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L’indagine sui concetti di vero e di falso ha generalmente privilegiato, nella filosofia contemporanea, la verità semantica o apofantica, cioè la verità di dicta (di enunciati, proposizioni, asserti, dichiarazioni, ecc.). Tuttavia, i predicati “vero” e “falso” sembrano applicarsi anche ad altre entità oltre ai dicta. Non sono infrequenti, infatti, i contesti in cui si parla della verità e della non-verità di res, di cose. È verità delle cose, di res, per esempio, la verità che predichiamo, rispettivamente, di un professore, di un diamante, di una norma, di un guerriero, di una banconota quando parliamo di un “vero professore”, di un “vero diamante”, di una “vera norma”, di un “vero guerriero”, di una “vera banconota”. In anni recenti, alcune ricerche nell’ambito della filosofia del diritto e della filosofia della normatività hanno rivolto la propria attenzione verso il concetto di verità delle cose (verità de re), che non è riducibile al concetto di verità apofantica. Il presente articolo, nel solco delle ricerche di Amedeo Giovanni Conte, intende mettere in evidenza alcuni dei contributi più significativi che queste ricerche possono offrire all’indagine dei rapporti tra verità, validità e normatività, e più in generale, all’indagine filosofica del concetto di verità., The investigation into the concepts of true and false has generally privileged, in contemporary philosophy, semantic or apophantic truth, that is, the truth of dicta (of utterances, propositions, assertions, statements, etc.). However, the predicates "true" and "false" also seem to apply to other entities besides dicta. Indeed, contexts in which we speak of the truth and untruth of res, of things, are not uncommon. It is truth of things, of res, for example, the truth that we predicate, respectively, of a professor, a diamond, a norm, a warrior, and a banknote when we speak of a "real professor," a "real diamond," a "real norm," a "real warrior," and a "real banknote." In recent years, some research in the field of philosophy of law and philosophy of normativity has turned its attention toward the concept of truth of things (verità de re), which is not reducible to the concept of apophatic truth. This article, in the wake of Amedeo Giovanni Conte's research, aims to highlight some of the most significant contributions that this research can offer to the investigation of the relations between truth, validity and normativity, and more generally, to the philosophical investigation of the concept of truth.

The notion of “norm” is a controversial one: notably, it is controversial what kind of entities this notion refers to. Norms are often identified with linguistic entities, such as deontic sentences or deontic propositions. However, in human (and possibly non-human) societies, many norms seem to exist and operate without being created or expressed through linguistic entities. Starting from the consideration that normative phenomena intersect different orders of phenomena, I distinguish seven possible entities the word ‘norm’ may alternately refer to: three are linguistic entities (deontic sentence, deontic proposition, deontic utterance), four are non-linguistic entities (deontic state-of-affairs, deontic noema, deontic behaviour and deontic artifact). Focusing on Amedeo G. Conte’s notions of deontic state-of-affairs and deontic noema, I suggest that norms should be identified with deontic states-of-affairs when their validity (i.e., their belonging to a specific normative system) is taken into account, and they should be instead identified with deontic noemata when their effectiveness or operancy on human behaviour is investigated. The experience of a deontic noema (i.e., the mental representation of a norm) is typically but not necessarily connected to the existence of a corresponding deontic state-of-affairs within a normative system: it is also possible that a deontic noema arises in normative experience independently of any corresponding valid deontic state-of-affairs. Following Ota Weinberger, I suggest, on the one hand, that a proper normative experience of deontic noemata should be distinguished from a non normative experience; on the other hand, I suggest that normative experience may have a nomogenic role: it may contribute to the genesis of new norms either through the spreading of a normative experience or through exerting an influence on nomothetic powers.

A widespread thesis in the analytical theory of law is that norms exist as linguistic entities. Rodolfo Sacco is one of the authors who have most fruitfully insisted, on the contrary, that there is no necessary correlation between norms and language, not even in the specific context of law. He thus extended the conceptualisation of legal normativity well beyond the boundaries of language through the notions of cryptotype and mute law. This paper takes into account two alternative hypotheses to the hypothesis that norms exist as linguistic entities, which are respectively based on the concepts of deontic state-of-affairs and deontic noema. Both hypotheses are tested for their applicability to the phenomena investigated by Sacco under the notion of mute law, notably with reference to cryptotypes. The question is raised then of how the existence of cryptotypes can be inferred from behaviour. The paper emphasizes the role that can be played in this context by nomotrophic behaviour, that is, the behaviour that consists in a reaction to the violation of a norm.

During the twentieth century, the development of semiotics and philosophy of language had a great influence on the investigation of normative phenomena, particularly within the philosophy of law: the analysis of normative language became the prevalent methodological approach among many legal philosophers, and the science of law was frequently understood as an analysis of the object language of law. This approach led to the development of a linguistic ontology of the normative and to a semiotic theory of the validity of norms, in which norms are conceived of as linguistic entities, and their validity is accordingly conceived of as a predicate of normative sentences. However, the resort to a semiotic approach for the investigation of normative phenomena does not necessarily imply the adoption of a linguistic ontology of norms. The semiotic analysis of the possible referents of the word ‘norm’ elaborated by Conte (“Studio per una teoria della validità”, Giappichelli, Torino [1970]1995; entry “Norma” in Enciclopedia filosofica, Bompiani, Milano, 2006) shows that the word ‘norm’ may alternately refer to both linguistic entities and non-linguistic entities, such as deontic states-of-affairs and deontic noemata. Such a “sigmatic” analysis exhibits the relevance of the ontological notion of deontic states-of-affairs, and of the correlative notion of “syntactical validity”. After reconstructing Conte’s theory of validity, we wonder whether validity is necessarily to be conceived of as asystemic validity, or also an asystemic and factual validity of norms should be considered.

During the twentieth century, the development of semiotics and philosophy of language had a great influence on the investigation of normative phenomena, particularly within the philosophy of law: the analysis of normative language became the prevalent methodological approach among many legal philosophers, and the science of law was frequently understood as an analysis of the object language of law. This approach led to the development of a linguistic ontology of the normative and to a semiotic theory of the validity of norms, in which norms are conceived of as linguistic entities, and their validity is accordingly conceived of as a predicate of normative sentences. However, the resort to a semiotic approach for the investigation of normative phenomena does not necessarily imply the adoption of a linguistic ontology of norms. The semiotic analysis of the possible referents of the word ‘norm’ elaborated by Conte (“Studio per una teoria della validità”, Giappichelli, Torino [1970]1995; entry “Norma” in Enciclopedia filosofica, Bompiani, Milano, 2006) shows that the word ‘norm’ may alternately refer to both linguistic entities and non-linguistic entities, such as deontic states-of-affairs and deontic noemata. Such a “sigmatic” analysis exhibits the relevance of the ontological notion of deontic states-of-affairs, and of the correlative notion of “syntactical validity”. After reconstructing Conte’s theory of validity, we wonder whether validity is necessarily to be conceived of as asystemic validity, or also an asystemic and factual validity of norms should be considered.

0. Introduzione. — 1. Il diritto primitivo come ordinamento giuridico completamente decentralizzato basato sulla vendetta di sangue. — 1.1. I sistemi vendicatori come prima forma di diritto. — 1.2. Il diritto come tecnica sociale di motivazione indiretta basata su sanzioni coercitive. — 2. La vendetta di sangue come fenomeno sociale nella prospettiva sociologica e antropologica. — 2.1. L’aspetto soggettivo del carattere sociale della vendetta. — 2.2. L’aspetto oggettivo del carattere sociale della vendetta. — 3. La vendetta di sangue come fenomeno normativo nella teoria pura del diritto. — 3.1. La vendetta di sangue e il principio di imputazione. — 3.2. Il vendicatore come organo della comunità e il monopolio dell’uso della forza. — 4. La vendetta di sangue nell’evoluzione del diritto come specifica tecnica sociale. — 4.1. La vendetta di sangue come ordinamento giuridico decentralizzato. — 4.2. Dagli ordinamenti vendicatori al diritto degli stati moderni. — 4.3. La graduale differenziazione e centralizzazione delle tre fasi dell’applicazione del diritto. — 4.4. La rilevanza della dimensione procedurale nella teoria della vendetta di sangue di Kelsen.

Special issue of the Journal "Phenomenology and Mind" collecting papers originating from the San Raffaele School of Philosophy “The True, the Valid, the Normative”, organized by the Faculty of Philosophy of the University Vita-Salute San Raffaele in collaboration with the research centres PERSONA (Research Centre in Phenomenology and Sciences of the Person), CeSEP (Centro Studi di Etica e Politica), and CISEPS (Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology and Social Sciences), which took place at Palazzo Arese Borromeo in Cesano Maderno on September 20th to 22nd, 2022.

This introductive article illlustrates Amedeo G. Conte's distinctions of de dicto and de re truth as well as its relations to values, validity., and nomotropic

Concerning normativity, legal theorists and philosophers tend to focus on the acts of norm creation but disregard normative experience. By contrast, Petrażycki’s theory of law offers an analysis of normative experience that reveals how normative phenomena occur in the human consciousness. In this chapter Lorenzo Passerini Glazel reconstructs Petrażycki’s notions of normative experience and norm through the phenomenological concepts of “deontic noesis” and “deontic noema.” He then discusses whether Petrażycki’s analysis can account for the fact that one may know a deontic noema (or a norm) without having a corresponding deontic noesis (or a normative experience), that is, one may imagine or know of the existence of a norm without subscribing to it.

This issue of L’Ircocervo is devoted to the new research directions on normativity that have emerged due to new attention paid to normative phenomena also in empirical disciplines such as ethology, anthropology, psychology and neuroscience. In this introduction, we propound some of the problems and some of the new research directions that are emerging, emphasising the fact that in many cases, for the resolving of problems and the advancement of research, the collaboration of philosophy with other scientific disciplines will be desirable or even necessary. Notably, we formulate eight questions that the philosophy of norms and normativity will have to face in the decades to come.

Hans Kelsen devoted significant attention to “primitive” law, particularly to the phenomenon of blood revenge. His analysis of blood revenge bears witness to the intent to offer a general theory of law, in all its different manifestations. Such a theory, far from being restricted to the centralized legal systems of modern states, also accounts for more decentralized legal systems, including those of “primitive,” stateless societies and international law. The present chapter develops both an analysis of Kelsen’s sociological and anthropological works on revenge and an examination of the role that revenge played in his famous pure theory of law.

In his book Coercion and the Nature of Law Himma proposes a conceptual analysis of law defending what he calls the Coercion Thesis. Himma’s approach to conceptual analysis is articulated in two steps. The first step is what Himma calls an “empirical observation” of “ordinary intuitions” as they are manifest in the “contingent linguistic conventions for using the relevant concept-term” in “ordinary talk.” The second step consists in identifying “the philosophical assumptions about the metaphysical nature of a thing to which the corresponding concept-term refers.” Our remarks are not intended to question the Coercion Thesis (which, on the contrary, they can possibly corroborate); rather, they intend to show that grounding conceptual analysis exclusively on the canons of ordinary usage of words and on the philosophical assumptions of an undefined and contingent linguistic and cultural community to which the last word is given is not free from risks.

La deontica filosofica, a lungo indagata con rigore e con originalità da Amedeo G. Conte, può essere definita come una filosofia teoretica del dover essere, ossia come un'indagine del dover essere in quanto dover essere. Alla deontica filosofica e alle correlate indagini di filosofia del linguaggio normativo Conte ha offerto numerosi contributi fecondi ed innovativi che riguardano, tra altro, le forme di dovere non-deontico e le regole costitutive, il problema dell'applicazione della logica alle norme, la teoria e l'ontologia della norma, la teoria della performatività thetica, la distinzione di differenti concetti di validità deontica, le forme dell'agire in funzione di regole o nomotropismo, e la distinzione dei concetti di verità semantica e verià ontica. Questa prefazione ricostruisce in un quadro d'insieme alcuni dei principali contributi offerti da Conte, al fine di introdurre ad uno studio del suo pensiero grazie ai testi raccolti in traduzione francese nell'antologia.

Che cos'è una norma? Esistono relazioni logiche tra norme? Su che cosa si fonda la validità di un ordinamento di norme? Che cos'è la validità deontica? I verbi performativi possono agire sulla realtà? Quali sono i differenti modi di agire in funzione di una regola? Che cosa sono le regole costitutive? Che cos'è la verità? Queste sono alcune delle domande indagate nei saggi di Amedeo Giovanni Conte raccolti in questa antologia, saggi che offrono numerosi ed originali contributi alla filosofia delle norme e del linguaggio normativo., What is a norm? Are there logical relations between norms? WHat are the foundations of the validity of a normative system? What is the deontic validity? Can performative verbs directly act on reality? What are the different ways of acting with reference to a norm? What is a constitutive rule? What is truth? These are some of the questions aroused by Amedeo Giovanni Conte in the essays collected in this book. Through the investigation of these questions Conte offers many original and important contibution to the philosophy of norms and normative language., Qu’est-ce qu’une norme? Y a-t-il des relations logiques entre les normes ? Sur quoi repose la validité d’un système normatif ? Qu’est-ce que la validité déontique ? Les verbes performatifs peuvent-ils agir sur le monde ? Quelles sont les différentes façons d’agir en fonction d’une règle ? Que sont les règles constitutives ? Et qu’est-ce que la vérité ? Ce sont là quelques-unes des questions que posent les essais d’Amedeo Giovanni Conte rassemblés dans cette anthologie. Ces essais offrent quelques-unes des contributions les plus originales et les plus significatives de la philosophie du langage normatif.

We almost every day direct our actions with reference to social, moral or legal norms and oughts. However, oughts and norms cannot be perceived through the senses: how can we “grasp” them, then? Adolf Reinach distinguishes enacted norms and oughts created through a social act of enactment, from moral norms and oughts existing in themselves independently of any act, knowledge or experience. I argue that this distinction is not a distinction between two species of oughts within a common genus: it is rather a deeper ontological distinction between two modes of existence that are quite different, even though both are objective, according to Reinach. This ontological distinction is reflected in the way in which enacted oughts and moral oughts can be grasped, respectively: in the former case, the enacted ought is grasped by going back to the underlying social act from which it springs; in the latter, a “grasping through feeling” (fühlende Erfassen) of the moral values is implied.

La consuetudine è un fenomeno complesso, che non sembra trovare posto in quelle concezioni positiviste del diritto che presuppongono che il diritto sia necessariamente il prodotto di un atto di volontà. Il presente articolo esamina cinque ragioni della complessità della consuetudine, e prende in esame la tesi di Uberto Scarpelli secondo la quale il diritto consuetudinario può essere accolto nel diritto positivo a condizione che i fatti che generano la consuetudine siano reinterpretati come manifestazione di una volontà. Ma di che tipo di volontà si tratta? E com'è possibile inferire la norma presupposta da una determinata condotta? Attraverso l'esame dell'analisi dell'abduzione come metodo per inferire norme proposta da Gaetano Carcaterra, nell'articolo vengono distinte sei possibili forme di volontà inerenti ad un comportamento che sia rilevante per la formazione di una norma consuetudinaria, viene indagata in particolare la volontà nomotrofica, ossia la volontà, implicita o esplicita nella reazione alla violazione d'una norma, che la norma violata resti valida., Custom is a complex phenomenon, and one that is hardly given a satisfying account, especially if it is assumed, as many legal positivists do, that law is only produced through acts of will. After examining five main reasons for the complexity of custom, I will consider Uberto Scarpelli’s thesis that customary law can be given an account within legal positivism through a reinterpretation of norm-generating facts as the manifestations of a will. But what kind of will is implied here, and how can the underlying norm be inferred? I will first briefly examine Gaetano Carcaterra’s analysis of abduction as a method to infer norms from behaviors, and then distinguish six different forms of will possibly implied in a behavior which is relevant for the formation of a customary norm. I will finally focus on norm-oriented, or nomotropic will, and especially on nomotrophic will, that is, the will –implied and expressed in the reaction to the violation of a norm–that the infringed norm be valid., La coutume est un phénomène complexe et il ne trouve apparemment pas de place dans les théories positivistes du droit qui présupposent que le droit est nécessairement le produit d’un acte de volonté. Après avoir examiné cinq raisons de la complexité de la coutume, j’examinerai la thèse d’Uberto Scarpelli selon laquelle le droit coutumier peut être accueilli dans le droit positif pourvu que les faits générant la norme coutumière soient réinterprétés comme la manifestation d’une volonté. Mais de quel type de volonté s’agit-il? Et comment est-il possible d’inférer la norme présupposée par une certaine conduite? J’examinerai l’analyse de l’abduction en tant que méthode pour inférer des normes, conduite par Gaetano Carcaterra, et je distinguerai six formes possibles de volonté impliquées dans une conduite qui soit pertinente pour la formation d’une norme coutumière. Je me focaliserai finalement sur la volonté nomotrophique, c’est-à-dire sur la volonté, impliquée et exprimée dans les réactions à la violation d’une norme, que la norme violée soit valide.

Nel vasto panorama di studi su Platone politico che si diffuse in Germania nella prima metà del xx secolo a partire dall’opera di von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, in netta discontinuità con la precedente immagine di Platone come filosofo eminentemente teoretico, spicca la lettura del filosofo del diritto e giurista austriaco Hans Kelsen. La valutazione proposta da Kelsen del Platone politico è però di segno nettamente opposto a quella che nello stesso periodo autori come Werner Jaeger, Julius Stenzel e Kurt Hildebrandt posero a fondamento di un’esaltazione di Platone come educatore e come modello per una rifondazione della società tedesca. Per Kelsen, il tentativo platonico di dare fondamento, nella dottrina delle idee, a una giustizia assoluta conduce ad una inaccettabile subordinazione della verità alla giustizia e nell'intero progetto politico e sociale di Platone. Il contributo esamina i presupposti e gli argomenti della critica kelseniana all'assolutismo filosofico di Platone, che tende inevitabilmente a condurre verso forme di assolutismo politico. Alla ricerca di un fondamento assoluto della normatività si contrappone in Kelsen la costruzione di una teoria del fondamento relativo ed ipotetico di ogni forma di normatività sociale.

Luigi Ferrajoli, in his work La logica del diritto. Dieci aporie nell’opera di Hans Kelsen (2016), pointed out ten aporias in Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law. This paper deals with the fifth aporia, that is the of Kelsen’s concept of a “norm”. The paper firstly distinguishes two different questions on the concept of a norm underlying the pure theory of law: the question “What is a norm?”, and the question “What has the meaning of a norm within a legal system?”; it secondly distinguishes three different levels of interpretation of a norm: (i) interpretation of the semantic meaning of norm sentences, (ii) interpretation of the subjective intrinsic pragmatic meaning of the norm creating act; (iii) interpretation of the extrinsic objective normative meaning of the norm creating act; it thirdly suggests that the existence of a norm is the ideal (ideel) existence of a meaning, not the empirical existence of an act.

Per il positivismo giuridico tradizionale, l’idea che alcune norme create dal legislatore attraverso atti di normazione formalmente validi possano costituire “diritto illegittimo” sembra essere una contraddizione in termini. Questa tesi viene tuttavia messa esplicitamente in discussione nella teoria assiomatizzata del diritto di Luigi Ferrajoli, che pur si propone come uno sviluppo della teoria pura del diritto di Hans Kelsen. Il dissenso da Kelsen si incentra sul problema dell’applicazione dei principi logici di contraddizione e di implicazione al diritto, applicazione impossibile per Kelsen, necessaria invece per Ferrajoli per l’identificazione del diritto illegittimo. Gli autori della prefazione ricostruiscono i nodi teorici fondamentali della critica di Ferrajoli a Kelsen, e mostrano come Ferrajoli proponga di superare i limiti della teoria pura kelseninana attraverso l'elaborazione di un costituzionalismo logico., For traditional legal positivism, the idea that certain legal norms created through valid enactments can be "unlawful law" seems to be self-contradictory. This view is explicitly disputed by Luigi Ferrajoli's axiomatized theory of law, which is nonetheless presented as a development of Hans Kelsen's pure theory of law. The dispute focus on the problem of the application of the logical principles of contradiction and implication to legal systems: an impossible application for Kelsen, a necessary one for Ferrajoli, since the theory of law should identify "unlawful norms" within the legal system. The authors of this preface reconstruct the main theoretical claims of Ferrajoli's critique to Kelsen, and show how he suggests to overcome the theoretical limits of the pure theory of law through the delieation of a logical constitutionalism.

Per il positivismo giuridico tradizionale, l’idea che alcune norme create dal legislatore attraverso atti di normazione formalmente validi possano costituire “diritto illegittimo” sembra essere una contraddizione in termini. Questa tesi viene tuttavia messa esplicitamente in discussione nella teoria assiomatizzata del diritto di Luigi Ferrajoli, che pur si propone come uno sviluppo della teoria pura del diritto di Hans Kelsen. Il dissenso da Kelsen si incentra sul problema dell’applicazione dei principi logici di contraddizione e di implicazione al diritto, applicazione impossibile per Kelsen, necessaria invece per Ferrajoli per l’identificazione del diritto illegittimo. Il volume raccoglie venticinque contributi di altrettanti studiosi che si sono confrontati con Ferrajoli tanto sulla lettura della teoria di Kelsen, quanto su quei concetti della teoria assiomatizzata del diritto che sono stati introdotti da Ferrajoli per superare i limiti della teoria pura kelseniana., For traditional legal positivism, the idea that some of the norms created by a legislator through valid enactments can be "unlawful law" is self-contradictory. This claim is explicitly disputed by Luigi Ferrajoli's axiomatized theory of law, which is nonetheless presented as a development of Hans Kelsen's pure theory of law. The central point of the dispute concerns the problem of the application to law of the logical principles of contradiction and implication: an impossibile application for Kelsen, a necessary application for Ferrajoli if the theory of law has also the function - as he maintains - of identifying "unlawful law". The book collects the contributions of twentyfive different scholars ideally discussing with Ferrajoli both on his critique of Kelsen's theory and on some of the main concepts introduced by Ferrajoli to overcome the limits of the pure theory of law.

Many theories of law tend to consider legal norms mainly as, or in strict connection to, linguistic entities, such as normative sentences, normative propositions or normative speech acts. The focus of these kinds of theories is generally laid on norm-creating acts: they almost completely disregard the other side of normative phenomena, that of normative experience. While this approach may be legitimate in a dogmatic perspective, it appears inadequate to give a complete account of what law is in its entirety as a human and social phenomenon, and it falls short of explaining many aspects of the actual operating of norms on behaviour, as well as the emergence of customary legal norms independently of any norm-creating speech act. Starting from the consideration that normative and legal phenomena generally intersect different orders of phenomena, such as those of linguistic, social, logical, psychological, practical, behavioural and ethical phenomena, I will first distinguish, in an ontological perspective, seven different kinds of entities that in different contexts can be called “norms”: deontic sentences, deontic utterances, deontic propositions, deontic states-of-affairs, deontic behaviours, deontic objects, and deontic noemata. I will then focus on the phenomenological notion of a deontic noema – of a norm as an intentional object – and I will suggest that this notion can be fruitful for the analysis of normative experience – and of the experience of law in particular – by briefly focusing on the analysis of normative experience in Leon Petrażycki. However, since a subject can act in consideration of a norm without complying, or feeling obliged to comply, with that norm (when stealthily stealing something, for instance, as Max Weber suggests), I will argue that a deontic noema is not necessarily the correlate of a genuine deontic noesis – of a truly normative experience: it can also be the correlate of a non-deontic noesis, of a mere knowledge of the norm, as Ota

Nel suo ultimo libro JR Searle propone una teoria unificata della realtà che, contrapponendosi tanto al dualismo cartesiano quanto al materialismo, mostra come la realtà umana e sociale faccia parte della realtà di base costituita da particelli in campi di forza. Ricostruendo la distinzione tra oggettività e soggettività ontologica, gli autori mostrano che nella teoria di Searle la realtà è una, ma le ontologie sono due. A questo scopo viene analizzato il ruolo delle relazioni costitutive, delle dichiarazioni, e delle regole costitutive nella costruzione della realtà umana così come essa viene riscostruita nella filosofia di Searle, che si presenta come un'indagine logica delle condizioni di possibilità della realtà umana.

Contro una diffusa concezione dell’efficacia, Max Weber e Hans Kelsen affermano che ad essere efficace o operante (wirksam) sull’azione è non la norma in sé, ma la rappresentazione della norma (Normvorstellung). Ma in che senso un agente si rappresenta una norma? Attraverso il concetto di noema deontico, Lorenzo Passerini Glazel indaga il modo in cui le norme possono essere presenti nella coscienza d’un agente: all’esperienza d’una norma vissuta normativamente – qui esaminata attraverso l’analisi in termini psicologici proposta da Leon Petrażycki – si contrappongono la mera conoscenza d’una norma (Ota Weinberger), e le norme meramente pensate (Hans Kelsen). L’operanza di norme intese quali noemi deontici illumina quei contesti in cui, nella vita del diritto, vengono applicate norme che non corrispondono ad entità linguistiche determinate o a norme espressamente statuite, In opposition to a widespread notion of effectiveness, Max Weber and Hans Kelsen claim that the very idea of the norm (Normvorstellung) is effective (wirksam) on one’s behaviour, rather than the norm itself. In what sense, though, one can have an idea of the norm? The author con-fronts this question through the concept of deontic noema and draws a distinction between the lived normative experience of a norm – here investigated through Leon Petrażycki’s psycho-logical analysis of normative experience – and the mere knowledge of the norm (Ota Wein-berger), or the merely thought norm (Hans Kelsen). The analysis of norms in terms of deontic noemata can shed light on those contexts where norms are applied, which do not correspond to linguistic entities or to expressly enacted laws