In Turkey, democracy was inaugurated immediately after WW II. After its initiation, it has been interrupted by three short-lived military interventions: 1960-1961; 1971-1973; and 1980-1983. However, closer examination reveals a more striking pattern. On the one hand, when competitive elections are held, the corollary democratic institutional setup repeatedly failed to flourish. On the other hand, none of the three military interventions culminated in fully institutionalized authoritarian regimes. In Turkey, when democracy has existed, it has constantly oscillated between two largely proceduralist conceptions: 1) minimalist, entailing free and fair competitive elections with inclusive suffrage; and 2) polyarchy, where the political order is composed of competitive elections and institutions that ensure genuine political competition (e.g., by securing particular conditions such as freedom of expression, alternative information, and associational autonomy). In short, considering 5 years of total military interregna and 50 plus years of democratic experience, over the last 57 years, the Turkish political regime has oscillated within the extremes of a not well-institutionalized military regime and a polyarchy; mostly vacillating between polyarchy and minimalist democracy. I argue that this pattern of oscillation does not illustrate a movement in between regime types, but a regime type in itself: the consolidation of a middle-ground position. Described as such, this phenomenon begs for an explanation. Modernization, structural, and contingency theories of democratization are inadequate in explaining this phenomenon. Instead, I offer the following hypothesis: The tension inherent in Turkey’s hegemonic ideology (Kemalism) between modernist nationalism and liberal institutions accounts for the noninstitutionalized military rule, the nonconsolidated democratic rule, and the oscillation between them. In this hypothesis, the concept of hegemony, is employed as it is used in social/political theory in its intellectual continuity from Gramsci to Laclau and Mouffe. The employment of this concept helps me to establish necessary relations in order to understand the particular development of democracy in Turkey: the mutually reinforcing and constitutive relations in between ideas, institutions and actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]