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The term function currently features prominently in outlines of social positioning theory but a sustained account of the view of function informing social positioning theory has yet to be supplied. In the absence of a fuller articulation of the theory's underlying view of function confusion and misinterpretation are likely to be encouraged especially among those committed to one or other of the numerous alternative accounts of function available. In this paper key features of the concept of function as it now appears in social positioning theory are identified and the similarities and differences between it and selected other views of function explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alfred Marshall is often depicted as a pioneer of neoclassical economics almost as if this is a label he embraces and promotes. Yet neoclassical economics is not a category Marshall deploys but a term Thorstein Veblen introduces in characterising Marshall. Veblen coins the term neoclassical to identify an ontological discrepancy in the work of a specific group of his contemporaries, a prominent figure among whom is Marshall. Veblen's view is that Marshall and other neoclassicals discern features of social reality that suggest a tentative recognition of a causal processual social ontology of the type Veblen associates with modern evolutionary approaches and yet also remain staunchly committed to a taxonomic conception of science underpinned by a quite different set of ontological presuppositions. Veblen's assessment of Marshall is brief and assertive. In this paper it is argued that the ontological discrepancy interpretation of Marshall, that Veblen first sketched, can convincingly be filled out, has substantial merit and is of importance in developing an adequate appreciation of Marshall. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For advocates of critical realism emergence is a central theme. Critical realists typically ground their defence of the relative disciplinary autonomy of various sciences by arguing that emergent phenomena exist in a robust non-ontologically, non-causally reductionist sense. Despite the importance they attach to it critical realists have only recently begun to elaborate on emergence at length and systematically compare their own account with those developed by others. This paper clarifies what is distinctive about the critical realist account of emergence by comparing it with an alternative. Critical realism and interactivism are shown to independently converge on the same general process (or constraint) view of emergence and develop complementary accounts of particular emergents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I show that two senses are often assigned to essences in frameworks that award them a significant ontological status. There is both a defining sense and a more concrete-explanatory sense. Once this distinction is recognized, competing forms of essentialism can be differentiated and their implications more easily explored. As an example of work where the defining and the concrete-explanatory senses of essence are tied closely together I consider the essentialism outlined by Rom Harré as part of his analysis of the practices of natural scientists. As an illustration of a position where the two senses are de-coupled and priority given to the defining sense I examine the essentialism Charles Peirce develops in his mature account of natural classes. I show that arguments concerning the scope of essentialism and its relevance for the study of social phenomena depend heavily on the sense of essence prioritized. The focus on these two senses of essence facilitates a better understanding of the forms of essentialism defended by Harré and Peirce and helps identify the challenges contemporary realists face as they seek to defend an essentialism that applies to the social. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rom Harré's generative account of causality has been drawn on heavily by advocates of critical realism. Yet Harré argues that critical realists often exaggerate the extent to which powerful causal explanations of social phenomena can be developed. Certain proponents of critical realism have responded to Harré's criticisms by suggesting that it is useful to consider the relevant issues in relation to the familiar Aristotelian classification of four causes. In this paper I contribute to this debate and pursue a similar strategy. The paper adds to existing contributions in two ways. Firstly, I outline how Harré sees his generative account of causality as linking up with Aristotelian themes. It emerges that Harré at times conceives of his generative theory as part of an alternative to the Aristotelian system while at other times he draws connections between it and a reformulated account of formal causality. Secondly, I argue that when we consider the positions of Harré and proponents of critical realism on the scope of causal explanation in the social realm in relation to the interpretation of final causes offered by another philosopher profoundly influenced by the Aristotelian tradition, namely Charles Peirce, we can see both as limited in certain respects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The particular use made of the terms 'open and closed systems' by proponents of critical realism has generated some critical commentary in recent years. In this paper it is shown how debates about open and closed systems provide a perspective from which to address certain fundamental questions in economic methodology. It is argued that the meaning and significance that advocates of critical realism attach to these terms can be clarified by understanding the context within which they were developed. The paper shows how the limitations associated with dominant perspectives both in the philosophy of science and within economics could more effectively be revealed once the terms 'open and closed systems' had been elaborated upon. A partial comparison with the work of Nancy Cartwright is developed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years there have been an increasing number of contributions to economic methodology that develop or seek to reveal ontological positions. Despite this there is no agreement about either what ontology is or how it can contribute to economics. For some ontological theorising reveals the presuppositions of economists and its role is largely descriptive. Others see ontology as primarily engaged in setting out and defending a general account of some domain of reality and suggest that such a conception can help us evaluate the appropriateness of the methods economists deploy. In this paper I clarify the scope and role of such theorising in economics by considering two projects with ontological orientations, namely critical realism in economics as developed by Tony Lawson and Nancy Cartwright’s work on the nature of economic theory. I argue that there are similarities between these two projects but also differences and show that these can be better understood once we recognise that each draws on a distinct conception of the legitimate scope of ontological theorising. I use Peirce’s writings on the nature of sustainable metaphysical analysis to clarify certain aspects of the approach to ontological theorising that Lawson favours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the development of contractual relations in television broadcasting under the influence of some key reforms in the sector in Great Britain since the 1980s. Investigation of the relations between independent production firms and the terrestrial broadcasting companies in light of the introduction of quota for independent production; Analysis of the effects of internal reorganizations within the television stations ITV and BBC.

The reforms instituted by the Broadcasting Act 1990 led to a period of turbulence and upheaval within broadcasting with results that were at best unintended and, at worst, seriously undermined the ideal of public service broadcasting. A Hayekian economic perspective would suggest that the reforms failed because they did not go far enough in the direction of full `marketization'. The paper develops an alternative perspective, based on an adaptation of systems theory within the context of law and economics. This approach offers a broader methodological foundation for the understanding of `economic law' and a different normative perspective on the broadcasting reforms. It is suggested that the difficulty with these reforms was not their failure to go further in the direction of the market, but rather their lack of clarity in articulating a clear alternative to the market as the basis for the organization of television production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Opinion. Discusses broadcasting policy debates with reference to the Pilkington Report published in 1962 in Great Britain. Contents of the report; Discussion on the appropriate purpose of broadcasting; Arguments put forward by the report.

From the perspective of the transcendental realist account of science and critical realist elaboration of the relationship between human agency and social structure, this paper examines the methodological approach Marx adopts in his analysis of the labour process. The agency-structure relation as detailed by critical realism is set out and placed in the context of wider debates surrounding the notion of structure. In particular the transcendental realist position, which has emerged in recent controversies in the philosophy of science and which underpins critical realism, is considered. The links between Marx's method and critical realism are then explored as a preliminary to the discussion of his analysis of the labour process. The main contention of the paper is that Marx's analysis of the labour process is in line with critical realism and that it can be viewed as a useful example of what a substantive analysis consistent with this perspective can look like. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I accept that just as mainstream economics can be characterized by its insistence upon a deductivist method, so the least contentious, most widely accepted aspects of Post-Keynesianism can be accounted for by its anti-deductivist stance and more specifically by its tacit commitment to something like critical realism. I argue that neo- Ricardian economics, to the extent that it takes closure for granted as a natural and useful starting point for analysis, retains an underlying commitment to deductivism and so is difficult to reconcile with Post- Keynesianism. By providing a criterion for assessing whether neo- Ricardianism belongs within a coherent Post-Keynesianism I also clarify why the nature of this relationship has for so long remained unresolved. Not until it was recognized that coherence within Post-Keynesianism turns upon methodological issues, and essentially involves the abandonment of the deductivist framework, could progress in understanding its relationship with neo-Ricardianism be made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]