1. Large ranking games with diffusion control
- Author
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Stefan Ankirchner, Nabil Kazi-Tani, Julian Wendt, Chao Zhou, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität = Friedrich Schiller University Jena [Jena, Germany], Institut Élie Cartan de Lorraine (IECL), Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), National University of Singapore (NUS), Support from the German Research Foundation through the project AN 1024/5-1 is gratefully acknowledged., Nabil Kazi-Tani’s research is supported by the ANR project DREAMES ANR-21-CE46-0002-03., Chao Zhou’s research is supported by Singapore MOE (Ministry of Education) AcRF Grants R-146- 000-271-112 and R-146-000-284-114 as well as NSFC Grant No. 11871364., ANR-21-CE46-0002,DREAMES,Méthodes numériques pour l'aide à la décision : préférencesdynamiques et risques multivarié(2021), Wendt, Julian, and Méthodes numériques pour l'aide à la décision : préférences dynamiques et risques multivariés - - DREAMES2021 - ANR-21-CE46-0002 - AAPG2021 - VALID
- Subjects
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS ,[MATH.MATH-PR] Mathematics [math]/Probability [math.PR] ,Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory ,General Mathematics ,ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING ,TheoryofComputation_GENERAL ,Management Science and Operations Research ,2020 MSC : 91A16, 91A07, 93E20 ,Computer Science Applications ,[MATH.MATH-PR]Mathematics [math]/Probability [math.PR] ,oscillating Brownian motion ,game ,diffusion control ,rank-based reward ,mean field limit - Abstract
We consider a symmetric stochastic differential game where each player can control the diffusion intensity of an individual dynamic state process, and the players whose states at a deterministic finite time horizon are among the best [Formula: see text] of all states receive a fixed prize. Within the mean field limit version of the game, we compute an explicit equilibrium, a threshold strategy that consists of choosing the maximal fluctuation intensity when the state is below a given threshold and the minimal intensity otherwise. We show that for large n, the symmetric n-tuple of the threshold strategy provides an approximate Nash equilibrium of the n-player game. We also derive the rate at which the approximate equilibrium reward and the best-response reward converge to each other, as the number of players n tends to infinity. Finally, we compare the approximate equilibrium for large games with the equilibrium of the two-player case. Funding: Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [Grant AN 1024/5-1] is acknowledged. The research of N. Kazi-Tani is supported by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grant ANR-21-CE46-0002-03]. The research of C. Zhou is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 11871364], the Singapore Ministry of Education [Grants A-8000453-00-00, A-0004273-00-00 and A-0004277-00-00] and the MERLION 2020 award [Grant A-0004589-00-00].
- Published
- 2021