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Field studies were conducted in a number of intertidal and offshore islands in the Persian Gulf between 2006 to 2013. SCUBA and skin diving surveys were conducted around Larak, Hormuz, Qeshm, Hengam, Farur, Kish, Lavan, Khark and Farsi islands in the northern region of the Persian Gulf. Marine invertebrates including nudibranchs were photographed up to 32 m. Several species of nudibranchs are reported from the northern region of the Persian Gulf, over the Iranian side. In total, 32 genera of nudibranchs are recorded, which include Fryeria rüeppelii, Haminoea sp., Chromodoris annulata, Gymnodoris rubropapulosa, Cuthona yamasui, Hypselodoris maridadilus, Glossodoris pallida, Glossodoris sp., Asteronotus cespitosus, Marioniopsis viridescens, Stylocheilus striatus, Jorunna funebris and Elysia sp. were recorded from several Iranian Island in the Persian Gulf. The most common species was Chromodoris annulata throughout most of the surveyed islands, but Haminoea sp. was highly abundant and conspicuous species only in Farsi Island. Except for G. pallida, Glossodoris sp. and C. annulata, all the above species are considered new records for the northern region of the Persian Gulf, but Bursatella leachii, M. viridescens, Phestilla lugubris, Discodoris lilacina and Haminoea sp. are new records from the Persian Gulf proper. An increase in several new records to the Iranian fauna and new records of rare species, in relatively few years results mainly from sampling effort and contributions by specialists on samples of poorly known sampled areas. Prospects for finding new and more species are promising given more diving operations are carried out.

Echinoderms are one of the oldest and most important groups of marine organisms which play an important role in the marine ecology especially in the coral reefs. During November 2012 to August 2013, six stations were selected in the intertidal zone at the north of Gulf of Oman according to sea bottom. At each station, the Sea star species of the selected area were counted in 10 m2 with 10 replications. This study was made in three seasons namely autumn, winter and summer. According to the result, cluster analyses showed the site similarity in species abundance and diversity with the same substrata. Maximum and minimum sea star diversity was shown in winter and summer, respectively.

Field surveys pertaining to coral reef studies were performed from November 2010 to August 2011 around Larak Island in the Persian Gulf. The Line Intercept Transect (LIT) method was applied to record biotic and abiotic components of the coral reefs at two sites around Larak Island: North East (NE) and South West (SW) with two stations per site. Mean "Live Coral Coverage" (LCC) and “Dead Coral Coverage” (DCC) at SW 21.74% ± 1.92%, 4.58% ± 0.65%and NE sites were 5.69% ± 0.54%, 35.64% ± 3.28% respectively. Dead Coral Coverage was more prevalent in the NE than in SW. Based on Mann-Whitney U-test LCC and DCC showed significant difference (p< 0.05) among these two sites, (p< 0.05); The Kruskal-Wallis test also showed significant difference (p< 0.05) among four stations within two sites. This study indicated that coral communities of the NE site have been more destroyed by human impacts such as municipal run-off, breakwater construction, trap fishing, over-fishing and several other human activities.

Why after almost a decade of silence and "successful" crackdowns of contention during the 1980s has Iran witnessed once again waves of increasing popular protest? What are the processes and mechanisms behind the routinization of collective actions in Iran since the early 1990s, which continue despite state repression? Why and under what circumstances does a strong authoritarian state that has previously marginalized its contenders tolerate some forms of contention despite the state's continued repressive capacity? And finally, to what extent are available social movement theories capable of explaining the Iranian case? In "State, Dissidents, and Contention: Iran, 1979-2010" I engage theories of social movements and contentious politics in order to examine the emergence, development, and likely outcomes of popular contention in contemporary Iran. My study is the first project of its kind to focus on elite factionalism and its impact on popular mobilization in contemporary Iran. Although other scholars have extensively written on elite factionalism in postrevolutionary Iran, they have not analyzed the implications of the inter-elite conflict for the emergence and development of social protests against the Islamic Republic. While this study primarily utilizes political process and resource mobilization models, it acknowledges the importance of economic, ideological, and breakdown approaches for the interpretation of the emergence and development of popular mobilization in contemporary Iran. Drawing on data gathered from census figures, public policies, state and oppositional newspapers, and interviews with dissidents and state officials, this study shows that collective actions against the Islamic Republic emerged gradually due to institutional changes, limited electorate competition, social and educational expansion, and, more importantly, the intellectual transformation of a significant segment of the elites and their action-intended discourse. I demonstrate that the political opportunity structure is not a unitary national opportunity but rather varies by social groups, demands, and contexts. I make this argument by exploring the political environment for collective mobilization in contemporary Iran in four key contexts: 1. the period of consolidation, war, and repression (1979-1988, the Khomeini era); 2. the period of postwar reconstruction and economic liberalization (1989-1997, the tenure of President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani); 3. the era of reform and political opening (1997-2005, the tenure of President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami); and 4. the period of mobilization in the context of increasingly violent repression (2005-present, the tenure of President Mahmood Ahmadinejad). By examining social protests within these different contexts, I conclude that regimes that use force to restrict political rights after a long and sustained period of opening risk eliciting resistance from dissidents who have already gained organizational resources to challenge the state's violent closing.