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The article focuses on transnationalism and the Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Japan. It cites ways in which transnational forces help to form the ODA, such as framing of economic development in transnational terms in Asia. According to the author, the outcomes of the transnational campaign against the overseas environmental behavior of Japan and of the wider shift in transnational norms around the worldwide environment and ODA that took place during the 1980s, should be understood in terms of their interaction with domestic conceptions of ODA.

The article discusses the historical evolution of masculinity as well as foreign policymaking in Japan. It cites that the growing interest in bushidō, or way of warriors, is established in current political and cultural transformation of the country. Types of Japanese bushi masculinity are militarized and non-militarized masculinities. A brief history of masculinity in the country is also presented.

An essay is presented on post cold war foreign and security policy being implemented by Japan. It discusses the changes in international security threat level and the responses of Japan. It mentions that the factor that contribute to the active participation of Japan in security issues is its enhancement of the U.S. and Japan alliance relations after the cold war.

The recent Japanese-Chinese relationship is characterized as "cold politics, hot economy" and there are two schools of thoughts which describe this bilateral relationship as friendly or hostile. But such a friend/enemy dichotomy to humanize the two countries is not useful to understand it. A sectoral approach can offer the better understanding of China as a sectorally fragmented system with limited carrying capacity and the complex Japanese-Chinese bilateral relations. In this view, China has a problem in fitting its sectoral imperatives to its limited ecosystem and Japan's involvement in it has unintended and unwanted consequences. Japan should be more interested in managing negative consequences of its short-sighted involvement in China's complex system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a comparative study between Japan and Great Britain in relation to citizenship, colonial past and immigration policy. It says that the reason for comparing both countries is that they are both anomalies among other liberal democracies by having weak notions of citizenship. Accordingly, a large number of immigrants in Japan and Great Britain originate from former colonies and these immigrants were wanted as part of the labor force.

The article focuses on the ongoing Japanese discussion on soft power and its implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance is presented. It discusses the concept of soft power which was developed by author Joseph Nye and its potential and limitations as an instrument of national policy. It examines how the Japanese are utilizing the concept in dealing with their nation's security policy.

It has been argued that the hegemony of sovereignty is constructed by a binary opposition between inside and outside. The paper reconsiders how hegemony of sovereignty is constructed in process of state-building. Sovereignty is totally a discursive practice: national identity inside relies on the foreign threats outside. The methodology of inside/outside may play the convincing role in analysing the sovereign-building of early-modern (Meiji) Japan. The Japanese national identity inside is constructed by confronting the Western imperial powers as the outside threats. This paper deals with how hegemony of the sovereignty is discursively constructed by the inside/outside dichotomy in the process of the Japanese state-building in early-modern period. Two mechanisms play the significant roles in hegemonising the Meiji sovereignty: Exclusion and Supplement. National consciousness of the Meiji Japan, on the one hand, strongly relied on the Western threats, since there has been no nationalism and national identity until the Western powers confront Japan in mid-nineteen century. In this sense, the Japanese national identity inside is constructed by excluding the West. On the other hand, it does not mean the Meiji Japan totally challenged the modern international system: Japan induced a number of Western methods and technology in the process of modernisation. That is, Japanese modernization inside are also supplemented by the Western methods. This is because, the Meiji restoration is neither complete Westernisation (Kaikoku: open country) nor endorsement of ultra-nationalism (Sakoku: close country), but combination of both. Thus, an overall aim of the paper is to uncover discursive practices of the Meiji Japan that excludes and be supplemented by the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the advanced information technology came to redefine every facet of human life, it appears that global capitalism has nearly completed its project of subsuming the entire world under its transcendental gaze. In this circumstance, Japanese nation-state has been undergoing some visible and less visible transformation, adapting itself to the diverse and conflicting forces in a highly media permeated and technology driven politico-cultural space of contemporary Japan. In this paper, I investigate an emergent form of nationalism which appears to be benign and harmless, as exemplified in the circulation of national icons expressing one’s attachment to the nation, and assess the significance of this casual, individualistic, and madatized form of nationalism in the context of current globabl transformation. This paper is particularly interested in the effect of advanced technology and media which has radically been altering the cognitive and experiential parameters of the individuals, eroding historical temporality involved in seeing, and generating aesthetic inclinations that prioritizes feelings and senses over reason and ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent summits have sought to redefine Japan-China ties as a "strategic relationship of mutual benefit" by "increasing political trust." Sino-Japanese trust is important because hedging in security affairs is expensive and can undermine stability. Lack of trust encourages worst-case assumptions about the other's motives, placing a ceiling on cooperation and making miscalculation and conflict more likely. Why is trust such a problem between Japan and China? Studies in international relations point to the power shift associated with China's rise and differences in regime type (democracy/authoritarianism). Research on contemporary Sino-Japanese ties often focuses on the significantly expanded and sometimes contentious trade relationship. Finding those explanations insufficient, this paper argues that trust problems are better understood as functions of national identity. The way that Japan and China perceive 'the other' in the context of their own national identities is the primary source of distrust. In Japanese perception, Japan tends to be seen as more developed and civilized than China and Chinese identity as obsessed with being at the center. In Chinese perception, China tends to be seen as morally and historically superior to Japan and Japanese identity as latently aggressive and disrespectful of natural order. These perceptions are traceable in Japanese views of China's human rights policies and regional diplomacy, and Chinese views of Japan's handling of history (including textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine) and military normalization. By explaining the link between identity conflicts and bilateral trust, this paper demonstrates why Sino-Japanese trust remains low and recent improvements in relations fragile. Peace and security in East Asia depend not only on how Tokyo and Beijing define and pursue their interests, but also on how they define and relate to each other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines public and elite attitudes toward security policy in Japan. While focusing on the US-Japan security alliance, Japan's relations with East Asian countries, and Japan's role in the United Nations, the paper addresses three questions: (1) How have public and elite views evolved since the 1990s?; (2) what is the relationship between mass and elite opinion?; and (3) how do mass and elite opinion relate to security policy? The paper argues that a particular group within the security elite has shaped national security policy and that the public has generally followed that group’s leadership. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops and tests a general framework for explaining variations in the extent of postwar reconstruction. Existing studies point to the importance of economic resources and a coherent state apparatus in promoting effective reconstruction. This paper argues that because reconstruction inherently requires coordination between numerous societal actors as well as between state and society, a full explanation for the extent of reconstruction must examine the linkages among those actors, especially civil society. By generating greater amounts of information, a more vibrant civil society leads to a)better identification of needs, b)more efficient implementation, as well as c)more effective monitoring. The paper tests this proposition using newly assembled data from 46 Japanese prefectures. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that the traditional notion of Japan and the EU as the world’s two civilian powers is no longer sufficient to provide the conceptual glue for the EU-Japan Partnership. The EU and Japan both are gradually introducing harder defence mechanisms into their overall strategic outlook. The European Security Strategy (ESS) is evidence of a holistic concept of security that combines economic, civilian and, if needed, military means. Japan will also see the overhaul of its defence policy in the new strategic environment in Asia. However, neither the EU nor Japan will turn to traditional 20century power politics. In fact, both will continue to defend some of the values captured in the concept of civilian power while taking on larger and more difficult global responsibilities. The paper offers a conceptual framework of “shared global responsibility” that could provide a reference point for policy makers in Japan and Europe when revitalising and implementing enhanced co-operation between Japan and Europe. Older “lofty” notions of “civilian power” are perceived as outdated elsewhere. The new notion of “shared responsibility” is based on the unique capacities and historical trajectories that the EU and Japan posses. It combines civilian values with real capacities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Sino-Japanese relationship has become increasingly complex, conflictive, and of global consequence. The relationship has reached a point that while the two governments increasingly tie their fate together economically, growing rancor among the Chinese public over WWII and contemporary issues threatens to tear them apart. Since the mid 1980’s, anti-Japanese mass protests in China have been conducted on the streets, college campuses, and, in recent years, on the Internet. This paper has two objectives: (1) to detail the growing anti-Japanese mass movements in China and (2) to study the linkages between Chinese domestic public opinion on Japan and foreign policy decision-making. While there are some notable exceptions, the vast majority of public opinion literature has used Western democracies as case studies when detailing the links between public opinion and foreign policy. Many scholars automatically assume that the affect of domestic public opinion on foreign policy in authoritarian societies is insignificant. However, recently there have been academics that study Sino-Japanese relations that challenge this view and contend that growing anti-Japanese sentiment has a constraining impact on the available foreign policy options regarding Japan. However, none of these scholars look at exactly how Chinese domestic pressure has influenced the government and to what extent this pressure has impacted foreign policy decisions. This paper will attempt to address this gap and assess the whether Chinese public opinion has a role in moving Sino-Japanese relations toward conflict or cooperation ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The April 2007 visit by Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to Japan highlights new opportunities for cooperation between China and Japan to address challenges of globalization, such as pollution and rising demand for energy, yet progress in their relations has been uneven. Until recently China’s approach to globalization largely focused on its economic benefits and assumed that the Chinese state would be able to manage the process. Increasingly Chinese leaders and scholars are calling attention to the numerous non-traditional security challenges facing their country. The problems of economic globalization and non-traditional security are linked, however, as China’s dramatic growth creates unintended non-traditional security consequences for its neighbors, as well as its own citizens.This paper argues that, even if its rise is peaceful, China’s development creates unintended environmental consequences such as trans-boundary air pollution and rising demand for energy, which create risk for its neighbors. The paper examines China’s environmental risk management and its impact on Sino-Japanese relations, using a conceptual framework based on the work of European theorists of risk, particularly German sociologist Ulrich Beck’s World Risk Society. This research reveals a pattern of cooperation in addressing air pollution, but greater competition over energy. Why is there cooperation in the environmental area? Why has competition been more prevalent over energy? The paper argues that several factors shape the impact of environmental risk in China’s relations with Japan, including the urgency of the risk involved, the nature of risk management, state-society relations, and the securitization of risk. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1952 Japan's sole guarantor for national security was the United States-Japan Security Treaty. Against strong public opposition after many compromises with opposition as as well as government coalition parties , the widely popular Japanese prime minister Koizumi was able to deploy about 600 Ground Self Defense Forces for the reconstruction of Iraq. This paper analyzes the way public opinion changed before and after deployment, and what the long term effects for Japanese security and alliance arrangements will be. The paper takes advantage of a opinion survey conducted by the author in Japan and the US, which was innovative because it focued on foreign and defense policy questions, as well as public risk perceptions. The paper will also include context analysis of Japanese mass media and official government statement. This papers argues, that increased threat perception in Japan does have very little effect on support for more activist foreign policies, but that 9/11 and he Iraq War has triggered a public debate about Japan's international role. This indicates that the bi-lateral US-Japan security cooperation might eventually be weakened because of an increase in public support for additional bi-lateral (such as the recent agreement with Australia) and regional security arrangements. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neighborhood associations in Japan blur the line between state and society. Inextricably local in their orientation, there is tremendous variation across the archipelago in how NHAs are organized and what they do. Unfortunately, scholars do not have a clear picture of this variation due to a lack of comparable data across the nation. The JIGS survey team led by Yutaka Tsujinaka of the University of Tsukuba is conducting the first nation-wide survey of Japan-s 300,000 neighborhood associations (NHAs) ever. Although a limited number of sureys of NHAs in delimited regions do exist, operational difficulties in implementation have prevented scholars from conducting a nationwide survey. The Japanese government has also not conducted any such survey. This paper presents the first results of the survey, discussing the distribution and vitality of NHAs across Japan. Beyond these organizational dimensions, the paper also investigates activities of the groups. Widespread variation is expected in the survey (which will be conducted in winter 2006-07) results. This paper will also present the results of the survey on the relationship between NHAs and the government. Specifically, we investigate variations in the patterns of relationship between NHAs and local governments across different regions in Japanâ€"including the level of cooperation and support, as well as the differences in the scope of activities such as crime prevention, cleaning of the local environment, etc. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is there any Japanese IR? The purpose of this paper is, on opposite sides of the first and second speaker (IKEDA and SHIMIZU), to give a negative answer to the ‘Japanese IR Questions’.During the Cold War, especially in 1960s, there was the cut and thrust of debate between two leading IR scholars over whether or not Japan should re-consider the modality of Japan-U.S. alliance. Whereas Yoshikazu SAKAMOTO (University of Tokyo) argued that Japan should not form the alliance with the U.S. because of possible negative impacts of ‘balance of power’, Masataka KOUSAKA (Kyoto University) brought forward a counter-argument that Japan should maintain the military alliance taking into account of possible positive impacts of ‘balance of power’. Since then, Japanese IR scholars have labeled Prof. SAKAMOTO as an ‘idealist’ and Prof. KOUSAKA as a ‘realist’. Yet the paper tries to de-construct this dichotomy itself between ‘idealist’ and ‘realist’ that established in the debate, by pointing out that both Prof. SAKAMOTO and KOUSAKA can be classified into the category of ‘classical realism’. This paper would not deny that Japan has a peculiarity in the study of IR, but contend that there was no Japanese IR. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1960s, many American observers expected Japan to go nuclear, but their expectations have not come true even four decades later. In fact, not only did Japan not acquire nuclear weapons, it actually became a pillar of support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Why?This paper argues that the forecasters were wrong because they placed too much weight on the impact of constraints on Japan's nuclear freedom of action--notably, the opions of its U.S. ally and of its "nuclear-allergic" mass public--constraints that they judged to be dangerously loosening. But in fact, for a variety of strategic and identity motivies the majority of Japanese elites themselves strongly favored the overall contours of the nuclear weapons stance that emerged in the 1960s and early 1970s. Morever, even those elites who had serious objections to the majority position did not actually want nuclear weapons. Relying in large measure on Japanese-language source material, this paper offers a systematic look at the elite politics of nuclear weapons in Japan, paying special attention to delineating the cleavages in elite opinion during the crucial decade of decision from 1966-1976. It explains the deep sources of those cleavages with reference to elites' diverging domestic political interests and basic understandings of Japan's history and national identify.This paper will have significant implications for contemporary proliferation forecasts on Japan, which often eerily resemble the analyses of 1960 observers. It also will have significant implications for forecasting beyond the Japanese case, by offering tools for the analysis of domestica politics of nuclear choices. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In line with Pentagon’s policy to streamline the US forces in the ‘Arc of Instability’, East Asian outposts of the US military are going through drastic reorganisation. This paper focuses on the social processes of upgrading and reorganising US bases in Okinawa, in particular, replacement of the controversial and infamously dangerous U.S. Marine Corps Air Station in Futenma (central Okinawa). It attempts to shed light on the socio-economic dynamics of opposition and acceptance of the new replacement marine base construction in Henoko, beyond government-to government diplomatic processes. On one hand, it discusses the activities of oppositional groups based in Okinawa and Japan, and their transnational environmentalist network and allies. On the other hand, the paper examines the activities and rationales of non-government organisations that accept and promote the new base construction, including possible transnational co-operation. It is argued that the actual processes of base relocation in Okinawa are best understood as the negotiating and bridging of these two opposing social forces. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an effort to better understand the changing role of petro-diplomacy in China's and Japan's search for energy security, this paper draws upon analytical methods from the field of Science & Technology Studies to compare past thought with subsequent practice with respect to each of the states' petro-diplomacy. First, the paper investigates the ways in which policymakers and expert advisers in China and Japan have conceptualized and analyzed the advantages anddisadvantages of specific episodes petro-diplomacy (involving, for example, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Nigeria). Then, the paper compares these analyses with the policy tools and institutional capacities that were demonstrated through the practice of that petro-diplomacy. Finally, the paper argues that this comparison of thought with practice in China's and Japan's policymaking suggests that each state's experience offers lessons for the other about the role and utility of petro-diplomacy for managing energy security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given their economic capacity and tradition as the major providers of Overseas Development Aid, global development policy is an obvious field for much more advanced co-operation between Europe and Japan. However, while there are similar intentions and responsibilities, actual policies and preferences differ. Apart from different regional emphases, there are also different normative considerations that guide European and Japanese development assistance. Japan and Europe seem agree on a philosophy that emphasises humanitarian considerations, an appreciation of the concept of “human security”, the recognition of global interdependence, environmental conservation and potential for self-help as desirable conditions for development aid. When actual decisions on donations are made, many other considerations, among them traditional notions of regional hegemony and trade interest, seem to guide policy-makers in both regions. The paper looks at shared and differing concepts of Japanese and European development aid and asks whether better co-ordination between the poles could change the global debate on development aid. The paper has a normative agenda which is, however, rooted in a remarkably deep understanding of the practicalities of Japanese ODA. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For conventional studies of the English School, Japan’s interactions with International Society takes place only after Perry knocked down Japan’s doors in 1853. Until this point, Japan’s relations with Europe are presumed to have taken place under conditions of an ‘international system’, with minimal rules and common norms to govern their relations. This paper undertakes a fresh examination of Tokugawa Japan’s interactions Europe to challenge this account. The Tokugawa shogunate’s attempts to legitimate its position as the rightful ruler of Japan led to attempts to monopolise the conduct of diplomatic relations, and resulted in the emergence of a Japan-centric international order modelled on the hierarchical Chinese international order. Under this order, the Europeans had to consent to the rules set to them by the Japanese rulers if they were to maintain their trading and political relations. Furthermore, they were relegated to the lowest rung of the social hierarchy, and reduced to performing an ‘exotic other’ which served to confirm Japanese identity as the centre of the cosmos. This paper presents an empirical challenge to existing accounts of European relations with the non-European world by examining a case where the Asian polity dominated and dictated the rules of interaction, thus demonstrating that different civilisations can indeed establish societal relations in the absence of a common culture or ‘standard of civilisation’. It will generate implications for emerging scholarship in the English School tradition which calls for greater homogeneity among different polities in order to advance the ‘good’ international life. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does globalization bring forth fundamental institutional changes in national political economy? In this paper, I claim that domestic political institutions take a critical role in mediating the forces for change in markets. With a comparative case study of labor market reforms in Japan and Korea since the late 1980s, this paper argues that political and economic coordination mechanisms account for variations in the scope of reform agendas and policy outcomes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By using the Koizumi’s administration foreign policy towards North Korea as a case study, this paper argues that a constructivism framework can bring a new perspective to the Japanese questions of security by linking them to the identity construction and its reproduction process. Exploring Japan’s relationship with North Korea in such a perspective challenges the dominant representation of Japanese identity. In the first part of my paper, I deal with the dominant representation of Japanese identity by defining the terms of this dynamic concept. I then focus on the recent structural changes such as the “North Korean threat” and the redefinition of the American security alliance, which take took place under the Koizumi administration.In the second part of my paper, I approach the recent right-wing turning point in Japan’s political spectrum as a redefinition of national security in relation to the balancing process of identity construction.Finally, I conclude by exploring a few definitions of “foreign policy” such as the one proposed by David Campbell which represents it as an exclusion process to bring under control parts of population who disagree or might be a threat to the dominant representation of national identity. This part will end our survey about the looping interactions established between identity construction and security policy, by examining how the latter can further influence the dynamic process of identity reproduction through domestic policies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A shift from active pursuit of multilateral security framework in East Asia to enhancement of the U.S.-Japan alliance has characterized Japanese security policy during the last decade. Despite this shift, Japan has continued to diversify its security partners in East Asia. This paper will describe a broad range of Japan’s security cooperation with ASEAN countries and analyze the drivers of such cooperation. In doing so, the paper intends to seek a nuanced and empirically grounded explanation of Japanese security policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how the dynamics of multiparty decision making in parliamentary coalition governments affect international conflict, peace, and the stability of governments. It examines the conflicting expectations on the role of coalition cabinet politics in decisions affecting governments? foreign relations in Dutch, Japanese, and Turkish comparative case studies of foreign policy in the Netherlands, Japan, and Turkey from the 1980s to the present day. These cases are all instances of disagreement between coalition partners over foreign policy and focus on the way in which coalition politics affected the policymaking process, the foreign policy decisions, and the quality of the decision making process. This paper is part of a broader project that is cross-national, multi-methodological, and focuses on the policymaking process to examine the assumptions often made about coalition politics. Its purpose is to provide an analytical framework on the conditions under which coalition cabinets are effective and the factors that affect how coalition politics influences foreign policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The impact of norms and ideas upon international relations are at the center of my research interests. In this paper, I seek to reposition the status of norms as merely intervening variables to independent variables and address how they shape the media as an institution and decide its relations with state actors. My paper examines how Japan's top two national dailies (also the world's top two in terms of circulation) have covered China since the mid-1990s, when the relations between these two Asian giants began to deteriorate, a trend that is still going on today. I argue that these portrayals are driven more by concerns about Japan than about China, and that Japanese journalists choose from a limited series of normative frames, explaining China so as to understand Japan's place and identity in the world. This suggests that international reportage is about how the press domesticates foreign countries: China?s image has been socially constructed as a mirror by the Japanese media to reflect Japan?s own successes and problems. This paper further argues that the ?China Mirror? is in the process of being transformed from a fun-house mirror to a real mirror: that is, the portrait of China and of bilateral relations is changing from simple and one-sided moral judgments to a more contextualized representation. Hence, at a time when prevailing views on China?s swift rise as a world power would suggest increasing Japanese hostility and suspicion toward the country, instead we see a more complex media portrayal of China and of Japan-China relations. This recognition points to the autonomy of the Japanese press vis-à-vis a democratic home country and an authoritarian host country. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Japanese system of decision-making is often referred to as Japan, Inc., alluding to a blending of political, bureaucratic, and business circles into one unit. This relationship has also been portrayed as the horizontal bar on the letter T with the vertical bar symbolizing the hierarchically structured society that is subservient to its ruling class (Pempel 1987; Broadbent 2002). This paper argues that the Japanese political system is not always quite so rigid. Looking at climate governance, specifically the period during 2001-02 when Japan sought to reposition itself after the Bush Administration's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol reveals that public opinion and non-profit organizations were influential forces. Japan is constitutionally a parliamentary democracy, but power has rested primarily with the major ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI, before 2001 called MITI), and business (with the business association Keidanren as its primary mouthpiece). Prime ministerial power is limited not just because Japan is a parliamentary democracy, but because of the strong prevalence of factional politics within the LDP (Orr 1990). Although non-profit organizations are comparatively weak in Japan, they are gradually emancipating.This paper examines the roles of state and non-nation state actors in determining climate policy. Many studies on Japanese politics have used the reactive versus proactive dichotomy. While the Japan-as-'proactive-state' proponents argue that Japan's foreign policy is primarily internally driven (Yasutomo 1995; Anderson 1993; Nester 1990), the 'reactive-state' advocates claim that it is subject to significant foreign pressure (gaiatsu). However, the advocates are divided over whether this is due to international systemic conditions - that is, Japan's dependence on the United States for defense or trade - or whether domestic factors are the cause of Japan's passiveness (Calder 1988; Schoppa 1997; Orr 1990; Sato 1977). Such factors include the strong sectionalism of Japan's bureaucracy, the absence of a powerful central executive, Japan's unique electoral system, and the factionalism of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Calder 1988); in fact, they seem to include almost anything in the Japanese political system that is peculiar to the Western eye.Since assessments of the 'reactive state' theory diverge significantly, it has to be concluded that the extent of reactiveness or proactiveness by Japan on a particular foreign policy issue depends to a great deal on the respective determinants of a policy issue. They can include vested interests, strategic factors such as energy dependence, foreign policy goals or the level of media attention. If these determinants are weak, then Japan is more likely to be reactive to foreign pressure. Campbell (1992, xxx) argues that the presence (or absence) of a policy sponsor with sufficient resources, drive and skills to push a particular issue forward (or hold it back) is "the single most important 'variable' in determining whether and when a policy change will occur, and sometimes its contents as well".This paper describes the Japanese political system and examines the Japanese policy constituency on climate change to ascertain whether there is a policy sponsor and who this is who is driving the Japanese climate change agenda, and what role non-state actors play in this process. It starts from the premise that different types of policy networks exist in Japan, which span from stable, highly-integrated policy communities with restricted membership to unstable, loosely-integrated issue networks with large numbers of participants (Rhodes and Marsh 1992)... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The implications surrounding Japan?s population decline and its corollary?the growing need for foreign labor?continue to be widely discussed. The majority of this attention, both mainstream and academic alike, has been provoked by the ways in which the issue stages a critical tension in contemporary Japanese society: the industrial and service sector demands for foreign labor versus a seemingly narrow belief in ethno-cultural homogeneity. While numerous political, economic, and cultural analyses have sought to mitigate this conflict, the present study contends that their marginal gains can be attributed to a failure to recognize what Connolly refers to as the "identity\difference paradox." This paper, therefore, proceeds by focusing on the case of the nikkei (foreign-born Japanese and their descendents) since they stand as not only the policymakers' first attempt to address the labor issue, but also as disruptive subjects who are viewed as being neither "truly Japanese" nor "resolutely foreign." Thus, by employing a Deleuzian conception of "the One," "the Many," and "the Multiple," the paper will trace how three enunciative spaces (i.e. Japanese policymakers, activists/academics, and the nikkei themselves) frame Japan's nikkei population through various conceptions of difference: 1) a universalism that maintains national exclusions, 2) "minority" claims that demand, yet inhibit, pluralization, and 3) singular identifications that undermine the previous two. At stake in this treatment lays the very possibility of creating a more hospitable Japan?one that would be able to accommodate intra-national differences through acts of tolerance, plurality, and non-violence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic integration has been progressing rapidly in Northeast Asia, particularly among Japan, China, and South Korea, and a large volume of industrial and cultural products flow across the region. Despite high-level economic integration, the three countries have not developed an institutional arrangement to stabilize regional politics. To the contrary, Japan and the other two countries continue to dispute over issues related to Japan?s wartime past, including controversies over Yasukuni shrine and Japan?s history textbooks. Based on the constructivist approach, this paper explains why the three countries fight over these issues, focusing on state identity and politics of recognition. Japan developed its state identity mainly through interactions with the United States. Japanese leaders emphasize that Japan, as a liberal democratic country, has developed a pacifist stance after World War II. They want other countries to recognize that their actions, including the prime minister?s visit to the shrine, are consistent with the pacifist stance. In contrast, the memory of Japan?s past colonial rule plays an important part in China and South Korea?s state identity formation. State leaders in each country denounce the colonial rule as unjust invasion while praising past nationalist leaders? fight against it as patriotic. They demand Japan?s current leaders to recognize (acknowledge) wrongdoings of Japan?s colonial rule, opposing any actions that imply Japanese leaders? support for or tolerance of the colonial rule. Through the analysis of the current controversies between the three countries, this paper develops a theoretical discussion of identity and recognition in international relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although IR scholars have offered various explanations for the origins of sovereignty, the literature is yet to offer a convincing one. Rejecting the hypothesis to locate sovereignty with Westphalia, this paper traces the emergence of sovereignty to two nineteenth century developments: the dominance of the positivist legal theory and the ascendancy of European states over non-European states. Theoretically, this paper integrates critical legal theory and postcolonial theory into international relations theory. The critical legal theory clarifies how three doctrines that constructed sovereignty (state?s ultimate authority, territoriality, recognition) were directly related to the positivist (as opposed to earlier natural) legal theory. The postcolonial theory illuminates how the positivist legal theory?s construction of sovereignty was related to the legitimization of European and delegitimization of non-European political entities. Sovereignty both justified and enabled Europe? domination over non-European political entities. The empirical part of the paper examines the imposition of extraterritoriality (European states? exclusive jurisdiction over their citizens in non-European states) in Japan, China, Turkey, Iran, and Thailand to provide evidence that positivist legal theory?s attempt to conceptualize the interaction of European states? interaction with the non-European political entities crystallized the doctrine of sovereignty. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the evolution of Japanese national attitudes and security policy since the Cold War and will demonstrate how ideational explanations provide insights into Japan?s security policy in the 21st century. Adopting the constructivist framework of ideational impact on national policy (e.g., Katzenstein, 1996) but challenging the constructivist conclusion that Japan?s national identity is a pacifist state, this study will demonstrate how changes in Japanese collective identity have impacted security policy over the last fifteen years. Three questions will be asked: (1) How have public attitudes evolved in Japan since the end of the Cold War and how have these changing public attitudes affected security policy to date?; (2) what domestic and international factors explain shifts in public attitudes and national policy?; and (3) what are the implications of changes in public attitudes and national identity for the future of Japanese security policy?This paper argues that the highly unstable environments in East Asia and the world have encouraged the emergence of a new collective identity in Japan based on the concept of a ?normal state,? a state possessing military power commensurate with its economic power. The idea of a normal state has been promoted by ?international hawks? who define Japan?s national role not only as a promoter of its national interests but also as a defender of international peace and security that does not hesitate to resort to military means when necessary. The paper further argues that this new identity has affected the behavior of state leaders, who have sought to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security treaty and significantly expand the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces overseas. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines institutional design and change of financial regulatory systems as one of significant post-crisis financial reform efforts in Japan, Mexico, and South Korea. There has been a plethora of research concerning financial reform not just in the academic works but also in policy prescriptions from international financial institutions such as IMF and BIS. However, while most works emphasize the benefits of prudential regulation through financial reform, their emphasis has been put on its significance per se rather than on the conditions under which financial regulatory systems can be better designed and implemented as planned. Similarly, economic literature on this topic has been basically apolitical, not being able to take into account how diverse actors can strategically initiate, transform or resist reform efforts. Economic crises and subsequent reform efforts in post-bubble Japan, post-1994 Mexico and post-1997 South Korea provide a great opportunity to examine the similarities and differences in financial reform processes and outcomes. This is so since, despite differences in their pre-crisis financial systems, there had been considerable similarities among them such as (a) use of financial regulation as a primary policy instrument for economic adjustment and development, (b) the prominent role of state, especially finance ministries, in financial sectors, and (c) the timing of crises and financial reforms since mid-1990s. However, did Japan, Mexico, and Korea adopt similar post-crisis institutional settings for financial regulation because of pre-crisis similarities and international norms of prudential regulation? If not, why did they choose different institutional designs? To what extent have the post-reform regulatory systems been successful in prudential regulation? In order to answer these questions, this paper challenges previous works that emphasized organized interest groups and their influence on reform politics. Rather, it takes seriously the role of unorganized public that has been largely underestimated because of its lack of information and collective action problem and the conditions under which political leadership had to serve the public. It also questions the role of international actors and norms in financial regulation. Given the fact that even the most arm?s-length financial regulation leaves considerable room for subjective assessment of regulators, international norms and best practices are likely to be mediated by national institutions and conflicts among actors. Finally, this study compares the post-reform institutional changes of financial regulatory system in these countries by looking at the interaction between well-established pre-crisis regulators and newly established regulatory agencies. This study can contribute to a better understanding of how financial regulation is designed and under what conditions it is implemented as designed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Northeast Asia (for the purpose of this paper, China, Japan, and South Korea) may be described as the most dynamic region today. Some Asian scholars like Cho Myungrae, Sum Ngai Ling and Tao Lai Po-wah assert that Northeast Asia is a potential bloc. Some Western scholars; Simon and Gartzke, Waltz to some extent, and especially Huntington lend support to the above. This paper attempted to investigate the truth to the above claim using variables like trade, cultural affinities, common memberships in IGOs, and the BOP/fear factor (of the hegemon). The findings of this paper question the strength of the Korea-US and Japan-US alliance. Does peace between China, Japan, and South Korea prove Huntington's "shared foundation of culture"/"cultural-consciousness" ideas or simply prove the liberal peace theory. Or is Northeast Asia a marvelous example of a combination of both ideas. Northeast Asia is a test of this. Can we refute formation of a bloc simply because there is no formal agreement? Could it be invisible, operating on oriental-styled informal, familiarity-based structures rather than western formal ways. If so, is this the beginning of a future alliance? The uniqueness of this paper is it takes into consideration both Asian and western scholars' views and discusses implications of a Northeast Asian alliance. In addition, the paper adresses implications of the above for American foreign policy - should the U.S. prevent the formation or prepare for it. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1980s, the notion of national identity and the nature of its relationship with foreign policy have been in the focus of constructivist and post-structuralist scholarship. In both theoretical approaches, the nature of the relationship is pre-determined. The constructivist scholars tend to treat the national identity as a cognitive lens through which national interests and related polices are defined and shaped. In a post-structuralist analysis, foreign policy is often perceived as a practice of difference that creates borders and enhances the national identity construction.The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between national identity discourse of the Japanese ?self? vis-à-vis the Russian ?other? and foreign policy without any pre-theorization regarding the relationship.In the first part this paper examines the structure of contemporary Japan?s national identity construction vis-à-vis Russia. It argues that Russia, because of her role as a traditional ?other? for the West, has played a special role in Japan?s attempt to construct herself as a member of the universal realm of ?modern nations.? The second part of the paper examines Japan?s foreign policy vis-à-vis post-communist Russia along three dimensions; economic, military and the territorial dispute related to the islands captured by the Soviet Union during the last days of the Pacific War. Identity does not matter in economy- business as usual with profits overriding other concerns related to territory and history. Identity is slightly visible in the security discourse as seen in the lack of long-term trust of Russia?s intentions among the members of the security community. In the context of the the territorial dispute, identity shapes and, at the same time, is shaped by the policy related to this dispute. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on the International Whaling Commission (IWC) notes that some pro-whaling countries have encouraged developing countries to join. Many of these new entrants to the IWC have dubious ties to whaling as either a cultural, economic, or environmental interest. For example, consider that Japan lobbied for land-locked Mali to become a member in 2004. Several NGOs, journalists, and delegates from other member states have raised questioned whether or not pro-whaling countries are attempting to overcome their current minority coalition status in the IWC though the ?buying? of votes from countries to which they provide a great deal of foreign aid. Before answering the ?vote buying? question, prior questions must be answered: what is the similarity of votes between the new entrants and the pro-whaling countries? This paper analyzes voting patterns in the IWC for all years votes are publically available.To determine the similarity of votes, this paper calculates the voting affinity of dyads in the IWC in a given year. Each annual meeting results in about two dozen recorded votes. It is expected that countries that have recently joined the IWC will vote more frequently with Japan and other pro-whaling members. The method applied is similar to that used by Gartzke (1998) in assessing the similarity of votes in the UN General Assembly (see also Oneal and Russett 1999; Reuveny and Li 2003). Using the measure of similarity, S, defined by Signorino and Ritter (1999), this paper analyzes the similarity in members? votes in the IWC. Multiple calculations are performed with different weightings for substantive and procedural votes. In short, this paper provides an additional measure of dyadic voting similarity that can be used to supplement extant measures such as the now widely used UN voting variable. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal Reform in Japan: the Establishment of American Style Law Schools and Reinstitution of Jury System In recent years the Japanese government has set up American style graduate level three year law schools (Hoka Daigakuin) in Japan. The primary purpose of this initiative is to increase the qualified number of lawyers, prosecutors and judges in order to meet increasingly litigious societal needs and to meet global business challenge. The current number of lawyers (Bengoshi) in Japan is approximately 20,000 mostly concentrated in urban areas. This represents one lawyer for 6,300 Japanese. There are 941,000 lawyers in the United States or one for 290 Americans. The Japanese government wishes to increase the number of passers of the annual National Bar Exam from current 1,000 level to 3,000 level by about 2010. More than 70 percent of graduates of law schools are expected to pass the Bar Exam at their first try. The content of the Bar Exam will be to a large extent revised in accordance with the curriculum of the new graduate law schools. In addition, the Japanese government plans to re-institute the jury (Saiban-in) system in criminal law procedure in 2009. According to the Japanese government, this attempt is to encourage citizen participation in the judicial process in Japan and to improve the rule of law in Japanese society. The judicial process has been considered the last bastion of Okami (officialdom) based on the Confucian reverence for officialdom ? ?Respect official; and despise subject.? (Kanson Minpi). Critics argue that the decisions made by judges have been at times out of touch because of lack of citizen participation in the judicial process. Japanese courts have astonishingly a conviction rate of 99.9 percent. This paper examines recent legal reform in Japan from various perspectives. First, the paper examines rationale of the reform followed by law school curriculum, national bar examination, process of becoming lawyers in Japan, internationalization of lawyers, and reinstitution of jury system. The paper explores, further, whether the legal reform gives any impact on the issue of Japan?s war reparation and on deteriorating relations with neighboring countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1989 and 2000, Japan was the largest foreign aid donor in the world. Meanwhile, Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) had played a prominent role in Japan's foreign policy. Yet public recognition of Japan's ODA as a critical foreign policy tool seems low, and the effectiveness of this foreign policy is uncertain. Therefore, this paper analyzes Japan's national interests and how Japan's foreign aid attained its foreign policy goals. First, Japanese national interests will be examined by content analysis using white papers prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Second, it surveys Japan's foreign aid policy as a foreign policy tool. Third, this study attempts to assess if Japan's national interests were achieved while Japan was one of the largest ODA donors in the world. Quantitative studies reveal whether Japan's ODA provided positive impact on Japanese economic, diplomatic, and security interests. Finally, the research findings suggest how Japan should define and formulate its foreign aid policy as a foreign policy tool in the future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategic theorists depict the process of appraising the national interest, developing a supporting foreign policy, and crafting strategy that applies resources to policy ends as one of the most important and most vexing challenges of statecraft. This challenge is particularly difficult for contemporary Japan, where the habit of strategic thought has fallen into disuse -- and disrepute --owing in large part to decades of constitutional pacifism. With regard to sea power, the legacies of militarism and wartime defeat discredited strategic theory. Japanese leaders evidently recoil from Alfred Thayer Mahan's sea-power theories as they consider how to uphold Japan's interests at sea. Nor has Mahan been replaced in the Japanese lexicon by a less bellicose strategist such as Julian Corbett or C. E. Callwell. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces' (JMSDF) postwar dependency on the U.S. armed forces has only compounded the difficulties Tokyo faces as it rethinks its maritime policy and strategy in a more and more complex security environment.In recent years Japan has moved gradually to resume its place as a "normal" country, including in maritime affairs. Tokyo dispatched JMSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the first Gulf War, for example, and after September 11 it deployed escorts and logistics ships to support the coalition flotilla watching for terrorists fleeing Afghanistan. At the same time, Japanese leaders have evinced increasing enthusiasm for humanitarian operations. JMSDF units joined the massive multinational relief operation following the 2004 tsunami that struck South and Southeast Asia. Tokyo has portrayed the tsunami relief effort as a model for future maritime operations, not only out of genuine concern for disaster relief but as a way to amass "soft power" and to confer legitimacy on a more activist military strategy in the eyes of the Japanese populace. It is evident that Tokyo is increasingly couching "hard" maritime power in humanitarian terms.The dual nature of Japan's emerging maritime strategy, which seeks to cope with both conventional threats and new humanitarian responsibilities, raises several important theoretical and policy-relevant questions that we intend to address. Tokyo has declared that it will expand its new array of missions while continuing to discharge traditional missions such as defense of the sea lines of communication and the home islands, all at current funding levels and with the same force structure that now comprises the JMSDF. Accordingly, we will ask: Are these ambitious objectives feasible? Has Japan created a mismatch between policy and strategy? If so, how can it realign its maritime strategy with policy? Should (or can) it scale back humanitarian operations and other nontraditional initiatives? Should it rethink how it approaches traditional maritime security missions such as sea-lane defense? Should (or can) it increase naval spending and acquire new platforms? What kind of assets would the JMSDF need to execute a more ambitious slate of missions? Which strategic theorist supplies the best guidance in these matters?We will conclude that unless Japan conducts a thoroughgoing reassessment of its maritime posture, it will confront severe strategic dilemmas arising from a mismatch in policy and strategy. To help Japanese and U.S. decision-makers fend off such an outcome, the paper will generate a series of policy-relevant recommendations for Japan and its seafaring partner, the United States. We thus expect the paper to have immediate policy relevance for strategists and alliance managers, both in Tokyo and Washington. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan?s quest for regional order-building has a mixed historical record. During the first half of the 20th century, the country pursued its vision of a Japan-centered regional order, termed as the Grater East Asia Co-prosper Sphere, excluding the United States, only to bring total catastrophe to the region. Four decades later in the early 1990s, it conceptualized the ?multi-tiered? structure of regional security, with the US-Japan alliance as the linchpin, and rather quietly promoted it with some success. Despite such stark contrasts, the two instances show one commonality?Japan was an ascending power. With this backdrop, the paper examines Japan?s current attitude toward the question of the emerging regional order. Is Japan, now far from being an ascending power thanks to decade-long economic stagnation, and in the face of a new, rapidly ascending power, China, still committed to regional order-building? If so, does Japan still maintain a ?multi-tiered? regional order, in which the position of China is unspecified. Or has the country conceived of a new kind of regional order to reflect the current power balance in Asia? Through addressing these questions, the paper seeks to articulate the factors that shape Japan?s perspective of a regional security order and assess the possible implications for the country?s relations with other regional countries, especially China, overall intra-regional relations, and the ongoing discussion on the recently proposed East Asian Community. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses how and to what extent the international norm concerning the prohibition of the death penalty plays a role in East Asian democracies. In stark contrast to the worldwide abolitionist trend, the death penalty remains most entrenched in Asia, where more than 90 percent of all known executions take place. Why does the norm against the death penalty, which is apparently so important for most parts of the world, seem to have no impact on East Asia? How do domestic factors ? political leadership, public opinion, and institutional structures ? contribute to the rejection of the universally promoted human rights norm? With regard to the three major democracies in East Asia at different stages of the anti-death penalty movement (South Korea, most active in the abolitionist movement; Taiwan in the middle; and Japan least active), it investigates what accounts for the current varying impact of the norm in the same region. Analyzing how public and elite opinion interact with each other on capital punishment and what roles domestic institutional structures play, this paper aims to assess norm diffusion and to measure the norm?s capabilities and limitations for helping to shape new death penalty policy in this region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developmental state theories are one of comparative socio-political economy?s most prominent modes of explaining cases of state-led successful economic development. Nonetheless, while they had greatly improved our understanding of the positive functions states can play in industrial development, and the mechanisms through which they do so, to date they have proved to be inadequate in explaining the differences between diverse successful state-led economic-development. We know a lot about how state?s structure can influence development, but we know much less about why different development states succeed or fail in different ways, industries, and periods.Recently, a new cohort of scholars, termed throughout this paper as the neo-developmental statists, has come up with an explanation for these puzzles. The neo-developmental statitsts contend that for success in high technology industries, unlike in more mature industries, there is a need for a different state structure ? the networked structure. If, so the argument goes, in the past the Japanese state managed to lead a miraculous economic growth by concentrating on an ever-more complex set of mature and maturing industries and by commanding and controlling the Japanese industry, in the global world of the high-technology industry a different structure of state-industry relationships is needed ? one that relies on meshed networks of state and industry (Ansell 2000; Evans 1995. Pp. 14-15.; O'Riain 2000; O'Riain 2004). Accordingly, if, for example, we want to understand why Japan succeeded in manufacturing cars but failed in software, while Ireland rose to prominence with its software industry, the only thing we need to understand is the extremely different structure of state-industry relations in the two countries. The neo-developmental state theorists proposed a categorization of developmental states based on their structure, arguing that different structures prove more efficient in different times and with different industries. This is an elegant, simple, and aesthetically pleasing explanation. Nevertheless, this paper argues it is wrong. By neglecting ideology, a cornerstone of the early development state theories, both the neo-developmentalists and their structuralist counterparts have missed the overarching cause behind all the differences that they have been trying to explain. Where in ideology I define the framework in which policy makers and businessperson alike construct, and even more importantly, legitimize their actions and mobilize mass support. This paper argues that if we want to understand the difference between successful developmental states, we should focus not only on their structure, but also on their economic-nationalist ideology (hereby: econonationalist ideology). It is the econonationalist ideology that defines what the proper roles of state in industry and industry in state are, what the proper shape of the national industry should be, and who should own it. Looking at structure alone, I contend, is insufficient. Only by understanding the roles of both structure and ideology can we fully understand the differences between varied cases of state-led development. In order to advance this argument, this paper subjects it to a strong test using the critical case study method (King et al. 1994; Ragin 1987; Van Evera 1997; Yin 1994). It compares the structure of the ideal-type ?old? style developmental state ? Japan ? with the ideal-type ?neo? or ?networked? developmental state ? Ireland. This comparison is done in order to first, show that in fact state-industry structure in Japan and Ireland is similar enough that we need to conclude that it adheres to the same model. Second, the comparison aims to show that the significant differences between the two cases are much better explained by econonationalist ideology, not by structure. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is the second part of a time series analysis of foreign policy attitudes among Japanese foreign policy makers. The paper examines the current goals and direction of Japanese foreign policy makers though a series of interviews conducted in 2006 and compares these attitudes with interviews conducted back in 1998 with the same foreign policy makers. The paper tracks changes in attitudes, perceptions, and goals. It also explores new attitudes within Japan toward the rise of China and Japan?s newly found willingness to deploy the Self Defense forces (SDF) in the war on terror. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper will examine Japan's growing roles in US-sanctioned peace-keeping/building functions and in alliance with the United States, both of which are gradually blurring the border between Japan's self-defense and international security. This narrowing of the two areas is obscuring the relevance and meaning of Japan's policy of recognizing the nation's right to collective self-defense but not exercising that right. This blurring distinction is further eroding the restrictive constraints of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution on Japan's international security role. The paper will discuss these issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During World War II, the Japanese government is said to have conscripted over 100,000 women from the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, China, Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines to serve as wartime military sexual slaves or euphemistically known as ?comfort women? for the Japanese military troops between 1932 and 1945. Since the Japanese government?s acknowledgment of its imperial military?s institutionalized sexual slavery in 1992, Tokyo has managed to establish a ?private? compensation program in 1995 for the victims. Despite the calls for the ?formal? compensation accompanied by an ?unambiguous apology? by former sex slaves, the transnational movement organized by various human rights and women?s NGOs, and foreign governments, Tokyo still refuses to provide the formal compensation. The purpose of this paper is to explore various domestic and international reasons for the reluctance to squarely face the wartime guilt and address the public?s ?collective amnesia,? which underlie the Japanese government?s stance on the compensation issue. The paper will also discuss foreign policy implications of the ?comfort women? issue for the Japanese government. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There have been substantial attention on the so-called history question in China's relations with Japan. It is indeed a serious problem and there is no short-term solution to history and Yasukuni related issues. However, this paper argues that the history issue, as serious as it is, is unlikely to cause a future conflict between the two countries. But the energy issue, and specifically the dispute at the East China Sea, will be a major threat for further deterioration of Japan's relations of China. There is also a possibility of escalation or miscalculation from both sides. The paper will contend that both Beijing and Tokyo should take positive measures to prevent a localized show-down of force in East China Sea, work on common concerns in the energy and environment area, and integrate bilateral energy cooperation into the large framework of bilateral trade, investment and technological cooperation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyzes the relevance of the European integration experience for East Asia's future security architecture. Tracing European cooperative efforts from the early post-World War II days to the present, it argues that the process of European security integration provides useful lessons that can inform a similar process in East Asia. Considering the multi-faceted nature of security threats, the main ingredient of the European success strategy, namely the institutionalization of trust on multiple levels, and hence the creation of a complex web of governance, is likely to be emulated in the long run. While institutions are being created to enhance transparency, efficiency and trust, the paper argues two further developments need to occur to promote East Asian security. First, East Asia needs to deal more effectively with its historical legacy and the German case may provide useful lessons. Secondly, outstanding disputes need to be addressed and it is postulated that confidence-building via multi-layered institutions, similar to those found in Europe, may help resolve these conflicts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 21st century ushered in rising nationalism in both Japan and China. Mutual Sino-Japanese suspicions and accusations have been aggravated by the dispute over demarcating the resource-rich continental shelf in East China Sea and by the competition with regard to securing preferential access in the future construction of a pipeline from East SiberiaGiven that China?s imports of crude oil are projected to double by 2020 in tightening global energy markets, is it likely that Japan, whose dependence on oil imports is nearly 100 percent, may simply escalate conflicts with China with regard to energy security, due to the lack of policy coordination between the two? Is there any conceivable catalyst which may otherwise reverse what is seemingly a spiral of deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations?This paper sheds light on the ?hidden? side of so-called energy security, namely energy conservation; the other side of the coin as regards competition over limited energy supplies is usually emphasized from traditional geopolitical viewpoints. It attempts to explore the prospects for the emergence of an issue-oriented regime by focusing on energy-environmental areas and to examine the possibility of achieving a ?win-win? situation (or positive-sum game) in Northeast Asia It is estimated that China needs approximately ten times the amount of primary energy that Japan does to produce US one dollar equivalent of GDP, whereas the Chinese government considers energy conservation to be an unavoidable impending national issue in terms of maintaining its economic development, as endorsed by the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). Promoting technology transfers from Japan would bolster the sustainable development of the Chinese economy on the one hand, while on the other, Japan would also benefit, not only from mitigating China?s soaring energy demand, but also from promoting carbon emissions trading, particularly by employing the Clean Development Mechanism.It is argued that, despite the prima facie aggravation in the Sino-Japanese relationship, there nevertheless exists much potential for mutual cooperation or, at least, strategic trade-offs, which may in turn lead to stability in bilateral ties in the years to come. In addition to discussing the ongoing development of energy conservation business between the two, this paper addresses the implications of the Asia-Pacific Partnership, advocated by the Bush Administration since July 2005, and the conceivable roles of the United States in stabilizing Northeast Asian energy and environmental issues for the sake of future Sino-Japanese relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines of 1997, the subsequent War on Terrorism and other recent developments have significantly expanded the scope of the bilateral alliance and increased the role of Japan?s military beyond its own shores. This expansion directly affects the security of other Asian states. Deriving predictions from balance of power theory and a modified version of balance of threat theory, this paper tests both theories and attempts to explain Asian reactions. It tests two variables: the presence (or absence) of a military alignment relationship with the US, and wartime experience with the Japanese Empire. Asian reactions are evaluated according to whether they focus on the implications for power aggregation (i.e., the potential for changes to strengthen the aggregated military capabilities of the alliance) versus the implications for the containment function of the alliance (i.e., degrading the constraints on Japan?s reemergence as an independent military power). This paper finds that alignment with the US is less important than wartime experience. Regarding states with a brutal wartime experience, even US allies worry about the potential for expansion to degrade the alliance?s containment function rather than welcoming the power aggregation benefits of an expanded alliance. On the other hand, states that did not have a brutal wartime experience did not express concern about the degrading of the containment function regardless of alignment, and were likely to welcome the power aggregation benefits of the expanded alliance if they were allies or at least loosely aligned with the US. These reactions suggest that an alliance can have an important third-party reassurance effect by appearing to contain the military independence of an apparently threatening power. Finally, this paper assesses the implications of these findings for balance of power and balance of threat theories, and for East Asian regional security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The International Whaling Commission (IWC) is one of the exceptional negotiation arenas where Japan is the center of everyone?s attention. The participants, especially the dominating anti-whaling preservationists, are incessantly told by the Japanese negotiators to obey the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) exactly as it stipulates, to set the preservationists? ideology aside and let science prevail in the negotiations, to mutually respect the culture of participating nations, and to acknowledge the sovereign rights of the whaling nations to utilize cetacean resources sustainably. In parallel, the participants are also told by numerous studies why Japan is doing so. Those studies all presuppose that Japan is seriously trying to resume commercial whaling.However, because Japan?s assertions to lift the moratorium make no difference in the IWC stalemate, those assertions cannot be taken at face value. Rather, it is logically possible for Japan to obscure its real diplomatic objective by claiming the opposite in the IWC negotiations. Along this line of thinking, our argument challenges the common understanding of Japanese whaling diplomacy: since the negotiation phase to re-open the moratorium began, the primary objective of Japanese whaling diplomacy led by the dominating Fisheries Agency (FA) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry is the continuation of the so-called ?scientific whaling? under Article 8 of the ICRW and not the resumption of commercial whaling. We further argue that the Fisheries Agency (FA) even do not want to re-open the moratorium and is only pretending that it is devoted to lift the moratorium because the status-quo surrounding the whaling issue is favorable to continue whaling under Article 8 of the ICRW.Regarding the course of this paper, we begin with reviewing and briefly evaluating the aforementioned studies attempting to explain the Japanese whaling diplomacy. Secondly, a brief overview of the conceptual models is provided to understand the Japanese domestic political structure and process. Then, we thirdly turn to test our argument by counterfactual analysis. Fourthly, the domestic origin of Japanese whaling diplomacy including the policymakers? interests and incentives, and the enabling factors for pursuit of such interests are analyzed and put forward using the framework of a combination of conceptual models of Japanese domestic politics. This paper concludes with policy implications to the whaling controversy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]