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The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effects of civilian, military and dual (both military and civilian) R&D investments on the profitability of firms. In particular, this paper analyses the role of different types of R&D investment in a sample of firms that collaborate with the Spanish Ministry of Defence. This database contains detailed information about the R&D activities taking place and accounting and financial information. Our final sample consists of 935 observations from 158 firms during the period 2011-2018. The methodology used is the Generalised Method of Moments. The results show that military R&D is more significant than civilian R&D in explaining the financial firm performance in the Spanish defence industry. Moreover, they reveal differences between military and dual R&D and suggest the increasing importance of duality technologies. Finally, taking on board market segment idiosyncrasies does not eliminate, but reinforces, the differences observed. These results help to better understand the effects of R&D expenditure in the Spanish defence sector and are relevant in the current debate about reinforcing European defence capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between industry structure, aggregate R&D activity and the quality level of the resulting innovation is investigated in a simple stochastic one-shot game in which all firms share the same probability of attaining the innovation concerning a new weapon system and therefore obtaining the contract from the government. The main findings of the game can be summarised as follows. Although only performing numerical calculations, the model predicts the existence of a concave and single-peaked relationship between aggregate R&D and industry structure, making it desirable to adjust concentration in order to reach that peak. However, the degree of concentration that maximises the final quality level of the innovation is higher than that maximises industry-wide R&D efforts, except in the special case in which technical knowledge freely spills over across firms, thanks to the creation of a research joint venture involving all firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new defence policy of the European Union (EU) is forcing the defence industry in Europe to adjust its strategies, especially since the invasion of Ukraine. Both the European Commission and the European Defence Agency (EDA) are pushing for a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), taking account of factors that include the fragmentation of supply chains, the significant efficiency gains that can be made and the prospect of greater EU strategic autonomy. In the industrial field, particularly in the area of technology, it will change the shape of the European defence industry. But what direction will this new industry take? Will national oligopolies be reinforced at the same time as other European oligopolies emerge? Drawing on an empirical analysis based on interviews with experts, this paper focuses on Spain as a case study and explores the repercussions it will have on the country's defence industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing appreciation of the critical importance of domestic industry in national security resilience has led to the recent issue of the Defence Industry Development Strategy (DIDS). This article outlines the DIDS strategy and discusses the seven priority areas for industry development and several topical policy areas, notably naval shipbuilding and autonomous systems. Throughout this discussion the development of skilled workforce is an important challenge with no clear resolution in sight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This paper aims to examine the short-term market reaction for the world's 100 largest listed defence firms at and around the three recent largest threats to the global economy – Ukraine–Russia war, Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel. Design/methodology/approach: The author examine the impact of the three recent largest threats to the global economy in the largest listed defence firms using an event study methodology. Findings: The results show a positive and statistically significant short-term reaction around the three geopolitical threats. The results also reveal the existence of higher abnormal returns for defence firms with greater weight of defence sales, in line with the captured regulator theory and for firms with higher research and development and capital expenditure intensity. Originality/value: The effect of the war on stock markets has been relatively little examined in the financial theory. This study intends to fill this gap in the literature through the analysis of the three recent largest threats to the global economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new defence policy of the European Union (EU) is forcing the defence industry in Europe to adjust its strategies, especially since the invasion of Ukraine. Both the European Commission and the European Defence Agency (EDA) are pushing for a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), taking account of factors that include the fragmentation of supply chains, the significant efficiency gains that can be made and the prospect of greater EU strategic autonomy. In the industrial field, particularly in the area of technology, it will change the shape of the European defence industry. But what direction will this new industry take? Will national oligopolies be reinforced at the same time as other European oligopolies emerge? Drawing on an empirical analysis based on interviews with experts, this paper focuses on Spain as a case study and explores the repercussions it will have on the country’s defence industry.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has generated a new impetus towards an enhanced European defence pillar, while many EU members have announced significant increases in their respective defence budgets over the coming years. Expectedly, a large percentage of the capital and technological inputs required to support the efforts towards a common European defence and the increased defence needs of many EU members will be procured from the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). The European defence companies are among the major suppliers of conventional arms in the world. Their cumulative share of world arms exports is the second largest globally. This paper uses a Benefit-of-the-Doubt (BoD) model via Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to comparatively evaluate the sales performance of major European defence industries vis-à-vis other major international arms producers. The sample used in the analysis contains 72 firms and spans the period 2016–2020. The findings indicate that on the whole US defence manufacturers have a dominant presence among the biggest global producers and outrank many major European companies. These findings offer valuable policy recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Strategic Compass aims to strengthen the resilience of defence-industrial supply chains and complements the long-term strategic ambition of enhancing the EDTIB. Impetus for restructuring the EU's supply chains may be provided by the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the associated increase in defence budgets, and the promotion of joint projects and cross-border M&A. Since the prospect of achieving strategic autonomy also depends on how 'local' current supply chains are, we offer an in-depth investigation of three dimensions related to foreign dependency (company ownership, tender success, supply chain participation). Despite mean scores of non-EU ownership in the range of 25-30% for the EU's largest defence firms, foreign ownership does not necessarily threaten the EU's security of supply. Nevertheless, the participation of non-EU firms concerning M&A with high relevance for the EU defence industry increases, as does the share of defence-related EU tenders that are won by non-EU firms. An assessment of four multinational military aircraft programmes further exemplifies that the EU's defence R&D and production capabilities may critically depend on outside suppliers. We thus find that the importance of non-EU actors for the EU's defence industry is large and may not easily be mitigated, particularly if commodity imports are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is devoted to an analysis of the development of the Russian machine tool industry before and after Russia' invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It reviews the history of the industry in the USSR, its collapse in the 1990s and stabilisation in the early 2000s. Prior to Russian's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the imposition of sanctions by Western countries the government had already adopted policies to secure a revival of the industry on a more independent basis and some success was achieved. After 2014 the government's efforts to restore the industry intensified and the scale of output of metal cutting machine tools steadily increased. However, there was still a significant dependence on imports, especially of the most advanced types of equipment. After the start of the war in 2022 sanctions were rapidly intensified and more countries participated. Quite rapidly, imports from Western countries were replaced by imports from China and other non-sanctioning countries. The development of the domestic industry received new priority and output increased. By the end of 2023 the situation had to some extent stabilised. Notwithstanding sanctions, the Russian defence industry has been able to acquire the machine tools it needs, although not always of the highest quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The implementation of military spending through the Indonesian defense industry has shown gradual positive development, driven by efforts to establish an independent defense sector. This study examines the role of Indonesia's defense budget in supporting national security and fostering economic growth, focusing on the collaboration between state-owned enterprises (BUMN) and private companies (BUMS). The defense budget is applied progressively to balance the country's limited resources and the relatively low level of external threats. Using a qualitative research method, this study analyzes data from relevant literature, reports, and policies to evaluate the impact of the defense budget on the Indonesian economy. The research explores key aspects such as the gradual development of defense equipment, the role of research and development (R&D) in driving innovation, and the partnership between public and private sectors to strengthen the local defense industry. The results indicate that Indonesia's defense budget has steadily increased over the past decade, contributing to economic growth, particularly in the manufacturing and technology sectors. However, the overall impact on the economy remains mixed due to challenges such as bureaucratic inefficiencies and dependence on imported materials. The discussion highlights the potential for defense R&D investments to generate spillover effects into civilian industries and recommends strategies to enhance the efficiency of defense spending. In conclusion, the implementation of defense economic policies has laid a strong foundation for the development of an independent defense industry in Indonesia. The study suggests that a gradual increase in defense spending, combined with strategic partnerships and innovation, can support both national security and economic stability in the long term

This paper describes the current state of the Australian defence industry, highlighting its achievements, threats, and opportunities. Also discussed are the importance of having a robust national service scheme with regard to the manufacturing industry, and implications of the AUKUS (Australia United Kingdom United States) initiative on Australia's defence industry and national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article outlines the content of one of the main military-economic aspects of maintaining Ukraine's defence capability in the current conditions of development of the military-strategic situation – mobilisation readiness and capabilities of the State, in particular, the capabilities of its defence-industrial complex to create new and modernise existing models of weapons and military equipment, and to produce missiles, ammunition and other material and technical means. Given the main contradictions in the development of the defence industry of Ukraine, the authors propose, as an option, a system of state management of the defence industry of Ukraine, which should be based on the centralisation of strategic functions for its development. In particular, it is proposed to create the State Agency for the Defence Industry of Ukraine – a structure with the status of a permanent executive body and broad powers to develop and implement the tasks of the defence industry. The paper focuses on the importance of protecting economic facilities, and the authors believe that one of the ways to improve the effectiveness of defending the country's economic potential is to create an additional echelon of non-fire protection for the most important economic facilities, such as energy infrastructure, industrial enterprises, ports, airfields, railway stations, etc. It is through the integrated use of active fire defence and passive non-fire defence means that the unconditional preservation of the country's economic potential can be achieved. At the same time, an analysis of the scientific literature in this area of research shows that existing methodologies (methodological approaches) do not provide for a comprehensive approach to substantiating ways to address the problematic issues of the state's defence capability, taking into account the main military and economic aspects of its maintenance, as well as the peculiarities of the development of the military-strategic situation. In view of this, the authors believe that the prospect of further research should be to reveal the content of other military-economic aspects of maintaining the state's defence capability in the current military-strategic situation, and, with this in mind, to develop a comprehensive methodological approach to substantiating ways to address the problematic issues of combat and mobilisation readiness of the Armed Forces and the Defence Forces of Ukraine as a whole. The analytical material presented in this article is based on the experience gained by the troops (forces) in the course of operations (combat actions).

The Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) constitute another attempt to consolidate the European defence market. In this article, we explain the different engagements of Czechia and Portugal in the two initiatives until 2021 through the evolution and reform of the domestic institutions governing their defence industrial policies. We trace how the institutions were established, how they contributed to the national position on PESCO and EDF and how the two countries' defence industries became involved. The article shows how the different institutionalisation of the defence sector allowed Portugal and its companies to participate more than their Czech counterparts. We contribute to historical institutionalist scholarship by evidencing the critical role of ideas in promoting and preventing policy change. We also offer an insight into the practice of European defence co‐operation and identify processes that challenge further integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey's defence industries have shown significant development in recent years. But the limited domestic market and the financial crisis created sustainability problems for the industry. To increase its arms sales, Turkey began to search for potential markets to expand, and Africa emerged as an excellent market to enter. Turkey had already invested in Africa through its multi-track diplomacy, a necessary condition for arms sales. While the multi-track diplomacy and increased engagement helped Turkey's arms exports, they are insufficient to explain the recent rise of Turkish arms exports, which have been showing an upward trend since 2021. This paper argues that the increase in arms exports is the function of multi-track diplomacy, no-strings-attached arms export policy and the demonstration effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Changing conditions inevitably affect military structures and systems. Throughout history, military structures have constantly undergone changes due to doctrinal, organizational, strategic, and technological developments. This research aims to identify the problems experienced by armies in the digital transformation process and to discuss possible solutions to these problems. As a research method, a hybrid method has been used by applying systematic literature review and expert interviews. The unique value of this research is that it addresses practical and current problems faced by armies in the digital transformation process and offers concrete, realistic, and applicable solutions to these problems. This study has reached the conclusions that old systems had problems adapting to new technologies, digital transformation created cyber security vulnerabilities, there was a lack of infrastructure in data management, and personnel having ten years or more in education and training fields may be resistant to change. These findings will help practitioners and decision-makers in the armed forces to make predictions in situations such as transformations in the organizational structures of armies through changes in technologies during the digital transformation process, personnel employment, new skill and capacity requirements, military training systems, and decision-making processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of SIRIUS - Zeitschrift fur Strategische Analysen is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Contemporary research on so-called Nordic branding has provided crucial insights into the social power of states and how various actors use and circulate 'progressive' nation brand tropes for political and commercial goals. Hitherto, the literature on Nordic branding has focused on a wide range of substantive issues, among other things, human rights, gender equality, social welfare and foreign aid, but considerably less attention has been paid to the topic of security. The present article adds to a small but established literature on how the security sphere is increasingly entangled with nation branding. In the Nordic region, we argue, the latter is particularly evident in the case of Sweden – one of the world's largest per-capita arms exporters in the post-Cold War era but also a country known and often revered for its peaceful and progressive image. Focusing on the case of Sweden, the article contributes to knowledge of how defence industry-related actors (both public and private) draw on and frame nation branding tropes to sell and legitimise their products and services to both insiders (domestic constituents) and outsiders (the global security market). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Moneta e Credito is the property of Associazione Economia Civile and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since the end of the Cold War, the defence industry has emerged as a leader in innovative technologies, and the Russo-Ukrainian war has provided a unique opportunity to test these technologies in a real combat scenario. As a result of the geopolitical events of February 2022, the European defence industry has faced unprecedented political, economic, and technological changes. This study examines these transformations through semi-structured, open-ended, in-depth interviews with twenty-five experts across ten European countries, analysed using qualitative content analysis, with a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). While perspectives on the necessity of defence innovations vary, there is considerable market demand for both disruptive innovations and the advancement of conventional technologies. However, despite the theoretical benefits, the current uncertain environment leads policymakers to view international defence collaborations as insecure. Consequently, SMEs develop military technological innovations either independently or with domestic partners. This study's novelty lies in its foundation on real empirical data, contributing practically applicable insights to the existing literature on the subject.

While the publication of the European Union's Strategic Compass was planned before the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the war clearly impacted its interpretation and roll-out. The strategic document requires not only that the member states increase their defence spending but that they also increase the efficiency of their spending. This special issue addresses this call for more and better defence spending in the EU from different perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on examining the quality and competitiveness of Serbian defense industry in the global market for weapons and military equipment, with the aim to perform a structural and functional analysis of the global market of weapons and military equipment, to review its characteristics and to determine the place and role of the defense industry of the Republic of Serbia on it. The Covid-19 pandemic along with active and intense armed conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, Armenia and Azerbaijan, in the Middle East, in the north of the African continent and in the Sahel contributed to the sale of weapons and military services reaching record amounts in 2020. The activities of the USA, China and India on the international political scene and in the development and improvement of defense technologies will influence them to be dominant forces on the market of weapons and military equipment by 2030. The paper also gives a review of the quality and competitiveness of the Serbian defense industry.

With its geopolitical location and underground resources, the South Caucasus region has turned into a competitive field for regional and global powers, especially since the 19th century. Three Caucasian countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia) gained independence in the region where Soviet domination had been effective for many years. In the first years of their independence, these countries, on the one hand, faced political and economic crises and, on the other hand, sought ways to integrate into the international system. These crises had negative consequences for Azerbaijan, which has been at war with Armenia, and the lack of military capacity led to the loss of the First Karabakh War. The history of military cooperation between Türkiye and Azerbaijan, which built their relations on the discourse of “one nation, two states”, dates to the Caucasian Islamic Army’s liberation of Baku in 1918. Military relations, which ended soon after Azerbaijan went under Soviet domination, were re-established after its independence in 1991. Cooperation in the field of military and defence, which continues in many areas from training and technical issues to exercises, has expanded especially in the last decade. This study claims that Azerbaijan’s military cooperation with Türkiye was decisive in winning the Second Karabakh War. In this context, Türkiye-Azerbaijan military relations, which date back 100 years, will be discussed from a historical perspective, and Azerbaijan’s military capacity will be evaluated. In addition, the study will include the cooperation opportunities that have deepened with the Second Karabakh War and the future expectations.

The level of defence industrial innovation success has been modest in Malaysia, despite continuous investment into research and development (R&D). The authors use the Defence Research and Development Stakeholder Engagement Framework (DRDSEF) to argue that strategic collaborative engagement between stakeholders is critical for successful industrial and technological innovation. This paper has two aims: to describe the role of the stakeholders in managing defence R&D funding and to evaluate the challenges faced by these stakeholders in managing government defence R&D allocation for industrial and technological innovation. This is an exploratory case study using a combination of interpretivist and pragmatist philosophical approaches. Analysed data consists of secondary resources and primary resources included surveys in the form of open-ended semi-structured interviews and participatory observation. This paper concludes that successful defence R&D stakeholder engagement requires an open and independent platform, enhanced industry-academia cross-sector fertilisation and collaborative data analytics management tools to share information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war in Ukraine, coupled with a more turbulent international system characterized by geopolitical competition between the United States and China, is leading to a simultaneous change in the demand and supply side of the European defence market. On the demand side, European countries are adapting their procurement plans to move from a crisis management phase dominated by asymmetric warfare against small states or non-state actors to an era of strategic competition and potential conflict against peer adversaries. On the supply side, European defence industries are preparing to meet the increased demand for major equipment from national governments in the short term, while at the same time trying to be ready to invest in long-term innovation, in order to anticipate future government requirements for the new era. This paper investigates the interactions between demand and supply in the European defence market and provides a first illustration of the trade-off between prioritizing short-term readiness over long-term innovation and vice versa [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union defence sector is not only crucial for the EU's security, but it is also a major industrial asset for EU member states, as it may foster innovation and greater integration among member states, as well as facilitate technology transfer. The understanding of and inferences about the sector, however, are laborious since data on the defence industry in Europe is often contradictory and confused and it is mostly compared at the national not at the European level. As a contribution to address such shortcomings and as opening piece for this Special Issue, this article focuses on the finding, collecting, cleaning, and organizing data on the geographical concentration/location of EU defence industries. This is a fully original descriptive analysis of the current situation, and it provides a reliable basis on the concentration/location of defence companies. This paper represents a firm basis from which to explore (in future research) how defence companies contribute to the technological integration of the EU and it should help the reader to better understand the following articles in this Special Issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Critical Appraisal draws a picture of the current state of the EU Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) by building on the 7 Papers included in the Defence Studies Special Issue dedicated to "European Defence". The authors assess the EU defence industry consolidation process, describing the trends that shape it and the variety of actors involved. In the complex European defence market, opposite – but not mutually exclusive – trends of consolidation and fragmentation coexist. The authors conclude that the EDTIB is likely to continue developing along these apparently contradictory lines, where the variety of public and private actors involved cooperate and compete simultaneously, according to a plethora of interests. The Appraisal suggests several areas for future research and touches upon new EU defence initiatives, such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and it's precursor programmes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his 1961 farewell address, US President Eisenhower coined the term "military-industrial complex," referring to the coalescing of military, industrial, and political interest groups. In contemporary Europe, the military-industrial complex is arguably transforming into a complex with a noteworthy commercial civilian dimension, blurring traditional military and arms-focused understandings of European defence and security. Our emphasis on an added corporate civilian component captures the expansion of defence and security beyond the traditional military domain. Coalescing of industry and politics is observed in Europe, blurring the military-civilian divide, technologically as well as in organization and governance, particularly through public-private partnerships. Eisenhower, himself a decorated WWII general, warned of how the US military-industrial complex could lead to "disastrous use of misplaced power." Rather than reiterating such a conclusion in the European context, our paper examines how the European military-civilian-industrial complex is emerging, looking at how elite participants shape the public-private structure of the complex, and specifically how policies on dual-use and emerging technologies influence developments in Europe. The focus herein is on novel actors, characteristics, and the European Union and charts out defining conceptual features of the defence and security industry in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With its geopolitical location and underground resources, the South Caucasus region has turned into a competitive field for regional and global powers, especially since the 19th century. Three Caucasian countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia) gained independence in the region where Soviet domination had been effective for many years. In the first years of their independence, these countries, on the one hand, faced political and economic crises and, on the other hand, sought ways to integrate into the international system. These crises had negative consequences for Azerbaijan, which has been at war with Armenia, and the lack of military capacity led to the loss of the First Karabakh War. The history of military cooperation between Türkiye and Azerbaijan, which built their relations on the discourse of “one nation, two states”, dates to the Caucasian Islamic Army’s liberation of Baku in 1918. Military relations, which ended soon after Azerbaijan went under Soviet domination, were re-established after its independence in 1991. Cooperation in the field of military and defence, which continues in many areas from training and technical issues to exercises, has expanded especially in the last decade. This study claims that Azerbaijan’s military cooperation with Türkiye was decisive in winning the Second Karabakh War. In this context, Türkiye-Azerbaijan military relations, which date back 100 years, will be discussed from a historical perspective, and Azerbaijan’s military capacity will be evaluated. In addition, the study will include the cooperation opportunities that have deepened with the Second Karabakh War and the future expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dopo il fallimento della Comunità Europea di Difesa (CED) nel 1954, il percorso verso una vera politica comune europea di sicurezza e di difesa è stato lungo e frammentato. Tuttavia, nell’ultimo decennio ci sono stati rinnovati sforzi, per lo più guidati da shock e crisi esterne, l’ultima delle quali è rappresentata dal conflitto russo-ucraino. L’urgenza di rispondere in modo rapido ed efficace ai conflitti, la necessità di essere preparati ad affrontare minacce nuove (e ibride) e l’obiettivo di raggiungere una “autonomia strategica” hanno riportato in primo piano il dibattito sulla difesa comune. Anche se permangono ancora grandi lacune che devono essere affrontate, molto è stato ottenuto – o sta per essere raggiunto – in termini di efficacia istituzionale e operativa della Politica di sicurezza e difesa comune (PSDC), di coordinamento del procurement militare, e di rafforzamento dell’industria della difesa. Infatti, nonostante la persistenza di differenti visioni strategiche, l’integrazione industriale è già realtà e sta diventando, oggi più che mai, una priorità.

There are different models and methods for technology acquisition, but making the right choice and optimal use of models and methods plays an important role in success technology acquisition. In this research different methods and models are both introduced and criticized. In addition, a three dimensional model resulting from the interaction of factors related to owner, receiver, and nature of technology was chosen to survey technology acquisition methods in Iran's missile industry. Based on this model, Iran used a combination of "Optimal methods" (such as Human Exchange and Hiring method, Joint research and development method, Education method and Reverse engineering)," Possible but not Optimal methods" (such as Turnkey method) and "Methods not conforming to the selected model" (such as training and internal R&D method) for acquiring different missile technologies. Based on this, Iran has used a wide range of technology acquisition methods simultaneously and in parallel to develop its missile capabilities.

PT X is one of the companies that produces the Main Armament System (Alutsista) used by the Indonesian National Army. In an effort to meet the production needs of Assault rifle weapons, PT. X must meet the quality standards set by the Ministry of Defense to support the operational tasks of the Indonesian National Army. This study aims to improve the performance of the weapon production line by measuring and evaluating the amount of sigma value in long-barreled weapons. The method used in this research is DMAIC (Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, and Control), which is a structured approach to quality improvement. This method is used to address problems that occur on the weapon production line and analyze improvements that can be made to improve production performance. The steps recommended in this study include using the Critical to Quality method to identify the causes of problems that occur in weapon production. Furthermore, the Cause and Effect method is used to rank the most significant causes of problems based on the scores obtained. The 5W+1H method is also used to formulate appropriate improvement proposals based on the ranking results from the Cause and Effect Matrix. Thus, it is expected that an effective improvement proposal can be found to improve the performance of PT. X weapon production line.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the performance of Indonesia's informal offset policy over the period 1976-2014. The paper offers four original academic perspectives: firstly, it is framed by reference to what Indonesia's former Minister of Technology, Dr Habibie, described as the Progressive Manufacturing Plan, a novel approach in which offset was intended to play a critical supportive role in the systematic development of strategic civil-military industries; secondly, the analysis is structured into three distinctive 'development-survival-revival' industrialisation stages that impacted on the performance of both offset and the broader defence economy; thirdly, the study is uniquely different in the sense that the offset case studies all occurred in an era absent of a formal offset policy regime; and lastly, the study provides a wealth of rich data in a subject field well-known for its sensitivity, if not secrecy, and thus is characterised by a paucity of empirical evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkish foreign policy has taken a military turn in recent years. Turkey is now a major arms exporter, it hosts military bases in its neighborhood and beyond, and has engaged in conflicts in Syria and Libya. Scholars have highlighted identity and international system theories to explain the military assertiveness in Turkish foreign policy. This study proposes a domestic economy explanation. It argues that national wealth, a take-off in defence industry, and an alliance of conservative bourgeoisie and political Islamists are the primary drivers of the military turn in foreign policy. Analysis of Turkish economic development and historical trajectories of economic and bureaucratic wings of the defence industry shows that complex business-politics interactions and commercial interests of defence companies propel military assertiveness. This domestic economy framework supplements insights from the identity and international system theories to significantly add to our understanding of the military turn in Turkish foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The military conflict provoked by the Russian Federation in Ukraine has created major imbalances in international security. In this fluid and unpredictable security environment, the defence industry has reacted promptly, increasing production and export of military equipment and modern weapon systems to counterbalance the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation. The data analysed indicate the Russian Federation's continuing concern to make significant defence investments, including in the defence complex, which reveals its interest in continuing the military conflict in Ukraine. As for the Euro-Atlantic states, they are trying to counter the threat posed by the Russian Federation by supplying Ukraine with high-performance military equipment, while investing in their militaries to supplement the weapons supplied to Ukraine. After the outbreak of the military conflict in Ukraine, Romania has managed to increase its exports of arms and ammunition, creating favourable conditions for profitable partnerships with large companies in the Euro-Atlantic area. At the same time, Romania has increased its defence budget allocation to 2.5% of GDP, and there are discussions to further increase this percentage in the coming period. A substantial part of this budget allocation is earmarked for the procurement of modern military equipment to NATO standards for the Romanian armed forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Countries' defence industries are the leading indicator of their global power. The warehouse is the place where the materials are kept until the customer order arrives so that the companies are viable and can respond appropriately to internal/external customer demands. In this regard, warehouse location plays a vital role in the defence industry in terms of storage options with increased flexibility, a simplified supply chain with cost management and optimal positioning according to deployment locations. In this study, the decision on the location of warehouses for logistic support during the warranty period of military vehicles manufactured and supplied to the armed forces by a defence company was made. It is aimed to propose the best solution to a real-life problem with high complexity, containing many data and constraints. In this context, the criteria that are thought to be most relevant to this problem have been determined by taking expert opinions. Having determined the order of importance of the requirements by the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) with the Super Decisions V 2.10, their weights were included as a coefficient of the objective function in the goal programming (GP) model. As a result of solving the GP model using GAMS (general algebraic modelling system), it was decided to select the warehouses that provided the optimal results among the alternative warehouse locations in 9 different locations. Furthermore, to see the impact of changes in criterion weights, sensitivity analysis has also been included. The significance of this research lies within the integrated usage of AHP and GP in the defence industry when determining warehouse locations by the experts' opinions. With this study, not only a solution strategy was developed, but also a basis for the warehouse location decision in the defence industry projects already signed or to be signed was given. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on examining the quality and competitiveness of Serbian defense industry in the global market for weapons and military equipment, with the aim to perform a structural and functional analysis of the global market of weapons and military equipment, to review its characteristics and to determine the place and role of the defense industry of the Republic of Serbia on it. The Covid-19 pandemic along with active and intense armed conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, Armenia and Azerbaijan, in the Middle East, in the north of the African continent and in the Sahel contributed to the sale of weapons and military services reaching record amounts in 2020. The activities of the USA, China and India on the international political scene and in the development and improvement of defense technologies will influence them to be dominant forces on the market of weapons and military equipment by 2030. The paper also gives a review of the quality and competitiveness of the Serbian defense industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to the conventional wisdom that security is governed exclusively by nation states exercising political authority to generate public security goods, the European Union can also be considered a security state: it governs security indirectly by making rules incentivising and steering the provision of public security goods. To what degree, however, does the EU govern defence markets, shape the trajectory of national defence capabilities, and direct efforts towards European strategic autonomy? This paper traces the EU's attempts to regulate arms production and identifies critical junctures in EU authority as a market rule-maker over the means of force. It finds that market rule-takers—non-state defence firms—are shaped by EU epistemic authority and regulation. Specifically, EU rule-making shapes firm perceptions of relative defence market uncertainty. Firms perceiving future home defense markets as less risky due to regulatory oversight are incentivised to reduce their own current profits by self-funding innovation towards future defence requirements and procurement sales to their home states. By incentivising the non-state production of public security goods with its rule-making and relational market power, the EU is a modern regulatory security state, even in the defence domain where it has little political authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The current global market for armaments and military equipment in the second half of the 20th century has went through several transformative stages of its development and has now reached a qualitatively new evolution level. The aim of the study is to analyse the key trends in changing Russia’s positions in the global arms trade, including an assessment of its export and investment potential in defence industry, and opportunities for cooperation with key regional and global partners. It has been shown, that the international competitiveness of the Russian defence industry and the development of its military-technical cooperation with foreign countries continue to be affected by the specific conditions of the industry, in particular: weak susceptibility to major changes in the arms trade; high role of state protectionism; international technology transfer; globalisation of the world economy as a whole. An important role in shaping the current image of the military-technical cooperation is played by the dynamic and constant rearmament of the army, offset services and the partnerships cooperative networks’ formation, on which the flexibility and adaptability of the external economic component of defence industry operations depend. At present, the development of Russia’s armaments and military equipment trade will be mainly driven by the restoration of its lost positions on the global market.

This article situates recent initiatives to deepen security and defence cooperation in the European Union in the historical perspective. It proposes a model of constitutive relationship between the process of change in a security community and the formation of a transnational defence industry community of practice which yields positive feedback ('productive returns') to the security community as a broader assemblage within which it was constituted. This model is applied to the paradigmatic case of European security community that formed after the World War II (WWII). The analysis shows that the key driver for defence integration traced by means of social network analysis (SNA) in this case was economic rather than political, and for an extended period of time it developed without formal institutions. The productive return of the 'defence industry machine' as a distinct community of practice that was constituted through the integration process consisted in the sense of deeper belonging and a shared sense of working well together in a traditionally highly nationalised defence milieu. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Greece was never internationally renowned for its defence industry; in fact, its state-owned industries were usually a source of headaches rather than income for Athens. The Debt Crisis (2008-18) compounded the chronic ills of the Greek defence ecosystem which appeared to decline irreversibly. And yet, in recent years they rebounded and reached new heights. How can this surprising turnaround be explained? And what does it indicate for the future of the Greek defence industry? This paper aspires to examine how the Greek defence ecosystem (state- and private-owned) evolved from a stage of stagnation and decline into a phase of stabilisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Concern over the national security implications of transnational industrial integration is growing in the United States. Direct and indirect Sino-American integration in high-technology industrial sectors is regarded as a threat to American industrial security in terms of the National Technology and Industrial Base and technological primacy. The American government has launched a number of national and international initiatives to strengthen the resilience of American defence supply chains and limit China's capacity to derive defence-industrial benefits from industrial ties. The emerging industrial security framework supports the functional requirements of American defence firms, but threatens American arms programmes through its potential impact on the affordability of arms, the flexibility of arms production arrangements, the scale and time frame of arms production, and the development of arms over the long-term, as restrictions on offshore collaboration threaten industrial processes that are central to high-technology production and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]