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In a recent APSR article, Hajnal (2009) explores the question of who loses in American democracy, and finds that African Americans are more likely than whites to vote for a losing candidate. This finding is extremely troublesome, as it suggests that African Americans' voices are systematically being shut out of the political process. We revisit this question and show that Hajnal's analyses are too broad in their scope, and that they do not account for the sampling procedures unique to each national exit poll. When we disaggregate his results by year, weight the data according to each exit poll's probability sampling weight, cluster standard errors to take account of the first-stage precinct-wide sampling frame, and examine a longer time period, we arrive at different conclusions. We find a surprising number of elections where minority voters are more likely than whites to vote for a winning candidate. However, we also find many elections where minority voters lose, and we find that Hajnal overestimates the extent to which Latinos and Asian Americans win in some U.S. elections. The picture of "who loses" in American democracy may not be as bleak as Hajnal suggests for African Americans, but is somewhat less positive than he suggests for Latinos and Asian Americans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine constituency changes induced by redistricting and ask 3 questions. What explains the amount of instability and uncertainty induced by redistricting? Does uncertainty affect legislators' career choices (e.g., seek reelection or retire? How do these changes affect election outcomes? We show that members of Congress (MCs) affiliated with the party in opposition to the party that engineers a partisan gerrymander will see their district change more than that of other MCs. Thus, redistricting-induced instability and uncertainty are tied to the strategic actions of mapmakers. We also show that MCs targeted by one-sided partisan gerrymanders will reconsider their career in the House. Thus, career decisions are tied to redistricting-induced instability and uncertainty. Finally we show that constituency changes due to redistricting affect the likelihood that a legislator is reelected. Thus, election outcomes are tied to redistricting-induced instability and uncertainty. These findings have important implications for representation: through redistricting strategic actors can foster instability and sever representational ties that many theorists would consider paramount for the operation of a democratic republic. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can inconsistency in legislators' voting records be explained by the uncertainty they have about their constituency? Why does a two-dimensional model of roll-call voting explain the votes of some legislators better than others? In this paper, we present an uncertainty-based theory of legislative voting and inconsistency. We test this theory by examining whether U.S. senators' uncertainty about their constituency leads to higher levels of inconsistent voting in Congress. Specifically we compare southern senators who faced a large influx of black voters in the 1960s and 1970s with southern senators from more stable constituencies. We also examine other factors that can cause legislator uncertainty, such as legislators' backgrounds. Our results suggest that what some call "maverick" behavior by legislators can be better characterized as best responses by incumbents to a changing environment. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What factors lead to the occurrence of party switching in state legislatures? While the study of party switching at the congressional level is a burgeoning field, the topic has rarely been examined at other levels of government. This paper offers a systematic aggregate analysis of party switching among incumbent state legislators in the South from 1980 to 2003. The results show that the incidence of party switching rises with increases in environmental stress associated with political, institutional, and economic shocks. Findings from this paper will be of interest to students of state politics, parties, and elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper answers the following question: Under what conditions are states more likely to repeal disfranchisement provisions pertaining to the voting rights of persons convicted of a felony? We also address two broader questions: (1) Do parties seek electoral gain by changing the electoral system and voting laws? And (2) do parties override the ideological preferences of constituents in order to advance their electoral agenda? The answer to both questions is ‘yes’. We find that disfranchisement provisions are more likely to be repealed under a unified Democratic state government, but that states where electoral support for Democrats is generally weak are also more likely to repeal such provisions. We find no evidence that citizen ideology effects changes in voting rights. The implications of our analysis for students of parties and voting rights are clear: Rules are changed by those who stand to benefit, and parties matter at the state level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some of the scholarly conventional wisdom regarding voter turnout and participation, especially in the U.S. South, has been that race and ethnic background can be important predictors of turnout. However, the disproportional effect of felon and ex-felon disfranchisement laws on racial/ethnic minorities in some states suggests that the effects of race on aggregate voter turnout will be underestimated unless these laws are also considered. This electoral institution-the disfranchisement of felons and ex-felons-is an important omitted variable in models of state-level aggregate voter turnout, which might result in biased inferences pertaining to minority citizens' level of participation, especially in recent elections. Looking at statewide elections in the U.S. South from 1984-2000, we hypothesize that this electoral institution helps explain lower levels of voter turnout in states with high rates of felon disfranchisement. We also demonstrate, once felon disfranchisement is controlled for, that southern states with high minority populations will have higher levels of turnout in recent elections where minority voter mobilization has been on the rise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent APSR article, Hajnal (2009) explores the question of who loses in American democracy, and finds that African-American voters are significantly more likely than white voters to vote for a losing candidate in recent U.S. elections. This finding is extremely troublesome, as it suggests that African Americans' voices are systematically being shut out of the political process. We revisit this question and show that Hajnal's analyses are too broad in their scope, and that they do not account for the sampling procedures unique to each national exit poll. When we disaggregate his results on the basis of each election year, weight the data according to each exit poll's probability sampling weight, cluster standard errors to take account of the first-stage precinct-wide sampling frame, and examine a longer time period, we arrive at different conclusions. We find a surprising number of elections where minority voters are more likely than whites to vote for a winning candidate. However, we also find many elections where minority voters lose, and we find that Hajnal overestimates the extent to which Latinos and Asian Americans win in some U.S. elections. We conclude that the picture of "who loses" in American democracy may not be as bleak as Hajnal suggests for African Americans, but may be somewhat less positive than he suggests for Latinos and Asian Americans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some legislators present ideologically inconsistent voting records while other legislators are voting in a more consistent manner? We present an uncertainty-based theory of legislative search and ideologically inconsistent voting. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can ideological inconsistency in legislators' voting records be explained by the uncertainty they have about their constituents? Why does a two-dimensional model of roll-call voting explain the votes of some legislators better than others? We present an uncertainty-based theory of legislative search and ideologically inconsistent voting. We test this theory by examining whether U.S. senators' levels of uncertainty about their constituents leads to higher levels of inconsistent voting in Congress. Specifically we compare senators who faced large shifts in the racial makeup of their electorate due to enfranchisement with senators from more stable constituencies. We also examine other factors related to legislator uncertainty, such as legislators' backgrounds. We find that uncertainty due to black enfranchisement and uncertainty due to legislators' backgrounds both lead to higher ideological inconsistency among U.S. senators. Our results suggest that what some call "maverick" behavior by elected officials can be better characterized as best responses to a changing environment. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does district competitiveness cause members of Congress to change their rollcall voting behavior? Ansolabehere et al. (2001) find that congressional races where the candidates fought tough primaries tend are less polarized than if both candidates won uncompetitive primaries. However, Burden (2004) shows the exact opposite: competitive primaries drive Republican and Democratic candidates further apart on the ideological spectrum. Thus, the effect of primary competitiveness on ideological extremism is still misunderstood. With general election competitiveness, there is a larger consensus showing that competitiveness has a moderating effect on candidate ideology.Whereas prior research treats competitiveness in these two electoral settings as separate entities, we model "district competitiveness" as the product of primary and general election competitiveness. We hypothesize that competitive primaries absent competitive general elections will push candidates away from the middle. Similarly, competitive general elections absent competitive primaries should pull candidates towards the middle. Most interesting theoretically are those cases in which a) neither primary nor general election is competitive, or b) both primary and general election are competitive. We intend to show that the dynamics underlying district competitiveness are more complicated than previously shown and might explain the discrepancies in the literature. We further expect open and closed primaries to pull candidates in different directions.We analyze election data from 1990-2004 and examine every congressional race during that time period in a selected number of states. Our paper should be of particular interest to those who argue that uncompetitive elections are a primary cause of polarization in Congress. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the claim that MPs from linguistic minority groups are more likely to get elected from ridings where that group comprises a large share of the electorate. More generally, we ask: what factors lead to the election of MPs of French descent outside Quebec and MPs of non-French descent in Quebec? We find that the linguistic make-up of a riding is a consistent predictor of the winning MP's ethno-linguistic background. This effect is consistent both within and outside Quebec, and holds true even after controlling for other correlates of electoral success, such as incumbency. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the role of rapporteurs in the European Parliament (EP). A review of literature about rapporteurs within the EP is presented, along with an outline of theoretical explanations as they relate to rapporteurs within theories of legislatures. The article examines the ideology of the rapporteur with respect to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection during the 4th legislative term of the EP.

We test distributive, informational, and partisan theories of legislative institutions by examining the appointment of rapporteurs in the European Parliament using quantitative data from the 4th legislative term. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are legislators who present inconsistent voting records truly mavericks or are they simply responding to uncertainty they have over the preferences of their own constituencies? We investigate the impact of these uncertainty-causing and uncertainty-reducing factors on the (in)consistency of senators’ voting records for the period 1915-2004. We theorize and show that uncertainty about constituents’ preferences explains inconsistent voting behavior by legislators nationally. We also show that for southern senators, the interplay between party and the influx of black voters presents a particularly interesting case of legislator response to a changing environment. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I reexamine the issue of vote misreport using newly available cross-sectional time-series data from the 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES), in a setting where the winner of the presidential contest was not known until mid-December 2000. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some legislators present ideologically inconsistent voting records to constituents while other legislators are voting in a more consistent manner? We present an uncertainty-based theory of legislative search and ideologically inconsistent voting. We argue that legislators who face a substantial change in constituency composition—through either redistricting or substantial population change—are likely to react by voting in a less consistent and more ambiguous manner than legislators from districts with little constituency change. The ideologically inconsistent roll-call records are rational attempts by the legislator to search for the position of critical supporters on various issues whose preferences are unknown to the legislator.Specifically, we estimate models of ideological inconsistency on all U.S. House members from 1970 to 2006. We measure a legislator's voting record inconsistency by examining the frequency that a legislator's overall ideological position in a given Congress (e.g., NOMINATE scores) does not correctly predict his/her roll calls in Congress. We expect legislators from rapidly changing districts to be more inconsistent than members from more stable constituencies. Furthermore, we expect that legislators whose district boundaries were significantly altered will react to this uncertainty by casting votes that are less ideologically consistent than members whose district boundaries were left unaltered. The effect of redistricting should diminish over the 10-year cycle, as legislators update their beliefs and become more certain about the preferences of their constituents. The effect of redistricting should also be contingent on the processes that lead to the creation of the new districts (e.g., partisan, bi-partisan, court-imposed). Specifically, we predict opposition legislators "targeted" by redistricting to react by voting inconsistently in the new district (conditional on surviving their reelection attempt).This paper extends the theory elaborated by Grose and Yoshinaka (2006). The theoretical framework and empirical results should be of specific interest to students of Congress, legislative roll-call voting, congressional elections, and redistricting, and of a more general interest to students of representation and principal-agent models with uncertainty. Our paper provides a theoretical framework that can explain legislative behavior that is sometimes referred to as "erratic" or "maverick" behavior. Instead, our theory explains this behavior as a legislator's best response to a changing environment. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]