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Some commentators have recently argued that scientific psychology is overly reliant on artificial laboratory-based activities and that it undervalues field-based investigations. However, it remains unclear how a field-based programme of psychological research might be organized in a scalable way. We examine and compare two existing field-based approaches: Roger Barker's behaviour settings programme and Edwin Hutchins's distributed cognition programme. Both programmes prioritize observational work, and both reject the individual as the unit of analysis in favour of a community-scale unit. However, whereas the behaviour settings programme is concerned with structural properties of community life, distributed cognition is concerned more narrowly with the functional analysis of expert team performance. We discuss how these programmes can inform a future community-scale approach to studying psychology in the wild. We conclude that the two programmes are proof of concept of the possibility of a scientific psychology that rejects methodological individualism. This article is part of the theme issue 'People, places, things and communities: expanding behaviour settings theory in the twenty-first century'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the artisanal model of social norms and its ability to accommodate normative disagreement, contestation, and change. It addresses criticisms that the model is overly individualistic and idealized, arguing that it can account for the complexities of social norms and the role of individuals, communities, and institutions in shaping them. The author engages with comments from other scholars, highlighting points of agreement and disagreement. The article concludes by emphasizing the importance of a nuanced understanding of the social world and its connection to our biological nature. [Extracted from the article]

The term 'counter-power' is widely used in political debates and social struggles. Scientifically, however, there is no clear distinction between powers and counter-powers. In the academic debate, largely based on methodological individualism, power is mostly conceived as an interpersonal relation, and counter-powers have no specific role, unless as opposing powers. In this paper, I develop an ontology of capitalist power, based on Marx's critique of capital, and I clarify the role of counter-powers in this ontology. With these lenses, I reconsider critically the debate on power in economics and I discuss the limits of the individualist approach, from neoclassical ultra-liberalism to radical political economics. Finally, I discuss the implications of my ontological enquiry into counter-powers as far as theoretical research and political struggle are concerned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Charles Dickens often satirised and sharply criticised the unfortunate social realities of nineteenth-century England through his works such as Oliver Twist (1838), David Copperfield (1850), A Christmas Carol (1843) and Hard Times (1854). In my paper, I will be putting forward the argument that Dickens’s novels advocate for social change by exemplifying the theoretical doctrine of methodological individualism. As a social science doctrine, methodological individualism was first introduced by Max Weber in his work Economy and Society (1922). The central precept of Methodological Individualism, according to Weber, is that individual actions and motivations rather than social and cultural realities should be considered as the chief drivers of social change. However, it should be precisely noted that methodological individualism as a doctrine is not a reckless celebration of individualism, but, more importantly, a careful analysis of how the intentional states of individuals contribute to the unfolding of social changes in a given society. In other words, the doctrine of Methodological Individualism proposes that social structures are influential but they are not superstructures whose influence exceeds the agency of individual members of a society. In order to illustrate the argument, I will be specifically focusing on the novel Oliver Twist. The historical and social context of the novel consists of 1834 Poor Law Reforms and widespread economic and social inequalities in nineteenth century England. Within these contexts the characters of Fagin, Mr Bumble. Nancy, Harry Maylie and Mr Brownlow make highly individualistic choices that shape the narrative of the novel, challenge the established code of social relations and finally restores Oliver Twist to his rightful place in the society of nineteenth century England. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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We offer three advances to the perceptual crossing simulation studies, which are aimed at challenging methodological individualism in the analysis of social cognition. First, we evolve and systematically test agents in rigorous conditions, identifying a set of 26 "robust circuits" with consistently high and generalizing performance. Next, we transform the sensor from discrete to continuous, facilitating a bifurcation analysis of the dynamics that shows that nonequilibrium dynamics are key to the mutual maintenance of interaction. Finally, we examine agents' performance with partners whose neural controllers are different from their own and with decoy objects of fixed frequency and amplitude. Nonclonal performance varies and is not predicted by genotypic distance. Frequency-amplitude values that fool the focal agent do not include the agent's own values. Altogether, our findings accentuate the importance of dynamical and nonclonal analyses for simulated sociality, emphasize the role of dialogue between artificial and human studies, and highlight the contributions of simulation studies to understanding social interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an increasingly polarised world, crisp labelling, dichotomisation, and the flourishing of nation- and ethnic-based prejudice hinders the finding and construction of spaces for transcending boundaries. By combining cosmopolitanism as forms of relating with networks as a social and cultural practice characteristic of our time, this special issue aims at discerning forms and situations which defy prior categorisation or bridge social boundaries. It brings together eight case studies that provide ethnographically grounded explorations of the articulation of cosmopolitan perspectives with networking practices. The articles cover a variety of ethnographic settings, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe and Asia. Bringing 'cosmopolitanism' and 'network' together points to issues that are foundational to the discipline: from the definition of the 'Other' and the definition of the anthropological object of analysis, to the definition of the social in different social formations and actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on the recent work of Michael Bratman as emblematic of several important developments in the philosophy of action, I raise four questions that engage with a set of interlocking concerns about systemic functionalism in the philosophy of action. These questions are: (i) Are individual and institutional intentions the same kind of thing? (ii) Can the risk of proliferation of systemic functional explanations be managed? (iii) Is there an appealing basis for the apparent methodological individualism in our theories of action and agency? and (iv) Why not, instead, pursue a methodologically anti‐individualist and ecological approach to action and agency? The latter alternative, I suggest, offers a promising way to retain many of the core insights of the Bratmanian project while avoiding the difficulties inherent to some of the methodological presumptions of some strands of contemporary philosophy of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The practice of Corrective Feedback (CF), which is situated within a Second Language Acquisition (SLA) Paradigm, is currently positioned towards an accuracy-orientated delivery based on native speaker norms. This is despite the recognition in different areas of linguistic research that there is considerable variation in the way that English is spoken around the world. This paper argues that the epistemological assumptions and methodological approaches to investigate CF within an SLA paradigm have various underlying weaknesses that undermine research findings. These findings purport to provide support for an accuracy-orientated CF in the English classroom. However, it is suggested in this paper that a meaning-orientated CF would be more reflective and beneficial for students given the transformative changes that have occurred to English over the past 30 years. This perspective is discussed in relation to one teacher's approach to CF who participated in a larger project which examined CF conducted in a British-Sino University. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past twenty years, a persistent concern about the growing phenomenon of homegrown terrorism in the West has led researchers to study the radicalization process toward violent extremism. The potential link between ideology and behaviors is at the center of scientific debates. Some argue that adhesion to an ideology is not a necessary condition for political violence. According to this perspective, research should focus on the study of behaviors. Others argue that ideological aspects have an influence at every stage of engagement and that neglecting ideas would be a mistake in attempts at understanding radicalization. In this article, we contribute to that discussion by proposing a better way to understand the connection between ideology and behaviors. Using Raymond Boudon's general theory of rationality, we argue that engagement in violent extremism is a complex combination of actions, decisions, attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs the understanding of which requires the use of a comprehensive sociological approach. Thus, we defend a theoretical perspective based on methodological individualism and we develop a general typology for radicalization processes based on this perspective. We also point out how this perspective differs from conventional rational choice theory and other theoretical perspectives used in the field of radicalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a response and a reaction to the phenomenon of rural decline, the study of rural transformations has become an important research field in recent years, with special concern to the adaptation of agricultural systems, to the survival of rural communities and to the strategies of permanence in place at an individual farmer level. Based on a field research among farmers operating in the Gran Sasso and Laga Mountains National Park (a mountainous area in Central Italy that presents some rural decline related characteristics), this study is aimed at identifying the reasons behind permanence in place from the farmers' perspective. The farms' situation and the farmers' choice to keep staying in the remote areas of the Park are analyzed. The research has been carried out following a partially mixed methodology, which has combined quantitative and qualitative techniques, such as a secondary data analysis, a direct survey, territorial focus groups and face-to-face in-depth interviews. Based on the structural analysis of the rural decline within the area of the Park, the paper analyzes the processes of rural change associated with farmers' strategies to cope with the difficulties as well as the reasons behind their willingness to stay (permanence) according to an anti-reductionist view of individualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a summary of the book "Citizen Knowledge: Markets, Experts, and the Infrastructure of Democracy" by Herzog. The book explores the challenges to democracy and proposes improvements to create an "epistemically well-functioning democracy." Herzog examines the social epistemological aspects of markets, courts, public schools, and other institutions and emphasizes the importance of managing knowledge in democracies. The book critiques the belief in free markets as efficient knowledge-producing mechanisms and challenges the idea of a "marketplace of ideas" where truth always prevails. It also discusses the role of expert communities and the need for a trust-based partnership between society and experts. The book concludes by highlighting the influence of institutions and social norms on democracy and proposes practical solutions to enhance democratic systems. [Extracted from the article]

Neoclassical economics has established itself as the discipline of rational choice. Consequently, under methodological individualism and in the context of consumption, an agent's choice is based on the ordering of preferences determined exogenously, disregarding any emotional, biological influences, or factors from socio-economic dynamics. Therefore, this paper aims to present an alternative framework for the decision-making of economic individuals at a theoretical and formal-mathematical level, grounded in the principles of evolutionary economics and complex adaptive systems. It is argued that the process of making choices in consumption is inherent to social dynamics. From an individual-holistic perspective, the mechanism motivating action can be characterized as an evolutionary algorithm that integrates biological, historical, cultural, social class, and market competition influences as endogenous elements in determining choice and consumption behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The article discusses the concept of zoon politikon in order to provide arguments justifying the attractiveness of Aristotle's practical philosophy. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: There are three quasidefinitions of man in Aristotle's works, each of which emphasises a different aspect of humanity. According to the philosopher, we are speaking animals, political animals (zoa politika) and the only animals endowed with reason. I argue that it is the condition of zoon politikon that comes to the fore as the most human of human properties. The article uses a historical-philosophical method supported by textual analysis. THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: In the first part of the text, Aristotle's term zoon politikon is analysed as a concept intended to show the superiority of humanity over animality. In the second part, it is presented as a limitation that distinguishes humans from gods. By analysing how these two perspectives overlap, it is then possible to discuss some political consequences of the tension between them. RESEARCH RESULTS: The analysis leads to the conclusion that, according to Aristotle, a good human is not someone who "exercises rationality to a high degree" (Hurka, 1993, p. 3), but above all someone who is political to a high degree. It also suggests that Aristotle's concept can be used to distinguish between two kinds of politics, which should not be reduced to each other: "artificial" politics (which can be equated with power), and natural human politics (which is based on free individual action in the area of praxis). CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The notion of zoon politikon reflects the relational character of the individual human self, and thus offers a perspective that allows both methodological and political individualism to be challenged. It can also be (and is; see: Arendt, 1958; Crick, 1962) a source of inspiration for those scholars, who argue that politics cannot be reduced to power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While prior research has examined the connection between civic engagement and collectivist views, the present study considers to what extent years of education have been associated with more collectivistic views. This study analyzed data from the 2021 United States General Social Survey. Results suggested that more years of education was associated with believing that the government should do more for Black people and that the government should do move overall (in a scaled average of individualism/collectivism). Specific demographic factors were associated with more collectivist or individualistic views. Implications for program and policy development within higher education are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that a certain kind of naturalist approach to social ontology is likely to be both philosophically fruitful and relevant to empirical social science. The kind of naturalism I employ might be called contextualism, which emphasizes the constant presence of assumed background knowledge, is suspicious of general inference rules and all or nothing claims about the ontology of the social sciences, and argues that Quine’s quantificational criterion for ontological commitment has to be supplemented with local interpretations and arguments about what specific social science research is committed to. I look at three case studies employing this perspective, one on agent based models and individualism, a second on the reality of social class, and a third on the reality of race. In all three cases work is first needed to clarifying what empirical social science is claiming, what ontology or ontologies it seems to presuppose, and then description of the kinds of evidence that supports its commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social movements possess transformative and progressive power. In this paper, I argue that how this is so, or even if this is so, depends on one's explanatory framework. I consider three such explanatory frameworks for social movements: methodological individualism, collectivism, and complexity theory. In evaluating the various appeals and weaknesses of these frameworks, I show that complexity theory is uniquely poised to capture the complex and dynamic reality of the social world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The individual-community relationship has always been one of the most fundamental topics of social sciences. In sociology, this is known as the micro-macro relationship while in economics it refers to the processes, through which, individual actions lead to macroeconomic phenomena. Based on philosophical discourse and systems theory, many sociologists even use the term "emergence" in their understanding of micro-macro relationship, which refers to collective phenomena that are created by the cooperation of individuals, but cannot be reduced to individual actions. "Emergence" theories attempt to explain the nature of society as a complex system by examining how individuals and their relationships lead to the creation of integrated and macro-social phenomena such as markets, educational systems, cultural beliefs, and shared social practices. As a prelude to activity, every researcher has to answer the question from the methodological point of view, how is it possible to study the behavior of social groups and how can we gain knowledge about the laws related to social groups? Anyone who deals with humanities and social sciences or any reality and phenomenon that affects human beings, inevitably deals with the reality that is emerging. In fact, emergence occurs when one level of reality emerges radically from another level. Examples of emergent levels of reality include how the mind emerges from the body; or the way society emerges from human beings. Therefore, when there is an emerging factor, different scientific disciplines should be used, because it is inevitable to talk about social affairs, psychology and neurobiology, as well as physical and even chemical.

Anthropologists are often averse to the decontextualized approaches of moral and other forms of philosophy, arguing that they lack the thickness required to think well and carefully about issues of import. Based on fieldwork with a group of people who meet regularly in pubs to do philosophy, this article argues that decontextualization and abstraction can be useful in attempts to think well about big questions with others, but for oneself. Pub philosophers attempt in their weekly conversations to balance an attention to positioned knowledge with an effort to arrive at general ways of thinking about something. It is not only professional academics and philosophers who value thinking for its own sake, and not in order to find resolutions or conclusions to tricky questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Citizen participation under the lens of Hayek's methodological Individualism demonstrates that individuals are the ones who have the capacity to act and interact, being these agents of change in the social context. In this sense, the types of motivations they have for getting involved in public issues in their community impact the different levels of participation. Furthermore, the premise that guides this essay is the idea that higher levels of participation stimulate democracy for the exercise of active citizenship, and this citizenship provides opportunities for more participation, thus generating what we call the boomerang effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Soziologische Revue is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Externalities, as both a pervasive phenomenon and a concept, lie at the centre of ecological thought and policy debates. This paper questions the adequacy of deeming of pervasive phenomena as externalities including by some authors in the (eco)socialist tradition. It critically reflects on the epistemological underpinnings of what is seen as internal and what as external, and reveals the role of methods used in economics as well as real social and economic processes characterising capitalism in configuring these so-called externalities. The roots of said externalities are traced beyond Marshall and Pigou, to whom the concept is usually attributed, and associated with political economists, especially Mill and Sidgwick. Despite all the metamorphoses in the content and implications of the concept of externalities since its birth, the constitutive role of methodological individualism as a common ground of all particular uses of externalities is demonstrated. However, externalities as a concept do not owe their existence solely to the individualistic method of mainstream economics. Real and practical processes defining capitalism are at least as important in understanding the content and function of externalities in both theoretical economics and political debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Monique Deveaux's Poverty, Solidarity, and Poor-led Social Movements makes a significant contribution to contemporary capability theories by challenging their individualism. Mainline versions of the Capabilities Approach (CA), including those developed by Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen, and Ingrid Robeyns, insist on a methodological and normative individualism. And with good reason: communitarianism most often reinscribes patriarchal power, especially within the family. Deveaux, however, argues that this individualism yields a depoliticized account of poverty as capability deprivation, thereby downplaying or even denying the agency of the poor. But poor-led social movements politicize poverty, understanding it as a social and political relation between individuals and institutions. These movements build collective political capabilities: capabilities that can be exercised only by groups or that promote collective goods. The current paper explicates, extends, and defends this powerful challenge to mainline capability theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cultural and literary critics have begun to abandon a long-standing commitment to poststructuralist and deconstructive interpretative methods in favor of an ostensibly Marxist aspiration to comprehend cultural phenomena as symptomatic expressions of a social totality. This essay identifies some of the advantages and shortcomings of this symptomatological mode of interpretation by returning to a dispute in the German scientific establishment around the turn of the twentieth century concerning the applicability of biological conceptions of organic wholeness in cultural and social analysis. The dispute culminates in Max Weber's nuanced defense of biological metaphors as indispensable heuristic devices for cultural inquiry that can nevertheless result in dangerous consequences when they are inappropriately employed. This essay ultimately argues that Weber's contribution to cultural analysis remains an underappreciated and vital methodological resource for researchers who wish to rehabilitate the concept of totality today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article presents the interdisciplinary approach of Edwin Hutchins, analyzing his conception of distributed cognition as probably the most important and lasting contribution of anthropology to the repertoire of theoretical tools in cognitive science. At the same time, this conception resulted in one of the most interesting relationships between cognitive science and social sciences. These relationships are made possible by the assumptions of Hutchins’ conception, which directly contribute to interdisciplinary collaboration. His account of distributed cognition has enormous potential, allowing the integration of research into cognitive and social processes. This is also because it breaks with methodological individualism.

Social enterprises are recognised as relevant rural development actors. The specific features of social enterprises operating within rural areas (i.e. their relational, socially innovative and multi-stakeholder character and their focus on integrated development) concur with the principles of the neo-endogenous approach to rural development, which stress the potential role of third sector organisations as development actors within governance frameworks. In order to study this phenomenon, that links social enterprises and rural development, we propose a conceptual and methodological framework drawing from Polanyi's socio-economic theory, complemented with the concepts of place, spatial scale and corporate agency. Through the proposed framework, we advocate for a plural vision of the economy, socio-spatial and geopolitical sensitive concepts and overcoming methodological individualism for the study of an increasingly relevant phenomenon such as the participation of third sector organisations like social enterprises in the (neo-endogenous) development of rural areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The generalizability across cultural groups of the construct of Emotional Intelligence (EI) and its assessments has received scant attention. Most research on ability EI is done within a Western context. This study investigates whether the same internal structure of The Components of Emotion Understanding Test short 24 item version (CEUT-24) emerges also in non-Western, Turkish context with a bipolar Emotional Understanding (EU) ability factor, a unipolar (dis)acquiescent responding factor, and scenario-specific error covariances. The sample consisted of 680 (15-32 years old) participants. Three nested models (model A with only the EU factor, model B with the acquiescence factor added to model A, and model C with the scenario-specific error covariances added to model B) have tested with Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Results showed that only model C had an acceptable to good fit. An EU ability factor, an acquiescent responding factor, and scenario-specific error covariance factor accounted for the raw item responses of CEUT-24 in Turkey in the same way as in Western contexts. The current study contributes to generalizability of the CEUT-24 beyond typical western contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will try to consider the usual allegations of determinism that are directed towards Bourdieu's notion of habitus from a slightly different perspective. One of the most common arguments found in these types of charges is that Bourdieu unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile objective and subjective aspects of social life under one notion. According to critics, habitus is not a viable solution to structure vs. agency debate simply because it cannot be both determined by social structure and open to contingency of autonomous subjective interpretations of the social world. I will show that this critique of Bourdieu actually is inspired by incompatibilist philosophy which maintains that regarding human action either determinism or free will can be true. However, those sociologists who, in criticising Bourdieu's understanding of habitus, follow the incompatibilist line of reasoning usually overlook the compatibilist side of this old debate in moral philosophy. In that regard, I will argue that Frankfurt and Taylor's compatibilist account of second order desires and strong evaluations can help us to better understand how habitus can be determined by environmental social factors and, at the same, time not only foster free will, but also provide a theoretical insight into radical forms of social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unethical behavior in organizations has garnered more and more attention in the last decades but most of the scholarly work has used a static approach relying on methodological individualism and a mechanistic worldview when studying this topic. The process of moral disengagement and organizational culture have been linked to the prevalence of unethical behavior earlier, but this paper uses a complexity-informed systems perspective to explore the dynamic relationship of these concepts and aims to improve our understanding of the often unnoticeable, step-by-step process through which organizational cultures can become conducive to unethical behavior. Organizations are conceptualized as complex adaptive systems in which transformative and stabilizing processes based on feedback loops take place continuously. It is discussed how these processes can lead to a phase transition driving organizations towards a state where unethical behavior is the general norm. The process is illustrated through real-life examples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The basic question of sociology is what sets of rules and order are used in society and how they are maintained. One possible answer is based on the concept of institutions, which still provokes theoretical discussions due to, among other things, a certain ambiguity, since the term ‘institution’ is, figuratively speaking, shrouded in a kind of fog that prevents it from being captured in any direct, clear way. Today, ambitions of philosophy, political science, anthropology or mathematical game theory, which try to solve this problem outside the sociological framework, contribute to the deepening of the ambiguities surrounding the concept of institutions. Some approaches tend to define institutions as a cyber black box with inputs and outputs, whose working remains largely hidden (especially philosophical and mathematical approaches strive to find some common universal principle or even mathematical formula). From the perspective of general sociological theory, the article considers the topic of institutions. The author identifies this topic as a central issue that needs to be reconsidered in sociology. The starting point of the article is the analysis of concepts related to the topic, their definitions and paradigmatic integration. In the following part, the author considers the theoretical interpretations in the works of Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann, John Searle, and the concepts inspired by game theories and rational behaviour theories. After that, ten basic issues of the current approaches are identified. The author pays particular attention to the fact that methodological individualism tends to dominate, which explains the ignorance of certain issues, especially of a holistic and macro-social nature, thus, leading to some problematic simplifications. The article shows what needs to be changed in the current social-scientific thinking on institutions in order to develop a more appropriate starting point for the further development of sociological theory.

This article aims to vindicate the importance of the individual for sociology. Its main objective is to discuss and problematise the way in which various sociological perspectives (classical sociology, the action-structure debate, microsociology, methodological individualism, dispositionalist sociologies, the individualization thesis and the new institutional individualism, the sociology of social trials) have theorised the individual and the place it should occupy in sociology. We offer a critical review of each of these sociological approaches, showing some of their weaknesses and their potential to analyse current societies and the type of individual they produce. In this way, this article defends the project of a sociology of the individual that makes the individual a primary heuristic tool to understand our societies at a time when there is increasing demand for forms of social representation rooted in individual experiences.

"The Spiritual Turn: The Religion of the Heart and the Making of the Romantic Liberal Modernity" by Galen Watts explores the decline of traditional religion in Western countries and the emergence of a new form of religious expression called the "religion of the heart." Watts argues that this new form of spirituality helps individuals find meaning outside of religious institutions. However, the book's arguments are criticized for not engaging with relevant theories and empirical findings on secularization. The author also questions the definition of "religion" and whether the "religion of the heart" can truly foster social cohesion. [Extracted from the article]

There is an important tension at the heart of feminist discussions of individualism in development studies, one that arises from philosophical questions about the relationship between feminism and individualism. On the one hand, feminists criticize development policies for assuming that women can overcome structural barriers and for prioritizing individual success over systemic change. On the other, feminists criticize development policies for treating women as vehicles for the well-being of children and households and for assuming that women are altruists. I argue that these seemingly contradictory views about individualism can be reconciled by remembering that feminism's central value is opposition to oppression, not respect for individual personhood. Feminists are not worried about women's inability to count as separate for its own sake; we are worried about its connection to the subordination of women as a group. Recognizing this allows us to embrace postcolonial feminist and care ethical critiques of egoism without thereby suggesting that it is acceptable to elide women's interests with those of families and households. I contrast my view about how to reconcile feminist tensions around individualism with two others, one that claims we should keep normative individualism and jettison methodological individualism and one that claims we should reject independence individualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Ciencias Sociales (13159518) is the property of Revista de Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad del Zulia Venezuela and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the conclusion of the Center for the History of Emotions in Berlin, Germany and the research group's significant contributions to the study of emotions history since 2008. It introduces a special issue inviting contributions to explore the interdisciplinary nature of the field and its foundational premise that emotions are culturally and historically specific, intertwined with the social world as complex embedded and embodied phenomena.

Copyright of Seminare Learned Investigations / Seminare. Poszukiwania naukowe is the property of Francis de Sales Scientific Society / Towarzystwo Naukowe Franciszka Salezego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Τhe idea that social influences and social interactions play a central role in individual economic decisions has had a long presence in the history of economics. With the emergence of marginalism, this idea retreated into the background and the concept of the atomistic individual became established in mainstream economic rationality. Starting in the 1970s, there were some attempts to reintroduce non-atomistic preferences in mainstream microeconomic theory in the form of social interactions, interdependent preferences, keeping up with the Joneses, social identity, social preferences, and status concerns. Social preferences have a growing impact among mainstream microeconomics with the advent of behavioral economics, but still they are not in the hard core of the standard theory of choice. The article argues that atomistic preferences are still prevalent, especially in the form of the assumption of the representative agent. It also focuses on the role of methodological individualism and on the theoretical implications of relaxing the assumption of the atomistic individual as the main explanations for the resilience of the notion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three main conflicts between Popper and Agassi are discussed. Over the ethics of hard work which in reality turns out to be over perfectionism and optimism. Over the role of metaphysics in science. Over methodological individualism where is it argued that Popper's views are contradictory and that Agassi' Institutionalism prevails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article outlines a culture-analytical alternative in, and to, decision science. In contrast to the predominant individualistic and mentalistic conceptions of decision making an empirical and praxeological perspective is proposed. Beginning with empirical processes and situated practices of decision-making, this perspective aims to decenter the decision-making subject. The author revisits Harold Garfinkel's analyses of actual decision-making behavior amongst jurors in court proceedings and Ludwig Wittgenstein's reflections on rule-following to develop this critical perspective on decision-making necessities in contemporary culture and everyday life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional functionalists in social science, for example, Spencer ([64]), Parsons ([54]), Radcliffe-Brown ([56]), Malinowski ([44]), viewed society on the model of an integrated organism whose parts functioned to meet basic human needs and maintain the society's survival and stability. And shouldn't we include social systems such as transportation systems, medical systems, military systems, and educational systems; after all, these are the subject matter of the social sciences. I IntroductionMethodological individualism i (MI) has been a major topic in the philosophy of social science over the past several decades. In the final sections, I sketch an account of how we might distinguish social systems from other (non-social) systems, and argue that prioritizing the level of systems in social ontology has advantages for social critique. (Kukla and Lance 2014, 26) A social ontology suited to understanding social systems, then, must include the worldly components upon which our attitudes and activities depend; and social explanations will typically be incomplete without including the worldly constraints on the systems we are part of. [Extracted from the article]