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Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing safe havens have been key national security goals. The United States has provided Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror, more than $10 billion in funds and assistance. Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas' (FATA) rugged terrain, poor economic conditions, low literacy, underdeveloped infrastructure, and unique legal structure, all add to the complexity of efforts to address the terrorist threat in the FATA. This testimony discusses the (1) progress of U.S. national security goals in the FATA, (2) status of U.S. efforts to develop a comprehensive plan, and (3) oversight of U.S. Coalition Support Funds (CSF) provided to Pakistan. The testimony is based on recent reports on the status of a comprehensive plan (GAO-08-622) and preliminary observations on the use and oversight of U.S. CSF (GAO-08-735R). The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. According to U.S. officials and intelligence documents, since 2002, al Qaeda and the Taliban have used Pakistan's FATA and the border region to attack Pakistani, Afghan, as well as U.S. and coalition troops; plan and train for attacks against U.S. interests; destabilize Pakistan; and spread radical Islamist ideologies that threaten U.S. interests. GAO found broad agreement that al Qaeda had established a safe haven in the FATA. A 2008 DNI assessment states that al Qaeda is now using the FATA to put into place the last elements necessary to launch another attack against America. The United States has relied principally on the Pakistani military to address its national security goals in the FATA. Of the approximately $5.8 billion directed at efforts in the FATA border region from 2002 through 2007, about 96 percent ($5.56 billion) was U.S. CSF, used to reimburse the Pakistani military. U.S. and Pakistani government officials recognize that relying primarily on the Pakistani military has not succeeded in neutralizing al Qaeda and preventing the establishment of a safe haven in the FATA. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), independent 9/11 Commission (2004), and congressional legislation (2004 and 2007) called for a comprehensive plan that included all elements of national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support to address the threat in the FATA. Since 2002, the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan has not had a Washington-supported, comprehensive plan to combat terrorists and close the terrorist safe haven. In 2006, the United States and Pakistan began an effort to focus on other elements of national power beyond military. However, as of last month there was not a formally approved comprehensive plan and support from the recently elected Pakistani government was uncertain. Continued oversight is required to ensure the development and effective implementation of a... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing the terrorist safe haven have been key national security goals. The United States has provided Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror, more than $10.5 billion for military, economic, and development activities. Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which border Afghanistan, are vast unpoliced regions attractive to extremists and terrorists seeking a safe haven. GAO was asked to assess (1) the progress in meeting these national security goals for Pakistan's FATA, and (2) the status of U.S. efforts to develop a comprehensive plan for the FATA. To address these objectives, GAO compared national security goals against assessments conducted by U.S. agencies and reviewed available plans. The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. Since 2002, the United States relied principally on the Pakistan military to address U.S. national security goals. Of the approximately $5.8 billion the United States provided for efforts in the FATA and border region from 2002 through 2007, about 96 percent reimbursed Pakistan for military operations there. According to the Department of State, Pakistan deployed 120,000 military and paramilitary forces in the FATA and helped kill and capture hundreds of suspected al Qaeda operatives; these efforts cost the lives of approximately 1,400 members of Pakistan's security forces. However, GAO found broad agreement, as documented in the National Intelligence Estimate, State, and embassy documents, as well as Defense officials in Pakistan, that al Qaeda had regenerated its ability to attack the United States and had succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. No comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national security goals in the FATA has been developed, as stipulated by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), called for by an independent commission (2004), and mandated by congressional legislation (2007). Furthermore, Congress created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2004 specifically to develop comprehensive plans to combat terrorism. However, neither the National Security Council (NSC), NCTC, nor other executive branch departments have developed a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support--called for by the various national security strategies and Congress. As a result, since 2002, the U.S. embassy in Pakistan has had no Washington-supported, comprehensive plan to combat terrorism and close the terrorist safe haven in the FATA. In 2006, the embassy, in conjunction with Defense, State, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and in cooperation with the government of Pakistan, began an effort to focus more attention on other key elements of national power, such as development... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an effort to increase the quality and security of federal identification (ID) practices, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) in August 2004. This directive requires the establishment of a governmentwide standard for secure and reliable forms of ID. GAO was asked to testify on its report, being released today, assessing the progress selected agencies have made in implementing HSPD-12. For this report, GAO selected eight agencies with a range of experience in implementing ID systems and analyzed actions these agencies had taken. GAO was also asked to summarize challenges in the DOD personnel security clearance process. This overview is based on past work including reviews of clearance-related documents. Military servicemembers, federal workers, and industry personnel must obtain security clearances to gain access to classified information. Long-standing delays in processing applications for these clearances led GAO to designate the Department of Defense's (DOD) program as a high-risk area in 2005. In its report on HSPD-12, GAO made recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to, among other things, set realistic milestones for implementing the electronic authentication capabilities. GAO has also made recommendations to OMB and DOD to improve the security clearance process. Much work had been accomplished to lay the foundations for implementation of HSPD-12--a major governmentwide undertaking. However, none of the eight agencies GAO reviewed--the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, and Labor; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration--met OMB's goal of issuing ID cards by October 27, 2007, to all employees and contractor personnel who had been with the agency for 15 years or less. In addition, for the limited number of cards that had been issued, most agencies had not been using the electronic authentication capabilities on the cards and had not developed implementation plans for those capabilities. A key contributing factor for this limited progress is that OMB had emphasized issuance of the cards, rather than full use of the cards' capabilities. Furthermore, agencies anticipated having to make substantial financial investments to implement HSPD-12, since ID cards are considerably more expensive than traditional ID cards. However, OMB had not considered HSPD-12 implementation to be a major new investment and thus had not required agencies to prepare detailed plans regarding how, when, and the extent to which they would implement the electronic authentication mechanisms available through the cards. Until OMB revises its approach to focus on the full use of the capabilities of the new ID cards, HSPD-12's objectives of increasing the quality and security of ID and credentialing practices across the federal government may not be fully achieved. Regarding personnel... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many forms of identification (ID) that federal employees and contractors use to access government-controlled buildings and information systems can be easily forged, stolen, or altered to allow unauthorized access. In an effort to increase the quality and security of federal ID and credentialing practices, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) in August 2004, requiring the establishment of a governmentwide standard for secure and reliable forms of ID. The resulting standard is referred to as the personal identity verification (PIV) card. GAO was asked to determine the progress selected agencies have made in (1) implementing the capabilities of the PIV cards to enhance security and (2) achieving interoperability with other agencies. To address these objectives, GAO selected eight agencies that have a range of experience in implementing smart card-based ID systems and analyzed what actions the agencies have taken to implement PIV cards. Much work has been accomplished to lay the foundations for implementation of HSPD-12, a major governmentwide undertaking. However, agencies have made limited progress in implementing and using PIV cards. The eight agencies GAO reviewed--including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, and Labor; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration--have generally completed background checks on most of their employees and contractors and established basic infrastructure, such as purchasing card readers. However, none of them met the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) goal of issuing PIV cards by October 27, 2007, to all employees and contractor personnel who had been with the agency for 15 years or less. In addition, for the limited number of cards that have been issued, most agencies have not been using the electronic authentication capabilities on the cards and have not developed implementation plans for those capabilities. In certain cases, products are not available to support those authentication mechanisms. A key contributing factor for why agencies have made limited progress is that OMB, which is tasked with ensuring that federal agencies successfully implement HSPD-12, has emphasized issuance of cards, rather than full use of the cards' capabilities. Specifically, OMB has set milestones that focus narrowly on having agencies acquire and issue cards in the near term, regardless of when the electronic authentication capabilities of the cards may be used. Furthermore, agencies anticipate having to make substantial financial investments to implement HSPD-12, since PIV cards are considerably more expensive than traditional ID cards. However, OMB has not considered HSPD-12 implementation to be a major new investment and thus has not required agencies to prepare detailed plans regarding how, when, and the extent to which they will implement the electronic... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On February 13, 2008, Mr. Jack Edwards--an Acting Director in our Defense Capabilities and Management team--testified before the subcommittee at a hearing on the Department of Defense (DOD) security clearance processes. This report responds to a Congressional request for additional information on that subject. Specifically, GAO was asked the following: (1) In the report that GAO issued today to this committee and your testimony statement, you discussed a need for more emphasis on quality in clearance products and processes. What have agencies been using as quality measures, and are they sufficient? (2) Do you believe that DOD, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) have made the necessary commitment to improve the security clearance process? What steps need to be taken to ensure that on-going initiatives continue past this Administration? (3) The Intel Reform Act requires that timeliness statistics be reported to Congress. Do the timeliness statistics provide a full picture of how quickly clearances are being issued? If there are additional statistics that would add to the Congress's oversight of clearance timeliness, what types of factors should be considered in identifying additional metrics? Through our reports and testimonies, we have emphasized a need to build more quality and quality monitoring into the clearances process. As we have reported, since 1999 government agencies have relied on a measure of quality--the percentage of investigative reports returned by requesting agencies to the investigating agency because of incompleteness--and this measure is insufficient. We find this measure to be problematic because the number of investigations returned for rework is not by itself a valid indicator of the quality of investigative work. One reason for this is that according to adjudication officials, they were reluctant to return incomplete investigations in anticipation of further delays. Additionally, this metric pertains only to the investigation phase of the clearance process, and there are no metrics for the other five phases of the investigative process (the clearance process has six phases: the requirements setting, application-submission, investigation, adjudication, appeal, and clearance updating). As noted in our February 13, 2008 report, we are encouraged by some department specific and governmentwide efforts that have improved DOD's personnel security clearance program. Examples of improvements to the process include (1) DOD's ability to electronically submit a clearance applicant's form authorizing the release of medical information and (2) a governmentwide effort that has resulted in the increased use of the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing. Nevertheless, as we noted in our February 13, 2008 statement, we have identified a number of challenges in our past work that will require long-term commitment from this and... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates domestic medical, industrial, and research uses of sealed radioactive sources. Organizations or individuals attempting to purchase a sealed source must apply for a license and gain the approval of either NRC or an "agreement state." To become an agreement state, a state must demonstrate to NRC that its regulatory program is compatible with NRC regulations and is effective in protecting public health and safety. NRC then transfers portions of its authority to the agreement state. In 2003, GAO reported that weaknesses in NRC's licensing program could allow terrorists to obtain radioactive materials. NRC took some steps to respond to the GAO report, including issuing guidance to license examiners. To determine whether NRC actions to address GAO recommendations were sufficient, the Subcommittee asked GAO to test the licensing program using covert investigative methods. By using the name of a bogus business that existed only on paper, GAO investigators were able to obtain a genuine radioactive materials license from NRC. Aside from traveling to a non-agreement state to pick up and send mail, GAO investigators did not need to leave their office in Washington, D.C., to obtain the license from NRC. Further, other than obtaining radiation safety officer training, investigators gathered all the information they needed for the license from the NRC Web site. After obtaining a license from NRC, GAO investigators altered the license so it appeared that the bogus company could purchase an unrestricted quantity of radioactive sealed sources rather than the maximum listed on the approved license. GAO then sought to purchase, from two U.S. suppliers, machines containing sealed radioactive material. Letters of intent to purchase, which included the altered NRC license as an attachment, were accepted by the two suppliers. These suppliers gave GAO price quotes and commitments to ship the machines containing radioactive materials. The amount of radioactive material we could have acquired from these two suppliers was sufficient to reach the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) definition of category 3. According to IAEA, category 3 sources are dangerous if not safely managed or securely protected. Importantly, with patience and the proper financial resources, we could have accumulated substantially more radioactive source material. GAO also attempted to obtain a license from an agreement state, but withdrew the application after state license examiners indicated they would visit the bogus company office before granting the license. An official with the licensing program told GAO that conducting a site visit is a standard required procedure before radioactive materials license applications are approved in that state. As a result of this investigation, NRC suspended its licensing program until it could determine what corrective actions were necessary to resolve the weaknesses GAO identified. On... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Currently, U.S. citizens are not required to present a passport when entering the United States from countries in the Western Hemisphere. However, U.S. citizens are required to establish citizenship to a CBP officer's satisfaction. On its Web site, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) advises U.S. citizens that an officer may ask for identification documents as proof of citizenship, including birth certificates or baptismal records and a photo identification document. In 2003, we testified that CBP officers were not readily capable of identifying whether individuals seeking entry into the United States were using counterfeit identification to prove citizenship. Specifically, our agents were able to easily enter the United States from Canada and Mexico using fictitious names and counterfeit driver's licenses and birth certificates. Later in 2003 and 2004, we continued to be able to successfully enter the United States using counterfeit identification at land border crossings, but were denied entry on one occasion. Because of Congress's concerns that these weaknesses could possibly be exploited by terrorists or others involved in criminal activity, Congress requested that we assess the current status of security at the nation's borders. Specifically, Congress requested that we conduct a follow-up investigation to determine whether the vulnerabilities exposed in our prior work continue to exist. Agents successfully entered the United States using fictitious driver's licenses and other bogus documentation through nine land ports of entry on the northern and southern borders. CBP officers never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents presented at any of the nine crossings. On three occasions--in California, Texas, and Arizona--agents crossed the border on foot. At two of these locations--Texas and Arizona--CBP allowed the agents entry into the United States without asking for or inspecting any identification documents. After completing our investigation, we briefed officials from CBP on June 9, 2006. CBP agreed that its officers are not able to identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land border crossings and fully supports a new initiative that will require all travelers to present a passport before entering the United States. We did not assess whether this initiative would be effective in preventing terrorists from entering the United States or whether it would fully address the vulnerabilites shown by our work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

GAO's previous work found problems in security controls over sensitive excess military equipment that resulted in lost and stolen items, some of which were sold to the public, and significant waste and inefficiency in the Department of Defense (DOD) excess property reutilization program. GAO was asked to perform follow-up investigations to determine whether (1) unauthorized parties could obtain sensitive excess military equipment that requires demilitarization (destruction) when no longer needed by DOD and (2) system and process improvements are adequate to prevent sales of new, unused excess items that DOD continues to buy or that are in demand by the military services. GAO investigators posing as private citizens to disguise their identity purchased several sensitive military equipment items from DOD's liquidation sales contractor, indicating that DOD has not enforced security controls for preventing sensitive excess military equipment from release to the public. GAO investigators at liquidation sales purchased ceramic body armor inserts currently used by deployed troops, a cesium technology timing unit with global positioning capabilities, a universal frequency counter, 2 guided missile radar test sets, 12 digital microcircuits used in F-14 fighter aircraft, and numerous other items. GAO was able to purchase these items because controls broke down at virtually every step in the excess property turn-in and disposal process. GAO determined that thousands of military items that should have been demilitarized (destroyed) were sold to the public. Further, in June 2006, GAO undercover investigators posing as DOD contractor employees entered two excess property warehouses and obtained about $1.1 million in sensitive military equipment items, including 2 launcher mounts for shoulder-fired guided missiles, several types of body armor, a digital signal converter used in naval surveillance, an all-band antenna used to track aircraft, and 6 circuit cards used in computerized Navy systems. At no point during GAO's warehouse security penetration were its investigators challenged on their identity and authority to obtain DOD military property. The table below shows examples of sensitive military equipment obtained during GAO's undercover operations. GAO investigators posing as private citizens also bought several new, unused items currently being purchased or in demand by the military services from DOD's excess property liquidation sales contractor. Although military units paid full price for these items when they ordered them from supply inventory, GAO paid a fraction of this cost to purchase the same items, demonstrating continuing waste and inefficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To address the threat of dirty bombs and other nuclear material, the federal government has programs in place that regulate the transportation of radioactive sources and to prevent illegal transport of radioactive sources across our nation's borders. The Department of Homeland Security through the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses radiation detection equipment at ports of entry to prevent such illicit entry of radioactive sources. The goal of CBP's inspection program is to "...thwart the operations of terrorist organizations by detecting, disrupting, and preventing the cross-border travel of terrorists, terrorist funding, and terrorist implements, including Weapons of Mass Destruction and their precursors." Deploying radiation detection equipment is part of CBP's strategy for thwarting radiological terrorism and CBP is using a range of such equipment to meet its goal of screening all cargo, vehicles, and individuals coming into the United States. Most travelers enter the United States through the nation's 154 land border ports of entry. CBP inspectors at ports of entry are responsible for the primary inspection of travelers to determine their admissibility into the United States and to enforce laws related to preventing the entry of contraband, such as drugs and weapons of mass destruction. Our investigation was conducted at Congressional request as a result of widespread congressional and public interest in the security of our nation's borders, given today's unprecedented terrorism threat environment. Our investigation was conducted under the premise that given today's security environment, our nation's borders must be protected from the smuggling of radioactive sources by terrorists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents questions and answers related to the U.S. Department of Defense's Personnel Security Clearance Program. One question concerns the Office of Personnel Management manner of conducting personnel security clearance. Another question is about the primary criteria that the Government Accountability Office uses in determining the removal of a program from a high-risk list. A question on the rights of GAO in using closed-pending investigative reports is also discussed.

From 1982 to 1999, 68 of the 80 persons convicted of spying against the United States were Defense Department (DOD) employees. All of them had undergone personnel security investigations and held security clearances. This testimony describes how decisions are made to grant or deny security clearances to DOD employees and contractors, summarizes the key findings from GAO's recent report on this subject (GAO/NSIAD-00-12, Oct. 1999), and discusses the steps that DOD has taken in response to GAO's recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]