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U.S. special operations forces (SOF) are specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments. Since 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) has deployed SOF to conduct a range of military operations, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq. To meet an increase in operational demands for SOF, DOD has increased funding for U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as well as SOF force levels from about 45,700 in fiscal year 2001 (including about 43,000 military personnel and about 2,700 civilians) to about 69,500 in fiscal year 2014 (including about 63,000 military personnel and about 6,500 civilians).1 DOD s strategic guidance indicates that SOF will continue to play a prominent role in support of the defense strategy. For example, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review report states that the investment in SOF supports DOD s ability to sustain operations against terrorist networks, counter other transnational threats, and build the capacity of partners, among other things.2 DOD has taken steps to adjust some organizational structures and relationships for SOF. For example, DOD has assigned all SOF, including forward-based headquarters and forces, to SOCOM.3 With this new organizational relationship, SOCOM has direct responsibility for manning, training, and equipping all SOF.

Why GAO Did This Study. GAO has designated DOD s Support Infrastructure Management as a highrisk area in part due to challenges DOD faces in reducing excess infrastructure. DOD manages a global real property portfolio of over 557,000 facilities DOD estimates to be valued at about $828 billion as of September 30, 2012. In September 2011, GAO found that DOD was limited in its ability to reduce excess inventory because OSD did not maintain accurate and complete data on the utilization of its facilities in its Real Property Assets Database. House Report 113-102 mandated GAO to review DOD efforts to improve these data. This report examines the extent to which OSD has (1) improved the completeness and accuracy of facilityutilization data in its Real Property Assets Database and the military departments use of data to identify consolidation opportunities, and (2) a strategic plan to manage DOD s real property efficiently and to facilitate the identification of unutilized and underutilized facilities. GAO analyzed OSD s real property data from fiscal years 2010 through 2013, visited 11 active DOD installations from the four services to reflect those with high numbers of buildings, and interviewed officials. While not generalizable, the interviews provided perspectives about facility utilization. What GAO Recommends. GAO recommends that OSD establish a strategic plan to identify unutilized and underutilized facilities. In written comments on a draft of the report, DOD concurred with the recommendation., Report to Congressional Committees.

As U.S. forces draw down from Afghanistan and home training is expanded, the competition for training ranges may also increase. Section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (as amended) required DOD to submit a comprehensive plan to address training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and airspace available in the United States and overseas for training, and provide annual progress reports on these efforts through 2018. The act also requires GAO to submit annual evaluations of DOD s reports to Congress within 90 days of receiving them from DOD. In this report, GAO examined (1) whether DOD s 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report met the legislative requirements; and (2) whether DOD acted on GAO previous recommendations to improve its submissions. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. In commenting on this report, DOD stated that it agrees in general with the report., Rept. to Congressional Committees

DOD reports that more than 83,000 persons are missing from past conflicts in Vietnam, Korea, the Cold War, the Persian Gulf, and World War II. Several DOD organizations, known as the accounting community, have a role in accounting for the missing. Between 2002 and 2012, DOD accounted for an average of 72 persons each year. In 2009, Congress mandated DOD to increase its capability and capacity such that the community could account for at least 200 missing persons annually by 2015. The law also added all World War II losses to the list of conflicts for which DOD was responsible, thus increasing from about 10,000 to 83,000 the number of missing persons for whom DOD must account. A committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO to review DOD s efforts to address the accounting-for goal. GAO assessed DOD s capability and capacity to accomplish the missing persons accounting mission. In doing so, GAO analyzed guidance and requirements, discussed accounting efforts and the structure of the community with community members, and surveyed accounting community members and related entities. GAO is making nine recommendations to DOD, including for example: examining options to reorganize; clarifying responsibilities for the accounting community; improving planning, guidance, and criteria to prioritize cases; and sustaining communication. DOD generally concurred with these recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees

Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to discuss GAO's findings and recommendations about the Department of Defense's (DoD) missing persons accounting mission from our recently issued report, DOD's POW/MIA Mission: Top-Level Leadership Attention Needed to Resolve Longstanding Challenges in Accounting for Missing Persons from Past Conflicts. DoD reports that more than 83,000 persons are missing from past conflicts in Vietnam, Korea, the Cold War, the Persian Gulf, and World War II. Since the early 1970s, DoD has identified the remains of and accounted for approximately 1,910 persons. Several DoD components and organizations, collectively known as the missing persons accounting community, have a role in accounting for missing persons. Between 2002 and 2012, DoD accounted for an average of 72 persons each year. In 2009, Congress established an accounting-for goal in Section 541 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. This act required the Secretary of Defense to provide such funds, personnel, and resources as the Secretary considers appropriate to increase significantly the capability and capacity of DoD, the Armed Forces, and commanders of the combatant commands to account for missing persons, so that the accounting community has sufficient resources to ensure that at least 200 missing persons are accounted for annually, beginning in fiscal year 2015. The law also added all World War II losses to the list of conflicts for which DoD is responsible, thus increasing from about 10,000 to 83,000 the number of missing persons for whom DoD must account. In my statement today, I will focus on three key issues we identified in our report, specifically: (1) the accounting community's organizational structure, (2) the lack of clarity regarding community members' roles and responsibilities, and (3) DoD's planning to meet the statutory accounting-for goal., Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives.

Sealift is the primary means of deploying and sustaining the combat power required in major ground operations, typically accounting for upwards of 90 percent of all military cargo, and U.S. strategic seaports play an important role in ensuring that the U.S. military is able to quickly and efficiently deploy to address the country s overseas interests. The strategic seaport program administered jointly by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) facilitates the movement of deploying military forces through the 17 commercial and 5 military seaports designated as strategic seaports. These ports serve as significant transportation hubs and are important to DOD s readiness and cargo handling capacity. Over the past several years Congress has directed that a number of studies be conducted to ensure the readiness of the strategic seaports. Most recently, in the conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Congress directed DOD to provide an updated report on strategic seaport facilities used for military purposes, specifying that DOD must include (1) an assessment of the structural integrity and deficiencies of the port facilities and determination of the infrastructure improvements needed to directly or indirectly meet national security and readiness requirements; (2) an assessment of the impact on operational readiness if the improvements are not undertaken; (3) an identification of potential funding sources for the needed improvements from existing authorities; and (4) an opinion as to whether DOD has the necessary authority to support section 50302 of Title 46 of the United States Code.1 DOD issued that report in January 2013., GAO Reports.

DOD estimates that about 24 percent of servicemembers who die in combat could have survived if improved and more timely medical care could be made available. Because multiple DOD organizations conduct research to develop medical products and processes to improve combat casualty care, it is critical that these organizations coordinate their work. It is also important that agencies monitor and assess their performance to help achieve organizational goals, which for DOD include addressing gaps in its capability to provide combat casualty care. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 directed GAO to review DOD s combat casualty care research and development programs. This report assesses whether DOD (1) uses a coordinated approach to plan this research; and (2) monitors and assesses this research to determine the extent to which it fills capability gaps and achieves other goals. GAO reviewed DOD s policies and documentation; interviewed officials from DOD and other federal agencies; and analyzed metrics DOD used to gauge the progress of its research. GAO recommends that DOD (1) communicate the importance of early coordination among DOD s nonmedical organizations and (2) develop and implement a plan to determine the extent to which research fills gaps and achieves other goals. DOD concurred with these recommendations., Rept. to Congressional Committees.

The roles for women in the military have been expanding and evolving. Servicewomen today are integral to combat, combat support, and counterinsurgency operations, and serve in many roles they previously did not hold. Pub. L. No. 112-81, 725 (2011) mandated that GAO conduct a review of the female-specific health care services provided by DOD to female servicemembers, including the treatment of servicewomen who are victims of sexual assault. In this report, GAO evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD is addressing the health care needs of deployed servicewomen; (2) female-specific health care services are available to deployed servicewomen; and (3) medical and mental health care are available to servicewomen who are victims of sexual assault. GAO reviewed pertinent DOD policies, guidance, and data. GAO also met with health care providers, servicewomen, and others during site visits to 18 locations where servicewomen are currently serving or deployed, including 15 installations in Afghanistan and Navy vessels. To enhance the medical and mental health care for servicewomen who are victims of sexual assault, GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop department-level guidance on the provision of care to victims of sexual assault; and (2) take steps to improve first responders compliance with the department s requirements for annual refresher training. DOD did not concur with the first recommendation, but cited steps it is taking that appear consistent with the recommendation. DOD concurred with the second recommendation., Rept. to Congressional Addressees.

Since 2002, the United States has operated military detention facilities at its Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to hold individuals detained during overseas counterterrorism operations. In 2009 the President directed the closure of these facilities within 1 year. Since then, a number of statutes have prohibited the transfer of Guantanamo Bay detainees to the United States. GAO was asked to review existing U.S. facilities and identify factors to be considered in the event that restrictions were lifted and Guantanamo Bay detainees were transferred to the United States. This report describes the (1) current Guantanamo Bay detention facilities and infrastructure, (2) DOD corrections facilities and factors to be considered if these facilities were used to hold the detainees, and (3) DOJ facilities holding individuals charged with or convicted of terrorism-related crimes, and factors to be considered if these facilities were used to hold the detainees. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed relevant laws and policies on detention operations; visited several facilities at Guantanamo Bay and DOD and DOJ sites in the United States selected for their range of housing configurations; and interviewed officials at both agencies. GAO s review is descriptive and did not include an evaluation of whether specific U.S. facilities would be suitable for holding Guantanamo Bay detainees, nor did GAO address legal factors that are still being adjudicated. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. In commenting on this report, DOJ stated that it has no plans to transfer detainees to the United States. This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in November 2012., Report to the Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate.

The Department of Defense (DoD), which includes the military services, selects mid- to upper-career-level military officers to participate in fellowship and training-with-industry programs conducted at non-DoD organizations such as universities, think tanks, private corporations, federal agencies, and Congress. For some fellowships, the military departments pay a fee or tuition to the host organization. GAO was directed to review DoD's use of these programs. GAO's objectives were to determine the following: (1) the statutory provisions that authorize DoD's fellowship and training-with-industry programs for military officers, (2) the extent of the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) visibility over these programs, and (3) the extent to which the services are able to determine that they derive benefits from these programs. GAO analyzed relevant laws and DoD policies, collected data, and interviewed OSD and military service officials on their oversight and management roles and responsibilities for these programs. GAO is making 11 recommendations to DoD for improving oversight and management of DoD's fellowship and training-with-industry programs -- for example, submitting DoD-required annual reports and performing service-required program reviews -- that would enhance OSD's visibility over the programs and better position DoD to determine the extent to which it derives benefits from them. In response to a draft of this report, DoD concurred with the 11 recommendations and stated its action plan to implement the recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

The U.S. Military Academy, U.S. Naval Academy, and U.S. Air Force Academy each operate 4-year programs that provide successful candidates with bachelor s degrees and commissions as military officers. In addition to completing their academic courses, the officer candidates who attend the academies each year participate in rigorous military training activities and mandatory athletic activities. In return for their free education, the graduates must serve on active duty for 5 years after graduation. Each academy also operates its own preparatory school.5 The U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School, U.S. Naval Academy Preparatory School, and U.S. Air Force Academy Preparatory School serve as an alternative means for entrance into the academies. Academy officials screen all applicants and identify those who they believe could succeed at the academies but who would benefit from more preparation. The preparatory schools offer a 10-month course of instruction that combines academic instruction, physical conditioning, and an orientation to military life. Emphasis is placed on giving each candidate as much tutorial assistance as is necessary to maximize the individual s potential for success. The student body at each school is organized into a military unit with a student chain of command that is advised by commissioned and noncommissioned officers. This structure is intended to provide students with exposure to military discipline and order.

This report formally transmits our January 2012 briefing to committees in response to section 332(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 (section 332) and our response to House Report 111-166 regarding the Department of Defense's (DoD) energy-efficiency programs. The act and House report directed DoD to report on a specific set of energy issues and directed GAO to review DoD's report and submit to Congress a report on our findings. A summary of the eight required energy-efficiency reporting issues is included as enclosure I. Details on our findings and the basis for them are provided in enclosure II, Briefing for Congressional Committees January 2012, which consists of 19 briefing charts., Report to Congressional Committees.

This report responds to House Report 111-491 to accompany a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R. 5136). The House Report noted that according to the environmental impact statement for the proposed homeporting of additional ships at Naval Station, Mayport, Florida, homeporting of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier would result in temporary surges of maintenance employees associated with the 3-year depot-level maintenance cycle for the aircraft carrier. The homeporting of the aircraft carrier at Mayport is projected to begin in fiscal year 2019. Also, the House report raised questions about the potential impact that the additional depot-level workload would have on the sustainability, efficiency, capabilities, and stability of the maintenance employees who would travel from Navy depots to Mayport to perform the maintenance.

When the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) became fully operational in 2008, it inherited well over 100 activities, missions, programs, and exercises from other Department of Defense (DOD) organizations. AFRICOM initially conducted these inherited activities with little change. However, as AFRICOM has matured, it has begun planning and prioritizing activities with its four military service components, special operations command, and task force. Some activities represent a shift from traditional warfighting, requiring collaboration with the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other interagency partners. GAO's prior work has identified critical steps and practices that help agencies to achieve success. For this report, GAO was asked to assess AFRICOM in five areas with respect to activity planning and implementation. To do so, GAO analyzed DOD and AFRICOM guidance; observed portions of AFRICOM activities; interviewed officials in Europe and Africa; and obtained perspectives from interagency officials, including those at 22 U.S. embassies in Africa., Report to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives.

For decades, the Department of Defense (DoD) has relied on contractors to support contingency operations and recognizes them as part of the total force. In Iraq and Afghanistan, contractor personnel now outnumber deployed troops. In Iraq, more than 95,000 DoD contractors support 92,000 troops, and in Afghanistan, more than 112,000 DoD contractors support approximately 94,000 troops. DoD anticipates that the number of contractors will grow in Afghanistan as the department increases its troop presence in that country. Several long-standing challenges have hindered DoD's ability to manage and oversee contractors at deployed locations. Since 1992, GAO has designated DoD contract management as a high-risk area, in part because of concerns about the adequacy of the department's acquisition workforce, including contract oversight personnel. GAO has reported on many of the challenges that DoD faces and has made several recommendations aimed at improving the oversight and management of contracts in contingency operations. DoD has addressed some, but not all of these recommendations. This testimony addresses the extent to which DoD has institutionalized operational contract support. It is based on GAO's recently published reports and testimonies on planning for operational contract support and on DoD's efforts to manage and oversee contractors and ongoing audit work in Iraq and Afghanistan., Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives.

In fiscal year 2009, the Department of Defense (DoD) reported that it spent $4 billion to move troops and materiel into Afghanistan, a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with few roads, no railway, and only four airports with paved runways over 3,000 meters. The terrain and weather in Afghanistan and surrounding countries pose further challenges to transporting supplies and equipment. In December 2009, the President announced that an additional 30,000 U.S. troops will be sent to Afghanistan by August 2010. Today's testimony discusses GAO's preliminary observations drawn from ongoing work reviewing DoD's logistics efforts supporting operations in Afghanistan, including the following: (1) the organizations involved and routes and methods used to transport supplies and equipment into and around Afghanistan; (2) steps DoD has taken to improve its distribution process, based on lessons learned from prior operations; and (3) challenges affecting DoD's ability to distribute supplies and equipment within Afghanistan, and its efforts to mitigate them. In conducting its audit work, GAO examined DoD guidance and other documentation relating to the processes of transporting supplies and equipment to Afghanistan and met with various cognizant officials and commanders in the United States, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Qatar., Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. A classified version of this statement (GAO-10-462C) was delivered to a closed session of the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, on March 4, 2010.

DOD has a number of strategy, policy, and guidance documents related to interagency coordination for its homeland defense and civil support missions; however, DOD entities do not have fully or clearly defined roles and responsibilities because key DOD documents are outdated, are not integrated, or are not comprehensive. Previous GAO work, the National Response Framework, and DOD strategy and guidance all identify the need for clearly defined roles and responsibilities to enhance interagency coordination. Regarding DOD's documents, its 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, its series of civil support policies and guidance, and its joint guidance for interagency coordination are outdated and not comprehensive. Also, conflicting directives create confusion as to which DOD office is responsible for coordinating with law enforcement agencies. For example, three separate DOD directives, including one on DOD's support to law enforcement agencies that was last updated in 1989, assign overlapping law enforcement support responsibilities to three different DOD entities. Planned changes to the 1989 law enforcement support directive will lead to a gap in DOD's policy on support to law enforcement agencies for the counterdrug mission. We also found that specific delineation in interagency coordination and external communication roles and responsibilities among ASD/HD, NORTHCOM, and PACOM is lacking. By updating, integrating, and ensuring the comprehensiveness of its strategy, policy, and guidance, DOD could enhance its interagency coordination efforts for homeland defense and civil support and clarify current overlapping roles. Therefore, we are recommending that DOD issue updated, integrated, and comprehensive strategy, policy, and guidance.

In comparing military and civilian compensation, CNA's study as well as a 2007 CBO study,15 found that military pay generally compares favorably with civilian pay. CNA found that in 2006, regular military compensation for enlisted personnel averaged $4,700 more annually than comparable civilian earnings. Similarly, CNA found that military officers received an average of about $11,500 more annually than comparable civilians. Further, CNA found that the inclusion of three military benefits-health care, retirement, and the additional tax advantage for military members- increased the differentials by an average of $8,660 annually for enlisted servicemembers and $13,370 annually for officers. A 2007 CBO study similarly found that military compensation compares favorably with civilian compensation. For example, CBO's report suggested that DOD's goal to make regular military compensation comparable with the 70th percentile of civilian compensation has been achieved. We note that the major difference between the two studies lies in their definitions of compensation. CNA asserted, and we agree, that the inclusion of benefits allows for comparisons of actual levels of compensation and provides some useful comparison points for determining whether servicemembers are compensated at a level that is comparable to that of their civilian peers, although the caveats that we discuss below should be considered. CBO also noted, and we agree, that including benefits can add another level of complexity to such analytical studies.

In addition to its primary mission of warfighting, the Department of Defense (DoD) plays an important role in civil support. Four years after the poorly coordinated national response to Hurricane Katrina, issues remain about DoD's progress in identifying its capability requirements for supporting a coordinated civilian-military response to a catastrophic domestic event. This report addresses the extent to which DoD has done the following: (1) identified and addressed its capability gaps for its civil support mission; (2) clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and relationships and identified appropriate levels and types of personnel to assign to the FEMA regions; and (3) shared and tracked information concerning its civil support requirements response process with civil authorities. To do this, GAO analyzed DoD civil support guidance and plans and met with DoD and FEMA officials regarding the support that civilian authorities may request during a catastrophic incident. GAO recommends that DoD update its civil support guidance to reflect current doctrine; clearly define roles, responsibilities, and relationships for personnel assigned to manage civilian requests for assistance; conduct a staffing needs assessment for Defense Coordinating Officers; and establish an official system to track requests for assistance across DoD that is accessible to DoD's interagency partners. DoD concurred with GAO's recommendations., Report to Congressional Requesters.

Several DOD organizations have issued coordinated plans for the execution of the drawdown, but DOD has yet to fully plan for requirements for contracted services needed during the drawdown. Since our September 2008 report, DOD created new organizations to oversee, synchronize, and ensure unity of effort during the drawdown and established goals and metrics for measuring progress. To date, DOD reports that its drawdown efforts have exceeded its goals. For example, as of January 2010, DOD reported that it exceeded its target figure for withdrawing rolling stock in Iraq?which includes wheeled and tracked combat vehicles, some construction equipment, and trailers?by over 2,600 pieces. However, a large amount of personnel, equipment, and bases remain to be drawn down. In addition, although DOD took some steps to plan for contracted services, limited operational planning for contracted support has challenged its ability to identify the full range of its needs for contracted services to support the drawdown; existing processes may not allow sufficient time for all contracted services needed to be put on contract in a responsible manner; and there exists a lack of clarity regarding the roles and responsibilities of various contract validation review boards. Without addressing these issues, DOD risks not having the right contracted services in place to meet drawdown timelines, which may lead to inefficient and wasteful practices as the drawdown continues.

DOD has taken steps to implement our August 2008 recommendations to improve its sexual assault prevention and response program; however, its efforts reflect various levels of progress, and opportunities exist for further program improvements. To its credit, DOD has implemented four of the nine recommendations in our August 2008 report. First, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) established a working group to address our recommendation to evaluate the adequacy of DOD policies for implementing its sexual assault prevention and response program in joint and deployed environments. Based on the working group's findings, OSD suggested revisions to joint policy, which a Joint Staff official told us they are using to modify related publications. Second, the military service secretaries have each taken a variety of steps to address our recommendation to emphasize responsibility for program support at all levels of command. The most notable examples of this support include the U.S. Navy's recent establishment of a sexual assault prevention and response office that will report directly to the Secretary of the Navy, and the Army's incorporation of a sexual assault program awareness assessment into promotional boards for its noncommissioned officers. Third, OSD chartered the Health Affairs Sexual Assault Task Force to address our recommendation to evaluate and address factors that may prevent or discourage service members from seeking health services. Specifically, the task force evaluated and subsequently issued a number of recommendations that are intended to improve access to health care following a sexual assault, including chartering a Sexual Assault Health Care Integrated Policy Team to review department-level policies regarding clinical practice guidelines, standards of care, personnel and staffing, training requirements and responsibilities, continuity of care, and in theater equipment and supplies.

Since September 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) has relied heavily on the reserve component primarily in support of ongoing contingency operations for the Global War on Terrorism, which is now known as the Overseas Contingency Operation. As of February 2009, approximately 691,000 reserve servicemembers have been activated in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, with many of these servicemembers being called for multiple deployments or extended for more than one year. This increased use of the reserve component servicemembers has led to questions by Congress about whether reserve component servicemembers might be experiencing a decline in earnings as a result of extended and frequent activations. Citing the nation's increased reliance on the reserve component, Congress mandated in 2002 that we review compensation programs available to reserve component servicemembers serving on active duty. In September 2003, we reported that DOD lacked sufficient information to determine the need for compensation programs and recommended that DOD obtain more complete information on the magnitude of income change, the causes of any such identified change, and the effect of income change on retention. The results of DOD's 2004 Status of Forces Survey of Reserve Component Members showed that about 51 percent of reserve component servicemembers responding to the survey reported that they had experienced a decline in earnings while activated. However, our 2003 report noted that survey data are questionable primarily because it is unclear what survey respondents considered as income loss or gain in determining their financial status.

For the 4-year period we examined, the Navy had significantly more inventory than was needed to support current requirements. The Navy also experienced some inventory deficits, though to a far lesser extent. Our analysis of stratification data identified an annual average of about $18.7 billion of Navy secondary inventory for fiscal years 2004 through 2007, of which about $7.5 billion (40 percent) exceeded current requirements. About half of the $7.5 billion of inventory exceeding current requirements was retained to meet anticipated future demands, and the remainder was retained for other reasons or identified as potential excess. Based on Navy demand forecasts, inventory that exceeded current requirements had enough parts on hand to satisfy several years, or even decades, of anticipated supply needs. Also, a large proportion of items that exceeded current requirements had no projected demand. Inventory that exceeded current requirements included both serviceable and unserviceable parts, and was predominantly associated with steady programs that is, programs that were not significantly growing or declining. The Navy also had an annual average of about $570 million of inventory deficits over this 4-year period, which represented about 7 percent of its annual reorder point requirements. Fewer items had inventory deficits than had excesses, but some items experienced persistent deficits for the 4 years we reviewed.

The Department of Defense's (DoD) use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) continues to increase. In 2000, DoD components had fewer than 50 unmanned aircraft in their inventory. By May 2008, they had more than 6,000. However, DoD faces challenges, such as UAS acquisition and the integration of UAS into joint combat operations. GAO has made a series of recommendations to address challenges, including the need for a UAS strategic plan. To improve upon the management and use of UAS, DoD has implemented several actions, such as establishing new task forces. GAO was asked to do the following: (1) identify key DoD efforts to improve the management and operational use of UAS, and (2) assess the extent to which these efforts constitute an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee UAS efforts. GAO reviewed DoD documents such as directives and memorandums, and interviewed agency officials. GAO recommends DoD designate a single entity accountable for integrating efforts related to UAS; define roles, responsibilities, and relationships among UAS-related entities; and develop a UAS strategic plan to align and integrate efforts and funding with long-term goals. DoD partially concurred with one recommendation and did not concur with two recommendations, citing actions it has already taken. GAO recognizes DoD's efforts to date, but continues to believe additional actions are needed., Report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.

The Department of Defense (DoD) relies on a global network of DoD and non-DoD infrastructure so critical that its unavailability could have a debilitating effect on DoD's ability to project, support, and sustain its forces and operations worldwide. DoD established the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to assure the availability of mission-critical infrastructure. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which DoD has done the following: (1) incorporated aspects of DCIP into its exercises in the Transportation Defense Sector, and (2) developed DCIP training standards department-wide and made installation personnel aware of existing DCIP expertise. GAO examined a nonprojectable sample of 46 critical assets representing the four military services, five combatant commands, and selected installations within five defense sectors. GAO reviewed relevant DoD DCIP guidance and documents and interviewed cognizant officials regarding DCIP exercises, training, and awareness. GAO recommends that DoD do the following: (1) develop department-wide DCIP training standards and an implementation time frame, and (2) develop an effective means to communicate to installation personnel the existence and availability of DCIP expertise at the combatant command and military service levels. DoD concurred with both recommendations., Report to Congressional Requesters.

In 2004, Congress directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to establish a comprehensive policy to prevent and respond to sexual assaults involving service members. Though not required to do so, the Coast Guard has established a similar policy. This statement addresses implementation and oversight of DoD's and the Coast Guard's programs to prevent and respond to sexual assault incidents. Specifically, it addresses the extent to which DoD and the Coast Guard have done the following: (1) developed and implemented policies and procedures to prevent, respond to, and resolve reported sexual assault incidents; (2) ensured visibility over reports of sexual assault in the military; and (3) exercised oversight over reports of sexual assault involving service members. This statement draws on GAO's report on DoD's and the Coast Guard's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response programs issued on August 29, 2008 (GAO-08-924). For this work, GAO reviewed legislative requirements and DoD and Coast Guard guidance, analyzed sexual assault incident data, and obtained through surveys and interviews the perspective of more than 3,900 service members on sexual assault matters. GAO made 11 recommendations to improve implementation of DoD's and the Coast Guard's programs. These include, for example, reviewing and evaluating guidance and training, and improving oversight of the programs. DoD and the Coast Guard concurred with the recommendations., Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives.

While the pace and overall extent of reposturing in Iraq has yet to be determined, various defense commands began planning for reposturing in fall 2007, and in May 2008 DOD began coordinating these individual planning efforts to develop a logistical framework based on three key assumptions. According to DOD officials, initial planning efforts were uncoordinated because the three organizations undertaking them the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Army Materiel Command(AMC), and Headquarters, Department of the Army conducted their planning effort on their own initiative and with little input from CENTCOM and MNF-I, the commands overseeing operations in Iraq. By late 2007, however, a move began to synchronize and coordinate the efforts of DOD organizations engaged in planning for a reposturing of U.S. forces in Iraq. This culminated in a May 2008 logistics summit at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, and resulted in an order published by MNF-I that contained the process for the redeployment of units and retrograde of materiel and equipment. The order also established a working group chartered to continue the planning with an eye toward seeking solutions to challenges, including several of the challenges we discuss later in this report. DOD's planning efforts to date have been based on the following three key assumptions: any reposturing initiative will be based on MNF-I and Department of State assessments of conditions on the ground; there will be sufficient lead time to refine reposture plans once an order with a specific timetable and force posture in Iraq is issued; and the reposturing of forces will be deliberate and gradual, predicated on a 180-day process for units leaving Iraq and a sustained flow of no more than 2.5 brigades worth of equipment and materiel out of Iraq each month.

In July 2006, the former Commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) announced plans to relocate certain functions from Cheyenne Mountain to create an integrated command center at Peterson Air Force Base (AFB). In May 2007, we reported that NORAD and USNORTHCOM had not analyzed the anticipated operational effects and that the Department of Defense (DOD) could not discern the full costs or security implications of the move. As a result, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report by March 1, 2008, assessing the relocation of the NORAD Command Center and related functions from Cheyenne Mountain to Peterson AFB and mandated that we review DOD's report and the final plans for the relocation, and that we report to Congress within 120 days. Our report to Congress, which was classified by DOD, was issued on July 1, 2008, and provides additional details on the security issues surrounding the relocation of the NORAD Command Center from Cheyenne Mountain to Peterson AFB. This report is the unclassified version of our classified report. In reviewing DOD's report to Congress, our objectives were (1) to evaluate DOD's assumptions in its cost-benefit analysis of the three alternatives, and their effect on the recommendation; (2) to determine the extent to which DOD's report assessed and contained a plan to mitigate the security risks DOD identified at Peterson AFB; and (3) to determine the extent to which the final relocation plans take into account security issues raised in DOD's report.

In 2004, Congress directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to establish a comprehensive policy to prevent and respond to sexual assaults involving service members. Though not required to do so, the Coast Guard has established a similar policy. In response to congressional requests and Senate Report No. 110-77, GAO evaluated the extent to which DoD and the Coast Guard have done the following: (1) developed and implemented policies and programs to prevent, respond to, and resolve sexual assault incidents involving service members; (2) ensured visibility over reports of sexual assault involving service members; and (3) exercised oversight over reports of sexual assault involving service members. To conduct this review, GAO reviewed legislative requirements and DoD and Coast Guard guidance; analyzed sexual assault incident data; and obtained through surveys and interviews the perspective on sexual assault matters of more than 3,900 service members. GAO is suggesting that Congress consider requiring the Coast Guard to submit data to Congress on reported sexual assaults involving its members. GAO is also making a total of 11 recommendations to improve implementation of DoD's and the Coast Guard's programs, such as by reviewing and evaluating guidance and training, and to improve oversight of the programs. DoD and the Coast Guard concurred with GAO's recommendations., Report to Congressional Requesters.

The Navy has not identified voyage ship repair requirements for surface vessels operating near Guam for 2012 and beyond, although some information is available for developing estimated requirements for use in planning. Navy officials stated that they do not have enough information on which to base such an assessment. Nonetheless, while the Navy has plans for an increased ship presence in the Pacific and can generally predict the number and types of vessels likely to operate near Guam for the next 2 years, the Navy has not determined precisely how changes to its force structure for 2012 and beyond will impact ship repair requirements in Guam. Furthermore, the Marine Corps has not finalized its plans for additional vessels at Guam, or for the potential frequency and duration of visits to Guam anticipated for amphibious vessels which are currently home-ported in Japan, but that may be moved to Guam by 2014 to support Marine Corps units being moved there. In addition, MSC expects changes to its force structure operating at or near Guam. Officials stated that the timeline is uncertain for these changes, and thus the timing of future voyage repair requirements remains uncertain. While the Navy, Marine Corps, and Military Sealift Command have not made final force structure decisions or operational plans for vessels operating at or near Guam, information is available to support estimations of ship repair requirements as part of the multiyear planning and budgeting process. Moreover, DOD guidance requires that maintenance programs be clearly linked to strategic and contingency planning. Previous ship repair records and certain other information exists that could support development of at least estimated requirements.

To identify and help assure the availability of mission-critical infrastructure, in August 2005, DOD established the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), assigning overall responsibility for the program to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]). Since 2006, ASD(HD&ASA) has collaborated with the Joint Staff to compile a list of all DOD- and non-DOD-owned infrastructure essential to accomplish the National Defense Strategy. Each critical asset on the list must undergo a vulnerability assessment. As part of our ongoing work, this report evaluates the extent to which DOD is (1) identifying and prioritizing critical Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and Special Access Programs (SAP) assets in DCIP and (2) assessing critical SCI and SAP assets for vulnerabilities in a comprehensive manner consistent with that used by DCIP for collateral-level assets. We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 through February 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Military physicians and other health care professionals are needed to support operational forces during war or other military conflicts and to maintain the wellbeing of the forces during nonoperational periods. These professionals also provide health care services to military retirees and dependents. The Department of Defense (DOD) acquires its health care professionals primarily through two programs the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program and the Financial Assistance Program with which it recruits and trains military health care providers who fill medical specialty positions. These programs offer participants reimbursement for tuition, books, fees, other education expenses, and a stipend, which is a fixed amount of money given to the participants on a monthly basis, in return for an active duty service obligation. Recruiting and retaining highly qualified health care professionals, however, is becoming more challenging for each of the military services. The added stresses of repeated deployments and the general perceptions of war, along with the potential for health care providers to earn significantly more money outside of DOD, have caused some professionals to choose to separate themselves from military service, even after DOD has paid for all or part of their medical education. Because DOD medical training programs can take years and are a costly investment, DOD is negatively affected both financially and operationally when individuals do not fulfill their active duty obligations.

Over the next several years, implementation of the Department of Defense's (DoD) Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will result in the realignment of U.S. forces and the construction of new facilities costing billions of dollars at installations overseas. The Senate and House reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to monitor DoD's overseas master plans and to provide congressional defense committees with assessments each year. The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to review DoD's master planning effort for Guam as part of these annual reviews. This report, first, examines how the overseas plans have changed and the extent to which they address the challenges faced by DoD and, second, assesses the status of DoD's planning effort and the challenges associated with the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam. GAO is not recommending executive action. However, Congress should require DoD to report on residual value and U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) training limitations, as well as periodically on its planning efforts for Guam and efforts to address various challenges. DoD believes congressional action is not necessary., Report to Congressional Committees.

The Department of Defense (DOD) built the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center located near Colorado Springs, Colorado, in the early 1960s to withstand a multimegaton-yield-weapon strike and to provide protection against chemical and biological warfare. The mission of the Cheyenne Mountain Directorate is to monitor, process, and interpret air, missile, and space events that could threaten North America or have operational effects on U.S. forces or capabilities. The Air Force's modernization of the attack warning systems within Cheyenne Mountain will cost more than $700 million from fiscal years 2000 through 2006. DOD officials have stated that they no longer need to continue operating in this hardened facility considering that the threat of an intercontinental ballistic missile strike in today's environment is low. In July 2006, the former Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM6 announced plans to move certain functions from Cheyenne Mountain and create an integrated command center at Peterson Air Force Base, which he projected at that time would save between $150 million and $200 million per year. Additionally, USSTRATCOM announced plans to relocate its missile warning mission from Cheyenne Mountain to Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, and Air Force Space Command is in the process of moving the Space Control Center from Cheyenne Mountain to Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. GAO was asked to determine (1) the estimated costs, savings, and benefits associated with moving functions from Cheyenne Mountain to other locations; and (2) how DOD evaluated the security implications associated with moving the functions, and what these implications are. On March 13, 2007, we provided a briefing on our preliminary observations regarding the proposed relocation. This report summarizes the results of that briefing and provides updated information as a result of additional work we have performed since that time.

Corrosion can have a deleterious effect on military equipment and infrastructure in terms of cost, readiness, and safety. Recognizing this concern, the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003 required the Department of Defense (DOD) to designate an official or organization to oversee and coordinate efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion. Recently, the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2006 directed GAO to examine the effectiveness of DOD's corrosion prevention and mitigation programs. In addition, GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD has incorporated corrosion prevention planning in acquiring weapon systems. GAO reviewed strategy documents, reviewed corrosion prevention planning for 51 recent major weapon system acquisitions, and interviewed DOD and military service officials. GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics ensure that actions designed to effectively implement DOD's corrosion prevention strategy are taken. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with GAO's four recommendations. DOD's actions are generally responsive to the intent of GAO's recommendations., GAO Report to Congressional Committees. The original document contains color images.

The Department of Defense (DoD) transient lodging programs were established to provide quality temporary facilities for authorized personnel, and to reduce travel costs through lower rates than commercial hotels. DoD has approximately 82,000 temporary duty (TDY) and permanent-change-of-station (PCS) rooms worldwide. These accommodations were reported to cost about $860 million in appropriated and nonappropriated funds to operate in fiscal year 2005. While the Army plans to privatize its lodging in the United States, there are concerns as to whether these plans are cost-effective, and about how they relate to DoD-wide lodging efforts. GAO was asked to address the following issues: (1) how each military service and DoD manages, funds, and assesses the performance of its lodging programs to meet short- and long-term needs; and (2) the effect that lodging privatization would have on costs to the Army and on its ability to maintain and recapitalize facilities. GAO also is providing information on the status of DoD's actions on prior recommendations regarding the lodging program. GAO obtained data from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and nine military installations. GAO is making recommendations to improve DoD's oversight of the lodging program. In commenting on a draft of this report, DoD agreed with the recommendations., Report to Congressional Requesters. The original document contains color images.