Search

With the rapid development of e-commerce, both gray products and counterfeit products are particularly serious in the luxury industry. This paper develops an analytical framework to investigate the interaction among the gray market, the counterfeit market and the authorised market, and examines how luxury manufacturers should manage unfair competition from gray products and/or counterfeit products. First, regardless of the existence of counterfeit products, the manufacturer can benefit from gray products when the status utility is moderate. Second, counterfeit products may benefit the manufacturer, depending on the availability of gray products and the physical resemblance of counterfeit products. Third, gray product may benefit the counterfeiter while counterfeit product always harms the gray marketer. Finally, we reveal that gray products can help luxury manufacturers fight against counterfeit products. In particular, gray products can reduce the demand for counterfeit products and even drive counterfeit products out of the market when the physical resemblance of counterfeit products is sufficiently low. Our findings provide several new managerial insights for luxury manufacturers and gray marketers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Citing corporate concentration and lax enforcement since the Reagan era, the Biden administration has declared a new era of aggressive antitrust prosecution, bringing antimonopoly actions against tech giants such as Meta, Google, and Amazon. But what's so bad about monopoly or corporate concentration? The standard answer appeals to economic consequences, such as higher prices or deadweight losses. This paper offers a different framework. It argues monopolizing can be a form of cheating, which is a wrong that attaches to means, not just ends; an athlete who cheats but loses still does wrong. In particular, this paper argues that certain market-controlling strategies constitute a form of cheating I call 'structural cheating,' best illustrated by the metaphor of creating an unlevel playing field: rather than compete fairly on merits such as product quality and price, a firm that acquires rivals biases the market in its favor, thereby entrenching a dominant position that effectively forces would-be competitors to compete uphill. By framing (alleged) antitrust violations as cheating, while using the FTC's lawsuit against Facebook (now Meta) as a test case, this paper provides a needed corrective to those citing market success as evidence of merit or skill. A further upshot is the structural cheating account better explains the distinctively problematic features of social media market concentration than Heath's Market Failures Approach. More generally, this paper provides a normative lens for analyzing fair market competition and shows why it's not only winning or losing that counts in capitalism, but how one plays the game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the use of a competitor's trademark as a keyword in digital advertising, specifically in the context of sponsored links on search engines like Google. It argues that this practice constitutes unfair competition, leading to confusion among consumers and parasitic competition. The text also delves into the legal implications, including civil liability for search engine providers and the need for compensation for damages caused by such actions. The article emphasizes the importance of protecting trademarks and preventing consumer confusion in the digital advertising landscape. [Extracted from the article]

This paper examines the ramification of the platform's dual role on its featuring strategy, sellers' pricing strategies, and consumer welfare. A digital platform operates the marketplace that connects third-party merchants to consumers and simultaneously participates in its marketplace by selling its own product directly to consumers. This dual role raises the concern that the platform may be self-preferencing, leading to unfair competition and harming both merchants and consumers. We develop a game-theoretical model to investigate the implication of dual role on the platform's product featuring strategy, the seller's pricing strategy, and the consumer's welfare. We show that the platform presents an "intermediary bias" such that it may not feature the best possible product to consumers, regardless of whether the platform is under dual role or sole marketplace mode. Surprisingly, dual role, in some scenarios, may mitigate the intermediary bias and intensify price competition in its marketplace. Consequently, prohibiting the platform from selling directly to consumers may not always be welfare-improving to consumers. Furthermore, banning the platform's perfect product imitation can harm consumers when dual role is still allowed. History: Anthony Dukes served as the senior editor for this article. Funding: This work was supported by the Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72202160, 72342026, and 71902142] and the Pujiang Scholar [Grant 22PJC115]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2022.0338. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The principle of freedom of competition is considered one of the basic pillars that guarantee merchants the right to compete with each other. However, in many cases the matter may amount to a competitor exceeding the limits of freedom of trade, by resorting to fraud and using methods and means that are harmful to the competitor, which results in unfair competition. Which prompted the Algerian legislator to regulate practices restricting competition through Ordinance No. 03-03 relating to competition, amended and supplemented, and also Law No. 04-02 specifying the rules applied to commercial practices, amended and supplemented, where the economic aid was granted the right to resort to the judiciary under a lawsuit, which is a means to which it resorts. A request for compensation for the damage suffered as a result of acts of unfair competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese courts follow a dual-track approach in cases about nonliteral copying of game mechanics. The courts grant market exclusivity to game developers either under copyright law or under unfair competition law. In recent years, the fact that copyright law and unfair competition law differ in their cognitive efficiency has become clear. Copyright law is cognitively highly efficient. It is able to provide high-quality background information to navigate decision-makers through the complex issues. Unfair competition law, on the other hand, is cognitively inefficient, providing hardly any structural guidance to strike the delicate balance between creators and users of disputed game mechanics. Abundant cases in China help us understand the importance of cognitive efficiency in choosing the proper modularity of law. When it comes to game mechanics, copyright law is the better modularity in comparison to unfair competition law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nodaways, diverse artificial intelligence techniques have been applied to analyse datasets in the legal domain. Precisely, several studies aim at predicting the decision to help the competent authority resolve a specific legal process. However, AI-based prediction algorithms are usually black-box, and explaining why the algorithm predicted a label remains challenging. Therefore, this paper proposes a 5-step methodology for analysing legal documents from the agency responsible for resolving administrative sanction procedures related to consumer protection. Our methodology starts with corpus collection, pre-processing, and TF vectorisation. Later, fifteen machine and deep learning algorithms were tested, and the best-performing one was selected based on quality metrics. Interpretability is emphasised, with the SHAP scores used to explain predictions. The results show that our methodology contributes to the understanding the decisive influence of legal terms and their connection to the decision made by the competent authority. By providing tools for legal professionals to make more informed decisions, develop effective legal strategies, and ensure fairness and transparency in the legal decision-making process, this methodology has broad implications for various legal areas beyond disputes, including administrative procedures like bankruptcies and unfair competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ensuring food safety and protecting consumers are major aspects for commercialized products. Honey, the most prominent in the class of bee products, requires special regulations due to its origin as a natural product. Mislabeling, imitation, and adulteration represent a source of risks for human health. Specific determinations and analyses are essential for controlling the sector and preventing unfair competition. To compare and establish the correct labeling of several different honeys, melissopalynological, physicochemical, mineral content, and microbiological analyses were carried out on 18 samples commercially available in different countries, namely Türkiye, Romania, Bulgaria, and Northern Cyprus. The honey labels were in accordance with the determined pollen content. The physiochemical parameters showed high variability: 4.07–5.25 (pH), 79.95–83.45 (°Brix), 0.262–1.452 µS/cm (electrical conductivity), and 14.6–18.4% (moisture). The samples were quantitatively high in K, P, Na, and Ca, with the highest cumulative mineral content being found for honeys containing Fagaceae pollen. Additionally, the antimicrobial potential of the various honey samples was evaluated against selected bacteria, employing the disk diffusion and serial dilution methods. Results revealed that the honey samples exhibited increased antibacterial activity against Gram-negative bacteria, with notable activity against S. typhimurium, and moderate activity against Gram-positive S. aureus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with competition law disputes between doctors and presents three cases in which the Supreme Court has made clarifications. The first case concerns permissible competition among elective doctors, where no pricing regulation can be derived. The second case concerns improper advertising of dental treatments abroad. The third case deals with unfair competition in connection with a dental clinic and the tourism representative. It is emphasized that unfair competition law also provides effective legal protection in cross-border medical matters. [Extracted from the article]

In view of the complexity and diversity of hyperspectral images (HSIs), the classification task has been a major challenge in the field of remote sensing image processing. Hyperspectral classification (HSIC) methods based on neural architecture search (NAS) is a current attractive frontier that not only automatically searches for neural network architectures best suited to the characteristics of HSI data, but also avoids the possible limitations of manual design of neural networks when dealing with new classification tasks. However, the existing NAS-based HSIC methods have the following limitations: (1) the search space lacks efficient convolution operators that can fully extract discriminative spatial–spectral features, and (2) NAS based on traditional differentiable architecture search (DARTS) has performance collapse caused by unfair competition. To overcome these limitations, we proposed a neural architecture search method with receptive field spatial–spectral attention (RFSS-NAS), which is specifically designed to automatically search the optimal architecture for HSIC. Considering the core needs of the model in extracting more discriminative spatial–spectral features, we designed a novel and efficient attention search space. The core component of this innovative space is the receptive field spatial–spectral attention convolution operator, which is capable of precisely focusing on the critical information in the image, thus greatly enhancing the quality of feature extraction. Meanwhile, for the purpose of solving the unfair competition issue in the traditional differentiable architecture search (DARTS) strategy, we skillfully introduce the Noisy-DARTS strategy. The strategy ensures the fairness and efficiency of the search process and effectively avoids the risk of performance crash. In addition, to further improve the robustness of the model and ability to recognize difficult-to-classify samples, we proposed a fusion loss function by combining the advantages of the label smoothing loss and the polynomial expansion perspective loss function, which not only smooths the label distribution and reduces the risk of overfitting, but also effectively handles those difficult-to-classify samples, thus improving the overall classification accuracy. Experiments on three public datasets fully validate the superior performance of RFSS-NAS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the platform owner entering complementors' product space, the cooperative nature of the platform ecosystem shifts into coopetition, a mixed strategy of cooperation and competition. Since a disproportionately large number of complementors are small in size and suffer from insufficient resources, their platform owner's unfair competition can pose existential threats to them. Although the literature acknowledges the significance of the research domain, there still exist the challenges of inadequate conceptualization, inefficient measures, and insufficient studies of coopetition. This study attempts to fill the research gap by elucidating the relationship among coopetition balance, capability, and intensity from the complementors' perspective and by operationalizing the coopetition via latent congruence modeling. The survey data collected from 365 complementors at Amazon suggest that coopetition balance and coopetition capability impact on relationship performance, and that coopetition capability and coopetition intensity moderate the relationship between coopetition balance and relationship performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Privacy and antitrust are on a collision course. Large firms with monopoly power or near-monopoly power can build products that ostensibly enhance user privacy while raising rivals' costs and allowing monopolist firms to gain footholds in secondary markets. In this Note, I use the example of Apple's privacy changes, the impact these changes had on digital advertising, and Apple's subsequent expansion of its own digital marketing offerings as a motivating example of how current antitrust doctrine is ill-equipped to handle this new form of monopolist behavior. Privacy is the latest example of an "incommensurability" problem in the final stage of the standard rule of reason analysis. Even if a plaintiff can demonstrate competitive harm from privacy-preserving conduct, courts are constrained in what type of relief they can order. Fortunately, one of the main federal antitrust enforcers--the Federal Trade Commission--is also the source of much of federal privacy law. It has the authority and expertise to promulgate rules pursuant to section 18 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to address anticompetitive privacy and strike the appropriate balance between competition and consumer protection. Much of the Commission's privacy enforcement has reflected the heavily criticized "notice-and-choice" privacy framework. However, the Commission's recent initiation of the Magnusson-Moss rulemaking process signals an opening to not only move beyond this framework, but also to consider both competition and privacy in the formation of any rule regulating technology firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neurofeedback is a brain-training technique that continues to develop via ongoing innovations, and that has broadening potential impact. Once confined primarily to clinical and research settings, it is increasingly being used in the general population. Such development raises concerns about the current regulatory mechanisms and their adequacy in protecting patterns of economic and political decision-making from the novel technology. As studies have found neurofeedback to change subjects' preferences and mental associations covertly, there is a possibility it will be abused for political and commercial gains. Current regulatory practices (including disclaimer requirements, unfair and deceptive trade practice statutes and undue influence law) may be avenues from which to regulate neurofeedback influence. They are, however, limited. Regulating neurofeedback will face the line-drawing problem of determining when it induces an unacceptable level of influence. We suggest experiments that will clarify how the parameters of neurofeedback training affect its level of influence. In addition, we assert that the reactive nature of the traditional models of regulation will be inadequate against this and other rapidly transforming technologies. An integrated and proactive regulatory system designed for flexibility must be adopted to protect society in this era of modern technological advancement. This article is part of the theme issue 'Neurofeedback: new territories and neurocognitive mechanisms of endogenous neuromodulation'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of quantifying the reputational damage resulting from unfair competition actions derives mainly from the lack of contextually established criteria. In the same sense, the lack of relevant judicial precedents amplifies the precarious state of the system of indicative benchmarks in order to assess the damage to reputation as a result of affecting the rights and legitimate interests of the victims of unfair competition actions. Foreign methodological systems for quantifying damages caused by unfair competition actions could represent points of reference for the domestic legislator in the idea of solving practical difficulties in the process of assessing damages caused by unfair competition actions. An eloquent example could be considered the French model for evaluating the economic damage resulting from actions of unfair competition, developed by notorious practitioners in the field in question. The methodological sheets are generically called „La réparation du préjudice économique. Fiches méthodologiques et glossaire - 3e édition (2024)”.

It has been argued that the test for excessive pricing set out in United Brands is vague in a number of aspects and subsequent judgments of the EU courts have not provided much clarity on the matter. This article examines the evolution of the EU case law on excessive pricing for the last four decades including the most recent excessive pricing case investigated by the European Commission in the Aspen case. In particular, the article discusses the important question of what constitutes an excessive price that is "unfair in itself" and the question of how economic value is to be assessed. The article concludes that, although the abuse of unfair excessive pricing is likely to remain a difficult area for regulators to handle, the Commission's commitment decision in Aspen, despite the fact that it cannot change or replace judicial decisions, provides very important clarification of the legal test for excessive pricing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Alauddin Law Development Journal is the property of Alauddin Law Development Journal (ALDEV) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article explores the impact of the U.S. trade war and environmental policies on the timber trade between the U.S. and Vietnam. Due to the trade war, U.S. timber exports to China decreased, leading U.S. timber companies to look to Vietnam as an alternative market. However, concerns have been raised about Vietnam importing illegally harvested timber. The U.S. initiated a Section 301 investigation into Vietnam's timber imports, which resulted in an agreement for Vietnam to improve its timber legality assurance system. The article also discusses the implications of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership on illegal timber trade. [Extracted from the article]

After a fire breaks out, pedestrians simultaneously move towards the exit and quickly form a crowded area near the exit. With the intensification of pedestrians' tendencies towards unfair competition, there is an increase in pushing and collisions within the crowd. The possibility of stampedes within the crowd also gradually increases. Analyzing the causes and psychological tendencies behind pedestrian pushing and collisions has a positive effect on reducing crowd instability and improving evacuation efficiency. This research proposes a modified social force model considering the unfair competition tendency of pedestrians. The model considers factors such as the gap between pedestrians' actual and maximum achievable speed, effective radius, and their distance from the exit. In order to overcome the shortage of "deadlock" in the classical social force model in a high-density environment, this research introduces the feature of variable pedestrian effective radius. The effective radius of pedestrians dynamically changes according to the density of the surrounding crowd and queuing time. Through validation, the evacuation efficiency of this model aligns well with the actual situation and effectively reflects pedestrians' pushing and squeezing behaviors in high-density environments. This research also analyzes how to strategically arrange obstacles to mitigate the exacerbating effect of unfair pedestrian competition on exit congestion. Five experiments were conducted to analyze how the relative position of obstacles and exits, the number of evacuation paths, and the size of the obstacle-free area before the exit affect evacuation efficiency in the presence of unfair pedestrian competition. The results show that evacuation efficiency can be improved when obstacles play a role in guiding or reducing the interaction of pedestrians in different queues. However, when obstacles hinder pedestrians, the evacuation efficiency is reduced to a certain extent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of toxic business competition, this research investigates the legal protection of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in Indonesia, particularly in partnerships with large corporations. The primary emphasis is on the implementation of Law Number 5 of 1999, which prohibits monopolistic practices and unfair business competition, and Law Number 20 of 2008, which pertains to small and medium-sized enterprises. Data was collected from literature studies, pertinent regulations, and in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders using a qualitative approach and a case study design. The research results show that although the legal framework already exists, effective implementation still requires improvement. MSMEs face various challenges in partnerships with large companies, including access to resources and greater risks in business transactions. Recommendations are prepared to strengthen legal protection through regulatory revisions, strengthening legal institutions, legal education, developing partnerships, and stricter law enforcement. The main aim is to increase fairness in business relations between MSMEs and large companies, as well as support inclusive and sustainable economic growth in Indonesia. It is hoped that the implications of this research can provide a positive contribution in renewing policies that support the development of MSMEs as the backbone of the national economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Istanbul Law Review / İstanbul Hukuk Mecmuası is the property of Istanbul Law Review / Istanbul Hukuk Mecmuasi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the Digital Markets Act (DMA) enacted by the European Union (EU) and its implications. The author questions the effectiveness of the DMA in shaping future markets and fostering innovation in Europe. They argue that the DMA lacks a clear vision for European digital markets and overlooks the benefits of the more economic approach in antitrust enforcement. The article also highlights concerns about overregulation and the denial of efficiency defenses under the DMA. Overall, the author suggests a need for skepticism and further analysis of the DMA's impact. The author, Thomas Lübbig, suggests that the EU impact assessment process should include more consideration of the potential market outcomes that can be achieved through regulation. He proposes that instead of relying solely on evaluation, the legislator should consider implementing binding sunset clauses, which would set a specific time limit for the regulation. The author acknowledges that predicting the future is difficult, but believes that this approach would provide a more balanced and effective approach to market regulation. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the potential implications of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) in the European Union (EU) on fairness and competition in digital markets. The DMA aims to ensure contestability and fairness for business users and end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers. However, the article argues that the DMA may unintentionally limit fairness and create problems for Member States in protecting consumers and non-gatekeeper businesses. The article also highlights the potential conflicts between EU and Member States' competences and the potential future impact on competition law. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Revista E-mercatoria is the property of Universidad Externado de Colombia, Departamento de Derecho Comercial and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The increasingly prominent issue of unfair competition on Internet platforms (IPUC) severely restricts the healthy and sustainable development of the platform economy. Based on the IPUC "multi-agent co-governance" scenario, this paper introduces stochastic disturbances and continuous strategy set to improve the classical binary deterministic evolutionary game system. The results show that after considering stochastic disturbances, the positive state corresponding to the equilibrium point (1,1) is no longer stable, and the required parameter conditions are more stringent. The IPUC "multi-agent co-governance" system under stochastic disturbances exhibits specific vulnerability. In the continuous strategy set evolutionary game system, government departments and Internet platforms can flexibly make optimal decisions based on maximizing expected returns, and strategy selection has better elasticity. Regardless of the evolutionary game scenario, maintaining the participation level of NGOs and the public above a certain threshold while increasing the penalty intensity is conducive to the evolution of the game system toward the positive state. The analysis process and conclusions provide insights and guidance for the governments to design the IPUC regulatory system and frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "Doctor in competition law I: Relevant legal foundations for medical competition" deals with the legal foundations of medical competition. Doctors and other healthcare professionals are subject to the provisions of the Unfair Competition Act (UWG). The article provides an overview of the UWG and its significance for medical competition. The Training Reservation Act prohibits individuals who are not legally authorized from working in the field of health and healing professions. Violations of this law can be punished with administrative fines. The UWG aims to ensure fair and correct competition and includes unfair business practices and actions that can influence competition. It provides for both civil and criminal consequences for violations. Doctors can file injunction and damages lawsuits if health regulations are disregarded. [Extracted from the article]

The problem of quantifying the reputational damage resulting from unfair competition actions derives mainly from the lack of contextually established criteria. In the same sense, the lack of relevant judicial precedents amplifies the precarious state of the system of indicative benchmarks in order to assess the damage to reputation as a result of affecting the rights and legitimate interests of the victims of unfair competition actions. Foreign methodological systems for quantifying damages caused by unfair competition actions could represent points of reference for the domestic legislator in the idea of solving practical difficulties in the process of assessing damages caused by unfair competition actions. An eloquent example could be considered the French model for evaluating the economic damage resulting from actions of unfair competition, developed by notorious practitioners in the field in question. The methodological sheets are generically called „La réparation du préjudice économique. Fiches méthodologiques et glossaire - 3e édition (2024)". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article identifi es, systematizes the decisions taken by the Georgian Competition and Consumer Agency regarding digital markets/ competition and reviews the practices established by the Agency based on the said decisions. The introduction of the article highlights the signifi cant challenge of modern competition law, which implies that competition law does not exist independently of era and context, and it is important that competition law and its enforcement mechanisms function eff ectively in the conditions of the modern digital economy. The article then defi nes the digital economy and describes two of its key features, (big) data and digital platforms. A number of theoretical problems are then mentioned which may hinder the eff ective enforcement of competition law in relation to similar economic agents/markets. The main part of the article will concern the review of the decisions made by the Competition Agency in relation to online markets and digital platforms. Since there are currently no special legislative or by-law norms necessary for the eff ective enforcement of competition law in the digital age, the Competition Agency is guided by the general legislative framework regulating competition law to resolve similar issues. The analysis of the decisions revealed that the practice of the Agency develops in the direction of only two: (I) unfair competition (II) agreements restricting competition, and currently there is no, for example, a decision of the Competition Agency regarding the abuse of a dominant position by digital platforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document provides a summary of a court case in France involving the unauthorized resale of Chanel products. The court ruled that distributing free samples of the products does not give permission to sell them, and the trademark owner's rights are not exhausted. The court also determined that selling cosmetic products without their original packaging damages their condition and allows the trademark owner to oppose further marketing. The defendant's actions were classified as parasitic, as they involved comparing prices and inviting customers to test the products at the plaintiff's authorized retailer before purchasing them at a lower price from the defendant's shop. The appeal court upheld these rulings, dismissing the appeal and ordering the defendant to pay the costs. [Extracted from the article]

The 2022 Guidelines of the European Commission on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements regarding the working conditions of solo self-employed persons apparently introduced a fresh approach towards collective agreements in a gig economy era. The main aim of this paper is to discuss whether the 2022 Guidelines are an appropriate tool to address the problems of solo self-employed persons (i.e. persons who are not in a formal employment relationship and who rely primarily on their own personal labour to provide services) from the perspective of EU competition law. To this end, we first present key competition problems related to collective agreements (section 1). Second, we analyse the regulatory framework for exemptions from competition law, with a view for a potential exemption relevant for collective agreements, as well as an approach to collective agreements in EU case law (sections 2 and 3). Third, the background for adopting the Guidelines, and their goals, is analysed (sections 4 and 5). Fourth, the Guidelines are discussed in more detail in sections 6 and 7 from the perspective of exemptions from Art. 101(1) TFEU. Finally, we examine the relationship between the Guidelines and a proposal for a platform work directive. The article attempts to verify the hypothesis that the Guidelines may be considered a pseudo-development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Commercial & Intellectual Property Law (TFM) / Ticaret ve Fikri Mülkiyet Hukuku Dergisi is the property of Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, Facult of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Disagreement abounds on what exactly constitutes an 'abuse' within article 102 TFEU, EU competition law's prohibition of an abuse of a dominant position. This situation is highly undesirable, given the important role this prohibition is expected to play in alleviating concerns about substantial market power and its use in important sectors, typified by actions against 'Big Tech'. This article responds to this problem by analysing and synthesising the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union and its evolution to establish the constituent elements of an exclusionary 'abuse'. The article corrects crucial legal misconceptions, including the putative dichotomy between violations 'by object' and 'by effect'; the assumed disparate legal tests for pricing and non-pricing conduct; and the lost distinction between the 'as efficient competitor test' and the 'as efficient competitor standard'. This critical inquiry allows one to draw concrete predictions on the future development of this challenging, yet vital, area of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Computer und Recht is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The study aims to highlight the conditions that a product must meet in order to be protected by an indicative sign as well as the advantages conferred by means of protection through the prism of Community legislation and the CJEU jurisprudence. Indicative signs are marketing tools that contribute to the effective promotion of the product protected by a European and national quality system, intended to protect consumers against misleading practices aimed at misleading them about the geographical origin or production methods of the product, as well as producers against acts of unfair competition. Geographical indications, designations of origin and names of guaranteed traditional specialties allow consumers to trust and distinguish quality products, also helping producers in their marketing, in the case of the former, the connection between the specific geographical region and the name of the product being highlighted, in case a certain quality, reputation or other characteristic can be attributed essentially or exclusively to its geographical origin, as regards traditional specialties guaranteed, the link referring to the production method used over time in the determined geographical region with the quality and characteristics of the product protected by indicative sign. The protection of indicative signs is an effective tool to prevent the use of a name on the market, but this protection does not aim to limit the range of products available on the market, but to reserve a specific name for products that comply with the requirements of the specifications and that have a link clear geographical connection with a certain place, region or, as we have seen, in some cases, with the territory of a country, which does not prevent other producers from marketing the same type of product under a different name. It is unanimously accepted that the added value conferred by the indicative signs is based on the trust of consumers and only an effective protection system can guarantee them that a certain quality, characteristic or reputation of the products protected by the indicative sign are maintained for the entire duration of the protection period.

Automatic pricing algorithms with artificial intelligence (AI) technology in e-commerce have a significant impact on the running of the industry. This creates benefits as well as reaps polemics. Discrimination against consumers is one of them. For this reason, comprehensive treatment is needed to prevent negative impressions from occurring and can lead to the creation of justice and fairness. This research is normative qualitative research with the support of case and comparison approaches. The research results show that the algorithm uses AI to set prices based on market factors, production costs, and competition, providing price flexibility, price relevance, and increased business efficiency. Positive impacts include increased efficiency, price relevance, and consumer reach, while negative impacts involve the risk of discrimination and supervisory difficulties. Regulation and supervision are needed to maintain justice and legal balance. Unfair competitive practices, such as sudden price fluctuations, need to be monitored. Explicit regulations are needed to address the gap between AI developments and the existing legal framework. The implementation of automatic pricing algorithms must pay attention to aspects of justice and legal balance.

This study aims to find out the development of business competition law in Indonesia as stipulated in Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition and its impact on the dynamics of business competition in Indonesia after the enactment of Law Number 6 of 2023 on Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Government Regulation in Lieu of Law) Number 2 of 2022 concerning Job Creation into Law. This study uses a normative method with a statute approach and a library research approach. The formulation of the problem in this study is the development of business competition law in Indonesia after the enactment of the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law on Job Creation into Law and the impact of the enactment of Law Number 6 of 2023 on the dynamics of business competition in Indonesia. The results showed that the Business Competition Law in Indonesia experienced the first change in terms of substance after the enactment of Law Number 6 of 2023 on the Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 2 of 2022 concerning Job Creation into Law. These changes then led to a shift in the dynamics of the Competition Procedure Law, which was considered regressed.

Objectives Its aim is to justify the need for renewed scientific reflection on the issues of ethics and axiology in contemporary business, paying particular attention to the sphere of sales and services. Material and methods The research methodology used in the preparation of this study was subordinated to its main goal. Due to the theoretical and controversial nature of the article, non-reactive methods were selected for research. Content analysis of written and oral messages (disseminated via the media) and the desk research method, which involves the analysis of secondary sources, were used. The research procedure consisted of searching for information, collecting and analyzing the obtained data. The content of documents supplemented on an ongoing basis was compared with previously obtained materials. The sources of information used to write this article are interdisciplinary in nature. This is primarily scientific literature in the field of ethics, corporate social responsibility (CSR), sales promotion and marketing. The method of scientific inference was inductive. The descriptive analysis method was also used. Results A feature of modern sales activity is that it is not always integrated with the needs of stakeholders. This is contrary to ethics and the principles of corporate social responsibility. Conclusions Unethical ideas, behavior and actions must be vigorously opposed. Even seemingly minor manifestations of manipulation or actions, even those bordering on morality, may ultimately lead to further escalation of various types of abuse. company management should use a system of incentives for employees and control their activities. This should be achieved by clearly defined rules indicating the rightness or wrongness of specific conduct in the company.