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In the historical process, different interpretations of morality and responsibility, which are the common subject of religions and philosophy, have caused these issues to be discussed within themselves. Does it depend directly on divine declarations, independent of good and bad things and actions, or does it arise from the nature of things and actions? The first of these is defined as theistic subjectivism and the second as rationalistic objectivism, and the Mu'tazilites are closer to the latter with some differences. Although this rational attitude of the Mu'tazila regarding moral values manifested itself in different ways in the Basra and Baghdad schools, as a result, the knowledge of good and evil was accepted to depend on reason rather than revelation. Accordingly, the declarations of revelation have always had to be subject to rationality. Determining and knowing morality must ultimately be rational, whether through revelation or reason. Another issue is, since the Mu'tazilites attribute a primary role to reason and a secondary role to revelation in the knowledge of values, does reason have the competence to impose responsibility on people independently of revelation? Moreover, as a result of this responsibility, will there be punishment and reward for those who have reason? The Mu'tazilites, who attribute a primary role to reason in moral value, naturally evaluate the issue of obligation separately in terms of revelation and reason. Separate evaluation of obligation in terms of reason and revelation does not make these two independent from each other, on the contrary, it makes them dependent on each other. While reason constructs a responsibility in line with universal moral principles such as justice and cruelty in a universal and abstract sense, revelation reveals a concrete and particular responsibility based on reason. Although there are some similarities between the different branches of Ahl al-Sunnah and the Mu'tazilites, the sects other than the Mu'tazilites do not give the intellect the role of judgement alone. In this context, rational people are responsible for acting according to moral values in cases where there is no direct divine notification, and as a result they will face punishment and reward. In line with the thoughts put forward by Mu'tazila, this study seeks answers to the current value of two basic problems. Firstly, on what basis does religious discourse build the foundation of revelation while imposing certain responsibilities on believers? How does determining this basis as reason contribute to the dynamic structure of religion? Secondly the contemporary value of the Mu'tazilites' rational approach to the issue of obligation is that they treat obligation separately in terms of religion and reason and develop a common understanding of responsibility for all humanity on the basis of reason. Therefore, the reason-based understanding of obligation does not limit the scope of obligation only to religious discourse, but extends it to all rational individuals. In this study, after discussing the issue of proposal in Islamic thought in general, the moral value debate that forms the basis of the subject will be examined from the perspective of Mu'tazila. In this context, the role and function of revelation regarding moral values and obligations will be revealed from the perspective of reason. For this purpose, firstly Mu'tazila's own sources will be consulted, and then the evaluations in opposition sources will be examined comparatively. In addition, direct and indirect current studies on the subject will also be used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cumhuriyet Ilahiyat Dergisi / Cumhuriyet Theology Journal is the property of Cumhuriyet Universitesi, Ilahiyat Fakultesi / Cumhuriyet University, Faculty of Theology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cumhuriyet Ilahiyat Dergisi / Cumhuriyet Theology Journal is the property of Cumhuriyet Universitesi, Ilahiyat Fakultesi / Cumhuriyet University, Faculty of Theology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Nisar: Journal of Religious Studies / Dini Tetkikler Dergisi is the property of NISAR and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Dergiabant is the property of Dergiabant and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The question of how the relationship between metaphysics and theology should be understood is one of the main topics of debate on the agenda of philosophers and theologians from Aristotle (d. 322 BCE) to Avicenna (d. 428/1037), from Avicenna to the late Islamic theological tradition, and even to medieval Jewish and Christian thought. Avicenna criticized Aristotle for identifying metaphysics with theology and presented a new perspective on the relationship between those two disciplines. He argues that God is not the subject but the goal of metaphysics, in other words — metaphysics is an ontological science in terms of its subject matter and a theological science in terms of its goal. In Islamic thought after Avicenna, the relationship between metaphysics and kalam continued to be one of the most heated topics of debate. Trying to explain the relationship between those two disciplines, thinkers such as Imam al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111), Shams al-Din Samarqandi (d. 702/1303), and Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjani (d. 816/1413) made a distinction between “Islamic science and rational science” and argued that metaphysics is an intellectual science while kalam is a religious (Islamic) science. On the other hand, Siraj al-Din al-Urmawi (d. 682/1283), who dealt with the relationship between metaphysics and kalam in his treatise On the Difference between Metaphysics (God-Science) and Kalam, revised Avicenna’s approach and criticized theologians who tried to explain the problem in terms of the distinction between religious and rational sciences. The aim of this article is to analyze Avicenna’s and Urmawi’s views on the relationship between metaphysics and theology, taking into account the historical-problematic context of the issue.

Among the creatures we frequently encounter in nature, capturing our attention and becoming an integral part of our lives, animals undoubtedly stand out. Among these, the honeybee takes precedence with its life and biological processes filled with profound lessons. This research examines the honeybee's existence, characteristics, and its relationship with nature and humans, particularly within the context of the existence and unity of a creator. Our aim is to investigate the various systems and abilities of the honeybee and demonstrate that these phenomena can only be realized by a supreme being with a transcendent consciousness. It is crucial to examine behaviors that necessitate a higher consciousness in honeybees and similar creatures in relation to a creator. In this context, while establishing the epistemological framework of the study, primary sources such as the Quran, certain hadīths scientific studies, and classical and modern works on the proof of God's existence (Ithbāt al-Wājib) were consulted. The mentioned texts were systematically scanned through document analysis. The obtained data was evaluated within the framework of fundamental principles. This study is significant due to its detailed examination of a specific topic within the context of the proof of God's existence (Ithbāt al-Wājib), its utilization of modern data, and its contribution to the field of theology regarding the necessity of a creator for living systems in the biosphere. Scholars of Kalām and Islamic philosophers have engaged in struggles with denialist currents of their time. Since the emergence of modern sciences, materialist-atheist thought has often claimed to draw sustenance from natural phenomena, natural sciences, and scientific advancements while positioning itself against religion. Therefore, if atheistic currents primarily base their theses on natural phenomena in the universe, it is an inevitable necessity for the theologians of the age to develop different perspectives after thoroughly examining existence and natural phenomena, to present striking evidence pointing to a creator that cannot be attributed to coincidence. This study is valuable in meeting this need through extensive literature review, utilizing classical and modern proofs of God's existence (Ithbāt al-Wājib), and modern scientific data. In the context of the proof of God's existence (Ithbāt al-Wājib), the fact that the honeybee serves as evidence for God's existence, particularly through the fine-tuning of physical events and natural phenomena that have come to the fore in modern times and through the argument of design in living beings, as well as in the context of ecological, teleological, cosmological, and order-based evidence, is endeavored to be presented by utilizing relevant Quranic verses and modern data. As a result, it has been concluded that all biological systems and extraordinary phenomena requiring a high level of consciousness in honeybees can only be explained by the existence of a supreme creator. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Islam, Christianity, and Judaism approach the ontological position of Jesus from different theological perspectives, highlighting the epistemological diversity and doctrinal differences among these Abrahamic religions. Judaism generally assigns a lesser degree to Jesus, arguing that he is not the Messiah. Christianity, on the other hand, emphasizes the divinity and sanctity of Jesus, considering him an integral part of the Trinity doctrine. Islam describes Jesus not as a manifestation of divinity but as a prophet, maintaining a balanced perspective between his humanity and his prophetic status. Nûreddin es-Sâbûnî, a Muslim scholar who lived between the 6th and 12th centuries, questions the Trinity doctrine within a rational framework. He argues that the belief in the Trinity contradicts the nature of the one and indivisible Divine essence. This article examines Nûreddin es-Sâbûnî's critiques of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and the views of contemporary Christian sects on this doctrine. The aim of the study is to explore the theological and doctrinal foundations of the positions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam regarding Jesus, Mary, and the Holy Spirit in relation to the belief in the Trinity. Using a comparative theological analysis method, the study evaluates each religion's approach to Jesus and the interfaith implications of these perspectives. Historically, while some Christian sects attributed divine qualities to Mary, mainstream Christianity views her not as divine but as the holy mother of Jesus. The Quran's depiction of Mary and Jesus reflects this by condemning their deification. Es-Sâbûnî's critiques, informed by Quranic verses, emphasize Islamic criticisms of the Christian Trinity, particularly regarding Mary. These critiques address historical groups like the Collyridians, who saw Mary as a deity, and reflect broader Islamic objections to perceived Christian polytheism. The research concludes that understanding these theological differences promotes empathy and accurate comprehension among different faiths. Es-Sâbûnî's works contribute to authentic knowledge by exemplifying Islamic theological perspectives on Christian doctrines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The spread and rooting of Ash'arism in the Maghrib region dates back to the IV-VIth centuries of Hijri. During these centuries, many scholars grew up in the region and their thoughts and works have survived to the present day. One of these scholars is Ibn Humayr al-Sabtī (d. 614/1217). By his time, Ash'arism had reached a wide scholarly accumulation in the region. Thus, he had the opportunity to closely follow the scientific and intellectual development of Ash'arism. He also witnessed the manipulative discourses of superstitious groups such as the Mubtılîn and the Mulhidin on the religious thoughts of the people of the region, and the objections raised by the opponents of Kalām on various theological issues. In this way, he realised that religious arguments would not be enough against these groups and individuals and came to the conclusion that rational arguments should also be used. Therefore, he wrote his theological work Muqaddimāt al-merāshid ilā 'ilm al-'aqā'id fī def'i shubuḥāti al-mubtılîn wa'l-mulhidîn. In this work, he tried to explain the theological issues against the claims of the mentioned groups with a defensive approach based on rational foundations. In this defensive approach, one of the issues that he focused on and discussed the most was the issues of the eschatology (sem'iyyāt). Because of the abundant use of narrative evidence in these issues, the objections of the opponents emerged through them. This situation necessitated the use of a theological method based on reasoning in addition to the use of narrative evidence. Therefore, the theoretical basis of Ibn Humayr's method based on reasoning while justifying the issues of the eschatology against his opponents was daqīq al-kalām (kalām cosmology). In this framework, he attempted to respond to the objections and claims of extremist groups and individuals on the questions of the eschatology by justifying them in terms of the elements of the universe such as substance, accident and body. In fact, in addition to using theological cosmology to understand and make sense of the universe, theologians have also used it in matters such as the eschatology. It can be seen that Ibn Humayr also deals with this area. So much so that he thought that anyone who did not have knowledge of kalām cosmology would be incomplete in the study of the sem'iyyāt, and he stipulated that the subjects of jalīl al-kalām and daqīq al-kalām must also be known. From this point of view, this study will examine Ibn Humayr's views on sem'iyyāt in theological thought and the distinctive aspects of his approach. It will attempt to identify the differences and similarities of these aspects with the Ash'arite thought to which he belonged and his contribution to Ash'arite thought in the Maghrib region. It will also examine how Ibn Humayr constructed and grounded the issues of the nature of the torment of the grave, the unity of soul and body, recreation/i'âdah, and the eternity of heaven and hell on the basis of daqīq al-kalām. It analyses how he uses the properties of substance in his justifications, such as its permanence in itself, its inability to be abstracted from accidents, its mutajānis/mutamāṣil, and its inability to be dissolved. Similarly, the method of explaining and interpreting the properties of accidents, such as non-existence without substance, non-continuity, and the way they occur in space, will be discussed. On the other hand, since Ibn Humayr is less known compared to other Ash'arite scholars, it also aims to introduce him. As a result of the study, it was seen that Ibn Humayr based the Ash'arite understanding of cosmology on the issues of the eschatology against his opponents in the Maghrib region where he lived and prepared the ground for a correct understanding of religious thought. In addition to this, he presented the issues of the eschatology in a holistic manner, without separating the issues of daqīq al-kalām and jalīl al-kalām. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the period before the VIIIth century AH, when the Hanafī madhhab's method of writing on both theology and the methodology of fiqh stabilized, in Bukhara and Samarkand, different sectarian schools of thought are witnessed. In particular, Bukhara Hanafism, which had a say in jurisprudence and the methodology of jurisprudence, developed an oppositional attitude to al-Māturīdi's views in theology as well as in the methodology of jurisprudence. Some obvious examples of this tendency, which we see in Bukhara's mashayikh in general, belong to Fakhr al-Islâm al-Pazdawī and Shams al-eimme al-Sarahsī, two important jurists who shaped the method of fiqh. In their discussions on the usul al-fiqh, they expressed opposing views to Imām al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) on some basic principles such as husun-kubuh and takwīn. Thus, in this period when the theological system of Māturīdism was not yet fully institutionalised, they sometimes shifted to a point of reconciliation with the Ash'arites. Although it is not possible to say that they adopted Ash'arism in its entirety, it is undeniable that they distanced themselves from Māturīdīism. It is known that after a short period of time, the Māturīdī jurists criticized the jurists within the sect who leaned towards the Ahl al-Hadīth/Ash'ārī line. When the available data are evaluated, it is possible to say that the two aforementioned usūlists had a theology-usūl thought that was suitable to be the subject of these criticisms. Although there is a possibility that this claim can be confirmed with more detailed research, it is thought that this view can be proved in the current evaluation. This is because the issues that the Bukharan jurists opposed to Māturīdism are the issues at the center of kalām. In terms of our subject, the question of why Bukharan jurists were sometimes indifferent and sometimes opposed to Māturīdīism is of vital importance. The above evaluation of the historical process points to one aspect of the issue. However, in our opinion, the most important part of the answer to our question lies in the scholarly mentality of the Bukharans. The Māturīdī-Samarqand tradition clearly portrayed the usul al-fiqh as a branch of theology and developed its views accordingly. Quite early on, perhaps as early as the beginning of the fourth century AH, Imām al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) adopted a method of writing uṣūl not only as an individual endeavor but also on behalf of the Samarqand mashāyīl that took into account the data of kalām as well as fiqh. This method of writing usul al-usūl centered on kalām has been attempted to be revived since the end of the Vth century AH. Although the Bukharan jurists were probably familiar with al-Māturīdī's works and views in their century, they did not refer to him by name in their usul works and followed a very different profession in terms of the method of writing usul. These scholars, who tried to explain their usul al-usūl opinions in relation to furu fiqh rather than their theological background, found it more appropriate to mention theological issues only in case of necessity and to the extent of need. This becomes more understandable when we take into account the reports about the distant attitude of the Bukhara mashayyah towards theology during this period. Thus, the Bukharans, who apparently did not fully embrace the Māturīdī system of kalām, were able to display oppositional and sometimes reactive approaches to Māturīdīism on some matters of usul. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Istiṣḥāb al-ḥāl , the presumption of the persistence of a state or ruling, is a disputed source within Islamic jurisprudence. For some scholars, it is one of the main sources of Islamic law. Many juristic principles are based on istiṣḥāb. The Hanbali scholar al-Ṭūfī (d. 716/1316) follows this idea in Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-Rawḍa and holds that istiṣḥāb is the fourth source of law after the Quran, Sunna, and Consensus. Al-Ṭūfī argues for the validity of istiṣḥāb with regard to a physical theory in kalām known as atomism. He discusses the possibility of continuation in existence. In his view istiṣḥāb is based on the principle that persistence/continuation (baqāʾ) is an accident (ʿaraḍ) that is not re-created in each moment in contrast to kalām atomism, which postulates that accidents are re-created constantly. This article presents al-Ṭūfī's original approach to the validity of istiṣḥāb that guarantees the continuous existence of a state and ruling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Maqāṣıd, which expresses the basic aims and objectives of religious judgements, is one of the important concepts that reveal serious areas of debate within the specific contexts of Islamic sciences. In theology, the concept of maqāṣıd refers to the idea that divine actions can only be realised with a purpose and aim, towards what is beneficial and wise. Muʿtazila and Māturīdī schools are the theological schools that include the idea of maqāṣid. Their views on this issue have an important relationship with the meanings they attribute to divine attributes and the way they conceive of these attributes. As a matter of fact, the issue of divine attributes, which was one of the first topics of debate in the historical process, gradually gained depth and led to the development of different conceptions of God. In this respect, this study aims to justify their thoughts on maqāṣid in terms of their understanding of divine attributes by taking into account the main works of Muʿtazilī and Māturīdī theologians. In particular, the meanings they attributed to the attributes of knowledge, wisdom, and justice influenced them to include the idea of maqāṣid in the creation of God, His making an offer, and related matters. For example, according to the Muʿtazilites, God is a scholar by His essence. This quality cannot be separated from Him. This truth means that God has eternal knowledge of everything. In this context, the knowledge that justice is good and oppression is bad is an eternal knowledge and coincides with the content of religious judgements. Other truths and qualities that are thought to be fixed in eternal knowledge are also influential on the nature of the divine purpose. The Māturīdīs developed a doctrine of theology centred on wisdom. According to them, wisdom is an essential attribute of God. The absence of wisdom means ignorance. Allah is exempt from this. This strong emphasis of both schools on divine knowledge and their explanation of other divine attributes based on it had a significant impact on their development of the idea of maqāṣid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anyone specialising in Islamic theology at a Western university is aware of the fact that their teaching and research will either be recognised by the institution as falling under the category of "Islamic Studies" or "Divinity". In the first case, Islam is predominantly considered a cultural phenomenon and studied as such. In the second case, for reasons that have to do with what Marianne Moyaert in her latest book Christian Imaginations of the Religious Other has conceptualised as "Christian normativity" and the "religionisation" of other faiths, Islamic theology is de facto understood as Islamic speculative theology (kalām). In both cases, the understanding of how Islam theorises and practices theology is significantly restricted, when not altogether ignored. This article unpacks the genealogy of the secular version of a Christian epistemic framework that dominates the study of Islamic theology in the West and engages with the issues related to its application in the field of Islamic theology. In doing so, it opens a critical space for the investigation of Islamic literary productions as both dissensual and consensual theological terrains, through the analysis of the poetry of two theologians and polymathic scholars from two different periods of Islamic history, namely Ibn al-Fāriḍ (d. 632/1235) and Sidi Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥabīb (d. 1390/1971). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work focuses on a crucial subject in mediaeval religious discourse within the realm of education. The objective of this study is to gain a comprehensive comprehension of educational theology during the mediaeval Islamic era and intellectual culture. This will be achieved by examining the innovative, influential, and inherently intricate philosophical, kalām, and sufism ideologies, which have not been fully recognised until now. This study employs a discourse analysis methodology, which is commonly utilised to examine both oral and written conversation. This work provides a comprehensive analysis of the contributions made by mediaeval scholars to the field of educational theological discourse, focusing on the areas of philosophy, kalām, and sufism. The study's findings demonstrate that mediaeval scholars effectively reconciled philosophical, theological (kalām), and mystical (sufism) perspectives in the field of educational theology. This was particularly evident in their treatment of the human nature, which they portrayed as both possessing free will and being subject to fate. This accommodating stance becomes remarkable, particularly because the content and approach of philosophy, kalām, and Sufism are frequently perceived as highly distinct or even conflicting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article discusses, the evidential nature of the knowledge that qualifies one as a human being and the existential and epistemic processes of being responsible will be discussed from a Muʿtazilite perspective. What are the intrinsic and cognitive qualities that make human beings knowers? How should the intellect be understood as evidence and its functional contribution to the process of gaining knowledge from evidence? To what extent is the activity of the subject's realized in the process of intellect, evidence, and knowledge? How can the minimum cognitive conditions that make human beings responsible be explained in relation to the nature of the obligation (taklif) Assuming that every human being, by virtue of his/her nature and rational faculties, is capable of reaching the level of knowledge that is the source of responsibility, what justifies moral retribution (punishment) in the case of failure despite the existence of this capacity? Seeking answers to questions like these is the main interest of this article. In Muʿtazilite theology, not recognizing God and His superior qualities, and not completing the process of obligation for a virtuous life means that the individual will face a consequence proportional to his level of belief and morality. Moreover, man can use his/her intellect to investigate the causes and reasons of things, to understand what the evidence points to, and to complete the epistemic process that leads to the unknown. By nature, man knows himself/herself, is aware of the external world, wills, perceives, has a priori knowledge, is willing to think, is aware of the evidence, can understand what is said, knows the causes of his actions, and the nature of moral values. Therefore, this article will examine the initial principles that make human beings responsible and the cognitive limits that arise from human nature. The stages of human responsibility from physical development to intellectual maturity will be discussed from a Muʿtazilite perspective with a descriptive method. After mentioning the basic nature of the a priori knowledge that makes man responsible as an intelligent being, the existential and cognitive processes that require responsibility will be analyzed. Since the article is not a interfactional comparison, the main issue will be analyzed on the axis of Mu'tazila. For this reason, the main issue will be examined around a theme in which the intellect and moral nature are at the center, without giving space to a detailed lexical and terminological conceptual analysis. The article focuses on the physical factors that make human beings responsible, the lowest level of knowledge, the qualities of knowledge that require being responsible, and the intellectual and moral process of obligation. The relationship of knowledge about God to existential and cognitive processes is determined with categorical distinctions in order to ensure the originality sought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Various claims are attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa regarding the createdness of the QurḤān (khalk al-QurḤān). Some sources claim that he was the first person to put forward this idea, and that he was about to have this idea when he died. Some other sources, on the other hand, state that he never defended this idea and even suggested that it should not be discussed on this issue. While some works attributed to him do not contain any of his views on this subject, some other works attributed to him contain ideas that he distinguished between the meaning and pronunciation and recitation. Another striking point is that there is no reference to Abū Ḥanīfa on this subject in the Hanafī-Māturīdī works written in later periods expressing their views on this theological issue. Thus, while one group among various sectarian formations accused Abū Ḥanīfa of this view and marginalized him, other Hanafī and Sunnī groups, who evaluated him in line with Ahl al-Sunnah wa'l-Jamāah, tried to purify him from this view. In this study, we aim to analyze the views attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa on the issue of the createdness of the QurḤān from an impartial perspective. Our research, based on the methods of the discipline of the History of Islamic Sects, is based on an approach that evaluates ideas in terms of their relationship to historical context and events, with a perspective that takes into account the development of the idea of khalq al-QurḤān in the historical process from the time it was put proposed; it was also carried out by taking into account the socio-cultural and sectarian affiliations of the individuals. The fact that the idea of khalq al-QurḤān was adopted by some Hanafī people during the MiḤna period must have been effective in attributing this idea to him. In this respect, it can be said that the attribution of conflicting narratives to Abū Ḥanīfa regarding this idea largely reflects a retrospective construction activity. Neither the Hanbalī circles, who accuse those who make a distinction between meaning and pronunciation of the QurḤān by "Lafziyyah" and condemn them as "Jahmī"; nor other figures from the AḤḤāb al-Ḥadīth who adopted this distinction, such as Bukhārī and Ibn Qutayba, said anything about this distinction by Abū Ḥanīfa. This fact leads us to doubt of the claim that this distinction was made by Abū Ḥanīfa. In general, the main point that makes the contradictory claims presented in our article meaningful is that it depicts the struggle between the groups that exclude Abū Ḥanīfa within the Ahl al-Sunnah and those who defend him. On the other hand, mostly Iraqi Hanafīs, who were interested in kalām and were close to the MuḤtazilah, were influential in attributing this idea to Abū Ḥanīfa; on the other hand, the Hanafīs of Māwerāunehr, who displayed an attitude closer to the Ahl al-Hadīth, stood out with their opposition to attributing this idea to him due to their anti-MuḤtazilah attitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The human being that Allah has made an offer to is different from other beings in the universe in terms of his characteristics. His own will and power and his freedom in his actions are his most basic characteristics. In the kalam, his function in the actions performed by humans has been discussed. In this context, Mu'tazilah and Ash'ariyyah who have different methods, naturally put forward different views from each other. Samarqandi found it appropriate to characterize the attitudes of the two schools regarding human actions as fate and compulsion. Although he accepted that Allah is the creator of human actions as well as everything in the universe with His power and will, he considered Maturidiyyah as the middle way closest to the truth because he accepted that humans do their actions with their will and power. While Samarqandi addressed issues such as human actions and good deeds within the framework of the principles of the Maturidi's, he criticized the Mu'tazilah's ideas and did not take sides in benefiting from their views. Although he was from the Ahl al-Sunnah, he was able to criticize the views of the Ash'aris. Undoubtedly, in Samarqandi's display of such an approach, in addition to his mastery of the subjects of theology, his accumulation of knowledge consisting of logic, mathematics and philosophy contributed and influenced him. Thanks to the ideas he tried to put forward, it is possible to see that the will and power of Allah and man are balanced in the explanation of the occurrence of human actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aim: of the paper is to present and criticize the statements of the new science of theology (New Kalam) in the field of prophecies and the effect of its supplanting the old science of theology in solving objections and problems, and to explain the motives and consequences resulting from such innovative opinions. This paper deals with the position of the new science of Kalam (Islamic theology) regarding prophecies. Its pioneers criticized selection, the miracle, supernaturalty, and other concepts adopted by ancient theologians. They also developed a new approach to proving prophecy that is compatible with their modern vision and environments and time. Their critisizm started by denying the rational evidences upon which old Kalam built its conclusions, and by highlighting some of old Kalam problems as they claim, New Kalam pioneers agreed on the liberal view of the statements of ancient theology and urged its renewal through religious expansion with the help of modern sciences. They made this renewal process completely open, so there is no specific approach through which this upgrade must follow, evaluated, or controlled. Even a single issue has led so often to multiple and varying results, some of which may be due to false premises or a relative view, and they did not stipulate at all that the science of Kalam provides certain or definitive knowledge at all in the first place. Methods: of induction, deduction, comparison, and criticism. Conclusion. The definitions from which those who advocate the new science of theology started and the introductions from which they started are false introductions, or for which there is no evidence. The positions of the advocates of renewing the science of theology have varied regarding the issue of prophecy, whether in the concept of revelation, the concept of prophecy, or acceptance of the miracle, and some of them went on to renew it to understand these issues. Some of them focused on other cultural topics, such as women’s rights. Recommendation: the necessity of making comparisons between those who advocate ancient and new theology in more specialized topics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Mevzu is the property of Ali Sever and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Mevzu is the property of Ali Sever and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Belief in God is the first of several principles enshrined in the Rukun Negara of Malaysia which makes it one of the important principles to be upheld by any Malaysian citizen. However, there are some who do not accept this concept of believing in God and they are referred to as atheists. The existence of this group can seen clearly when issues that concern this group became public knowledge like the meeting of atheists in Kuala Lumpur that took place in 2017 and the existence of a Facebook group called Warung Atheist (Atheist Stall). Therefore, this article is prepared to discuss a discourse on the atheism within the Malaysian society including: [1] to analyze past studies related to the definitions and history of atheism; [2] to analyze past studies related to atheist thoughts and arguments and [3] to analyze past studies related to the response and objection to atheism. This article is written using qualitative method with content analysis design. In general, the research findings show that, in Malaysia, there are so few studies conducted on this topic. The study on the definitions and history of atheism among Malaysian researchers is still lacking because many researchers make the studies as a side topic only. This also happens to studies on themes related to atheism, but it should be noted that there are several studies have begun to make focusing on atheism. However, most researchers in Malaysia conduct studies which concern the objection against and criticism towards atheism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we argue that under certain assumptions, Islamic theism moves in the direction of a multiverse. We present several arguments in two major categories. The first is based on the divine attribute of everlastingness: if God's everlasting attributes are expressed in the creation and the universe has a finite past, then God created a multiverse. The second category involves perfect being theology: if some of God's attributes express themselves in the creation, and God has every compossible perfection, then we should expect God to create a multiverse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Turkey Journal of Theological Studies is the property of Turkey Journal of Theological Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Religious Studies / Dini Araştırmalar is the property of Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi Yayinlari and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Muhammad b. Ashraf al-Samarqandī (d. 722/1322) is an important Islamic scholar who lived in the late thirteenth and first quarter of the fourteenth centuries. He is known for his works in mathematics, astronomy, logic and theology. Samarqandī placed special emphasis on the topic of the soul which is one of the important common issues of theology, philosophy and mysticism. In his work titled Ilm alĀfāq wa'l-Anfus, he comprehensively addressed the human’s physical and spiritual structure. Samarqandī also focused on this topic in his theological works and he demonstrated this aspect by writing a commentary on Ibn Sīnā’s (d. 428/1037) soul ode, al-Qaṣīdah al-ʻAynīyah. This commentary is also valuable as it forms part of the series of commentaries on Ibn Sīnā’s soul ode. His most special work on this subject is the poem al-Qaṣīdah al-Rūḥānīyah which he wrote as a response to Ibn Sīnā’s aforementioned ode, along with the commentary he wrote on this text. This work was previously published by Alī Muḥ addis based on a single manuscript. In this edition of the work, it is stated that only the poetic text belongs to Samarqandī. It is noted in the mentioned publication that the author of the commentary written on the work is unknown. However in this study, it is proven with evidence that both the poetic text and the commentary belong to Samarkandi. Additionally, some errors in the previous publication have been corrected with this edition, which was made using reliable manuscripts. In this concise work, Samarqandī presents a synopsis of his views on the theory of the soul. In this context, the treatise addresses the following topics: the nature of the soul, its relationship with the body, its faculties, the competencies it grants to the body, its own processes of perfection, its role as a mirror to the manifestations of God Almighty, and its capacity to be a source of extraordinary events such as miracles and acts of divine grace. In both al-Qaṣīdah al-ʻAynīyah and al-Qaṣīdah al-Rūḥānīyah the soul is symbolised by a bird that descends from the higher realms to the body. Expressions such as “coming” and “descending” which are characteristic of physical entities, appear to be contradictory to Ibn Sīnā’s theory which posits the soul as an abstract entity. Aware of this, Samarqandī in his commentary on Ibn Sīnā’s work, highlighted the necessity of interpreting these expressions in a manner consistent with Ibn Sīnā’s theory. From the perspective of Samarqandī who regards the soul as a subtle substance residing in the body, such expressions pose no problem. Conversely, Ibn Sīnā highlights the challenge of providing a satisfactory explanation for the souls that lose contact with the body before completing their perfection. However, he does not provide a solution to this significant issue. In contrast, Samarqandī structured his treatise around this issue. He focuses largely on how the soul could attain perfection while being closely connected with the body. Samarqandī offers an explanation of the process of the soul’s perfection, which is based on three pillars: asceticism, worship, and moral development. This represents the point at which Samarqandī integrated Sufi discourse into his theory, under the influence of Ibn Sīnā. The primary figure shaping Samarqandī’s theory of the soul is also Ibn Sīnā. Fakhr alDīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 606/1210) criticism of Ibn Sīnā and Naṣ īr al-Dīn al-Tūsī’s (d. 672/1274) defense of Ibn Sīnā led Samarqandī to adopt a position between these two figures. By considering the views of these three scholars, Samarqandī sought a balanced approach between philosophy and theology. He incorporated certain elements into his theory to benefit from the explanatory power of Ibn Sīnā’s abstract theory of the soul. Fundamentally however he maintained the sensitivities of the general theological line, which holds that no abstract entity can exist apart from God. This study consists of three sections. In the first section, an overview of Samarqandī’s theory of the soul is presented and the relevance of the content of Sharh al-Qaṣīdah al-Rūḥānīyah within this context is examined. Subsequently the similarities and connections between this text and al-Qaṣīdah alʻAynīyah are examined. The next stage of the study addresses the naming of the text and commentary their attribution to Samarqandī, the manuscripts and the methodology employed in the critical analysis of the work. The second part of the study is devoted to the critical edition of Sharh al-Qaṣīdah al-Rūḥānīyah. The third part includes the Turkish translation of the work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Islamic theology, the matters of "sem'iyat" hold significant importance and are considered crucial subjects in the science of kalam, particularly when examined from the perspectives of Mu'tazilah and Ahl al-Sunnah. Sem'iyat are defined in the science of kalam as issues that cannot be comprehended through reason alone and are known through revelation. These topics typically include concepts such as life after death, the hereafter, heaven, hell, and the Sirat (the bridge over Hellfire). They hold special importance within Islamic sciences because they constitute the fundamental elements of faith and shape the Muslim understanding of the world and the hereafter. While the Mu'tazilah is known for its approach based on reason and logic, this sect tends to interpret the matters of sem'iyat in the light of reason. This approach is particularly notable for its efforts to strengthen the rational foundations of Islam by questioning issues related to sem'iyat. On the other hand, scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah approach sem'iyat with interpretations supported by both transmission (revelation) and reason. Thus, they preserve the faith-based aspect of these matters while adopting an interpretation that does not contradict reason. The aim of this study is to comparatively analyze the approaches to sem'iyat issues between the Mu'tazilah and Ahl al-Sunnah through the work of al-Zamakhshari, "al-Kashshaf." The research aims to reveal how al-Zamakhshari's Mu'tazilite thought structure differs and to identify the similarities or differences with Ahl al-Sunnah regarding sem'iyat issues. The research shows that al-Zamakhshari's approach to sem'iyat topics significantly diverges from the traditional Mu'tazilite understanding. The study documents that he occupies an independent position within Islamic theology, leaning towards Ahl al-Sunnah thought, while still providing interpretations unique to his own sect. These findings allow us to better understand al-Zamakhshari's place in the history of Islamic thought and offer a distinct structure that fills an important gap in the literature of Islamic theology, differentiating it from previous studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study, investigation and analysis of the scholarly heritage produced in the history of Islamic thought has many difficulties in itself. Because in the past, writing and printing techniques were not as developed as they are today, and not all works were recorded by official authorities, which has caused doubts about the authenticity of some works today. Such doubts often prevent a correct understanding of the scholarly heritage and cause major distortions that can damage scholarly traditions. One of the scholars who has been subjected to such misunderstandings and the criticisms arising from them is al-Ghazālī, one of the cornerstones of the history of Islamic thought. Due to his influential position in Islamic thought, many ideas and works have been attributed to al-Ghazālī, sometimes by his opponents and sometimes by his followers, in an attempt to find a ground of legitimacy. The fact that al-Ghazālī has written in many different scientific fields and he has gone some intellectual changes facilitated the attribution of some ideas and works to him, although they did not belong to him. One of the works that is subject to the issues we mentioned is Ma‘ārij al-quds fī madārij ma‘rifat al-nafs, which is frequently used to determine al-Ghazālī's views in contemporary studies in the fields of kalām, Sufism, and philosophy. The fact that this work is frequently used by researchers in their studies shows that there is a general acceptance about its attribution to al-Ghazālī. However, with the exception of some parts of the work, its content and basic thought differ from the most fundamental views that al-Ghazālī defended in his other books, and even contain obvious contradictions to them. In addition, the negative interaction created by this work has caused al-Ghazālī to be subjected to many unfair criticisms and has caused dilemmas in the identification of his views. As far as I have been able to determine as a result of the literature review, there has not been a comprehensive study in Turkey, the Arab world and the Western world about the attribution of the work to al-Ghazālī. This has necessitated an independent study of the work in order to analyze the scholarly heritage properly. Since the historical data of the past periods was used to determine the work's belonging, due to the difficulties involved, I have focused on the the analysis of classical works, tabakat works and manuscripts and also the analysis of the opinions and references mentioned in the work. As a result of the examinations and analyses, many authors of classical Tabaqat works have been identified who have given al-Ghazālī's biography in their works. None of these works attributed Ma‘ārij al-quds to al-Ghazālī. As a matter of fact, there is no reference to alGhazālī's Ma‘ārij al-quds from his own works, nor is there any reference to any of his works from this work. Moreover, although there are many scholars in the postGhazālī period who criticized al-Ghazālī for his works, there is no reference to Ma‘ārij al-quds in these criticisms. In Ma‘ārij al-quds, there is a different style that we have not encountered in any of al-Ghazālī's works. In this work, there are pages of verbatim quotations without any scholarly critique. As is well known, al-Ghazālī took a stand against information that was not filtered and obtained only through imitation, and severely criticized those who had such a style. In Ma‘ārij al-quds, pages of verbatim quotations from the works of Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), Imam al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), and Rāghib al-Isfahānī (d. 502/1108) were identified. In order to better demonstrate that these quotations are verbatim, the quotations are given in comparison with the works from which the quotations are taken. In addition to all these, this work has been compared with the methodology and basic thought of al-Ghazālī’s works that are certain to belong to him, considering its content. As a result, based on the incompatibility of the content of the work with al-Ghazālī's basic thought and methodology and the presence of pages of quotations in the work, as well as other evidence obtained, it is concluded that this work does not belong to him. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Islamic theology, it is accepted as an ethical principle that holds the person responsible for the consequences of their behavior. However, there are different opinions among the schools of theology regarding whether it is an attribute of the act and the factor that makes the act preferable. While Mu’tazilite scholars argued that human beings have created, active, and free will, Ash’arites centered on the absolute will of God and said that humans will be passive. Although the Māturīdīs, like the Ashʿarīs, accept that God’s will is involved in everything, they also state that humans will be active in the act. Scholars who argued that the will is an accident adopted the view that it is a faculty independent of the biological structure of the human being. However, modern science has revealed that the will is not independent of the biological structure of the human being, contrary to what theologians claim. Neurobiologists have stated that human behavior is largely caused by brain activity and that biological factors directly affect behavior. Hormones and genetic factors have been found to significantly affect human behavior. Empirical research has also revealed that human beings do not have a will independent of their physiological structure. In this context, examples of the neurobiological basis of human behavior are presented in our study, and a theological analysis is made of the deep debates on the nature of human behavior. Based on personality changes after frontal lobe damage, the relationship between neurobiology and willpower was established, and this relationship was elaborated with different examples. Brain tumors, nervous system disorders, and medications can lead to behavioral changes, and the biological basis of pedophilia, excessive sexual behavior, and aggressive attitudes has been discussed. Thus, it has been determined that the human will is a structure related to the brain and biological processes. Based on the information obtained, the theological perspective and neurobiology were compared, and it was determined that there was a difference between the theological view that human beings are always responsible for having a will and neurobiology. Despite the view that people’s actions are generally conscious choices and that they are responsible for their consequences, biological factors that determine human behavior should not be ignored. It has been suggested that neuroscience can better explain human behavior, and that responsibility for action should be reconsidered theologically along with biological reasons. Finally, the distinction between theology and law was emphasized, and it was stated that each individual should be subject to a unique theological evaluation and that the social order should be implemented in a balanced manner of theology and law. It is concluded that discussions on the relationship between theology and neurobiology will help us understand the complexity of human behavior in more depth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is believed that the origin of translation activities in Islamic thought dates back to the Umayyad period. These activities were first carried out during the reign of Khalid b. Yazīd (d. 85/704 [?]). In particular, the Greek texts of antiquity (antiquity) began to be translated. Initially, translations were made in the fields of medicine and chemistry. Later on, during the Abbasid period, the translation process, which was continued by the Caliph Abū Ja'far al-Mansūr (d. 158/775), eventually expanded the field of research with the establishment of the Bayt al-Hikma. Thus, translation activities continued systematically in the fields of philosophy, ethics, politics, physics, metaphysics, botany and zoology. As a result, the Greek heritage of antiquity was inherited by Islamic civilisation, and many translated texts were received by Islamic thinkers, which paved the way for discussions on them. This situation facilitated a better analysis and understanding of Greek texts and provided an opportunity to compare them with the views of Islamic thought. One of the areas translated was zoology. In this context, one of the thinkers who was influenced by zoological texts and included Greek zoology in his works was Amr b. Bahr al-Jāhiz (d. 255/869), a Muʿtazilite scholar and naturalist from Basra. In fact, al-Jāhiz included many animals and their characteristics in his seven-volume Kitāb al-Hayawān, which can be regarded as the zoologicalzoographic literature. He also mentioned animals from time to time in his other works. All his knowledge about living creatures is based on the Qur'an, hadiths, idioms, proverbs, poems of the Jahiliyya period, and experiences of Bedouins, animal trainers, dogs, pigeon and rooster owners, sailors and hunters. On the other hand, he makes many references to Greek zoology, especially to Aristotle (384-322 BC), whom he calls “Ṣāḥib al-Mantiq”. In Aristotle's Kitāb al-Hayawān, he mentions Aristotle's views on the vital processes of many species, such as pigs, birds, fish, elephants, snakes, insects, their status in their habitats, feeding methods and reproduction. Although al-Jāhiz accepted Aristotle as an authority in the field of zoology, he investigated the information he received from him. He consulted Bedouins, sailors and hunters who had experience with animals and tried to confirm the accuracy of Aristotle's ideas. He even tested Aristotle's ideas by conducting experiments and observations himself. This situation shows that sometimes al-Jāhiz did not take the information he received directly, but researched its accuracy and included it in his own work. In addition, al-Jāhiz also included the ideas of Greek thinkers such as Galen (d. 200 [?]) and Polemon (Aflimun) (d. 314 BC) about animals in his work. From this point of view, he was influenced by Galen's experiments on the digestive system of animals; he provided information on the digestive system of animals and how they digest food. In this regard, he mentioned the experiments of his teacher, Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm al-Nazzām (d. 231/845) on animals. Examples include observations such as feeding stones to ostriches, the resistance of animals such as dogs, wolves, lions and horses to digesting food and bones or measuring the endurance of some animals by giving them a drink. He also mentioned Polemon's views on pigeons and how their living conditions should be. He emphasised what a good and beautiful pigeon should look like and where it can best live out its life, such as in the field. It can be concluded from this that al-Jāhiz consulted Polemon’s ideas because of his interest in pigeons and their ubiquitous use in his time. The knowledge he acquired from his own culture, from many different sources, and the information he received from Greek thinkers enabled him to accumulate a deep and wide zoological knowledge. Thus, his accumulation of knowledge influenced many people after him. In fact, the knowledge he transmitted, especially from Greek zoology, was included in the works of Kamāluddin al-Damīrī (d. 808/1405) Hayāt al-hayawān and Zakariyyyā al-Qazwīnī (d. 682/1283) ʿAjāʾib al-makhlūqāt wa gharāʾib al-mawjūdāt. Like al-Jāhiz, they called Aristotle “Ṣāḥib al-Mantiq” and referred to his views. This situation shows that al-Jāhiz served as a bridge to transfer Greek zoology to later periods. This study attempts to determine how al-Jāhiz received the Greek zoological heritage and how he incorporated it into his own work. It will also discuss the extent to which he was influenced by Aristotle and whether or not he accepted his views as they were. As a result of the study, it will be understood that al-Jāhiz transmitted the information he received, sometimes directly, sometimes by testing its accuracy, and even by resorting to experimentation and observation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study confidently evaluates views on taqlid al-faith in classical theological literature, asserting that they can be assessed in light of neurobiology and modern learning theories. It is evident that a considerable number of believers base their understanding of faith in taqlid (mimicry). However, whether most people meet the criteria for achieving Tahqiq faith (research-based) remains uncertain. The criteria for achieving internalized faith are well-established and can be met with proper guidance and effort. This assertion is based on the perspectives of Muslim theologians on faith, which highlights the differences between taqlid and internalized faith. Taqlid faith is not based on reason. However, critical faith is based on reasoning and logical deductions, leading to the conclusion that Allah is the absolute creator of everything. It is important to note that while arguments based on reasoning and deduction alone may be insufficient to establish the existence of the divine in matters of faith, theological scholars assert that they are still a valuable tool in understanding and interpreting religious beliefs. Theological schools should reconsider their justification of the method of reasoning employed regarding the subject of internalized faith. Faith is not solely a cognitive process but also encompasses behavioral and emotional dimensions. This framework asserts that theological approaches that reduce faith in a cognitive process must be evaluated in the light of modern science's mirror neurons and learning theories. Mirror neurons, discovered by a group of scientists from the University of Parma, Italy, led by Giacomo Rizzolatti, are a crucial biological mechanism that significantly influences the way people relate to each other, empathy, and learning processes. The text clearly and confidently explains how mirror neurons in the brain respond to various experiential factors and how they affect cognitive function. It asserts that the theory of mirror neurons is grounded in human physiology and emphasizes that imitation involves both actional similarities and cognitive processes. The cognitive process in the theory of mirror neurons, whereby individuals believe in observing others, implies the use of reasoning. Additionally, the connection between imitation and social learning theories was examined, highlighting its crucial role in the development of genuine beliefs. Learning theories emphasize the interaction between individuals and their environment, highlighting the significance of social interactions such as modeling and imitation. Theological schools should reconsider their justification of the method of reasoning employed regarding the subject of the Tahqiqi (research-based) faith. Faith is not solely a cognitive process but also encompasses behavioral and emotional dimensions. This framework asserts that theological approaches that reduce faith in a cognitive process must be evaluated in the light of modern science's mirror neurons and learning theories. Mirror neurons, discovered by a group of scientists from the University of Parma, Italy, led by Giacomo Rizzolatti, are a crucial biological mechanism that significantly influences the way people relate to each other, empathy, and learning processes. The text clearly and confidently explains how mirror neurons in the brain respond to various experiential factors and how they affect cognitive function. It asserts that the theory of mirror neurons is grounded in human physiology and emphasizes that imitation involves both actional similarities and cognitive processes. The cognitive process in the theory of mirror neurons, whereby individuals believe in observing others, implies the use of reasoning. Additionally, the connection between imitation and social learning theories was examined, highlighting its crucial role in the development of genuine beliefs. Learning theories emphasize the interaction between individuals and their environment, highlighting the significance of social interactions such as modeling and imitation. Bandura, one of the main proponents of this theory, argues that people learn by observing the behavior of others around them. He also emphasizes that learning is not limited to imitating observed behaviors but that cognitive processes also play an important role. Therefore, he argues that the process of learning by imitation depends not only on external factors but also on the internal thought processes of the individual. This study discusses the effects of imitation on human behavior and its relationship with cognitive processes within the framework of social learning theory. It has been argued that the process of modelling the behavior of the person being imitated overlaps with the process of inference and deduction underlying social cognitive theories. In addition, the interplay between the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral dimensions of faith is emphasized, and it is stated that the Prophet taught faith using live models, symbolic models, and verbal instructions in the Prophet's message, and that these teachings were observed and imitated by the Companions. The article is unique in its field as it is a multidisciplinary study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of whether divine kalām is created or eternal is one of the fundamental issues that caused differences of opinion among the sects. The debates around this issue, the Khalq al-Qur'an, began in the middle of the second century Hijri and deeply affected Islamic thought. With the process of confrontation that occurred as a result of these debates, the phenomenon of identifying oneself through the opposing opinion emerged, hadiths on the subject were fabricated, works of refutation were written, and the impact on hadith literature was quite extensive. The Salaf and Ahl al-Hadith engaged in a fierce struggle with sects such as the Mu'tazilites and Jahmiyya. In this process, the rejection of some narrations that Ahl al-Hadith considered to be religious by the Mu'tazila, Jahmiyya and Ahl al-Ra'y further increased the tension between the sects. This tension took on a new dimension with the intervention of politics, resulting in the famous Mihna incident. There is no second event in the history of Islam with a similar effect and characteristic to the Mihna incident that took place with the confrontation of Khalq al-Qur'an. The belief that "the Qur'an is created", which was adopted by the Mu'tazilites during the Mihna period, was adopted as the official policy of the Abbasids during the reigns of Caliphs al-Ma'mūn, Mu'tasim and al-Wāshiq. In this period, those who insisted that "the Qur'an is not created" were interrogated, tortured, imprisoned and subjected to certain sanctions. It is seen that sectarian factors were effective in the external reflections of the Mihna incident, in which politics was also involved and different clans and groups played a leading role. The Mihna and its aftermath, a period of evolution or rupture in Islamic thought, was a period of intense sectarian influence and affected Islamic thought in political, social, epistemological, scientific and sectarian terms. In this article, the possible causes of the discussions on the Khalq al-Qur'an and the Mihna event are discussed, the effects of the sectarian factor on the Mihna event and the discussions on the Khalq al-Qur'an are investigated, and the post-Mihna period, in which these effects are intensely seen, is also scrutinized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the science of kalām, which played an important role in the construction of the Islamic belief system in the historical process, and the denialist movements that oppose these belief systems differ from each other in terms of foundations and goals, they sometimes showed similarities in terms of procedure, method and discourse. This situation gave the impression that there is a harmony and parallelism between thought structures that differ from each other in many points, as in the case of Muʿtazila and deism. These structures, which constitute two opposing movements of thought regarding the possibility and necessity of prohethoot and revelation, have reached different results by using the same procedure and method to prove their own theses. This study aims to question the reality of the similarity in method between Muʿtazila and deism, which at first glance seems to support such an impression, in terms of the source of morality. Deism accepts the existence and unity of God, as in the classical period, but argues that prophethood and revelation are impossible and unnecessary by putting forward rational justifications. There are three basic arguments put forward by deism in terms of the source of morality. The first of these is that moral values are inherent in the essence of things and actions, secondly, these inherent features of things and acts bring about a deterministic necessity because they are the determining reasons that necessitate the value of the act, the last one is that moral values can be known by reason alone, without divine help. On the other hand, the Muʿtazila school of theology defends the possibility and necessity of prophethood and revelation on rational grounds and accepts it as a divine obligation. The conclusion reached by Muʿtazila, who tries to reveal the source of morality with a similar discourse and method, is different from deism. Although there are different views against these three basic arguments of deism, some Muʿtazila theologians argue that moral values are inherent in the essence of things and actions, while others take into account the states and conditions related to moral values. One of the most important reasons behind Mu'tazila's different views on this issue is their natural philosophy. Contrary to deism's thesis that moral values can only be known through reason, although Muʿtazila grants the mind a wide range of competence both a priori and theoretically, this is not a mind independent of divine declarations. In this context, the fact that revelation and reason are both created by God brings about harmony and coordination rather than contradiction and disharmony between the two. In contrast to deism's understanding of a deterministic necessity regarding moral values depending on the ontological structure of things and actions, Muʿtazila argued that values of things and actions were essentially created by God and that this situation did not cause a necessity independent of His power and will. By making a comparison between deism and Muʿtazila regarding the source of morality, the study aims to reveal the differences in the context of the foundations and goals between these two movements of thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims to examine the problem of the possibility of value and the source of attributing value to actions in the context of the thought of the Ottoman scholar Shams al-DīnAhmad b. Mūsā al-Hayālī. The question of what is the approach to the issue of value in the Hanafi-Maturidi tradition vis-à-vis the Mu'tazila and Ash'arites is discussed with reference to al-Hayālī's views. al-Hayālī expressed his own thoughts in the commentary he wrote on his teacher Hızır Bey's ode called al-Qasīda al-Nūniyya. He especially examined the issue of husn and qubh in the interpretation of the lines of this ode: "Goodness and evil are religious, but / we say that they can be known by reason". In analyzing and interpreting his thoughts, Muhammad 'Umar b. al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Jalīl b. al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Jamīl al-Baghdādī al-Hanafī’s work titled alHawāshī al-Futūhiyya li-Sharh al-Nūniyya and Mehmet Emin Uskudārī's work titled Hāshiya 'alā Sharh al-Hayālī 'alā alQasīda al-Nūniyya are used. Ash'arites claimed that knowledge of value is not possible for humans and accepted that the source of our knowledge about good and evil is religion. Mu‘tazilite thinkers, on the other hand, associated good and evil with the essence of actions or with the attributes found in the essence of actions. Some Mu‘tazilite thinkers, such as the al-Jubbā’ī stated that the context and conditions in which actions are performed are also important in attributing value. Regarding value, Hanafī scholars from Bukhara stayed close to the Ash'arite understanding of value, while Māturīdīs stayed close to Mu‘tazilite ideas. Although Māturīdīs accepted that religion gives information about good and evil, they claimed that the value of some things could be known through reason. In our study, it has been shown that al-Hayālī’s basic approach is in favor of al-Māturīdī’s understanding of values. Attention has been drawn to the similarities between the Mu‘tazilite and Māturīdī scholars regarding the meanings of good and bad attributed to actions. It has been explained that good and evil have three meanings. First, goodness means that a person's deeds are praised in this world and rewarded in the afterlife. Evil means being blamed in this world and punished in the afterlife. Secondly, good is what is fit for purpose, and bad is what is not fit for purpose. This also means that good is what is beneficial and bad is what is harmful. Thirdly, good is an attribute of perfection and evil is an attribute of deficiency. For example, knowledge is good because it makes people more perfect. Ignorance is bad because it leaves man in a deficient and low state. According to Mu'tazila, the goodness and evil of everything can be known through reason, while according to al-Māturīdī the goodness and evil of some things can be perceived through reason. In this context, Mu'tazilite and Māturīdī thinkers criticized the arguments of the Ash'arites, who accepted that religion is the source of value knowledge that necessitates responsibility. The article also discusses the relationship between the source of value and the liar paradox which arises from the combination of truth and falsehood in a single sentence. Believing that there is a solution to the liar paradox, al-Hayālī stated that al-Māturīdī’s understanding of value can be justified through this solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article attempts to determine the source of moral obligation in al-Māturīdī’s thought. First of all, a classification of concepts of morality in his writings is presented. These concepts are found to be three in number: Utility, Virtue and Right. However, of these, the concept of right is found to be the ultimate representative of moral obligation, since it alone offers us the idea of a categorical imperative which is essential for morality to be objective. Thereafter, two main sources of moral obligation are noted. One is revelation and the other is reason. Revelation presents the notions of divine lordship and sovereignty together with the divine command and prohibition. Yet, at the same time, reason determines our moral understanding with objective principles and supports revelatory teachings. This means that the findings of reason in the field of morality are usually in accord with revelation; where they differ, it is often because humanity lacks access to the necessary knowledge, which makes it impossible for them to reach the correct conclusions. Hence, al-Māturīdī also notes that revelation is especially needed in regards to areas of morality that are obscure and controversial, since it offers answers that humans would not otherwise be able to know with certainty. At the same time, it is understood that reason is a source of obligation in accordance with natural law theory, and therefore this latter theory is a basic way to categorize al-Māturīdī’s thought. The natural world offers guidance to reason and is a source of knowledge from which moral conclusions can be derived that are in line with basic human needs and desires. Al-Māturīdī, in particular, cites peace and prosperity as fundamental aims for humanity that can only be ensured by a guiding foundation. However, since God is the creator and designer of the world, the principle that ultimately determines the form of morality is divine wisdom. In the third section of this article, the topic of moral motivation is addressed. This is the key to understand how people can behave morally, and it is concluded that al-Māturīdī shows that we can act for objective reasons and judge actions morally without only taking into consideration their consequences. This is because reason allows one to judge actions according to criteria that are not based only on contingent and subjective aspects of reality but also on categorical principles and imperatives. In the last part of this study, it is suggested that al-Māturīdī views reason as independently bringing moral obligations. This allows us to overcome the gap that David Hume presented between is- and ought- statements. Thus, it is concluded that for al-Māturīdī the source of moral obligation is not simply based on revelatory commands, but also derived from the principles of reason. These principles are to a significant degree the result of derivations made from observations on human nature and the natural world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of rü'yetullah, which refers to the visibility of Allah, is an important issue that has been studied in depth by different theological disciplines throughout history. In the history of theology, there are two main perspectives on this issue: those who accept and those who reject ruʿyat Allāh. While Ahl al-Sunna is one of the leading groups that embrace ruʿyat Allāh, the Mu'tazilite sect firmly rejected it, considering it incompatible with the station of divinity because ru'yat involves corporeality or requires some issues related to it. Those who accepted ruʿyat Allāh resorted to a number of rational and empirical justifications. From the perspective of Ahl al-Sunnah, it is seen that in the early period, vision of Allah was justified on the basis of "qiyām with its essence", while later it was justified on the basis of "existence". In this study, the approaches of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) and his close follower Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī (d. 682/1283), two thinkers belonging to the Ashʿarī school, on the subject of rū'yat Allah based on existence will be discussed. Al-Rāzī is an enlightened scholar who has different views on many subjects. One of the issues on which he expresses more than one opinion is whether existence-centred vision can be justified or not. He exhibits three different approaches to the method of justifying the existence-centred rū'yat Allah: acceptance, rejection, and tawaqquf. His change of opinion on many metaphysical and theological issues, especially on rū'yat Allah, is attributed to the approach he adopted. The fact that he changed his views on many metaphysical and theological issues, especially on rū'yat Allah and that he justified the approaches he adopted from different perspectives, on the one hand, reveals his philosophical and theological depth, and on the other hand, it is directly related to his method of tahqiq. Therefore, philosophical commentators such as Shihāb alDīn al-Qarafī (d. 684/1285) attributed this change in al-Rāzī's thought to the maturity of his knowledge, the superiority of his intellectual abilities, and the depth of his religious comprehension. Indeed, this change shows that al-Rāzī was always in search of truth and constantly questioned his ideas. Al-Rāzī, who made various criticisms about the "existence"-focused vision in many of his works, endeavours to explain this issue in a more organised system and in items in his work alArʻbaīn. In the aforementioned work, al-Rāzī tries to justify his criticism by focusing on some philosophical and theological proofs such as "the defectiveness of 'adam", "whether every judgement must be based on a cause", and "whether substances and accidents can be parallel with different causes". Urmawī, who summarises and criticises al-Rāzī's work, objects to al-Rāzī's findings and arguments in the Lubāb and thinks that the existence-centred rationality can be justified. The arguments presented by both scholar thinkers put forward centred on rū'yat Allah reveal their conception of God on the one hand, and their philosophical and theological views on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Folk beliefs encompass a fairly broad range of content. Just as there are folk beliefs in the religious field, it is common to encounter folk beliefs in every conceivable field such as weather, social, economic, military or civil life, entertainment, and sadness. The focus of this article is predominantly on folk beliefs that continue to exist vividly among people and are related to Islamic beliefs. These folk beliefs are not only religiously incorrect but also hinder the proper understanding of Islamic beliefs. In this regard, the subject falls within the field of kalām, as kalām deals with the principles of belief. Therefore, for kalām, it is important to understand the structure of people’s beliefs and their reflections on daily life. Despite some social disciplines conducting studies in this area, there is an evident gap in terms of kalām, as these disciplines treat religious issues as a case without making value judgments. However, kalām does not merely settle for determination; it evaluates from the perspective of the religion to which it belongs. To the best of our knowledge, there are few studies examining people’s beliefs and behaviors using modern research methods in the field of kalām. In this article, an attempt was made to determine the religious acceptance and life of the people through questions covering some of the basic religious principles and certain folk beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The subject of signs of apocalypse was not given much place in the Sunni theological works of the classical period. The subject of signs of the apocalypse has been discussed more in recent times and different views have been adopted on the subject. The discussions mostly have took place around the great signs of the apocalypse. There are those who see the great signs of the apocalypse as a matter of faith, but there are also those who do not accept them as a matter of faith. This article aims to examine this issue, which is the subject of different ideas and question marks, from the perspective of Mu’tazila. For this reason, the ideas of Zamakhshari, who gave relatively more information on the subject among Mu’tazila, were emphasized. As a matter of fact, it has been seen that there is no research in the literature that deals with the views of Mu’tazila and Zamakhshari on this subject independently and in detail. The aim of the article is to determine Zamakhshari’s views on the signs of the apocalypse. Moreover, it is to get an idea about Mu’tazila’s approach to the subject. Document analysis method was used in the study. Zamakhshari’s work called al-Kashshaf was examined. Additionally, his works named al-Minhaj and Asas al-Balaga were consulted. It has been seen that Zamahshari, in his work called al-Kashshaf, mostly took the narrations into consideration and accepted the signs of the apocalypse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the main subjects of the science of Kalam (Islamic theology) is the issue of the existence and oneness of Almighty Allah. He is a being that is both transcendent with His essence and immanent with His attributes. Allah has created beings to manifest His essence and has created His art to manifest His attributes. Humans can attain knowledge of His existence by reflecting upon creation. Among the most important topics in the science of Kalam is the section on "divinity" (ulūhiyya). A relationship is established between divinity and the universe. This relationship is pursued through the evidence of Allah’s existence. Among the classical proofs, there is the argument from purposiveness and order in existence. The content of the argument from purposiveness and order encompasses the issue of beauty, which is the most important topic of the science of aesthetics. The aesthetic proof holds a significant place in recognizing the existence of Allah. In attaining the existence of Allah, we draw upon both the material beauty in existence and the moral beauty found among human behaviors. Therefore, at the core of this subject lies the concept of "beauty." "Beauty" is a universal reality. The highest expression of beauty is manifested in art. The greatest aim of Islamic art is to establish the connection of tawhid (oneness) between religion and art. This is achieved through the concept of beauty in existence. In this context, all the beauties we observe in the universe are reflections of Divine art. The concept of beauty in existence is too vast to be confined to matter alone. In this context, beauty has both material and spiritual dimensions. In Islamic belief, the essential aim is not just to know what is purely beautiful, but to seek the absolute truth through beauty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to objectively examine the criticisms feminist theologians have directed at the concept of a masculine God in Judaism and Christianity, and the consistency of these criticisms. Additionally, the antiwomen views attributed to theology in Judaism and Christianity due to patriarchal and social pressures and their consequences are investigated. By utilizing critical, interpretative, and holistic methods of analysis, we strive to create a context to explore issues such as whether the religions of Judaism and Christianity are/are not monopolized by men as feminist theologians claim, the alleged dominance of patriarchal mentality in this regard, and the language of religion has always been used by men. Furthermore, this paper examines the different teachings on gender roles, contemporary debates on gender equality in various societies, and the definitions of male and female roles developed by Judaism and Christianity. From this perspective, feminist theology emphasizes the association of religious texts with gender and advocates for women's voice in the theological discourse. Feminist theology criticizes the notion of a masculine God and male-dominated mindset with various arguments, asserting that this idea exists in Judaism and Christianity. The primary goal of feminist theology is to eliminate generalizations about women, especially in theological contexts. It also seeks to demonstrate that women, like men, have a voice in theological matters. Feminist theology is a discipline that examines and critiques gender issues within the religious domain. This discipline re-evaluates and critiques religious texts and practices that have traditionally been interpreted from a masculine perspective. Feminist theologians criticize the attribution of theological teachings, passed down through generations, to a single gender. The aim of feminist theology is to reshape religious experience and belief on the basis of gender equality and justice. It critically assesses traditionally male-dominated religious doctrines, texts, and practices, advocating for changes in current practices. Feminist theology, playing a significant role in gender issues within religion, contributes to moving towards a more just and equitable structure, supporting women's increased visibility and influence in religious fields. It provides a significant contribution to understanding the relationships between gender and religious matters more deeply and creating a more just society. This paper will address the issues tackled by feminist theology, their solutions, and the criticisms directed at the concept of a masculine God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Muʿtazilite thought, reasoning precedes religion and deserves to be the first of the obligatory duties. For this reason, it is the first duty of man to use the intellect, which is a special gift of Allah. This is because man is a special being who has the ability to remove possible harms from himself through his thinking, to obtain benefits, and to reach the unknown based on the evidence to which his mind is directed. Therefore, by enduring the arduous nature of reasoning, this duty, which is the basis of unity, must be fulfilled. A person can turn to the evil eye and to himself/herself (inner voice) with the fear of not thinking and ignorance and realize that thinking is necessary. He/She has a nature that makes him think, and he is a being under the influence of stimuli that call him to think. In Muʿtazilite thought, the fear of not thinking that prepares the individual for the evil eye before the evil eye is called ḥātır. One of the themes that will be emphasized in this article is that the ḥātır can occur due to many reasons arising from the individual's self and the external environment. In this article, we will try to examine the ontological and epistemological importance of the reasoning and the khawatır for a rational being, the logical relation of both concepts to the fear of ignorance, and the qualities and characteristics of their essence through a descriptive method. In our study, we will not include detailed lexical and terminological analyses of the basic concepts and their historical background. We will focus on the basic parameters that the Mu'tazilites wanted to achieve with both concepts and construct the main theme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kemalpashazāde, who witnessed the golden age of the Ottoman Empire, conformed to his family tradition and served in military class for a while and then transferred to Ilmiye class (authority on religious law and education). After getting an advanced education, Kemalpashazāde both taught many students and wrote many books. On the other hand, he had the opportunity to utilize his expertise in bureaucracy. Although he was a prominent Fiqh scholar, he proved to be a competent Kalam scholar with the explanations and footnotes he wrote on the classic writings of Kalam Kemalpashazāde wrote genuine risalas on the most Specific topics of Kalam such as qada and qadar (destiny, predestination), and appointed time; in this manner, in his books Risāle fi’l-cabr ve’l-kader ve Risāle fi’l-ecel he also interpreted the topic of appointed time on the same line with Ahl-I Sunnah’s qadar understanding. By evaluating the concept of appointed time in two categories as inevitable and suspended, he discussed a dual concept of appointed time and accused the ones who claimed one appointed time as erroneous. Nonetheless, in order not to be seen on the same line with Mu’tazila, he did not abstain from stating that his understanding of appointed time is different from theirs. Kemalpashazāde who considered the topic of appointed time from the Qur’an perspective used Tafsir and Qur’an works as his references. In Qur’an, the appointed time, which is one of the topics Kemalpashazāde wrote independent books, is used in different context and appropriate to its lexical meaning; and it refers to the lifetimes of humans and of the world, and also to the end of those lifetimes. Furthermore, the verses and the hadith use the concept of appointed time outside of its lexical meaning and they present it as an opportunity for humans to use it for performing good deeds. In this meaning, the appointed time is presented as a source of motivation that encourages humans to perform good deeds. The kalam sects (Sunni schools of law), they shaped the issue of appointed time in the direction of the qadar doctrines of their sects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge theory is a discipline that interacts between different disciplines and examines issues such as the source, nature, transfer and use of knowledge. Discussions about the nature and source of knowledge have increased the importance of knowledge theory along with technological developments and changes in the field of communication. This offers many interesting areas for future research. There are various views on the definition and approaches of knowledge. One of the scholars who put forward important opinions on this subject is Abū ‘Alī al-Yūsī (d. 1102/1691). Yūsī, who had important views on the definition and value of knowledge, lived in the 17th century and was a prominent Mālikī scholar of Morocca, well-versed in rational and natural sciences, and distinguished in theology, philosophy, logic, and methodology. Yūsī’stheory creates a comprehensive framework that transcends the boundaries of disciplines. This interdisciplinary approach promotes a holistic understanding of knowledge and encourages scientists from different fields to collaborate and contribute to the advancement of knowledge theory. According to him, the capacity to access and understand knowledge varies between man and other beings. The idea that man has limited knowledge and God has absolute knowledge is an important point in understanding the sources and the nature of knowledge. At the heart of Yūsī’s theory is the recognition of the multidimensionality of knowledge. It goes beyond a simplistic view that equates knowledge with mere awareness or understanding. Instead, he argues that knowledge encompasses cognitive processes, epistemological considerations, and broader metaphysical dimensions. According to Yūsī, knowledge comes from three sources: reason, revelation, and senses. According to him, reason alone is not sufficient to understand the complexity of existence. Therefore, it emphasizes the importance of revelation, which represents divine guidance and transcendent wisdom. Revelation expands the scope of human knowledge by providing insights and truths beyond our limited reasoning abilities. Sensory experiences such as perception and observation also contribute to our understanding of the world. By interacting with the senses, we gain empirical knowledge and discover physical manifestations of reality. Yûsî’s theory underscores the need to integrate these different sources of knowledge. According to him, knowledge can be valuable in itself or serve another purpose. Yūsī’s theory underscores the need to integrate these different sources of knowledge. According to him, knowledge can be valuable in itself or serve another purpose. The division of knowledge into two categories: sciences for its own sake and sciences that serve another purpose, reveals the value and use of knowledge. In this perspective, it can be said that Yūsī’s theory of knowledge has a deep and versatile understanding within the tradition of Islamic thought. The six basic sciences and eight auxiliary sciences that stand out among Islamic sciences are a reflection of this understanding. Likewise, his theory of knowledge encourages in-depth studies in the relevant field by providing interaction between different disciplines and emphasizes the value of knowledge, showing that it plays an important role in human life. The study aims to provide a basis for studies on Yūsī’s other theological views, especially his theory of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ʿAbd al-Latīf al-Kharpūṭī is a modern theologian based in Turkiye in the 19th century and took the first concrete step to introduce new ilm al-kalām. He aimed at defending Islam using both rational (‘aql) and narrative (nass) evidence, thereby envisioning a methodological renewal in kalām. Using wisdom, al-Kharpūṭī wanted to eliminate the issues that would harm the Islamic faith through wisdom. Such objectives are evident in the definition of wisdom, he quoted from Qādī Bayzāwī. He interpreted wisdom in the sense of demonstrations (burhan) that express certain knowledge and rhetorical (khitabī) and falsifiable (zannī) proofs in order to eliminate doubt and uncertainty. Al-Kharpūṭī considered the demonstrations and evidences used in kalām as wisdom. He attached so much importance to wisdom, and he claimed that Islam was built on wisdom. With the meaning he attributed to wisdom, he aimed to interpret the Qurʾān and Sunnah and to uncover the secrets of religion. He believed that through wisdom, religion could reach great masses of people. In this way, both the common (hawas) and elite (ʿavām) people would benefit from religion. He used wisdom as a method and emphasized its encompassing, functional and enlightening characteristics. The fact that al-Kharpūṭī’s definition of wisdom supports the purpose of the science of kalām is a clear manifestation of the relationship between the science of kalām and wisdom. At the same time, wisdom’s characteristic of precise knowledge that eliminates doubt and its persuasive appeals with evidence and demonstrations are also among the goals of kalām. Evaluating wisdom based on the rules of logic, al-Kharpūṭī established a relationship between reason and science through wisdom. A concrete example of this can be found in his treatise “On the Tawjīh and Tawfīq of the Apparent (Zahirī) Dispute Between ‘Ilm al-Hay’at and Qurʾāb al-Muqaddasa” and in his work Tanqīh al-Kalām. In this treatise, he established a relationship between revelation and science, emphasized the science of hayat and wisdom,, mentioned some earlier astronomical theories, and tried to prove that Islam was not opposed to science and reason by supporting them with verses. Al-Kharpūṭī often referred to natural sciences and scientific facts and emphasized the power and wisdom of Allah. He associated various verses from the Qurʾān with scientific informations, thereby drawing attention to the wisdom in religion. Al-Kharpūṭī considered all humanity in the service of science as a portal of service to Islam, regardless of whether it is through the hands of a disbeliever or a Muslim. For him, service to Islam is wisdom, and it is this wisdom that will continue for centuries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Diya' al-Din 'Umar al-Razi (d. 1164-65 [?]), the father of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1210) was a prominent figure in the fields of fiqh, Sufism, rhetoric, literature, and Kalam. His literary aspect extended to his theological views, as he employed poetry as a tool to substantiate his ideas on imamate, the leadership of the Muslim community. The discovery of the second volume of his lost work, Nihayat al-Maram fi Dirayat al-Kalam, has provided valuable insight into his thoughts. While adhering to Sunni tradition on imamate, Diya' al-Din 'Umar al-Razi presented novel perspectives, re-examined the views of earlier kalam and fiqh scholars in light of contemporary circumstances, offered a theological perspective on his society's socio-political issues, and proposed solutions. This study delves into Diya' al-Din 'Umar's perspective on the necessity of appointing an imam, the qualities an imam must possess, the process of imamate, the possibility of removing an imam from office, the possibility of having two imams simultaneously, whether an imam is appointed through nass (divine decree) or bi'ah (pledge of allegiance), and who is the most virtuous/superior individual after the Prophet Muhammad. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]