an

The debate on whether Pakistan can be considered a trustworthy actor in the international arena has surfaced again. Recent events have shown that Pakistan is capable of prudence and moderation when dealing with non-aligned South Asian powers, which is a welcome, (if relative), improvement in its international image. The fact that Pakistan remains under continuous global scrutiny regarding terrorist-related activities is well known; however, a true commitment to the fight against terrorism by the current government can go a long way in reshaping Pakistan’s credibility. To what extent can Pakistan’s counter-terrorist initiatives be trusted is thus far unknown. The task is immense, and it remains to be seen whether Pakistan can transform itself from a country that exports terrorism to a country that promotes peace and harmony both regionally and internationally. This article focuses on this bold new Pakistani ambition, which is led by the country’s new government under the leadership of Prime Minister Imran Khan. We have witnessed bans on organisations and networks known to financially support terrorist activities locally, regionally and internationally, and Islamabad has also put forward claims to curb terrorism and militancy. Will we finally witness the rise of Pakistan as a credible and responsible global actor?

Cross-border terrorism has been present in the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir since 1947, when both the dominions of India and Pakistan were created. One of the first documentations of the phenomenon was Maharaja Hari Singh’s letter addressed to Lord Mountbatten, dated 26 October 1947, which accompanied the Instrument of Accession and cited the need for protection against ‘soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes with modern weapons,’ which resulted in ‘wanton destruction of life and property’ (Singh, 1947). Over seven decades later, we can see that despite the logic of terrorism remaining the same – to destabilise India – the operations have grown more complex and the destruction more radical. Drug trafficking is also an old phenomenon in the region, as the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir is close to the main drug-producing areas of the world. What is relatively recent is the international recognition of the fact that terrorist groups with links to the Pakistani state are also trafficking drugs. This paper seeks to first investigate how cross-border terrorism works on the ground; then examine recent trends in the production and trafficking of drugs; and, lastly, to explore how closely the two criminal areas are linked. In doing so, our starting point shall be hitherto SADF research on both topics, as both drug trafficking and terrorism have been examined extensively

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A woman of great knowledge and virtue sets aside the prominent years of her life to help the underprivileged living in impermanent settlements of Karachi, Pakistan. The devastating reality is that she was murdered for her noteworthy initiative. By mapping with the residents, she helped them gain land title, as she proved their case to the city and government officials. It was through her unique manner of involving the residents solve their issues that made her pro-poor model a success. This is Perween Rahman’s journey in questioning planning regimes of Karachi to define the need of local planning.

Pakistan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2010, committing to upholding the Treaty and human rights. The ICCPR, which came into force in 1976, recognised ‘the inherent dignity of each individual and undertakes to promote conditions within states to allow the enjoyment of civil and political rights. Countries that have ratified the Covenant are obligated to protect and preserve basic human rights and to take administrative, judicial, and legislative measures in order to protect the rights enshrined in the treaty. This Policy Brief argues that Pakistan plays a doublegame as a member of the ICCPR that also persecutes religious minorities. The oppression of minorities has become systemic in Pakistan’s top-down and bottom-up jihad nexus of state and non-state actors forming alliances to work together in targeting minorities. From 2018 until 2020, Pakistan will sit as an elected member on the Human Rights Council. This is a timely opportunity for Pakistan to effectively implement the rights enshrined in the ICCPR to its domestic legal order and take urgent steps to bring an end to violations of religious freedom. First and foremost, this report will examine the 9 March 2018 Islamabad High Court ruling on religious minorities that states every Pakistani citizens’ religious affiliation must be written on their identity cards. Second, this report will analyse Pakistan’s historical and socio-political development and national educational system that have radicalized Pakistani society. Third, Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, namely Section 295-C is Pakistan’s most severe provision for punishing by death the use of derogatory remarks in respect of the Holy Prophet will be investigated. And lastly, cases of Christian persecutions will be illustrated to detail the severity of the issue.

Pakistan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2010, committing to upholding the Treaty and human rights. The ICCPR, which came into force in 1976, recognised ‘the inherent dignity of each individual and undertakes to promote conditions within states to allow the enjoyment of civil and political rights. Countries that have ratified the Covenant are obligated to protect and preserve basic human rights and to take administrative, judicial, and legislative measures in order to protect the rights enshrined in the treaty. This Policy Brief argues that Pakistan plays a doublegame as a member of the ICCPR that also persecutes religious minorities. The oppression of minorities has become systemic in Pakistan’s top-down and bottom-up jihad nexus of state and non-state actors forming alliances to work together in targeting minorities. From 2018 until 2020, Pakistan will sit as an elected member on the Human Rights Council. This is a timely opportunity for Pakistan to effectively implement the rights enshrined in the ICCPR to its domestic legal order and take urgent steps to bring an end to violations of religious freedom. First and foremost, this report will examine the 9 March 2018 Islamabad High Court ruling on religious minorities that states every Pakistani citizens’ religious affiliation must be written on their identity cards. Second, this report will analyse Pakistan’s historical and socio-political development and national educational system that have radicalized Pakistani society. Third, Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, namely Section 295-C is Pakistan’s most severe provision for punishing by death the use of derogatory remarks in respect of the Holy Prophet will be investigated. And lastly, cases of Christian persecutions will be illustrated to detail the severity of the issue.