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We consider a class of infinite-dimensional singular stochastic control problems. These can be thought of as spatial monotone follower problems and find applications in spatial models of production and climate transition. Let $(D,\mathcal{M},\mu)$ be a finite measure space and consider the Hilbert space $H:=L^2(D,\mathcal{M},\mu; \mathbb{R})$. Let then $X$ be an $H$-valued stochastic process on a suitable complete probability space, whose evolution is determined through an SPDE driven by a self-adjoint linear operator $\mathcal{A}$ and affected by a cylindrical Brownian motion. The evolution of $X$ is controlled linearly via an $H$-valued control consisting of the direction and the intensity of action, a real-valued nondecreasing right-continuous stochastic process, adapted to the underlying filtration. The goal is to minimize a discounted convex cost-functional over an infinite time-horizon. By combining properties of semiconcave functions and techniques from viscosity theory, we first show that the value function of the problem $V$ is a $C^{1,Lip}(H)$-viscosity solution to the corresponding dynamic programming equation, which here takes the form of a variational inequality with gradient constraint. Then, by allowing the decision maker to choose only the intensity of the control and requiring that the given control direction $\hat{n}$ is an eigenvector of the linear operator $\mathcal{A}$, we establish that the directional derivative $V_{\hat{n}}$ is of class $C^1(H)$, hence a second-order smooth-fit principle in the controlled direction holds for $V$. This result is obtained by exploiting a connection to optimal stopping and combining results and techniques from convex analysis and viscosity theory.

We consider the strategic interaction of traders in a continuous-time financial market with Epstein-Zin-type recursive intertemporal preferences and performance concerns. We derive explicitly an equilibrium for the finite player and the mean-field version of the game, based on a study of geometric backward stochastic differential equations of Bernoulli type that describe the best replies of traders. Our results show that Epstein-Zin preferences can lead to substantially different equilibrium behavior.

We investigate the allocation of a co-owned company to a single owner using the Texas Shoot-Out mechanism with private valuations. We identify Knightian Uncertainty about the peer's distribution as a reason for its deterrent effect of a premature dissolving. Modeling uncertainty by a distribution band around a reference distribution $F$, we derive the optimal price announcement for an ambiguity averse divider. The divider hedges against uncertainty for valuations close to the median of $F$, while extracting expected surplus for high and low valuations. The outcome of the mechanism is efficient for valuations around the median. A risk neutral co-owner prefers to be the chooser, even strictly so for any valuation under low levels of uncertainty and for extreme valuations under high levels of uncertainty. If valuations are believed to be close, less uncertainty is required for the mechanism to always be efficient and reduce premature dissolvements., Comment: 46 pages, 9 figures

We characterize optimal consumption policies in a recursive intertemporal utility framework with local substitution. We establish existence and uniqueness and a version of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem characterizing the optimal consumption plan. An explicit solution is provided for the case when the felicity function is of the Epstein-Zin's type.

We study an intertemporal consumption and portfolio choice problem under Knightian uncertainty in which agent's preferences exhibit local intertemporal substitution. We also allow for market frictions in the sense that the pricing functional is nonlinear. We prove existence and uniqueness of the optimal consumption plan, and we derive a set of sufficient first-order conditions for optimality. With the help of a backward equation, we are able to determine the structure of optimal consumption plans. We obtain explicit solutions in a stationary setting in which the financial market has different risk premia for short and long positions.

We provide an axiomatic approach to general premium principles in a probability-free setting that allows for Knightian uncertainty. Every premium principle is the sum of a risk measure, as a generalization of the expected value, and a deviation measure, as a generalization of the variance. One can uniquely identify a maximal risk measure and a minimal deviation measure in such decompositions. We show how previous axiomatizations of premium principles can be embedded into our more general framework. We discuss dual representations of convex premium principles, and study the consistency of premium principles with a financial market in which insurance contracts are traded.

In this paper, we study an irreversible investment problem under Knightian uncertainty. In a general framework, in which Knightian uncertainty is modeled through a set of multiple priors, we prove existence and uniqueness of the optimal investment plan, and derive necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality. This allows us to construct the optimal policy in terms of the solution to a stochastic backward equation under the worst-case scenario. In a time-homogeneous setting - where risk is driven by a geometric Brownian motion and Knightian uncertainty is realized through a so-called "k-ignorance" - we are able to provide the explicit form of the optimal irreversible investment plan., Comment: 32 pages. Relaxed one assumption

We study a class of infinite-dimensional singular stochastic control problems with applications in economic theory and finance. The control process linearly affects an abstract evolution equation on a suitable partially-ordered infinite-dimensional space X, it takes values in the positive cone of X, and it has right-continuous and nondecreasing paths. We first provide a rigorous formulation of the problem by properly defining the controlled dynamics and integrals with respect to the control process. We then exploit the concave structure of our problem and derive necessary and sufficient first-order conditions for optimality. The latter are finally exploited in a specification of the model where we find an explicit expression of the optimal control. The techniques used are those of semigroup theory, vector-valued integration, convex analysis, and general theory of stochastic processes., Comment: 21 pages

We reconsider the microeconomic foundations of financial economics. Motivated by the importance of Knightian Uncertainty in markets, we present a model that does not carry any probabilistic structure ex ante, yet is based on a common order. We derive the fundamental equivalence of economic viability of asset prices and absence of arbitrage. We also obtain a modified version of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing using the notion of sublinear pricing measures. Different versions of the Efficient Market Hypothesis are related to the assumptions one is willing to impose on the common order., Comment: to appear in Econometrica

Knightian uncertainty leads naturally to nonlinear expectations. We introduce a corresponding equilibrium concept with sublinear prices and establish their existence. In general, such equilibria lead to Pareto inefficiency and coincide with Arrow--Debreu equilibria only if the values of net trades are ambiguity--free in the mean. Without aggregate uncertainty, inefficiencies arise generically. We introduce a constrained efficiency concept, uncertainty--neutral efficiency and show that Knight--Walras equilibrium allocations are efficient in this constrained sense. Arrow--Debreu equilibria turn out to be non--robust with respect to the introduction of Knightian uncertainty.

Under risk, Arrow-Debreu equilibria can be implemented as Radner equilibria by continuous trading of few long-lived securities. We show that this result generically fails if there is Knightian uncertainty in the volatility. Implementation is only possible if all discounted net trades of the equilibrium allocation are mean ambiguity-free.

We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available in general, we argue that our model is the appropriate version for timing games. We show that the notion coincides with the usual one for discrete-time games. Many timing games in continuous time have only equilibria in mixed strategies -- in particular preemption games, which often occur in the strategic real option literature. We provide a sound foundation for some workhorse equilibria of that literature, which has been lacking as we show. We obtain a general constructive existence result for subgame-perfect equilibria in preemption games and illustrate our findings by several explicit applications., Comment: 27 pages, 1 figure

We consider optimal consumption and portfolio choice in the presence of Knightian uncertainty in continuous-time. We embed the problem into the new framework of stochastic calculus for such settings, dealing in particular with the issue of non-equivalent multiple priors. We solve the problem completely by identifying the worst--case measure. Our setup also allows to consider interest rate uncertainty; we show that under some robust parameter constellations, the investor optimally puts all his wealth into the asset market, and does not save or borrow at all.

In this paper we study continuous-time stochastic control problems with both monotone and classical controls motivated by the so-called public good contribution problem. That is the problem of n economic agents aiming to maximize their expected utility allocating initial wealth over a given time period between private consumption and irreversible contributions to increase the level of some public good. We investigate the corresponding social planner problem and the case of strategic interaction between the agents, i.e. the public good contribution game. We show existence and uniqueness of the social planner's optimal policy, we characterize it by necessary and sufficient stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions and we provide its expression in terms of the unique optional solution of a stochastic backward equation. Similar stochastic first order conditions prove to be very useful for studying any Nash equilibria of the public good contribution game. In the symmetric case they allow us to prove (qualitative) uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, which we again construct as the unique optional solution of a stochastic backward equation. We finally also provide a detailed analysis of the so-called free rider effect., Comment: 38 pages. This version is a revised version of the paper "Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution under Uncertainty". Added new results, improved exposition of the results and changed some proofs

Foster and Hart proposed an operational measure of riskiness for discrete random variables. We show that their defining equation has no solution for many common continuous distributions including many uniform distributions, e.g. We show how to extend consistently the definition of riskiness to continuous random variables. For many continuous random variables, the risk measure is equal to the worst--case risk measure, i.e. the maximal possible loss incurred by that gamble. We also extend the Foster--Hart risk measure to dynamic environments for general distributions and probability spaces, and we show that the extended measure avoids bankruptcy in infinitely repeated gambles.

We prove that in smooth Markovian continuous-time economies with potentially complete asset markets, Radner equilibria with endogenously complete markets exist.

In this paper we study a continuous time, optimal stochastic investment problem under limited resources in a market with N firms. The investment processes are subject to a time-dependent stochastic constraint. Rather than using a dynamic programming approach, we exploit the concavity of the profit functional to derive some necessary and sufficient first order conditions for the corresponding Social Planner optimal policy. Our conditions are a stochastic infinite-dimensional generalization of the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem. The Lagrange multiplier takes the form of a nonnegative optional random measure on [0,T] which is flat off the set of times for which the constraint is binding, i.e. when all the fuel is spent. As a subproduct we obtain an enlightening interpretation of the first order conditions for a single firm in Bank (2005). In the infinite-horizon case, with operating profit functions of Cobb-Douglas type, our method allows the explicit calculation of the optimal policy in terms of the `base capacity' process, i.e. the unique solution of the Bank and El Karoui representation problem (2004)., Comment: 25 pages

We develop the fundamental theorem of asset pricing in a probability-free infinite-dimensional setup. We replace the usual assumption of a prior probability by a certain continuity property in the state variable. Probabilities enter then endogenously as full support martingale measures (instead of equivalent martingale measures). A variant of the Harrison-Kreps-Theorem on viability and no arbitrage is shown. Finally, we show how to embed the superhedging problem in a classical infinite-dimensional linear programming problem.

We combine general equilibrium theory and theorie generale of stochastic processes to derive structural results about equilibrium state prices.