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Paper Proposal for the 45th Annual ISA Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17-20, 2004: European Security after September 11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq Heinz Gärtner Traditional security thinking dominated the Cold War. Reliance on military capabilities was the primary strategy adopted to achieve greater security. In the new post-1989 world, and in particular post- 9/11, a broader and more complex concept of security has emerged. With the end of the Cold War, attention was thus given to building more sophisticated and integrated security concepts and developing frameworks designed to embrace a more comprehensive construct for security. The dramatic shift in threat perceptions brought about by the fall of communism have been confirmed by a wide variety of post-September 11 development: Wars between competing political ideologies and inter-state conflicts are no longer seen as the prime dangers to international security. The real security risks in the near future seem to come not from strong and stable governments but from failed and collapsed states. This paper examines both the impact of the developments before and after September 11 on both NATO and European Security, in particular on the concept of collective and territorial defense. By far the greatest proportions of the operational efforts of NATO and the European Union (EU) have already shifted away from collective defense. Crisis management is the paradigm that forms the cornerstone of the post-Cold War security system. Since the end of the East-West conflict NATO underwent a significant transformation process that has been speeded up by the terror attacks of September 11. Founded as a collective defense organization at the onset of the Cold War, NATO has revised its strategic concept to respond to the broader spectrum of the threats. The invocation of its Art. 5 security commitments for a war that took place not on NATO-territory changed the meaning of this article together with Art. 6 that prescribes this area. With NATO enlargement, a greater role for Moscow, NATO’s small military role in Afghanistan and Iraq, NATO seemed likely to lose military significance in international significance. NATO was at risk of becoming totally irrelevant in a world in which terrorism has become the principal strategic threat. So it had to give up more and more the old NATO, a collective security organization designed to protect Western Europe against Soviet invasion. At the Prague summit the heads of governments approved the formation of a Rapid-Response force of around 20,000 troops that would be deployable within 30 days wherever they are needed. In the framework of the Prague Capabilities Commitment individual countries will also have to commit themselves to provide specific equipment and expertise within set deadlines. In the case of Iraq Germany, France and Belgium blocked the start of NATO military planning to protect Turkey against the threat of an Iraqi missile attack. Subsequently, Turkey has requested consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, that states that NATO’s members will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any NATO country is threatened. With the post-cold war era NATO’s traditional role as a collective defense organization was coming to a close. NATO together with its PfP could become a military toolbox of allied forces. The European Union launched a 60,000-strong Rapid Reaction Force in 2001, is supposed to be up and running by 2003, but is struggling amid budget restrictions and affected by post-September 11 events, the war in Afghanistan and the pending war against Iraq. After the end of the East-West Conflict European deficiencies of military capabilities became more and more visible, however. One important reason lies in the legacy of the Cold War. During this period the European armies prepared for a confrontation with the major threat from the East in a collective effort to defend their territories. The conflicts and challenges after the end of the military bipolarity do not require massive, heavy-metal European armies, not suited for transport and projections to distant places, but rapid reaction forces with flexible structure and light weapons, deployable over great distances, equipped with modern communication assets to coordinate their actions, surveillance and reconnaissance facilities. A draft report of the Presidium the European Convention provided recommendations and the wording of new articles for the Treaty of The Convention. The report recognizes that the concept of security is very broad, by nature indivisible, and one that goes beyond the purely military aspects covering not only the security of States but also the security of citizens. On the basis of this broad concept of security, the common foreign and security policy and the European Security and Defense Policy. It allows the Union military options over and above the civil instruments of crisis prevention and management. Within this broad concept of security, disarmament occupies an essential place. In the area of crisis management there is the danger of duplication of NATO and EU capabilities and missions. Division of labor and role specialization could avoid it on the one hand, and cooperation in certain areas such as common command structure for crisis management on the other. There must be appropriate division of labour. The wars in Kazoo, Afghanistan and Iraq showed that the overwhelming U.S. contribution is war-fighting capability - what is by comparison a limited European contribution. In this the gap between the military capabilities of the U.S. and the rest of the world is huge and is growing. However, a capability to act does not only imply war fighting. Europeans are more designed for peacekeeping, humanitarian action, disaster relief and post-conflict reconstruction rather than the rapid deployment of larger forces over long distances. The United States will need to continue to project forces in high-intensity conflict. There should be some risk- and responsibility sharing, however. European states should keep a minimum level of participation in all phases of an operation. As Europeans should keep and develop some war fighting capability U.S.-troops also should participate at least at a minimal level in lower end peace support operations. They should not be reduced to war fighting alone but demonstrate that they are able to do humanitarian and rescue and peacekeeping operations. Hence, despite the transatlantic differences, there is clearly consensus among some of the EU Member States and the United States on the need to develop force planning and strategies for ‘ad-hoc’ coalitions of the willing that can have access to NATO and EU economic, military and human assets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper undertakes a reading of the UK government’s recent white paper, Secure Borders, Safe Havens. The aim is to investigate the politics of in/security by comparing it not with the geopolitics of the Cold War but with the politics and discourse of social security. The paper concludes by proposing a concept of ‘domopolitics’ to make sense of the identities and practices present in British immigration debates, but also in the US experience of ‘homeland’ security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Who gains the greater political advantage from new information technologies -- states (and some states more than others?), individuals, firms, or some novel form of organization? States function effectively in part because of their ability to accumulate, process, store, use and monopolize information. The rational-bureaucratic institutions of the modern state are, in essence, vast human-machine information processing devices. As state power is dependent on information and the systems for managing it, a massive shift in the underlying information infrastructure will, logically, have to threaten states, or, construing the question more narrowly, threaten national security. This paper will investigate the nature of that threat. I disaggregate the potential threats to national security into four conceptual categories: specific internal threats to regime survival, specific external threats to regime survival, specific threats to the physical security of citizens, and the general threat to nation-stateness itself. Each of these threats intersects with a different aspect of the new media. The paper lays out the case for considering each of these threats separately and then points towards evidence to help us evaluate the severity of each. My goal is to identify the mechanisms linking possible technological trajectories to particular political outcomes. The most important message, though, is disaggregation itself -- of both information technologies and threats. Although information revolution enthusiasts envision a seamless, ubiquitous digital future, different portions of new information technologies will affect different states differently. The trajectory of technologies themselves are still open to huge amounts of social and political influence, so the kind of national security threat information technology becomes, will be a consequence of the kind of information technology we make. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the relationship between power and knowledge in the context of the construction of security in Australia. Specifically, it seeks to apply critical theoretical approaches to security to the Australian government’s security discourse regarding asylum-seekers in 2001 and terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2002. It is argued in this paper that perceptions of the provision of security are central to the political legitimacy of states. In particular, specific actions on the part of governments may be enabled by perceptions among their citizens that these actions maintain or further their security. If we accept this point, then the crucial question becomes: how do certain meanings of security come to resonate with particular populations in particular contexts? It is argued here that we can further our understanding of this process through acknowledging relationships between power and knowledge, and specifically the role of governments in creating contexts in which particular meanings of security become resonant. Through applying such an approach to the Australian government’s depiction of asylum-seekers and its response to terrorist attacks in New York and particularly Bali, we can move towards a greater understanding of the ways in which security is constructed and of the relationship between security and political legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper identifies and examines a number of long-term trends reshaping the security environment in the Taiwan Strait in ways that might produce a military conflict. Focusing on long-term trends is a useful analytical approach that highlights the possibility that political leaders may knowingly take risky actions in response to perceptions that adverse trends are eroding their security. Taiwan?s democratic transition and growing sense of a separate Taiwan identity have changed the political considerations governing Taiwan?s policy toward the mainland. China worries about growing pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan, but lacks the political tools to build support for unification. As a result, China has sought to deter movement toward Taiwan independence while developing the military capabilities to deter U.S. intervention in support of Taiwan. China?s goal is to force the United States to choose between continuing its support for Taiwan or sacrificing Chinese cooperation on economic and security issues. The perceived Chinese military threat to Taiwan has caused the United States to increase its support for Taiwan, included increased security cooperation. These trends are gradually undercutting the basis for the ?one China? framework that has served U.S. interests effectively for the past thirty years. The paper examines these long-term trends and assesses their implications for the stability of the security environment in the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do ‘humanitarian’ crises threaten states? I connect the ?humanitarian? impulse of an intervening state to the self-identity and corresponding ontological security interests of states. Through a comparison with the ?traditional? notion of survival-based security, the paper develops ontological security as a more comprehensive, sometimes competing state drive. I also introduce the concept of shame as it relates to the self-identity of states, and discuss how shame can compel a state to change its policy even if the material structures of world politics remain constant. The paper then discusses factors that impede or enable states to achieve ontological security. I then use an ontological security framework to interpret how past foreign policy decisions motivated Western powers to ?reform? their routines to accommodate crises in Kosovo and Liberia, and discuss the costs to using a minimalist approach to ?humanitarian? intervention. The paper concludes with some normative and ontological proposals for the further development of an ontological security research program. I argue that if there are costs to ignoring threats to ontological security, then there are also benefits to ?structuring? routines to battle these threats as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research on unregulated population movements suggests that illegal migration and undocumented migration for labor and other purposes is on the rise in Northeast Asia, and is demanding the attention of regional policy-makers. The last decade has also witnessed an increase in the criminalization of migration in the lucrative form of human trafficking, often related women and girls for prostitution. This paper reviews the scholarly debate on the linkages between security and migration, including how illegal migration has been incorporated into the discussion on traditional and non-traditional security, and human security. The emergence of illegal migration as a security issue in the European Union is discussed before a consideration of whether, and how, illegal migration has been defined as a "security" issue among politicians and policy-makers in Northeast Asia. The so-called Copenhagen School?s framework of "securitization" is discussed in relation to how securitization could be applied to specific cases of illegal migration and unregulated population flows within and from Northeast Asia. Finally, the paper draws some conclusions regarding the implications and lessons for regional cooperation on illegal migration in Northeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Case studies on Clinton Administration national security policymaking are an important area for policy relevant research. During the 1990s, there were various attempts by the Clinton Administration to innovate in national security policymaking. Innovations were attempted in peace operations, the interagency process, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Were the 1990s Clinton policy leadership efforts in stopping the threats of WMD proliferation in North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq all policy failures that could have been prevented? Could more effective Clinton Administration policy leadership have made US counterproliferation efforts more successful? This paper focuses on the Clinton Administration?s Counterproliferation Policy Initiative in the 1994 North Korean Agreed Framework Case. The case uses coercive diplomacy theory to examine the existence of a theory-practice gap in assessing Clinton Administration top-down leadership in the 1994 North Korean crisis. This paper?s findings suggest a relatively effective linkage of theory and practice, however, the result is a short term rather than long term policy success. Additional case studies are necessary to further assess the effectiveness of Clinton era executive leadership patterns in Counterproliferation Initiative policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes as its starting point the observation that bordering practices in global politics are less and less straightforwardly related to territorial sites. That is to say, bordering practices, understood as controls on the movement of subjects, are not only found at territorially identifiable locations such as ports, airports and traditional crossings between states. Rather, they are increasingly ephemeral and impalpable: electronic, non-visible and located in zones that defy a conventional territorial logic. Examples include biometric identification to control movement and technologies to track movement such as social security data, financial transaction data and similar GPS based records of activity. Furthermore, the rise of international border management agencies, such as BORTAC in the US and FRONTEX in the EU context, has led to the proliferation of border simulation exercises. These innovations in the international politics of border management challenge conventional assumptions about the relation between territory, bordering practices and 'reality', which often underpin theoretical starting points in the study of global security. With this in mind, the paper investigates the analytical purchase of the concept of the virtual for understanding these practices. It marries insights on the concept of the virtual offered by Jean Baudrillard with Michel Foucault's understanding of 'security' and Giorgio Agamben's treatment of the sovereign ban and bare life. I argue that a global regime of virtual border security relies upon the simulation of the ban in order to attempt to produce the effect of maximum security in the West. However, this attempt is shown to constantly backfire, leading to the vary forms of insecurity systems of resilience strive to eradicate. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses political and technological aspects of cyber terrorism. Though the term "cyber terrorism" has become widely used, the range of meanings attributed to it is expansive. This paper tries to differentiate among various similar concepts of cyber attacks and outlines what can be done. Cyber attacks are not only physical attacks (body war) such as the demolition of a dam or the crash of airplanes, but also psychological attacks (head war) that are intended to impact people's minds. The latter could have longer and even irreversible effects. In order to counter these attacks policy makers need to understand the cultural gaps between government culture and geek culture. Our social systems including national security are increasingly dependent on geeks' technologies. If governments could involve geeks, effective measures would be possible to track cyber warriors. It is easier to stop the Internet, but cyber terrorists will never stop it, because it is the terrorists that are taking advantage of it. Policy makers must establish a better relationship with people who know technologies well. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the global health implications of security-oriented regulation of laboratory research on pathogenic micro-organisms. The challenge with such regulation, implemented to address government concerns about biological weapons use, is to maximise security benefits while minimising interference with legitimate scientific research conducted for therapeutic ends. The biotechnology sector performs basic research on infectious diseases, produces vaccines and other drugs, and instructs health professionals on how to use them. Too much biosecurity regulation might cripple commercial and academic enterprise in the life sciences and thereby diminish the ability of public health systemsâ??particularly their diagnostic and patient care elementsâ??to respond to an infectious disease outbreak. It may also hinder valuable international collaborations on addressing local and transnational infectious disease threats. On the other hand, the potential application of gene technology for offensive purposes highlights the powerful position held by scientists with access to pathogens and knowledge of what makes them dangerous. The paper compares biosecurity regulatory schemes in the United States and Australia, and offers more general observations about health and security trade-offs in a global context. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper approaches the issue of forecasting in international affairs theoretically and empirically. In the theoretical section, the paper discussed the epistemological and normative problems arising when attempting to forecast international events, but concludes that forecasting is both scientifically rewarding as well as normatively desirable. It then proceeds to argue that constructivist theories of strategic culture and norms regarding the use of force can act in conjunction with insights about capabilities and future security challenges as a mid-range theory to account for the evolution of the EU as a security actor. This proposition is elaborated empirically by drawing on the empirical findings of comparative strategic culture research to generate some forecasts concerning the goals the EU is likely to pursue and the capabilities it is likely to acquire. It does so by highlighting opportunities for foresighted policy as well as dangers inherent in ignoring some of limitations in terms of future capabilities and common will. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some in the literature on the Democratic Peace, particularly John Owen, have suggested that the underlying mechanisms of the democratic peace function both with other democracies and with non-democracies. Unfortunately, the mechanisms of the democratic peace remain ambiguous. Constructivist work on the democratic peace, and security in general, has made significant headway in exploring the mechanisms that drive the phenomenon, but significant gaps remain. In particular, while constructivist scholars have shed considerable light on the construction of security within the mind of leaders, little work has been done on how democratic leaders convey those constructions to the public. The paper seeks to address this lacuna. Using the Copenhagen School's securitization framework, this paper focuses on the role of identity in how democratic political leaders construct security threats. The paper also seeks to link the construction of threat in the mind of policy maker with the construction of threat in the public. To do so, a case study is made of the buildup to British involvement in Iraq. The conclusions are significant. The paper finds that at the personal level, Tony Blair relied on identity as a critical marker indicating potential threat. In turn, Blair used the language of identity in his efforts to securitize Iraq to the public. While there are some indications that he was successful, there are also indications that the democratic identity of Britons also served to block support of unilateral action. For the public, the role of identity is complex, and while the public democratic identity is clearly powerful, it operates in nuanced ways. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a social theory perspective, social actors produce and draw on collective ideations to make sense of the world, and to situate their practices therein. Seen from a critical vantage point however, the establishment of such ideations is often not the product of very inclusive or 'democratic' elaboration efforts - depending on the empirical issue-area in question, certain actors tend to stand in considerably more privileged positions than others to authoritatively define and prescribe specific collective ideations. Based on questionnaire and interview data, this paper draws on Pierre Bourdieu's notion of the field to illustrate and analyse the distribution of such authorities in the production of national security rationales in what I call the 'field of Swiss national security professionals': What governmental, partisan and civil society actors are being recognised as valid authorities of national security? How is national insecurity being defined, what foreign policy implications are being professed, and what 'ideational positions' do these different actors seize in these two interrelated debates? And last but not least, layering the two previous discussions atop each other, to what extent are the recognised authorities actually successful in imposing their national security views on the field's remainder? By determining the uneven recognised expert authority that different actors enjoy in contemporary Switzerland and by mapping and contrasting the different ideational positions adopted by them, the paper seeks to answer these questions and with it, to contribute a first sketch of the social and ideational power relations at play in the field of the Swiss national security professionals. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European renewable energy policy has gone through a remarkable development over the last few years. It has moved from being a predominantly national-level concern with a focus on environmental issues to a top European policy agenda item where security of supply and competitiveness concerns figure with equal prominence. In 2007 and 2008 EU established a very forceful policy framework with ambitious targets and strategies binding to all its member states. This paper examines European renewable energy policy development with a specific focus on the choice of policy instruments to promote renewable sources of energy in power and heat production. The paper traces key policy developments over the last decade and analyzes the role and influence of different interest groups, member states and policy makers in the EU policy-making processes, and how different - and partly competing - policy agendas have played in over time. From these empirical observations we look ahead. Based on key factors and agendas behind current policy developments, what can be said about what directions European energy policy might take in the future? The outlook discusses four distinct policy dimensions that will shape the direction of European energy policy: the climate policy agenda overall; the relative influence of different interests in shaping policy, the balance between European-wide and member state governance, and the level at which further market orientation is pursued in the sector. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper undertakes an assessment of the 'security as emancipation' discourse, within the general context of politicization promoted by the critical turn in security studies. It does so by: a) analyzing the debate that has been sparked by 'security as emancipation' and investigating how this discourse has responded to the criticisms wielded against it; and b) gauging the potential of 'security as emancipation' and identifying weaknesses and inconsistencies that need to be addressed. Three general conclusions will be advanced: firstly the 'security as emancipation' discourse has proved to be much more complex and nuanced than its critics purport. Secondly, the framework put forward by 'security as emancipation' - in its combination of an attention towards materiality, an awareness of the social nature of 'threat' and an understanding of security knowledge as deriving from interests and oriented by political goals - offers a privileged pathway towards the critical project of politicizing security. Thirdly, a reconsideration of 'security as emancipation' is necessary, and must encompass a more developed account of the interconnection between security, politics and subjectivity.The paper is divided in two parts. The first part presents the 'state of the debate': it introduces 'security as emancipation', identifies the criticisms it has sparked, analyzes the theoretical context of these criticisms and demonstrates that recent formulations of 'security as emancipation' successfully deal with the objections raised (I). The second part provides a deeper engagement with 'security as emancipation': on the one hand, it undertakes a reflection about the potentiality of 'security as emancipation' within the general context of politicization of security; on the other hand, it assesses the shortcomings of current formulations. The objective is to show that an explicitly normative approach to security committed to the positive transformation of the political sphere must take into account the interconnection between security, subjectivity and politics, and hence the politics of the subject of security (II). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the intensification of anti-immigration measures in Minnesota, first, as effective performances of biopolitical statecraft, i.e., as speech-acts that produce local agents of "national security" whose role is to secure "American society" against the perceived threats posed by foreign bodies. Blurring the boundaries between war and law enforcement, these agents defend the body politic against the parasitic and insidious bodies of immigrants by mapping local spaces and communities (thereby rendering potentially hazardous bodies visible), by inoculating, weakening, or purging bodies deemed hazardous (e.g., through surveillance, incarceration, deportation, and killing, and by threatening all of these tactics), and by regulating the everyday lives of Minnesota residents. Secondly, the paper analyses these orders and orderings as effects of the nationalist or, more accurately, nation-statist backlash against the boundary-blurring movements and migrations animated by the post-nationalist economic logic of global capitalism. Drawing on Foucault's recently translated lectures, I argue that the resurgence of nationalist populism in Minnesota, and in the U.S. more broadly, restages a xenophobic, "neo-racist" fantasy. The new populist movement strives to domesticate the U.S. war machine in order to police and defend the borders, internal and external, of an imagined American nation. Finally, drawing on Derrida, Althusser, and Lacan, I demonstrate the ways in which anti-immigrant populism is fueled by failure, and particularly by the failure to realize the fantasy of ethno-national harmony through representational practices and physical violence. I argue that the "American nation" cannot be defended because, in the last analysis, it does not exist. It is anxiety stemming from its absence, I suggest, that fuels the productive activities of the police state. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses the role of the private company in the fight against terrorism. It argues that the private company has become political important for counter-terrorism, but that the economic logic of the company is hardly compatible with the aim of providing national security. By examining how corporate actors conceptualize the risk of terrorism, the paper investigates whether it is possible for a private company to assume responsibility in the fight against terrorism; and what political dilemmas that arise when the private company is given a political role in the provision of national security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on two specific situations (the response by security forces to radical social mobilization in Oaxaca, and the militarized "war on drugs"), and recurring to the notions of "pressure from above" and "argumentation", this papers offers a systematic account of the international attention/preoccupation, and the related debates and discussions, that have emerged around the tensions between security and human rights during the first year of the presidency of Felipe Calderón. How strong is this international concern? What are the characteristics of the discussions or the debates implied? What do we make of all this? Does it matter? The paper shows that the Mexican government is not under significant international pressure to modify its approach to human rights within its security agenda. The paper also shows that the discussions about human rights and security cannot be considered as "true argumentation". This implies that international concern and the related discussions or debates are not significant, and that therefore international actors and the processes they generate are not making a determinant contribution to the definition of the Mexican government's approach to human rights within its security agenda. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democratic regimes and institutions are often faced with dilemmas between conflicting values, principles and needs. In wartime, states of emergency and more largely in time of high insecurity, the existing tensions are amplified. Many authors have thus deduced from this that democracy and wars were two incompatible elements (Rossiter 1948) and this, especially when wars tend to last (Tocqueville, 1835). By a mobilisation of both theories of democracy and security theories, this paper seeks to assess the relevance of such assertion. More precisely, it aims at answering the following questions: How do democratic actors act and react within the context of protracted insecurity? What impact does it have on the state of basic rights and liberties in the long term? Is the entire citizenry affected by the curtailment of their rights to the same extent or is the principle of "inclusive citizenship" or the right of permanent residents in a country to enjoy the same rights and liberty granted to the other citizens (Dahl 1998, 85) challenged in such times? Finally, what does it tell us on the capacity of a democracy to hold in times of emergency? In order to do this, the paper examines the Israeli state, the only case of a proclaimed democracy, which has known a constant state of emergency since its formation. Despite its specificity, the study of the Israeli experience can help us comprehending the processes and mechanisms that are developing in democracies, where insecurity dominates public and social life. For what is at stake is the democratic regime itself, only the internal effect of the protracted insecurity are analysed, excluding from the study the situation within the Palestinian territories. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper conceptualises security as a (meta)discourse of violence that masks violence in the name of counter-violence, killing in the name of protection. As the case of Hindutva in India illustrates, violence against minorities is normalised in the name of personal, communal, national and even international security. The will to secure the Self has as its corollary the will to insecure the Other, the desire to control and use violence. Using the example of anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat in 2002, the paper examines some of the ways in which a stereotypical image of Muslim men (the figure of 'The Muslim') is seen as constituting the danger against which the Hindu body politic needs to be secured. The violence against minority Muslims is facilitated and justified in the name of achieving security for the Hindu Self at individual, community, national as well as international levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Latin American countries do not define their security agenda. In fact the regional presence of the United States conditions the security agendas of the countries in the region and their capacity to establish autonomous national policies on the global , regional and sub regional spheres. Nevertheless the regional integration process in the southern cone and the international role that Brazil has been signaling it would like to play since the transition to democracy have allowed the governments of Brazil and Argentina to define some strategic orientations. During the last fifteen years the civil authorities have established some defense and security policies in the absence of direct intervention on the part of the armed forces, in contrast to previous periods. In this paper we shall analyze the conceptual sources incorporated by the political elite in both Argentina and Brazil and the means and resources available for decision making in the security sphere in these countries . We shall investigate the process of securitization in the regional context taking into account the interaction between endogenous and exogenous variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks by the non-state network al Qaeda against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have had a transformative effect on the discourse of security within the United States. The Bush administration has declared terrorism an existential threat, a challenge as formidable as any ever faced our country. To be sure, the U.S. response to 9/11 may not seem at all surprising in the wake of the significant number casualties resulting from the 9/11 attacks, but it raises the question as to why this particular form of violence generates an existential threat to the state whilst other more common and indeed more deadly forms of domestic violence such as homicide (ca. 16,000 deaths in 2001 in the U.S.) or the flue (responsible for an average of 36,000 deaths per year in the U.S. alone) do not receive similar public attention. Given the many threats faced by individuals in the course of everyday activities that are more likely to cause death than terrorism, the mechanism by which terrorists convert violence against individuals and property into terror and a national security problem is not particularly well understood. This paper seeks to explain the threat of terrorism and the U.S. government’s response to 9/11 not as a challenge to the state’s or individual’s physical security (though violence plays a role), but rather as a threat to ontological security. Ontological security describes a basic need of individuals for stable expectations about the rules governing social interaction, a predictable foundational normative order within which states and individuals ground their identities and through which the ever-present risks of ordinary activities are kept at bay. It argues that terrorism both manipulates and disrupts ontological security by taking advantage of expectations of stability and dependence on normal appearances to make salient simultaneously the threats of death and chaos. By operating clandestinely and perpetrating violence outside the realm of normal expectations, terrorism creates a pervasive sense of generalized threat in which the continued salience of mortality on the micro level threatens the cohesiveness of society and thereby the foundation and purpose of the state at the macro level. States respond to the ontological security threat through securitization, the discourse and practice of security, transforming the experience of uncertainty and chaos posed by the invisible yet omnipresent terrorists in our midst into a concrete enemy against which the full powers of the state can be arrayed. Perhaps ironically, much of what comes to be understood as the threat of terrorism flows not from the terrorists themselves but rather from terrorism’s interpretation by government officials and the need to convey the seriousness of the threat in order to legitimize a response. At the level of individuals, the threat to ontological security, rather than undermining the authority of the state, results in an increased dependence upon the state and its expertise in the provision of security. Paradoxically, given the flexible nature of terrorism and the difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures, the state’s response to terrorism may reassure while having little if any effect on physical security?or worse yet, unwittingly contribute to greater insecurity by provoking aggression through increased military actions abroad. Following the theoretical development of the micro foundations and macro implications of ontological security and its link to securitization, I present a case study of 9/11 and the conditions facilitating the securitization of terror in the U.S. and its implications for policy and the practice of security more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that globalization undermines the organizational capacity of the post-imperial state to effectively organize, manage and control its security institutions. As a result, globalization helps to blur the difference between various types of security functions and undermines the state’s ability to effectively deal with transnational security threats and non-state actors. Evidence from security trends in the post-Soviet states illustrates the argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper criticises the traditional realist distinction between high politics (sovereignty and security matters) and low politics (economics and other less important state activities) on several grounds. First, it ignores the economic underpinnings of military power and national security. Second, it overestimates the independence states have both from the international economy and from domestic political opposition when mobilizing economic resources in support of security objectives. Finally, it glosses over the potential for states to achieve national security objectives in an interdependent world economy by using economic instruments, such as economic sanctions and economic incentives. This article, therefore, makes the case for treating the political economy of national security as a distinct subfield of security studies for both teaching and research purposes. It identifies a unique set of political economy issues that have a direct bearing on national security calculations. It reviews both the classical geopolitics literature and a growing literature by contemporary international relations scholars that address these issues in an effort to bridge the chasm between political economy and security. Finally, it suggests avenues of further research to flesh out the conditions under which domestic and international economic factors affect the pursuit of national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reviews of research in political science, sociology, and psychology suggest that migration is an important factor in interethnic conflict, yet the magnitude of migration’s impact on intergroup hostility and violence remains a major theoretical and empirical puzzle. This project takes on a challenge identified by one review as understanding why migration may be viewed as undermining national security, how threats are constructed, and why boon is transformed into bane. A particular problem is not even so much how to explain variation in fear, but in fear exaggeration. Drawing on studies in international relations, sociology, and social psychology, I present an explanation of anti-migrant hostility based on the idea that threat exaggeration follows the logic similar to that of the interethnic security dilemma. From this perspective, migration will be plausibly seen as an exaggerated threat to national or group security, if it is associated with (a) perceptions of emergent anarchy (government decline and shifts in ethnic balance); (b) offensive (illegal settlement, territorial claims) and defensive (legal trade, business) intent of migrants are indistinguishable and migrants are seen as having an offensive advantage (capacity to dissolve into the host state); (c) perceptions that migrants form a distinct, distant, and cohesive group (groupness); and (d) perceptions of relative economic deprivation and negative socioeconomic impact of migrants. The paper presents two empirical tests of these ideas-a quantitative test based on multiple regression analysis of the Primorskii krai 2000 Survey (N=1,010) and a qualitative, case-based comparison of official statements and media content in Russia’s border regions facing significant in-migration of non-Slavic ethnic groups (Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar krai, Kazakhs in Volgograd oblast, South Asian ethnics in Orenburg oblast, and the Vietnamese in Tver oblast). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bill Clinton in 1998 set up the first institutions and strategies of a U.S. cyber-security policy. The focus at that time was very much on cyberterrorism. Under George W. Bush, the discourse over cyber threats took three new turns. The first one came immediately after the election, when suddenly nation-states like China received much more attention in the cyber-threat debate. The second turn came after the attacks on 11 September 2001, and brought cyberterrorism back onto the security political radar. Now, with Iraq and Norht Korea on top of the security agenda, the debate seems to turn back towards states as possible cyber enemies again. How are these discourse serpentines linked to the real problem, if at all? This paper will provide some insight on the possible reasons for the change in perception of the cyber threat. It will show that the debate over the danger from cyberspace in the general public as well as in the political elites is decoupled from the real-world cyber-threat developments and in a postmodern way really is a virtual debate. In the end, we will see that "cyber-" has more to do with discursive trends and hidden agendas than with electronic terrorism or digital enemies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the hypothesis that the social reproduction of affluence tends to intensify national and human in/security, a contradiction that is projected on a universal scale by US strategies of world order. In the context of the hierarchy of social and political forces in a global order configured by disciplinary neo-liberalism, an exploration of the US political economy is crucial. This is partly because American lifestyles are increasingly energy-intensive, consumerist, individualist and premised on forms of social Darwinism that entail restructuring of social institutions and patterns of social risk. This, along with the shock associated with the mega-terrorist attacks of 9/11, as well as violence within US society, have led to generalized and growing perceptions of increasing insecurity. Here, one of the paradoxes of intensified globalization is that there appears to be an inverse correlation between the wealth held by individuals and their sense of personal security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of strategic culture as employed in this project is constructed from two factors, the concept of security and operational principles. Together these serve, along with the socio-historic environment, as intervening variables which mediate between the independent variable of relative power and the dependent variable of grand strategy. The key question which informs this paper is whether the evolution, presentation, and interpretation of human security within the relevant departments of the Government of Canada (notably DFAIT and CIDA) then carried over to inform and affect the definition of mandate and of threat as well as the policies, procedures, planning, deployment, and operating principles and practices of Canada?s Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces? In particular we are interested in whether and, if so, in what ways the discourses on security and the operational principles informing the deployment and application of military force (and other forms of coercive means such as police or special forces) incorporated or were affected by the emergence of the ideas of human security and their incorporation into the international security discourse of DFAIT, the department which leads on Canada?s role in international affairs. Further, it will be of interest to explore the extent to which the internationalization of the human security discourse and policy objectives, as they were adopted and enunciated by a variety of countries including those who are members of the Human Security Network, contributed to the saliency of human security thinking within both policy and operational branches of the Canadian government. Did this have any impact on the security or strategic culture within the Department of National Defence? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uganda is no longer a classic ‘African’ nightmare, having successfully transformed itself from 15 years of civil wars to 15 years of rapid growth: now an alternative African ‘model’ or ‘miracle’? However, it has experienced more economic than political liberalization; and its democratization is incomplete or problematic. Moreover, rapid growth in the south contrasts with residual conflict around the borders in the north: what scenarios for the rest of the first decade of the new century? The paper includes a thumbnail sketch of regional development around Mbarara. The case of contemporary Uganda contains lessons for African & other state & non-state policy-makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates in security studies in the U.S. and Europe have drifted almost completely apart. In Europe it is common to present the theoretical landscape in terms of, say, critical security studies, the Copenhagen School, traditionalism and feminism. In the U.S. it is more common to see the major debate within security studies as being the one between offensive realism and defensive realism! Previously, almost all theoretical inventions in IR were made in the U.S. Currently, distinct theories are widely associated with places like Aberystwyth (Critical Security Studies), Paris (Bigo’s Bourdieu-inspired work) and Copenhagen (securitization). The new European approaches differ not only from security studies in the US, they also stand apart from most work done in other parts of the world. Are these theories peculiarly ‘European’ and if so, why? The paper aims at explaining the emergence of these European security theories. The explanation draws partly on the political context in the different regions, and partly on features of the intellectual fields, International Relations and Security Studies. The theories are also assessed briefly as to their relevance and usefulness. To what extent are they bound to local, European problems or relevant to the issues that are addressed elsewhere and vice-versa for the theories that flourish in the U.S. and the periphery respectively? Can they travel to the other parts of the world in a helpful role? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dynamic changes in International Relations after the fall of totalitarian regime in Iraq have a profound effect on Russia and pose new questions its policy-makers. The reality is that the US war in Iraq attracted the support of the Kurds alienated by the often-brutal tactics previously adopted by the several states. The year of 2003 made the Kurdish issue to be seen as an important combination of different factors that are of crucial importance for providing stability in the vulnerable Middle-East region and in Turkey, which is close to Russia’s southern borders. The paper analyzes some regional aspects of this international problem and clarifies how and to what extent the Kurdish question influence Russian foreign policy. There are some observations, explanations, scenarios and suggestions in the conclusion [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an enquiry into the dynamics of the theory, process, and debate of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and its impact on the security, defense planning, and military modernization trajectories of advanced small states - those that have the means, motives, and capacity to pursue the RMA such as Israel. Its purpose is to describe, analyze, and explain the Israeli RMA perceptions, processes, problems and outcomes during 1995-2008. In doing so, the study attempts to explain how Israel is responding or has responded to the changing dynamics of the RMA, and particularly, how the country attempts to leverage RMA concepts and capabilities in its force modernization trajectory. Accordingly, the study aims to expand the boundaries of the predominantly U.S.-centered literature on the RMA by providing a comparative perspective on the applicability of the RMA in divergent security environments and strategic settings. Its underlying premise is that risks and opportunities linked with the RMA theory and processes are not confined solely to the U.S context - RMA-related concepts and technologies continue to evolve and drive military modernization programs in many parts of the world, albeit in different magnitude, which has significant implications not only on how military organizations operate, but also on regional military balance, security policies, and the application of force. Therefore, if national security planners are to make appropriate strategic decisions, they need to understand how advanced small states and middle powers in world's major hotspots view the RMA in their force modernization programs, and its security ramifications. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper is a theoretical discussion regarding the latest trend within security studies and discourses to ‘securitize’ all realms of societal life in order to face the challenges of the 21st Century. Nevertheless, reflecting on this trend from a gender p ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's post-Cold War security policy has largely revolved around the question of how to respond North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. As a primary response, Japan has participated in the Six-Party Talks, which have aimed at promoting North Korea's denuclearization and building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. Japan has had the ability to provide North Korea with strong economic incentives to change its policy stance. However, Japan has failed to use the economic card very effectively. In my paper, I will examine factors behind the failure. Then, I will consider what Japan should do in order to play a more positive role in building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, with a particular attention to the opportunities and constraints resulting from political changes in the United States and South Korea. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that in the Canadian context, human security descended from a grand design of foreign policy premised on national values and interests, and an internationalist approach. However, human security became immersed in an unnecessary struggle to distinguish a new 'paradigm,' alienating many who may otherwise have come to see the term as useful and constructive. It became a polarizing theme in Canadian foreign policy as the government presented it as a novel approach, rather than one grounded firmly in the strategy of Canada's foreign relations. Despite the ensuing controversy over its use, and the current Conservative government's attempt to set itself apart from the Liberal legacy, I conclude that the human security agenda remains largely intact with the current government, though without explicit reference to the term. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

British foreign and domestic security policy towards Islamist extremism since 2001 has been shaped a kind of "secular ambivalence" within the policy process. This ideological phenomena is a by-product of domestic forces, in particular the evolution of British Christo-secularism since the 1960s. This is not confined to the United Kingdom, but is the response of a Christo-secular state to "religious violence" in the late modern period. This paper will lay out the defining characteristics of secular ambivalence as an unofficial ideological position. It will then explore the British encounter with the Mehdi Army in Iraq between 2003 and 2004 as an illustrative example of secular ambivalence in action. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While almost a decade old, Ted Hopf's observation that the democratic peace is an observation in search of a theory still has some validity. In particular, the mechanisms behind the observed lack of war between democracies are poorly understood, making it difficult for scholars to provide a compelling explanation. While there has been some innovative work, particularly with respect to learning and the ability of an increasing number of democracies to cement democratic norms, Müller and Wolff note that normative and structural explanations are monadic explanations for a dyadic phenomenon. Underappreciated in the existing work is the role of identity and the importance this has for driving the democratic peace. With a focus on developing a dyadic democratic peace mechanism and using a case study approach, this paper utilizes the Copenhagen School's securitization framework to examine how identity plays out in the U.S. response to the Indian and Iranian nuclear programs. It finds that in fact identity does play a significant role in how security policy is constructed. The potential implications of this finding, particularly on policy, are significant. If the democratic peace does rely on identity to trigger the constraining norms that limit the escalation of conflict to violence, it is unlikely the democratic peace can be spread by force and it is possible that states nominally democratic can be excluded from the community of democracies if their behavior or significant other aspects of their perceived identity are at variance with the accepted democratic identity standard. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the development of jihadi ideology with respect to the state andexternal threats in Egypt from the early 1980s until the present. It focuses on theideas of two main jihadi groups, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) and Tanzimal-Jihad (Jihad Organisation), using the lens of security studies. Jihadi groups arenormally viewed from the perspective of the state as security threats, but I argue thatthey can be fruitfully approached as 'securitising agents' themselves. Thisperspective engages with both the 'broadening' approach of the Copenhagen Schoolof security studies, as well as the 'deepening' agenda of critical theory. Althougheach approach can be shown to have significant drawbacks, I argue for theexplanatory utility of combining elements of each through a study of the Egyptiancase. I argue that several security agendas, with attendant threats and enemies, havebeen elaborated in Egypt, and that jihadi discourse has interacted with these agendasin important ways. One important point of intersection between these securityagendas has been the question of Israel and, to a lesser extent, the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concepts of identity and security have served as departure points in critical approaches to international relations since the end of the Cold War. In nearly all studies they are interlinked, yet almost inevitably one is prioritized over the other. The paper discusses how in critical approaches to security prioritize security over identity, by conceptualizing identity either as a subject of security discourses or as a referent object of acts of securitization. I argue that this conceptualization fails to recognize that identity formation processes possess their own dynamics that are at least partly independent of security. I present some examples of works, mostly part of critical approaches to identity, that have pointed to ways in which identity interaction between self and other can be the basis of transformed security relations. I compare and critically evaluate the process of collective identity formation by Wendt (1992, 1999), the strategy of disidentification in Aradau (2004) and the alternative forms of otherness discussed by Hansen (2006), Diez (2005), and Rumelili (2004, 2007) as possible ways of dismantling security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that there is a need to move beyond the oft-cited but mis-applied security dilemma framework to analyze cross-Strait relations. In delineating an alternative more dynamic security model, I argue that the realities of the Taiwan Strait reflect an equilibrium of insecurity, where both states choose to remain in relatively insecure rivalry because it provides a stable cognitive environment that is less uncertain than other possible alternatives. The key mechanism that maintains and sustains this dynamic equilibrium is strategic histrionics, which is a hybrid of security logics with Chinese theater and operatic theory. In using four case studies, I show the empirical validity of the strategic histrionics mechanism in sustaining the equilibrium of insecurity. Finally, in my conclusion, I provide some suggestions for future research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considerable effort in recent years has gone into rebuilding fragile states. However, the lively debates over the effectiveness of such state building exercises have tended to miss the fact that capacity building and the associated good governance programs, which comprise contemporary state building, are essentially about transforming the state - meaning the ways in which political power is produced and reproduced. State capacity is now often put forward as the missing link required for generating both positive development outcomes and security, blurring the dichotomous distinction between security and development. However, rather than being an objective and technical measure, capacity building constitutes a political and ideological mechanism for operationalising projects of state transnationalisation. The need to question prevailing notions of state capacity and the normative assumptions these carry has become sadly apparent in light of the failure of many state building programs in post-conflict states. Such programs have proven very difficult to implement, and implementation has rarely achieved the expected development turnarounds or alleviation of violent conflict in those countries. In this paper I argue that to identify the potential trajectories of such interventions, we must understand the role state building currently plays in domestic politics, and in particular the ways in which processes of state transformation and transnationalisation, whether intentionally or not, affect the development of different and often conflicting powerbases within the state. This argument is examined using examples from the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trust and confidence are key building blocks for relations among people, within societies and among nations. Trust and confidence are fundamental in bringing long-term security to any society, a security that increasingly depends on our ability to handle non-military crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the US focused on Homeland Security efforts, Mexico’s desire to advance immigration reform efforts will go unfulfilled for the foreseeable future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concepts of "human security" and "health security" have played an increasingly prominent role in the policymaking literature. However, debates still rage within the academic literature about the wisdom of broadening the concept of "security" to include problems like infectious disease. Focusing on the consequences of AIDS on the militaries, economies, and state identities of southern African states, I demonstrate that infectious disease does in fact have important consequences that adversely affect a state’s national security. Further, I demonstrate that these negative consequences for national security can actually be integrated into existing theories of national security. In effect, I argue that the proponents of health security have a valid point, but have largely gone about integrating it into international relations theory in the wrong manner. Employing existing theories, rather than attempting to create a new security studies paradigm, will allow health security’s proponents to better engage the debates about national security. As an added benefit, integrating health security into existing theories of national security will provide a firm theoretical grounding for the plans of action suggested by the policy literature for addressing the challenges posed by infectious disease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globalization, far from being a monolithic economic phenomenon, involves a range of complex economic, social, and political trends that are unpacking the Westphalian inter state security system. These trends include, in particular, ! complex economic interdependence, ! ideological fragmentation, multiculturalism, postmodernity, etc., and ! the expansion of diverse, ad hoc processes of global governance. In this context, a growing range of actors, especially non state social and economic actors, find increasing incentives to defect from the state bound international security order. The result is a fragmentation of both threats and responses in a fluid Aneo medieval@ political environment. These new conditions of (un)governability create strong incentives for political entrepreneurs to experiment with untested projects for creating (or re creating) top down control, including attempts to impose unilateral American hegemony, among others. However, these projects themselves become sources of instability and conflict as they in turn reinforce incentives for defection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much has been written in recent years about new, changing and emergent security issues around the globe. From terrorism to diseases and other chemical and biological threats to the recurrence of ethno-nationalism, security in the contemporary world is a different beast than even a decade ago. Moreover, this process of evolution will likely continue to change in the years to come. These changes have had distinct impacts on the ways individuals perceive threats to their security and how they act to make themselves feel more secure. But even though much attention has been paid to the ways security (and the ways we cope with challenges to security) is changing, little, if any, attention has been paid to the ways the next generation of citizens and decision-makers perceive current and future security challenges. Our research examines the ways middle school and high school students in the United States perceive security issues and the problems of global cooperation. Utilizing a quasi-experimental design that centers on an international studies simulation project embedded within the secondary school social studies curriculum, our analysis will inform discussion about how perceptions of security may change (or are changing) as the next generation comes of age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that in today?s evolving security environment, it is fruitful to integrate the analytical insights of core security concepts -- like the security dilemma, deterrence, containment, balance of power, and anarchy -- with newer insights regarding the rise of transnational and non-state threats, and the security externalities and complex links among other phenomena such as technological change, economic development, environmental change, globalization, and human welfare. This involves a two-step process. First, the meaning and insights of the core security concepts must be generalized. This requires identifying and relaxing the (often implicit) actor-specific and context-specific assumptions commonly associated with them. Second, the insights generated by these concepts must then be adapted to the specific actors and strategic contexts that characterize one?s strategic environment. This approach to security treats military inter-state competition under anarchy as a subset of a wider range of issues, actors, and contexts that can be explained fruitfully using core security concepts such as the security dilemma, containment, offense, defense, and deterrence. Integrating the field?s core security concepts with recognition of the broader range of actors and phenomena created or empowered by the diffusion of modern technology provides analytical clarity plus the flexibility needed to generate effective security policies. Doing so helps to generate more robust analyses of security challenges, disclose errors in current policy responses, and clarify policy options and recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current U.S. security strategy contains several relevant elements, and some of them are new. At the inter-American level, the most important issue is whether security will override indefinitely other important issues of U.S.-Latin American relations. The end of the Cold War radically changed the global panorama and gave rise to the emergence of new actors and issues on the international agenda that are currently challenging the scenario of the world order. Terrorism, drug trafficking, and the fight against organized crime are some of the big problems to be tackled. September 11 produced a rigorous review of U.S. security doctrine, giving rise to preemptive action and homeland security, which demonstrate how the United States concentrated on implementing unilateral policies by adopting a strategy towards guaranteeing security "vis-à-vis everyone and despite everyone." The future of Latin America in U.S. national security plans, at least in the short term, was relegated to a back burner, just as multilateralism became the mechanism par excellence for solving conflicts in the international arena. In the eight years of the George W. Bush presidency, the United States returned to a vertical unilateralism, with extraordinary implications for international security. The U.S. also relatively abandoned some of the regions allegedly of importance, such as Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective is to imagine three scenarios for 2020 in which biochemical warfare moves progressively from being a peripheral to a major security concern - then to ask how well our current concepts (either in counterproliferation efforts, arms control, em ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]