Search

The armed conflict in the Republic of Tajikistan, which involved the country's four regions vying for access to the political apparatus after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been noted for its sudden escalation to violent conflict in 1992, the climax of fighting between 1992 and 1993, as well as its termination via peace settlement in June 1997. Yet, while the overt violent conflict only lasted less than a year, it claimed up to 60,000 lives and displaced an estimated one million people who fled into neighboring countries. Over ten years later, Tajik society has not seen a resurgence of direct violence, but the lasting effects of its period of non-violence may have produced a worse result which involves the presence of latent or structural violence. At the political level, the country's peace process which involved a political sharing arrangement has not been enforced since 2000 and leaves many opposition members isolated from the political process. The level of endemic corruption, lack of press freedoms, along with an increasing rate of drug, arms and human trafficking from South Asia to Eastern Europe, and continuing violence along its southern border with Afghanistan are significant hindrances to sustainable development within the country. Its economic dependency on remittances through labor migration has floated, yet not alleviated the economic development of the country, and instead, accompanied with nation-building strategies of encouraging Tajiki language over Russian language development, has left many Tajiks migrating to Russian-speaking countries susceptible to trafficking and forced labor. Problematically, the aforementioned risk factors are often tolerated both nationally and internationally as acceptable in the absence of direct violence. And while all are significant, the focus of this paper is not on evaluating the risk factors alone, but is focused on the lack of social and religious freedoms which have been highlighted by the Tajik government as "the" source of potential instability for Tajikistan. It is my thesis that it is correlation of the aforementioned factors with the current exploitation of social and religious affairs by the Tajik government for political gain that needs to be considered as increasing the potential for Tajiki men and women to become radicalized. This hypothesis comes from the recent intensity of Government efforts to "secularize" social and religious practices in the country through the political process including regulating the usage of the hijab, the registration of madrassas, and the co-opting of Friday prayers at large mosques which have given rise to concerns for recruitment into more fringe or radicalized elements of Islamic practice. Civil Society organizations have recognized that this recent assault on social and religious life is detrimental in the face of political and economic instability, and have worked on preventive measures to counter the government crackdown in this sphere. This paper will summarize the aforementioned hypothesis, then delve into a discourse on the varying approaches to preventing radicalization between government offices and civil society organizations and where these two competing strategies (albeit asymmetrical in their power dynamic) leave Tajikistan's citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the balance of power is generally considered to be a central theory in the field of international relations, it is also widely acknowledged to be an extraordinarily elusive concept because it is both ambiguous and protean. This paper has two main aims. The first is to identify the very different ways that the concept has been drawn upon in the theoretical literature and it focuses on neo-realism, the English school, classical realism and Marxism. In the second part of the paper these divergent approaches will be drawn upon in order to develop a pluralistic framework that will make it possible to examine the balance of power in different geographical and historical contexts. In particular, the aim will be to establish a framework that makes it possible to throw light on the role played by the balance of power in the very different processes of system reproduction and system transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the logic of current international politics (power politics)? In my paper, I try to analyze and understand the contemporary logic of international politics  particularly the logic of power politics. I argue that after 911, the world has turned into a power political state of mind, in which securitization seems to be a way of rule. From the perspective of power politics, international order seems to have elements of both an imperial and hierarchic system. The framework for analysis of this paper has three interlinked dimensions and elements. Firstly, the sphere of national security thinking provides the overall setting. The indefinable content of immanent national security explains the origins of securitization, of which forms the second element of the paper. I argue that securitization is both a useful tool for analysis and a way of ruling in existing world politics. With the help of securitization the politics and interests of national security is executed that results in hegemonic order. In the paper, my attempt is to explain why the combination of national security, securitization and hegemonic order constitutes a model, which explains, at least in part, the current logic of world politics . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates NATO force planning in the period 1989-2003. The paper defines force planning in terms of rules and focus and then identifies key turning points during the post-Cold War period. The purpose of the paper is partly to explain force planning change and continuity, partly to assess whether NATO in the future will be able to maintain a coherently integrated set of armed forces. Observers of NATO force planning generally explain allied planning with reference to variants of organization and institutional theory, emphasizing NATO bureaucrats’ as well as NATO members’ interest in regime continuity. In contrast, this paper uses power politics and national competition to account for force planning stability and change. Rather than discarding regime theory, the paper seeks to embed this perspective in a new framework of power politics, which draws attention to the tight relationship between NATO’s politically defined strategic concepts on the one hand and military planning on the other. The paper will draw on a book manuscript, which will be in the making at the time of the ISA conference (thus, not yet published), and which will be based on extensive primary research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While international relations scholars have long sought the causes of war, issues that arise after the fighting stops have garnered comparatively little attention. In this paper, I address a fundamental problem that all victorious states must face. That is, what exactly is prudence in victory? Is a moderate or lenient peace more likely to provide a stable post-war environment, or should the vanquished suffer a harsh, punitive peace that prohibits the state from ever rising to again disturb international stability? The conventional wisdom, emanating from the logic of the balance of power, is that defeated states should be treated moderately. While the proposition of moderation in victory may sometimes be appropriate, it is not specified well enough to explain the various ways victorious states have treated defeated states. I challenge the conventional wisdom by exploring the range of options that victors have with regard to a vanquished foe, from engagement to dismemberment, and provide a model to explain post-war settlements. In doing so, I show why victorious states sometimes choose more punitive settlements and, by extension, that punitive settlements can provide a more stable post-war environment under certain conditions. Prudence in victory, it follows, should not be measured by the means of a settlement, as many suggest, but by the consequences of the settlement for the post-war international system. While asking many similar questions that the literature on war termination presents, this paper seeks to go beyond explaining how wars end and explains both the causes of victorious states’ management strategies and the consequences of the settlements reached. To illustrate the argument, I present several cases of great power war settlements. This focus may provide insight regarding the most recent case of a defeated great power. While recent events have altered the US-Russia strategic relationship, Russian potential to destabilize the post-Cold War international system should not be dismissed and how the US continues the process of managing a defeated Russia will, at least to some extent, determine if this crippled giant goes the way of post-WWI or post-WWII Germany. Moreover, while not as likely to affect system stability but possibly more pressing in the current international system, applying this research to cases of regional or lesser powers may provide insight into the correct way for the US and other great powers to manage defeated states such as Iraq. Since war is not likely to disappear and the potential pitfalls of victory are all too obvious, critically and constructively examining the notion of prudence in victory is especially important given the context of US global leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper adapts the Charles Tilly's statebuilding argument for the creation of unified rule in Warring States Japan (1467-1590). Japan during this period was exemplar of the Hobbesian anarchy of realist theories. The system lacked central rule after the failure of the shogunal state and was split into independent warlord domains. Then, in the last three decades of the 16th century, the archipelago dramatically transformed from an anarchic to a hierarchic order. The resulting state was a reinstitution of feudalism, in stark contrast to the demise of feudalism and creation of the centralized sovereign state in Europe. This paper addresses the following questions: Why did the balancing mechanism fail to prevent unification in Warring States Japan? Why did the resulting government go backward and reinstitute feudalism? This paper addresses these questions by throwing the focus on the military alliances that the unifiers depended upon to unite and govern Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the EU's use of strategic diplomacy as a means of positioning itself in the world arena and of managing relationships with major powers within the arena. The first part of the paper develops an argument about the place of strategic diplomacy in EU external policy, identifying key elements and proposing a framework for analysis. The second part looks at the record of EU diplomacy towards China since the mid-1990s, evaluating key phases in the evolution of the EU-China 'strategic partnership', and assesses the negotiations for an EU-China Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The conclusions revisit and reassess the arguments, and ask whether it is possible to identify 'value added' through the pursuit of EU strategic diplomacy in this case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global health governance is frequently concerned with issues that are framed as pitting the interests of developing2 countries against those of industrialized countries, such as health worker migration and access to pandemic flu vaccine. But, as some middle-income countries (MICs, including but not only the BRICS) evolve into rising powers and emerging markets, how well do North-South political alliances and analytical categorizations function? Using the case of intellectual property (IP) rules and access to medicines, the paper analyzes the implications of this transition for global health politics. On the one hand, many MICs face a double-burden of disease, persistent poverty, and a growing need for affordable generic medicines as their social insurance systems expand - all of which imply the need for flexible IP rules. On the other, because they will contribute the majority of growth to the global pharmaceutical market, they are under pressure to strengthen the patent monopolies granted to multinational drug firms. Finally, their growing domestic medicines production and R&D capacities hold potential for helping to address national and global health needs. The paper concludes that the MICs will increasingly challenge IP rules perceived to favor industrialized countries, shape alternative global institutions to meet their domestic health needs, but simultaneously face growing expectations to contribute to global public goods that meet the needs of all countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper represents the early stages of a new project that explores China's search for 'responsible' great power status through the case study of Sino-African aid relations. China has become less hesitant about its intentions of attaining the status of a 'responsible great power' in recent years, and it is often argued that part of its desire to play a more prominent role is manifest in its aid policies to the developing world. In the context of Sino-African relations, China's quest for natural resources and propping up of autocratic regimes has been subject to much scrutiny. It is, however, important to keep in mind that China is also under pressure to provide assistance to the developing world in a 'responsible' manner which befits the status of a 'responsible' great power as defined by the Western powers which continue to dominate International Society to this day. In this paper, I seek to analyse Chinese policy discussions on international aid and explore how Western norms of 'responsible' aid have made inroads into China. Its findings will help us better understand how the Chinese leadership conceptualises what a 'responsible' great power should do, and the extent to which such thinking is influenced by Western discourses. This, in turn generates interesting implications on debates of legitimacy in contemporary International Society, as well as who (especially in China's eyes) is bestowed with the moral authority to bestow recognition of a 'responsible' great power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The balance of power is considered by many IR scholars as the nearest thing we have to a political theory of international relations for it lets scholars to tackle central questions of the discipline such as what forms of international anarchy, and what level of interaction between actors will develop as a result of balancing behavior. Although the expression „balance of power? itself was first explicitly coined in Renaissance Italy, the conduct of state actors to meet its criteria goes back to ancient times. This paper will argue that Near East of the Late Bronze Age (LBA) constitutes a meaningful research topic for elaborating the balance of power theory. It was during the Amarna Age in particular that we see for the first time the birth of a genuinely cosmopolitan culture where the states became fully integrated in an international system. Despite IR studies - especially in the English School tradition - examining the LBA Near East, systematic analyses of this phase in international history from the premises of power balancing are still somewhat lacking. The paper suggests that by studying the states-system in the ancient Near East we can better understand the great power dynamics of the present-day region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What impact do international economic conditions have on the likelihood of major power war? This paper addresses this longstanding question by starting from the contemporary empirical observation that the rise of emerging great powers - most notably, China and India - has been driven, at least in part, by the current wave of economic globalization. With this backdrop, the paper asks a specific question: Does a move towards deeper international economic integration foster a change in international power configurations that subsequently results in an increased chance of major power conflict? Liberal IR theory has traditionally seen economic interdependence as a force for international stability. Yet realist theory tends to see shifts in the balance of power as a cause of war. The paper constructs a theoretical argument that unites economic theory on the differential growth impact of trade, financial flows and technology diffusion with realist arguments on the conflict implications of polarity shifts and dynamic power differentials. It then tests the argument using evidence from the 1870-1914 period. The paper concludes that economic integration can indeed drive a rapid shift in the balance of power, and that it can consequently be a potent underlying driver of major war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a clear tendency for prime ministers and their offices to become more centrally involved in the foreign policy process and gain ground to the detriment of foreign ministers and foreign ministries. This paper explores the question of who really has authority and governs in foreign policy today and investigates this problematique through an in-depth analysis of one single case, Sweden, for purposes of tracing the operation of the causal mechanisms at work at a detailed level. The paper demonstrates that the power balance within the Swedish foreign policy executive between the office of the prime minister and the foreign ministry in the course of time has shifted in favor of the first, following a trend in other countries. This pattern has been reinforced by Europeanizing impacts following from Sweden's membership in the European Union. The findings carry implications for the debate on interdependence and internationalization of politics, and for research on foreign policy-making and systems, chief executive empowerment, as well as Europeanization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of security in the Asia-Pacific region has changed since the end of the Cold War. Not only is the nature of threats much more multi-faceted (terrorism, spread of weapons of mass destruction, territorial disputes, energy security, etc.), but there have been shifts in the balance of power, and one sees a clear increase in nationalism in the region. Scrutinizing the ASEAN Regional Forum, this paper assesses the effectiveness of this multilateral organization as a security actor by employing the conceptual framework of security governance discussed by Kirchner and Sperling in EU Security Governance. More specifically, the paper investigates four security functions--prevention, assurance, protection and compellence--and indicates where security developments in the region are likely to be headed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By focusing on major international oil companies (IOCs), this paper examines the balance of power in the oil industry in the current decade, which, unlike the previous two cooperative decades, can be characterised as 'conflictual'. In this decade, due to their weak relative bargaining power, the IOCs have generally been unsuccessful in bargaining with oil-exporting countries and national oil companies (NOCs). As a result, we are witnessing the return of the obsolescing bargain. Various factors endow oil-exporting countries and their NOCs with increased bargaining power vis-à-vis the major IOCs. High oil prices, increased industry competition, the lack of alternative investment options for IOCs and an increasingly hostile political climate in many oil-exporting states, translate to weaker bargaining power and unfavourable outcomes for IOCs. Their future as viable business entities is further compromised by the changing policy and regulatory environment in response to global climate change. By examining the strategies that major IOCs have adopted and may adopt to deal with systemic changes in the international oil industry, this paper proposes that to ensure the majors' long-term survival and viability, home governments should assume partial control of major IOCs and thus transform them into NOC-IOC hybrids. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some leaders choose foreign policies that flout the constraints posed by international structures? This paper argues that leaders possess varying beliefs about their state's proficiency in different areas of foreign policy, or "national efficacy beliefs." When sufficiently strong, these beliefs inspire leaders to act boldly, even when international structures offer incentives for restraint. Strong martial efficacy beliefs inspire leaders to challenge more powerful opponents on the battlefield, while strong moral efficacy beliefs prompt leaders to engage in costly forms of cooperation even when the relevant international institutions are weak. In constrast, weaker senses of martial and moral efficacy produce policies that are much more sensitive to structural constraints. The paper outlines how this framework can explain why the foreign policies of both China and India have become more conservative over the past six decades. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Where is the consistency in allied cooperation in American-led 'Coalitions of the willing'? Why does it vary, not only which allies who have participated, but also, when they have done what? In sum, this questions how bound to follow U.S. allies are in the unipolar post-Cold War international system? The central argument posed in this paper is that the U.S. allies' decision to participate or not in American-led international ad hoc coalitions in the post-Cold War era are determined by the severity of a unipolar alliance security dilemma. The variation in participation is explained by that the severity of this dilemma varies across states and coalitions even though the relative distribution of capabilities in the international system is held constant - unipolar. The severity of the unipolar alliance security dilemma is determined primarily by the interests of the unipole in relation to the allies and the specific coalition. Secondary is the interest of the ally and extend of comparability between the two and the degree of mutual dependence. The point is that there is a pattern of participation and that allied states are bound to follow. They are, however, not bound to follow the unipole as such, but they are bound to follow the maneuver room determined by the unipole. This is based on structural realist alliance theory, which argues that the polarity is the most obvious determinacy of alliance partners. The aim of this paper is to provide a model that can be used to analyse when and under which conditions intra-alliance cooperation in ad hoc coalitions led by the unipole takes place in a unipolar international system. The novelty of the paper is threefold. First, neorealist alliance theory is further developed on unipolar international systems and which alliance dynamics is inherent in such a system. Second, knowledge of the logic behind formation of coalitions used to manage military interventions and led by a unipole is extended. Third, understanding of allied cooperation during a unipolar international system is elaborated. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today, the United States faces a decision about how to deal with an environment in which its commitments exceed its capabilities and its power is overstretched. This paper argues that among several alternatives â€" divestment of resources, sustaining the status quo or transforming its power â€" the latter is a most desirable long-term alternative that can arrest and possibly reverse its overstretch and improve its relative power position. Is it, however, a viable alternative? This paper looks at all the cases when great powers (US, UK, and Russia) attempted to transform their power and analyzes causes of their success and failure. The finding is that institutional rigidity and a lack of fungible resources are the greatest obstacles to a successful transformation of power. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this paper is to show the importance of power politics in regionalism/regional cooperation with the case of East Asian regionalism. Unlike the expectation of liberal theory, the necessity of regional cooperation is not a sufficient condition for successful regional cooperation. The intention of strong power regardless of its geographical identity has strong impact on the formation of regional institution. The first East Asian Summit held in Malaysia revealed how much the interests of the United States matters in East Asian regionalism. The attempt to create an East Asian regional institution failed due to the objection of some countries(Indonesia and Japan) to Asia-only regional institution. This paper tries to show that East Asian regionalism is not regional matter but the competition of two strong powers, the U.S. and China for sphere of influence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Obviously, this is not the paper that I had intended to deliver on the 1930s panel, "American (Under) Balancing of Power: Neoclassical Realism, the Roosevelt Administration, and the Road to World War II." Both that paper and the present paper will be chapters 1 and 3, respectively, in my current book project, The Primacy of Power: Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy. This book presents a neoclassical realist theory to explain variation in United States grand strategy from the years immediately preceding its entry into World War II until the present. The theory provides an explanatory and descriptive framework for how the top leaders of the United States assess international threats and opportunities; adjusts national security policies in response to those threats and opportunities; and then mobilizes the human and material resources necessary to implement those policies. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, for much of the past six decades the United States has pursued policies broadly consistent with the expectations of neoclassical realism. In other words, the ultimate causes of U.S. grand strategic behavior lay in the international system. The international system, however, can only influence any state's foreign and security policies through the medium of decision makers' calculations and perceptions. This means that threat perception and the preliminary identification of policy options is rarely objectively efficient or predicable based solely on systemic factors, at least in the short-run. Finally, once leaders have identified threats and their preferred strategies for redressing them, they still face the task of mobilizing domestic political support and extracting the necessary resources from civil society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this particular paper, I try to analyze and understand the contemporary logic of international politics -- particularly the logic of power politics. Particular interest is placed on theoretical approach of security understanding in the context of contemporary world politics. The nature of the paper is primarily theoretical and conceptual. The paper is a critical reading of current world politics or more pertinently the contemporary power politics. Particular attention is paid to the national security thinking in the context of contemporary hegemon -- the United States. At the outset, the paper examines the nature of present-day power politics and describes the essence and fundamentals of national security conception. Secondly, in the paper is taken a critical stand on this dominant conception (national security) of International Relations in the light of critical security studies including some aspects of postmodern thought, too. In a subsequent chapter, critical analysis is supported and developed by the views outlined in the orientation of critical geopolitics. Third undertaking of the paper is to provide a platform for further study in which the aim is to reflect the overall and recent security debate within the discipline of IR, and particularly the criticality of it. Regarding the last task, which is not seriously tackled in this piece, the underlying presumption is that the critical security studies particularly, but also the orientation of security studies as such has failed to produce alternative approaches to world politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise and fall of great powers is an issue of great interest to international relations scholars. Four carefully designed classroom simulations have generated a dataset that allows for further analysis and comparison of two cyclical theories of international conflict: Power transition theory and power cycle theory. This paper accomplishes two tasks: First it identifies the crucial but often overlooked differences between the two research programs. Second, it uses new data from the classroom simulations in order to compare the relative strength of each theory. A concrete series of testable hypotheses are outlined, and a quantitative analysis of the simulation data is conducted. Do students exhibit more conflict behavior when their country is engaged in a power transition than at other times? Do critical periods lead to the kind of uncertainty and miscalculation that power cycle theory claims is necessary for large-scale war? What type of behavior results when a critical period falls within a power transition? In each simulation, teams of five students represent one of eight countries that interact on the fictitious continent of Aetolia. As national leaders, students have both individual and collective objectives, which can be achieved through policies including, but not in any way limited to: Free trade organizations, military alliances, cooperative public projects, resource cartels and in some cases, war. Over the course of six turns (approximately two weeks), students strive to achieve their objectives within the limitations of ever-changing power allocations. These allocations are manipulated in order to replicate the traditional bell curve that characterizes the rise and fall of great powers over time. Specifically, relative power for each country is altered in order to generate power transitions and critical periods. The structure of the simulations also allows the analyst to control the effects of important variables such as geographic proximity and contiguity, regime-type, national capability, time, trade and other important factors that are identified in the literature. Because they focus on modern major power conflict, power transition theory and power cycle theory have traditionally been limited to a very finite dataset. This data has seemingly been twisted and turned in every way possible. As a rough, but initial remedy, these simulations succeed in generating fresh, testable and reliable data, which is a nice alternative to another attempt at wringing more water from an old, dry rag. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through the informational activities of Africa’s civil society organisations, the new information communication technologies (ICTs) are largely perceived to offer unprecedented plurality that challenges the hitherto excessive powers and influence of the continent’s ruling elites. Before the advent of ICTs, many African leaders tightly controlled information dissemination ? allowing only the dominant political views. Based on interviews in Kenya and Zambia, this paper examines the perceptions that in Africa the impact of ICTs is, ironically, disproportionately greater than their overall spread, and that the libertarian ICTs as impetus to the third wave of democratisation shift the balance of power between states and citizens, especially in developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unipolarity is a concept which characterizes the distribution of power capabilities among states; however, it says little about the quality of those capabilities and nothing about the nature of the actors who possess them or their strategies for converting them into power. It is commonly agreed that the United States is a preeminent actor in a unipolar system. But there is much disagreement as to what kind of preeminence the United States likely to exert in the post-Cold War World. Different writers use very different terms to capture America’s role in the world. Some authors argue that the United States as an empire and see the US role as an imperial one. Others claim that the USA is a hegemon and interpret its behavior as that of a preeminent actor in a hegemonic system. Members of the conservative Bush administration see the USA as a leading state in a democratic ‘zone of peace’. Radical opponents of the administration view the USA as a core actor in a capitalist world-economy. This paper will first clarify these different concepts in the light of US foreign-policy praxis. It will then discuss more closely the relationship between the two popular concepts of empire and hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While economic globalization is frequently cited as a source for policy convergence, the precise causal links between these two variables often go unexplored. The common thread missing from most of the globalization literature is the role that state agency plays in the regulation of the global political economy. This paper builds on a simple game-theoretic model of policy coordination to develop two arguments. First, great powers remain the most important actors in determining the extent of policy convergence. When great powers act in concert, there will be effective policy harmonization. When the great powers fail to agree, partial policy convergence will take place through competition. The increasing returns to scale of regulatory harmonization will lead powerful actors to compete for as many allies as possible, leading strong policy convergence, but at multiple nodes. These different pathways are examined by examining the variation in outcomes of two different issue areas: money laundering and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a strong revival of interest in balance of power theory and theories of balancing in particular. One central debate is whether states balance against the strongest military power in the system (Waltz) or the greatest threats to their interests (Walt and others). One particularly important source of threat derives from a state’s traditional rivalries. In this paper we examine the relative importance or impact of two different sources of threat on the balancing behavior of the great powers: (1) hegemonic threats to the system as a whole, which we measure as a function of the military capabilities of the strongest power in the system; and (2) threats from rivals, which we measure as a function of the dyadic balance of power between a state and each of its rivals. We focus on the European system from 1495-2000 and examine the balancing behavior of the great powers. We define balancing in terms of external balancing in the form of alliance formation and construct a dataset on great power targeted alliances over the last five centuries. We define power in terms of land-based military power, operationalize it in terms of army size, and use the Rasler and Thompson (1994) data on European armies. We use Thompson’s conceptualization of rivalries and his database on rivalries over the last five centuries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are different explanations of the strategic phenomenon known loosely as the Bush Doctrine. Here I look at two competing and possibly complementary views: that on the one hand US foreign policy in its current form is a function of a unipolar system within which the United States is the only serious international actor; or on the other that it embodies something distinctly American ? that is something exceptional ? which tells us as much, if not more, about the United States as a very specific kind of polity than it does about the distribution of power globally. In this paper, I will explore these two lines of inquiry and draw some conclusions about the future direction of US foreign policy and whether or not the United States will continue along its current unilateral path. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines American behavior since 911 through the war against Iraq through the lenses of Hedley Bull’s notion of the five mechanisms that preserve international order (The Anarchical Society: balance of power, great power management, war, international law and diplomacy. I suggest that American behavior, while often interpreted in terms of advancing its own hegemonic interests, actually reflects a broader attempt to preserve international order as scholars and decisionmakers alike know it- an order based on states and the units of the game. I suggest that the 911 events have threatened to undermine this basic order, as they gave such prominence to a non-state actor. This has been a challenge to our theories, as well as to the decision-makers who wanted to use them, becuase basic IR theories are founded on the assumption of inter-state order. For example, the main theortical structures dealing with detternece assume one is deterring rational, internationally-accountable, states. The American determination to shift the war on terror to the war against the axis of evil, reflects the attempt to shift the international game back to the familiar inter-state level, where the rules are known and solutions appear to be available. It is no wonder that the two states most strongly opposed to American policy are France and Germany, who in their own experience in Europe have indeed gone beyond the conception of an inter-state world order... I address all these issues by examinning the challenges and changes that have occured in the five order-preserving mechanisms a-la- Bull. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the basis of the English school concepts of balances of power, great powers and middle powers, the paper argues that the US and China advocate competing concepts of regional order in the Asia-Pacific. The US prefers an order based on the instruments of war, whereas China gravitates towards instruments of diplomacy. Sino-US policies produce an unstable pattern of balancing marked by fluctuating alliance and partnership commitments, a low level of predictability, and considerable freedom of action. This intermediate type of order leaves middle powers such as ASEAN, Russia and South Korea with extraordinary responsibilities for preserving the balance. It is engendered by China’s efforts to postpone agreement on permanent mechanisms of regional order, pending the realization of its development potential allowing it to influence regional order on a par with the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a new theory that explains why marked shifts in the balance of power lead to war in some cases but not in others. The central argument is that the declining state?s military strategy is the key determinant of peace and war in the presence of power shifts. States essentially can adopt two military strategies: maneuver and attrition. The possession of a maneuver strategy increases the prospect of war by enhancing the declining state?s confidence in its military capability, accentuating its fear of losing a military opportunity, and reducing its susceptibility to compensation. If the declining state only has an attrition strategy available to it, on the other hand, war is less likely since the state has little confidence in its chance of victory and is more likely to be accommodating during a crisis. I probe the plausibility of my theory through a comparative historical analysis of two crucial cases of power shifts: Germany’s decline relative to Russia between 1890 and 1914, and Russia’s decline vis-a-vis Germany between 1870 and 1890. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the goals of ethnic terrorist organizations (ETOs). It reviews theoretical tenets from the fields of ethnic conflict and terrorism and employs various binary probit models to examine relationships between ethnic group characteristics and the existence of ETOs among these groups. Although all ETOs are nationalistic by design since they aim to improve the status of the groups to which they belong, their specific goals could be to (1) counter discrimination levied against their ethnic brethren, (2) advance a separatist or autonomy movement, or (3) achieve intracommunal power. I infer from these models that the goals of ETOs are separatism and intracommunal power but not counter-discrimination nor administrative autonomy. I control for relevant variables and find, not surprisingly, that ETOs are more likely to exist when ethnic groups have kindred group support, larger population proportions, and geographic concentration. If this analysis holds, governments should be skeptical in thinking that ending discrimination and granting autonomy will provide incentive for ETOs to disband. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws on realism and neoliberalism to explain how rising powers respond when their expanding interests conflict with those of the declining power. I hypothesize that when confronted with this dilemma, rising powers respond by challenging the declining power through international institutions, such as the United Nations. While more direct means of pursuing their competing interests may be available, these measures may be construed as provocative at best and threatening at worst. Instead, rising powers will seek to allay the concerns of the declining power by pursuing their competing interests through institutions. The reasons for this are twofold. First, institutions are considered to be a legitimate forum for debate and opposition. Second, institutions, by design, contain mechanisms capable of constraining the declining power. I test my hypotheses by: conducting a statistical analysis to determine whether changes in state power are associated with fluctuations in UN General Assembly behavior as reflected in votes cast; and conducting a case study of U.S.-China interactions in the UN Security Council. The principle data sources are: Erik Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic's "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data," The World Bank World Development Indicators, and press that covers UN Security Council developments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I develop a realist-constructivist theory to explain the limited nature of European social policy when significant efficiencies could be achieved through a significant transfer from the national to the European level. To explain how European social policy has been institutionalized in this way, the re-launch of social policy by interstate negotiations in Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. I seek to combine rational and sociological approaches by synthesizing realist intergovernmentalism and social constructivism. The initial genesis of the Single European Act and Maastricht Treaty can be explained by an intergovernmental explanation. Because of their favorable balance of power within the European Council, the most powerful member states determine the direction of the integration process. Additionally, the integration process has been marked by relative gains concerns. The intergovernmental nature of the integration process, with states calculating the relative gains, has becomes a reified, unquestioned part of the European integration. The state interests for social policy integration were socially constructed through phenomenological and symbolic interactions. Intersubjective structural processes have generated both European and national identities, which promote interests for continued cooperation that allows for national autonomy. The routinized, habitual interactions among the national elites, as agents, reproduce the European social policy as an intersubjective structure. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Great power status is an essentially contested concept, despite the commentaries of some IR theorists. In this paper I examine materialist definitions of great power status and find them lacking. Also, an intersubjective understanding approach to great power status fails at least insofar as no one can agree who a great power is, in at least some of the cases out there. After examining the literature I discuss how narratives influence foreign policy decision making and how a state's identity leads it to adopt certain policies - in this case, the pursuit of great power status. I extend this from a relational-identity perspective to a relational-power perspective, and seek to bring ideational studies and realism closer together. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Five decades ago, Karl Deutsch devised what he called "Parkinson's Law for international affairs": A state's insecurity expands along with its power. This certainly seems to apply to the United States, which is simultaneously the strongest country in the history of the world and the most insecure of today's great powers. The threats it has recently identified in the international system, from Iraq to Hugo Chavez to terrorism, are minor compared to what most states have had to confront throughout history. As states grow in power they usually also become more materially secure; why, then, do they often seem to worry more, often about trivial matters? This paper explores the political psychology of unipolarity in general, and the connection between power and insecurity in particular. Pathologies arise when irrational forces drive policymaking; presumably good policy is the result of rational cost-benefit analyses. If it is true that great power leads to perceptions of insecurity - or merely elevates the trivial to appear existential - then some of the most fundamental assumptions of U.S. grand strategy might need to be rethought. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the 'Cold War' balance of power came to an end and as the dynamic process of globalization affected not only the structure and the process of the international system as well as the way states started to perceive their own neighbourhood, new regional schemes emerged and multi-dimensional exchanges intensified on a regional scale. In short, regionalism gained a new momentum. However, the Black Sea region, characterised by a traditional high degree of geopolitical pluralism, proved to be a more complicated case and an area where geopolitical competitions were waiting to flare. Overall, during the 1990s the fear of power politics antagonism prevailed over any regional scheme or form of cooperation in spite of the efforts to enhance and institutionalise regional cooperation. This state of affairs started gradually to change and a new strategic perspective for the Black Sea area emerged. Increased volume of trade, FDI, new markets, the redrawing of the energy map, a redefinition of the relations among the states of the region and last, but certainly not least, the potential of EU and NATO accession were the prevailing geopolitical trends of the 2000s. However, this euphoria was soon put in question as the protracted conflicts of the region, the related weak state syndromes and ethnonationalism -all remnants of the 'violent' dissolution of the USSR- remained high on the agenda while at the same time, a number of regional and extra-regional actors started to have conflicting agendas and different priorities. Of particular relevance in this context is the trilateral power play between the European Union, the United States and Russia. Taking into consideration all these variables and the fragile balance of power, this paper attempts to assess the prospects for a modus vivendi between the various actors. Will regional cooperation prevail or will the Black Sea become a place of growing instabilities? What are or could be the preferable forms of cooperation? Is there are any window of opportunity after August war in Georgia or does the recent crisis symbolise the beginning of a new era of antagonism? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, the historiography of the academic discipline of IR, ever since its institutionalization (1919−), has been divided into three great debates. As a legacy of these debates the 'behavioralists', or those who believed in the methods of the natural sciences, left their mark on the field in the 1950s and 1960s. Although the positivistic approach is not anymore prevalent within the discipline, there's a clear indication that the IR theory has, even today, an exaggerated interest in the scientific explanation. This article will argue that the scholarly study should lean more on 1) historical analysis and there should be room for research agenda that is less focused on 'presentism', i.e. on contemporary history and current policy issues. Secondly, too much emphasis is put on Eurocentrism: important research topics outside the Occidental world are hence disregarded. As a result a distorted image emerges of how the modern international system came about. Perhaps more importantly, this state of affairs, to which the 'English school' has paid attention on its part, limits the understanding of classical concepts such as the balance of power, sovereignty, or even diplomacy reducing them exclusively to the domain of European states system. The aim of the paper is thus to examine the mutually beneficial interplay between history and IR theory by analyzing the 2) interstate relations in the Ancient Near East during the Late Bronze Age. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid ascent of China to great power status has caused much concern among politicians and academics alike. The prospect that China may eventually attain parity with the United States dramatically increases the likelihood of security challenges between itself and the West. There has been a great deal of attention given to this issue by policy analysts and media outlets; however, the rise of China has not received commensurate attention in the international relations literature. Power Transition Theory posits that states require not only the capability, but the willingness to overtake the system leader. While China’s ability to surpass the US is a possibility, our understanding of its willingness to take on systemic leadership is relatively indeterminate. In this analysis, we employ Power Transition Theory in order to address the following questions: is China dissatisfied with the status quo and, if so, will it be willing to assume the role of dominant power? Our paper attempts to answer these questions using conventional measures as well as participation in regional and supra-regional structures. In doing so, we hope to gauge China’s dissatisfaction with the status quo and its potential willingness to advance its preferences in the international arena. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dramatic ‘opening’ to the People’s Republic of China in July 1971 and the subsequent reconciliation in Sino-American relations stand as a lasting positive achievement of Richard Nixon’s US presidency. Nixon’s National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, is widely credited with the vision and rationale for the rapprochement. Public accounts of the period portray the US-PRC rapprochement as part of the search for systemic equilibrium and long-term peace; while in the shorter term it would boost détente and better relations with Moscow, Washington’s greater adversary. Yet, recently declassified documents undermine this “triangular relations” account. They show that Kissinger sought to structure what amounted to a secret alliance with the PRC. Kissinger’s effort more closely resembled a neo-realist balance of power exercise in which the US sided actively with the weaker of the two Communist powers â€" China â€" against the stronger threat of the Soviet Union. To articulate the dynamics of this change and to account for the security understandings that Kissinger and the Chinese leaders jointly constructed, we are conducting a series of analyses that apply the inferential tools of linguistic pragmatics to the contents of transcripts of 1973 conversations between Kissinger, Mao Zedong, and Zhou En Lai. In this paper, we analyze conversations we take to be pivotal, as we discern in them a substantive change in Kissinger’s communications to the Chinese regarding the nature of their strategic relationship with the US. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the course of history great powers have routinely sought to extend their influence over the international system and to create international orders congenial to their own interests. In doing so, they have had to contend with frequent acts of resistance and/or rebellion from groups unwilling to accept direct foreign or proxy rule. In their attempts to defeat such resistance and enforce their desired order at reasonable cost, great powers have relied upon indigenous forces. Efforts to create effective indigenous forces, however, have met varying degrees of success. This paper examines the causes of this variation by way of a an examination of the French efforts to create indigenous forces for their COIN efforts during the Algerian conflict between 1954 and 1962. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our era of globalization and complex interdependence requires that more attention be paid to the measure of Soft Power â€" a notion that is commonly used without much real understanding. Joseph Nye and his contemporaries have examined this issue, but few processes are offered for its quantification. This raises a fundamental question: Is it possible to measure or to characterize the Soft Power of a nation? The argument of this paper is that it is possible to partially evaluate influence through its indirect manifestations, the same way a forensics investigation analyzes hints post facto, but the task remains nevertheless very difficult. In spite of the inherent limitations associated with the measure of influence in the human sciences, it is concluded that a multidisciplinary approach augmented by the complexity sciences can provide a more complete portrait of influence. An examination of current methods shows that today’s tools offer important elements and processes for consideration, but that their individual contribution is insufficient. A review of the basic principles of complex systems is required to link influence to complexity. A first step based on a multidisciplinary approach taking advantage of thematic “geo-influence” mapping is proposed. Then, a second step consisting of using the tools of complexity sciences in a unified way to model and measure influence through the paradigm of cognitive networks is suggested. Finally, brief case studies on China and Iran’s respective sphere of influence in Asia are designed to illustrate the theoretical argument and show both the challenges and prospects related to this area of inquiry. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the words of human rights scholar David Forsythe, George H.W. Bush’s foreign policy incorporated “moral impulses as long as they did not prove inconvenient to expediential concerns,” (1995:126). In short, analysts have argued that human rights was approached pragmatically during the first Bush presidency, subordinated in realist fashion to broader strategic concerns and the considerations of post-Cold War power politics. But what of the son? By contrast, the presidency of George W. Bush has seemed to feature a shifting stance on the question of balancing human rights concerns and national security interests. As a candidate and in the first months of his presidency, George W. Bush largely echoed his father’s realist and pragmatic approach. For example, while committed to the promotion of political openness and economic growth abroad, on the question of humanitarian interventions, the initial position of the Bush team was to shun such operations unless larger regional or strategic interests were at stake. Yet by 2006 the Bush administration had embraced an apparent liberal interventionist stance toward the promotion of human rights, declaring in National Security Strategy 2006 that “… the United States seeks to extend freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy,” (2006:2). In this paper I will compare the approach to human rights and national security policy during the two Bush presidencies, identifying and accounting for key areas of similarity and difference. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In previous work I argue for a connection between different military doctrinal cultures and the failure of coercive diplomacy. Different military cultures in the United States and China affected signaling, communication, perception, and assessments of the balance of power. This led to failures of deterrence and coercion during the Korean War. In this paper, I extend this idea into two additional naval cases: the deterrence of conflict in the Taiwan Strait in 1950 and today. I argue that Chinese naval doctrine today is, for cultural and organizational reasons, distinct from that of the United States. I assess the potential dangers this poses to the conduct of military diplomacy in the Taiwan Strait, and offer proposals to overcome or limit these challenges. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a test of elements of Power Transition Theory (PTT) through an examination of types of demographic transitions against civil war. It divides population transitions into nine types and, from PTT logic, derives testable hypotheses. It also tests elements of PTT's rival, Balance of Power Theory (BPT). Although the logic of PTT seems appropriate to testing at the substate level, the results are mixed. Most states plagued by ethnic civil wars have stable populations (i.e. no transitions), yet three types of transitions stand out. Even here, however, PTT predicts violence in only one of these three types of transitions. BPT fares a bit better. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a large pool of rigorous empirical studies investigating the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and armed conflict. A general finding is that ethnicity matters, although not as much as portrayed in popular media. But a largely neglected aspect of these quantitative studies is how changes in the relative strength of groups affect conflict. Toft (2002) argues that differential growth may destabilize heterogeneous democracies internally. In democratic societies, political power is distributed according to popular support in elections. A changing balance between groups may thus alter the distribution of power and potentially lead to political instability and ultimately violent conflict. We argue that the relationship between differential growth and instability and violence may be even more important in semi-democracies with electoral systems, but with weak and inconsistent political institutions. In a cross-national time-series study we do a first empirical test of this notion. Starting from the premise that for differential growth to become a potential driver of conflict and instability, information of such change has to be recorded with a national census and actually published. Not yet having completed a reliable dataset on actual change between censuses, this paper investigates whether countries publishing identity data from consecutive censuses are at a greater risk of experiencing violence and political instability. Investigating the census data in two models of civil war and regime duration, we find no empirical support for the expectation that publishing identity data increases the risk of violent conflict and political instability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Steps to War theory (Vasquez 1993) suggests that war is brought on by a series of steps that increase hostility and the make then issues under contention more intractable. Power politics strategies, including coercion in the face of territorial disputes, rivalry or repeated crises, escalating bargaining demands, hardliners in power, alliances, and arms races, are all important steps to war. This paper will evaluate the steps to war research program using the qualitative comparative method. With this method, we can delineate the paths to war, rather than the steps to war. Territorial issues, rivalry, hardliners in power, and alliances are all probabilistic necessary conditions for interstate war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents an examination of the dynamics of multilateral military alliances or 'coalitions'. Framed within the wider debate over the future security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region, it has the dual objective of both enriching the academic debate and offering guidance to policy-makers by investigating the theory and practice of coalition behaviour. The article expounds the case for the American-Japanese-Australian combination and analyses the issues that confront such an alliance-coalition using two competing theoretical perspectives of allied behaviour: 'balance of power' and 'intra-alliance politics'. The main propositions of these perspectives are empirically tested against policy statements based on American, Japanese and Australian foreign and defence policies and associated academic writings. The paper demonstrates the continued validity of realist-conceived approaches to security provision and concludes that both theoretical perspectives are useful tools of analysis in this case. Focusing on separate levels and therefore different aspects of allied behaviour, they can in fact be viewed as complementary, rather than competing, and clearly exhibit strong potential for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The overall topic of this paper is the relationship between regime type (e.g., democratic or authoritarian) and foreign policy orientation (i.e., relative proneness towards conflict and cooperation) for South America's Southern Cone. Its specific purpose is to offer an explanation of the relationship between regime type and foreign policy orientation in the 1970s. I will argue that, unlike what we would expect from a balance of power perspective, political regime is indeed crucial to understanding foreign policy orientation in the case under scrutiny. But I will suggest that changes in foreign policy orientation within the region in the last decade or so might owe more to the vanishing of authoritarian regimes than to the return of democratically elected leaders. However, I will not make universal claims about authoritarian regimes. I suggest, rather, that the pervasive influence that a geopolitically driven discourse of international politics had over the military establishments within the region is crucial to understand the relative conflict proneness of the authoritarian regimes that prevailed during the 1970's. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a test of elements of Power Transition Theory (PTT) through an examination of types of demographic transitions against civil war. It divides population transitions into nine types and, from PTT logic, derives testable hypotheses. It also tests elements of PTT's rival, Balance of Power Theory (BPT). Although the logic of PTT seems appropriate to testing at the substate level, the results are mixed. Most states plagued by ethnic civil wars have stable populations (i.e. no transitions), yet three types of transitions stand out. Even here, however, PTT predicts violence in only one of these three types of transitions. BPT fares a bit better. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Being one of the international "hot spot", the cross-strait relation could not only influence the future of China, but the stability of East Asia area and even the global system. To majority of researchers, what they pay the main attention should not be the past of the cross-strait relations, that is, why Mainland and Taiwan begin to fight each other, but how could they solve these problems in the future. From the perspective of liberalists, they think the so-called "Democratic Peace" or "Peaceful Transformation" maybe the key answers, it means when Mainland China finish the economic reforms and therefore lead to the political transformation, the problem of cross-strait relations would be solved in the same time. Nonetheless, to the realists who believe the concept of "Power Politics", before we construct an appropriate international regime to deal the conflict effectively, they are afraid that the cross-strait relations should be decided by power contrast between Mainland and Taiwan. In this paper, I will review the standpoint of liberalism and realism first, and then try to analyze and realize which one would be the possible choice to resolve the deadlock of cross-strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "Small States and the International Society of States" prepared for the "International Studies Association Annual Convention" held at Waikiki in Honolulu, Hawaii. It discusses the views of international relation scholars Martin Wight and Hedley Bull on international society. It examines the balance of power in small states.