An escalation of commitment perspective on allocation-of-effort decisions in professional selling

Salesforce compensation theory assumes that given proper design of the incentive structure, salespeople will rationally allocate effort to maximize returns to their firm and themselves. However, faced with large sunk investments over long selling cycles, salespeople continue to commit resources to opportunities with little or no chance of being won, to the exclusion of viable leads. This article theoretically explores and empirically tests this over-investment effect under four potentially moderating conditions using a large multinational corporation's industrial salesforce. The findings from this field study indicate that escalation of commitment is more likely to occur in non-strategic accounts and accounts not involving channel partners. In addition, salespeople with lower ability demonstrate greater escalation of commitment. The study indicates that without targeted managerial intervention, salespeople will over-invest precious selling resources in unprofitable, unwinnable opportunities.
Author(s): Robert Mayberry [sup.1] , James Sanders Boles [sup.2] , Naveen Donthu [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (Aff1) 0000 0004 1936 7400, grid.256304.6, Department of Marketing, J. Mack Robinson College of Business, [...]