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This paper was conceived within the policy context of declining US efficacy and rising Chinese influence in Sub-Saharan Africa at large. China’s interests in Africa and in Sudan are of increasing importance to analysts, human rights advocates and policymakers. While much work is being done in the policy community to assess China’s economic and geopolitical intentions in Africa, it is of equal importance to assess the already-emerging political and humanitarian impacts its economic activities. The goal of this paper is to explore those impacts in Sudan within the scholarly framework of the “veil of anarchy” that, as I will show, is currently being employed in that state with the aid of Chinese investment. The goals of this paper are twofold. I intend outline a theoretical basis for understanding how the costs of state-led anarchy to the regime in power can be met through foreign inputs â€" financial, infrastructural, and diplomatic â€" thus making the normally risky strategy of the ‘veil of anarchy’ more attractive and sustainable to elites. I will then examine the case of Sudan to determine how this theory can be usefully applied to those elites’ manipulation of force and access to foreign resources via investment from China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research paper seeks to examine the importance of the 2008 Olympic Games in regards to China's foreign policy options and subsequent future behavior, with particular emphasis placed on the Taiwan issue. The primary question addressed by this paper is whether or not China will use the 2008 Olympic Games as a means of demonstrating a responsible power identity. This paper asserts three hypotheses. First, China could forgo any gains to be made by hosting the Olympic Games and take defensive-oriented action against Taiwan as a means of protecting important national interests. Second, China could use the games as a propaganda tool and take offensive-action against Taiwan as a means of pursuing an expansionist agenda. Lastly, China could choose to take no action and use the Games to demonstrate a responsible power identity. These hypotheses are tested through three historical case studies: the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and the 1980 Moscow Games; the 1936 Berlin Games and the aggressive German expansion that began shortly thereafter; and the 1964 Tokyo Games and the 1988 Seoul Games in that both Japan and South Korea used the Games to build identities. This paper finds that although the third hypothesis is most preferable, certain factors might push China towards selecting an option closer to hypothesis one. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question "what are the similarities and differences between U.S. trade frictions with China, Japan, and South Korea that account for different U.S. retaliation patterns?" This paper develops six independent variables and their relative measurements from U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea cases and the literature, and examines their impact on U.S. retaliation to China. Our results indicate that four out of six independent variables have decreased the probability of U.S. retaliation since 2001. Furthermore, the U.S. has lost the necessary political, economic, and military leverage to retaliate to China, although it has had two of the three "motivations" to do so. This paper suggests that U.S. leverage over China has deteriorated for two major reasons: (1) U.S.' "illusion" of the latter party's ability/willingness for cooperation and of its own capabilities to retaliate; and (2) China's accumulation of relative gains at an unprecedented rate after 2001. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An important yet overlooked dynamic of political and economic reform in China has been the recent centralization of three bureaucracies governing China’s economy with the goal of regulating and disciplining local governments and eliminating local protectionism. Centralization has shifted authority relationships within these bureaucracies so that individual offices within them are no longer beholden to their local government hosts. They are now directly controlled by their functional administrative superiors and share only a consultative relationship with their former bosses. Centralization thus establishes new economic and political incentives that guide officials’ behavior, creates new winners and provides them with benefits they are unlikely to relinquish voluntarily, and forges new institutional arrangements that are likely to endure far into the future. However, this centralization is distinctive in that it only extends to the provincial level – what I term “soft centralization.” This paper addresses several questions. Why has China undertaken structural changes to increase state intervention in local economic decision making by centralizing three commercial and regulatory bureaucracies when its economy is firmly embracing market principles? Which bureaucracies are involved in this shift and why? What are the actual institutional mechanisms accompanying soft centralization? Finally, what are some of the implications of soft centralization on the future evolution of the Chinese state? By engaging these questions, this analysis deepens our understanding of the current institutional changes unfolding in China, adds to the literature on decentralization, and contributes to the debate on market-preserving federalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study compares ethnic identity and nationalism among China’s ethnic groups, including Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongolians, Huis, Kazaks and the Han majority. Following a discussion of ethnic policies under the Qing Empire, the Republic of China, and the People’s Republic of China, the paper explores the extent to which ethnic minorities are sinicized and the meaning of being Chinese. It uses survey data and examines ethnic and national identities in four aspects, language identity, religious practice, inter-ethnic marriage, and the survey respondents’ overall feeling of ethnic and Chinese identities as compared to the U.S. and Russia. The findings show a high level of ethnic identity as well as a high level of national identity among China’s minorities. It concludes that ethnic relations in China are based on a pact between the government and the ethnic minorities, which requires the government to grant ethnic separation and autonomy if the minorities agree to show their loyalty to the Chinese nation state. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On March 22, 2008, Taiwan elected a new President hence not only its domestic politics but also its relations with China have entered into a new phase. Taiwan's new President Ma Ying-jeou suggested and proposed a series of political standing points and views which are quite different with those of former President Chen Shui-bian. Compared with Chen, Ma expresses more open views on many issues, particularly on his cross-strait policy. For instance, he re-started the cross-strait negotiations which had been stopped for several years under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Chen Shui-bian's rule. Taiwan therefore signed many historical agreements with China. Ma Ying-jeou suggests having more controllable and stable cross-strait relations under the insistence of Taiwan's sovereignty. However, although the cross-strait relations seem to progress towards a more positive direction, there are still some points that need to be clarified and investigated. The most outstanding point is China's attitudes to Taiwan; that is to say, China apparently separates political issues from economic ones. Therefore, this paper attempts to investigate cross-strait relations by means of examining their contacts and exchanges on trade, governmental, social and security issues. That is, the author wants to examine whether Ma's policies have changed the cross-strait relations and the prospects of cross-strait relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mao Zedong was China's Great Helmsman between 1949 and 1976. By 1976, China's economy remained rigid and inefficient. Deng Xiaoping succeeded Mao in 1976. Deng balanced ideological tenets with economic reality. His approach to systemic transformation combined tight political controls with liberalizing economic policies. Since restructuring began in 1979, China has been averaging a 9.9% annual growth rate, 8% annual nominal per capita income rise, a nominal GDP reaching $3.4 trillion making China the second largest economy in the world. China's foreign reserve is in excess of $1.65 trillion, the highest in the world. The future success of China's rapidly growing economy, however, is less than assured. Behind the veneer of ostensible successes there are also bountiful anomalies and challenges. China presently scores a .47 Gini coefficient, the highest among developed economies. Incidents of social unrest have been on the rise and financial irregularities and corruption remain undiminished. The challenges posed by being a member of the WTO await to be directly faced. This paper analyzes official documents, cogent laws, decrees, data and current writings investigating China's experience with systemic restructuring. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the complex learning process that occurred between 1979 and 1987, elites confronted anomalies in the long-term revolutionary development paradigm, which sought to establish a strong independent China by achieving three interrelated goals: security, prosperity, and self-reliance. Based on the perceived success of the SEZs and the nascent coastal development strategy, elites reached a consensus over replacing the long-term goal of self-reliance with a state-managed embrace of the international economy. The concept of self-reliance thus became obsolete as elites were no longer tethered to the Nativist beliefs of Mao Zedong and had incrementally learned of the limitations of import substitution. This paper hypothesizes that by 1987, Chinese elites agreed that China should join the rest of the East Asian economies in formally adopting outwardly oriented development regime, which regarded foreign capital, technology, and markets as tools to empower China. Elites thus initiated the GATT accession process, established the fifth special economic zone on Hainan, and announced the coastal development strategy. A new generation of technocratic elites would take over the country’s leadership to institute the new technocratic regime. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China has grown economically it has gained in world influence and military power as well. Some realist IR theorists believe that rising powers in general - and China in particular - pose serious dangers of conflict with the older great powers they seek to join or displace. Other scholars see China as acting cautiously and responsibly, like a status-quo-power. Neo-liberal theorists tend to believe that China can be integrated into a peaceful world system and constrained by a web of normative and legal obligations. Chinese leaders themselves speak of seeking a "harmonious world" and disclaim any intention to threaten anyone. What does the American public think about the rise of China as a world power? In this paper we use a variety of data collected by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and others to explore the nature and causes of Americans' views.It turns out that most Americans are well aware of the rise of China. Some are apprehensive about that rise, chiefly for national security (rather than economic) reasons, and many favor a degree of off-shore "balancing" of the sort that realists recommend. But few Americans want to actively work to limit the rise of China. Very few favor the use of troops to defend Taiwan. Very few favor a nuclear-armed Japan. Large majorities of Americans take stands more akin to those of neo-liberal than realist theorists, favoring cooperation and peaceful engagement with China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the Chinese government's strategy in dealing with a loophole of the fiscal system in the reform era. It argues that the central government selectively tolerates local exploitation of the loophole to encourage local efficiency. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for a close connection between political trust and overall regime-legitimacy in authoritarian systems such as the Chinese. It analyses the effects of perceived performance (in terms of perceived political and economic performance and perceived financial well-being) and political culture (in terms of hierarchical and conflict orientations) on political trust in the imagined, central state and the real, executive state. It also includes other previously tested variables such as internal political efficacy and media consumption. The results show that political trust is an outcome of aspects of per-formance (in particular political performance) and parts of political culture. Political trust can be better understood when we try to gauge the interaction patterns between both. The detailed analysis reveals important indirect effects of performance being shaped by as-pects of political culture and well-being. The results also suggest that there is a strong effect of trust in the real state on confidence in the imagined state. However, media con-sumption seems to no longer affect political trust while internal efficacy does affect attitudes on the imagined state. Lastly, indirect and direct effects from structural variables such as age, education, and income on political trust suggest that trust levels and probably also regime legitimacy are structurally inclined to decrease in the future unless the regime finds a way to make its political system less vulnerable to an increasingly skeptical citizenry. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores the foreign direct investment patterns across regions in India and China. It examines why certain regions have been successful at attracting FDI more effectively than others by focusing on regional policies and political ideology. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the mishu/shouzhang relationship in Chinese government as linking social institutions through which corruption often takes place in the context of the comparative politics literature on patron-clientilism and the principal-agent-client model. We argue that understanding mishu/shouzhang relationship helps us explain corruption and other outcomes better than patron-client concepts whould do. We also argue that the assumptions underlying the P-A-C model do not hold true in China. Mishu/shouzhang relationships are distinctively "Chinese," not just in sense of where they are found but in their origins, internal dynamics and significance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to provide an understanding and background as to what China's cultural ethos is and whether or not it affects Chinese foreign policy. Specifically, what are China's policy priorities and how do they affect how the People's Republic of China deals with external ethnic conflicts? This study looks specifically at how China has dealt with a variety of policy decisions pertaining to issues of sovereignty in order to draw broader conclusions about the nature and causality of Chinese policy decisions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large body of research treats China's local state activities, especially at the township level, as responses towards central policy changes, and concludes with the proactive role of the township level government in economy in the 1980s and 1990s, and its current tendency of retreat from society and economy. Are there such direct incentive-response relationships and causal links between central policy changes, local state activities and economic consequences? Based upon an in-depth case study of H Township in central China, this essay stresses a close examination of everyday activities of the township level government. It argues that the township officials are embedded in a complex system and anticipate continuous disruptions in the environment. Instead of intentionally being developmental, entrepreneurial or predatory, township governments muddle through. As such, seemingly proactive activities pursued by the township level government may not be intentional designs and may not lead to economic growth. Instead, economic growth may be unintended consequences of townships seeking insurances to survive a complex environment. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A case study on Volvo AB (trucking) as it relates to specific government actions in China will highlight the role infrastructure plays in attracting a foreign firm to a country due to policies that make that country more competitive compared to other states. The trucking industry is fundamental to the economic success of China, yet it is surprisingly absent in the literature. The competitive state model has yet to be applied to this industry and examining infrastructure as it relates to this model will reveal a dynamic that has not been fully explored in political science..x000d.Volvo did not begin to produce trucks in China until 2004, nearly three decades after China began to open up to the world. Taking a look at the competitive state model, specifically the overlooked aspect of infrastructure, will provide an excellent basis for understanding government involvement in economic affairs, and as a result better the understanding of how a state competitively attracts a foreign firm such as Volvo. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Will the future of hegemonic politics resemble the past? In the post-Cold war world, emergence of new actors will likely reshape hegemonic politics and potentially reconfigure the balance of power. As the world shifts from one era to another, the behavior of emerging actors like China will have far reaching implications. As the post-Cold war world's emerging hegemonic power, China presents the most challenging questions for scholars of international politics. This study draws from historical patterns detected from the behavior of two key hegemonic powers of the past fifty to a hundred yearsâ??Germany 1866-World War 11 and the United States 1898-end of the Cold warâ??in order to understand and to better predict China's behavior in the next fifty to a hundred years. Most scholars of hegemonic politics in the twenty-first century believe that it is essential to understand China's emergence and its implications for the international system. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study proposes that the application of Huntingtonian subjective control does not hinder nor affect the professionalization of the armed forces. Chinese empirical case shows the model did not affect the enhancement of military professionalism ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese government has disproportionately reformed the economic system over the political system to promote economic development. Public opinion polls suggest Chinese citizens similarly prioritize economic outcomes over political reform. In this environment in which outcomes seemingly trump procedure, what is more explanatory of perceptions of fairness in the political domain in China: receipt of a desired economic outcome or procedural characteristics? Additionally, if procedure matters, which characteristics of the process are most important for perceptions of fairness? I investigate these questions in the framework of village elections, using an experimental design. I find procedural characteristics have twice the substantive effect of economic outcomes. Three procedural characteristics significantly and positively impact perceptions of fairness; opportunities for expression, equal treatment, and the availability of quality choices. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I’m going to explore the factors which affect China-Iran oil relationship and Iran’s role in China’s westbound oil strategy. In addition to Iran’s strategic location in Euroasia and its oil, I will focus on the influence of the Sino-U.S. relation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

External events, such as central "small state-big society" reforms and the decentralization of policy-making and social-service delivery to ill-funded local government, created legitimate political space for social intermediaries in China. Simultaneously, improved access to international funding and uncertainty over the proper role of the state in a new "socialist market" system increased the capacity and legitimacy of these groups. In this environment, civil society groups actively partner with local governments to gain access to the policy process to indirectly advocate on behalf of their interests. The interaction between local officials and civil society organizations are expanding this space and creating a larger policy role for these groups. Additionally, the ability of civil society groups to transmit credible information generates some degree of accountability for local officials. The space and capacity for civil society groups to participate in the public policy process is limited, but increasingly leads to greater pluralism and accountability. While these groups do not appear as a force for democratization, they are generating better governance outcomes in China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China is asserting its position as a potential leader in the global economy with its participation in the World Trade Organization and with the upcoming Olympic Games to take place in 2008, the nature of Beijing's relationship with Pyongyang is becoming increasingly important. Thus, a crucial question must be answered: what does China want its relationship with North Korea to be? This question has been tackled at great length over the past decade, but has left out an important aspect of the problem: it is not only what China wants, but how North Korea sees the relationship and interprets it that matters. Therefore, this research aims at expanding knowledge regarding North Korea's potential choices and options if it decides not to follow the Chinese model of opening, which has been heralded as the most desirable policy option for Pyongyang, if the regime does not collapse on its own. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper uses qualitative empirical analysis to understand the depth and complexity of North Korea's unique development dilemma and trajectory. The paper attempts to understand North Korea as a hesitant "gradualist transition economy" on its own terms, viewed in comparison to China's "successful" economic reform trajectory, in order to shed light on why some authoritarian regimes successfully implement economic reform, and others have not. China's "successful" reform and opening path was stimulated and abetted by the combined force of bottom-up societal desires and pressures, teamed with top-down policies reflecting China's considerable state capacity under the Communist Party rule to lead long-term economic development, and facilitated by a favorable global environment. North Korea's unique gradualism, on the other hand, has largely failed, in part due to the global setting, but most importantly as a result of North Korea's own domestic political dynamics and institutions. Kim Jong Il's peculiar leadership structure and personality cult, based on the "suryong" (Supreme Leader) system supported by North Korea's "juche" (self-reliance) ideology, particularly the "songun" (military-first) policy, has eroded state functions, preventing the civilian bureaucracy from setting long-term economic development goals beyond regime survival, and tolerating little or no bureaucratic autonomy in implementing economic reform policies.In a very real sense, the historical legacy of Korea's anti-Japanese struggle has created a so-called "guerrilla-band state" in North Korea, haunting and defining Kim Jong Il's management style, including his use of economic policy instruments. Kim's "guerrilla tactics" approach, defined as an "achieve quick gains or abort the policy" approach, is fundamentally incompatible with long-term economic reform and opening policy. North Korea's trajectory has been doomed to follow a disjointed "go-and-stop" transition path. Despite recently rising willingness to reform economy, North Korea's state capacity to implement a long-term economic strategy has been degraded by decades of capricious and highly ideological leadership. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper summarizes preliminary findings of a sectoral empirical case study that explores the impacts of contemporary globalization on national security. The case focuses on the Taiwanese semiconductor industry migration to China, as part of the continuous globalization of the chip sector, and the extent to which such a globalization process, under certain conditions, may pose security challenges to the United States, Taiwan and China. The paper is composed of four sections. The introductory section explains why it matters to adopt a sectoral approach to the study of globalization's impacts on security and why it matters to focus on the chip industry in the proposed study. The section further defines key concepts of globalization and security as used in the paper, identifies inadequacies in the existing literature, and highlights the significance of the proposed research undertakings. The second section explains rationale behind the methodological choice for the study, and summarizes strategies used to ensure interview access, data representativeness and data reliability. Using evidence collected in more than 140 in-depth interviews with a wide range of chip industry, defense sector and government insiders in the US and Asia, as well as English-language and Chinese-language secondary data, the next two sections dissect the empirical data in two major areas: the sectoral migration and the security implications. On sectoral migration, it is argued that the scope of the migration is extensive, the direction complicated, the cause multiple, and the outcome significant in boosting the indigenous Chinese chip industry development. The ways in which non-state actors of Taiwanese firms and individuals have violated government regulations in order to migrate to China are also identified. As for the ensuing technological and defense security ramifications, it is argued that there is no immediate security risk involved; long-term security challenges, however, may emerge taking into account two intervening factors. They involve the technological change in the sector concerning spin-on prevalence and dual-use nature of the chip technology, as well as the PRC grand strategy behind its resolve to establish a solid indigenous chip industry. These long-term security challenges are chiefly linked with three conduits of influence: the defense industrial base and the PLA modernization, technological security risks, and the dubious export control policy implementations. The concluding section argues how and why empirical findings presented in the previous sections deepen our understanding of globalization's impacts on security as far as the agency and scope of security, the autonomy and capacity of the state, as well as the balance of power are concerned. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military threat was intensively used by China during Taiwan's presidential elections but is widely argued as counterproductive because it didn't prevent pro-independence candidates from winning the elections. To explain the logic of China's military threat and outcomes of the elections, this paper develops a formal framework in which China and the incumbent party has better information about the state of the world than voters and non-incumbent party. China's threat is interpreted as a way to transfer information to voters. Although she doesn't prevent the pro-independence party from being elected, China successfully prevents the winning party from declaring formal Taiwanese independence. In this way, China is always better off by issuing threats. In general, this paper not only attempts to improve our understanding of Taiwan Straight confrontation but also tries to shed new insight on the study of military threat in International Relations. It also offers a concrete game theoretic model to illustrate Putnam's two-level game metaphor. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has seen deterioration of corruption in the past decades. This paper is interested in examining regional differences of corruption in China. It proposes that the middle level administrators' monitoring effort against corruption is determined by their prospect of further promotion-defined as "promotion likelihood". Their monitoring effort is lowest when they have mediocre promotion likelihood. Corruption in this case is most likely to be the worst because these officials have the most need of bribing their way into a promotion. Whereas rising stars likely have some distinct advantage and the laggards know that their chances are nil, mediocre officials believe they have a chance if only some "extra advantage" can be introduced. Therefore corruption has an inverse-U relationship with officials' promotion likelihood. In this paper, I also develop a measure of local corruption using the excessive real estate investment (REI) of the 31 provinces from 1995 to 2004 to test competing theories on causes of corruption. The results show the promotion likelihood does have significant impact on corruption, while the effects of market competition and news coverage on China are not as significant as predicted in cross-country studies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the SARS epidemic broke out in China in the summer of 2003, the Chinese health care system has entered a stage of rejuvenation. As a component of the Chinese social welfare system, public health care in China is experiencing another major shift primarily in terms of its importance to policy makers in after its seeming collapse during the 1990's. With the Chinese economy being even more deeply integrated into the international economic system, the Chinese economic, social, and political life is experiencing a significant transformation. The stereotype is that economic globalization in developing countries drives a "race to the bottom", especially in undemocratic regimes where the lack of electoral competition disincentivizes political elites to invest on social welfare as a strategy to secure votes. The deterioration of the public health in China during the 1990s seemed to lend support to this argument, yet recent development in the Chinese health care reform suggests that authoritarian regimes do compensate under certain circumstances. The problem, however, is to identify exactly when they compensate. This paper investigates the political causes behind this shift in the Chinese health care system. My hypothesis is that as increased economic integration induces many factors of instability, political elites in authoritarian China invest on public health care as a means to increase their sense of security against an increasingly mobilized population. My paper focuses on how domestic politics mediates the impacts of economic integration on the welfare state, in particular public health. In authoritarian China, when social stability deteriorates, political elites use public policy as a political lever to maintain or to improve it in order to secure power, leading to changes in social welfare, including public health. Expenditure on welfare service, therefore, could be seen as a form of investment on political security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Early this year, Ye Xiaowen, Head of the State Administration for Religious Affairs of PRC, claimed that the Chinese government should promote Buddhism to solve the social conflicts caused by the unfair reallocation of resources. The Chinese government also claimed in 2004 that they had appropriated near 1 billion yuan in rebuilding and repairing Buddhist temples nationwide. Additionally, Buddhism is also the widest-accepted religion among Chinese people, and the government reported that it has more than one hundred million believers in China. All these facts brought some interesting questions to us: Why did a professed atheist government make a statement endorsing a certain religion? Is the government trying to establish Buddhism or use it as a ruling tool? Since the foundation of the PRC in 1949, China has been viewed as a country without God ruled by the atheist Chinese Communist Party. As the demise of the Soviet Union, the ideal of Communism along with the authority of Communist Party collapsed among the mass, and thereby emerged a spiritual vacuum in China. Perceiving the moral chaos caused by uncontrolled pursuit of simply material prosperity in Chinese society, the Chinese government raised the slogan of "constructing a harmonious society", and Ye argued that promoting religion is an important part of this construction. This paper argues that by promoting a new Chinese civil religion, it is possible to cultivate Chinese nationalism and patriotism in a moderate way, although "civil religion" may need to be redefined with different characteristics from America's. Through various national rituals and ceremonies, civil religion emphasizes the transcendence of the Chinese as a nation, and therefore, it draws most people together around the core of common interests/beliefs/passions to construct a common pride of the nation, through which the cultivation of nationalism and patriotism becomes possible. China has a long history of civil religion: The worship of emperors in dynastic era, and the worship of Mao before the Reform and the Openness. Based on this tradition, it is feasible to apply civil religion to China. However, which elements this new civil religion would consist of still remains in question. This paper just proposes a possible answer to the moral dilemma in current Chinese society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is interesting in the subject that since China is an authoritarian government, why does China need NGOs to deal with the international cooperation or interaction. The development of the NGOs in China will be examined in the paper. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to address two lingering puzzles in China’s economic reform experience. First, how have local governments been able to break through policy restrictions of the central government, when the country’s political system is tightly controlled by the latter? Second, why are the central government’s policy announcements often so vague and equivocal? Using a signaling game model, the paper explores the dynamic relationship between the reformist center, the conservative center, and local governments, and shows that by making policy signals vague, the reformist center could protect itself from the attack of the conservative center, and at the same time, make local governments undertake measured policy innovations, hence China’s gradualism in reform. The model explains why China’s sub-national governments can push reform forward without the protection of formal institutions, and thus addresses one major weakness of the “market-preserving federalism” model as it is applied to China. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the driving force behind democratization? What makes institutions of representative democracy eventually possible under authoritarian regimes? The past two decades have witnessed at once robust and successful liberal economic reforms in China as well as strong political control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, while scholars and political observers still complain about the lack of appropriate progress of political reforms in China, we do see significant institutional changes taking place. Especially in China's vast rural areas, a national trend is the creation and operations of Village Councils, an institution of representative democracy surprisingly supported by the local party-state. This paper explains the reason for the increasing popularity of Village Councils in rural China and the rationales behind the local party-state's decision to give its blessings . ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to address the challenge to the liberal paradigm of democratization posed by China's recent political reform to bring public participation and consultation into the administrative decision-making and legislative process. I argue that a paradigm change is necessary for the theories of democratization to illuminate the deliberative dimension of democracy, which may or may not be in conjunction with the liberal dimension of democratizing process. A brief survey of literature demonstrates that the mainstream paradigm of democratization, or transitology, has come to too narrowly identify "democracy" with territorially based competitive elections of political leadership for legislative and executive offices. Then I trace the deliberative turn in democratic theory, but primarily focus on the distinction between contemporary deliberative democracy and classical direct/participatory democracy in relation to liberal ideals of democracy. Evidently, for most deliberative democratic theorists, including Rawls and Habermas, deliberation constitutes democratization only in the sense of being supplemental to or "deepening" liberal democracy in public will- or opinion formation. What if the deliberation, such as the governance-driven deliberation (GDD) in China, takes place in an authoritarian regime? I argue that a critical understanding of deliberation suggests that deliberation has two empowering effects in societies across regime types: first, in communications, giving reasons accessible to all the citizens affected by the issue transforms individuals' mentality in relation to others and to the political community; second, in a plural and complex society, deliberation provides mechanisms to challenge the dominating discourse. A few cases of GDD reforms are introduced to illustrate the above mechanisms of empowerment; some empirical evidence is also discussed regarding the democratic effects of GDD along the three dimensions critically defined by John Dryzek, which are franchise, scope of issue areas, and authenticity respectively. I also point out that the changing society structure and state imperatives in reformist China strengthen the democratizing effects of GDD: first, the prospect of dialogue and contestation is positive considering increasingly divergent interests and the technological revolution in communication; second, the state retreats from the totalist control of society while trying to maintain stability in its demanding task of governance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theoretical work has provided convincing reasons to believe that corruption undermines economic development over time. Empirical testing of these theories has tended to look for relationships between corruption and different channels of economic development using cross-country, large-n analysis. Most studies assume, however, that all developmental models are equally impacted by corruption at all times. This paper tests the proposition that corruption inevitably leads to economic atrophy using China as a case study. The empirical results support the conclusion that thinking about corruption in context-dependant terms is valuable for helping understand the relationship between corruption and economic development. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the development of technology policy in China during the reform era (1979-present). It compares China's technology promotion to the Japanese model of development, which has been called techno-nationalism. Using Richard Samuels' "three-note chord" as the primary analytical construction, I argue that Chinese techno-nationalism has diverged from the Japanese path in several important ways. Unlike Japan, China has welcomed FDI in technology industries. This has fostered a more liberal approach to technological autonomy. I also argue that the diffusion of technology within the Chinese economy has become another point of divergence from the Japanese techno-nationalist model. Technology development is overwhelmingly concentrated in a few provinces along the southern coast. This is the result of a technology economy that is more competitive than collaborative in securing technology. These points of divergence should caution those who have labeled techno-nationalism an "Asian phenomemon." I suggest that studying technology in the Chinese economy requires looking past the models set by Japan or the NIC states and examining the interactions between state and industry within the emerging Chinese technology sector. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debate about the evolution of Chinese foreign policy is characterized by theoretical gridlock. Will the People's Republic of China (PRC) continue to pursue foreign policy strategies of engagement and accommodation in an attempt to achieve a "peaceful" rise to great power status? How will the changing nature of Chinese relative power growth qualitatively affect its relationship with the rest of the international system? What kinds of changes would push the Chinese to engage in more aggressive foreign policy behavior that might include confrontation with regional rivals like Japan and Taiwan or global competitors such as the United States?In this paper, I argue that the debate about the future of Chinese foreign policy has ignored insight offered by a formal analysis of the relationship between specific types of relative power growth and the foreign policy behavior they engender. I show that relative power growth can be divided into early and late stages. These two stages are defined, respectively, by increasing and diminishing rates of relative capability expansion. Existing international relations theory and empirical evidence suggests that this fundamental difference in the rate of relative power growth results in a divergent foreign policy incentive structures during early and late stages of growth. In the most basic sense, the early stage of relative power growth (which the PRC presently is in) cultivates a sense of optimism and leads to a general foreign policy of accommodation. The late stage of growth, however, is accompanied by increasing anxiety and a higher likelihood of confrontational foreign policy behavior. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the late 1970s, China began a gradual economic transformation, moving away from the structural deficiencies of the command economy towards a model of market socialism. Since that time, China has implemented various reforms of its state-owned enterprises (SOEs). While progress has been made, a large number of SOEs remain inefficient and uncompetitive in the market-reform environment. In this paper, I argue this is primarily due to the breakdown of principal-agent relationships. The nature of these relationships obstructs day-to-day management due to loose disciplinary and incentive mechanisms. State owned enterprises represent an important material foundation of socialism and play a dominant role in the economy, employing an estimated half of China’s 750 million workers. Without effective restructuring of SOE operations, China risks losing control of the reform process which may eventually lead to political fallout. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The empirical case that this study examines is the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) intense involvement in economic activities from the market economic reform in 1978 to present. As China open its market in 1978, Chinese authority pulled-in the PLA in economic activities during the critical process of economic adjustment. This article infers that the military's involvement in economic activities is best explained in terms of the government's wish to pull the military into the process of national macroeconomic adjustment. In other words, the government continued to pursue its interventionist policy in the economic development processes, as it lacked the necessary capital and technological know-how to compete with more advanced countries. In order to catch up with more advanced countries, the central authority mobilized its available resources to make capital and technologies available to the nascent private entrepreneurs. Thus, the PLA's economic activities must be seen as part of a broader, macro-level process of national economic adjustment, more importantly as core aspects of China's national strategic industrial policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What advice does the IMF give to a developing country with a stable macroeconomic environment? Does it serve its client or its shareholders? Does it recommend cuts in social spending? If not, what does this tell us about its role in policy reforms? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I’ll analyze factors affecting China’s oil acquisition in Central Asia and Russia, e. g. security consideration, economic interactions and the role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. I’ll look at the role of state in their oil relationship. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan Strait is one of the few explosive spots in today's world that has the potential to trigger military confrontations between two major powers (the People's Republic of China and the United States). Since the leader of Taiwan is determined to seek Taiwan's formal independence, which cannot be accepted by the PRC, many scholars warn that a Taiwan Strait War will break out in the foreseeable future. Other observers argue that the PRC will not risk a war over Taiwan because it can hardly afford the economic cost of such a war. What are the possible consequences of a future Taiwan Strait War? This article examines the impact of war on the PRC through the history of three major Sino- wars that occurred after the establishment of the PRC. I also look back to the Tiananmen Square Incident to see the international reactions and its damage of a quasi civil war. Although history indicates that war does not necessarily impede the development of China in the long run, the consequences of a Taiwan Strait War will be more serious because of the uniqueness of the Taiwan issue as well as the highly interdependence between the PRC, Taiwan, and the rest of the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research employs historical institutional analysis to explore the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Beijing and the Holy See. By examining the perceived priorities from the two primary leaders of this diplomatic dance, I present the public narrative involved in the potential opening of formal recognition. Beyond the official transcript, however, this research also explores the roles of other interested parties, including the underground Chinese Catholic Church, the Taiwan-based Chinese Regional Bishops' Conference, and interested Catholics around the world. The relationship between the world's largest and smallest state is important beyond the exchange of papal nuncios and missions - its likely impacts will be felt by Chinese Catholics (estimated between 10-15 million, of which 8 million are likely "underground"); Taiwanese Catholics (estimated 300,000); and other groups seeking free religious expression and collective voices beyond religiosity.This bilateral relationship provides both unique factors as well as comparative insights. A distinctive aspect of this case study is the zero-sum nature of the Vatican's recognition of Beijing: should this switch indeed occur, the Holy See would relinquish its diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China on Taiwan, a move it appears prepared to take. Comparatively, the case of Beijing's relationship with the Vatican can best be understood by other cases in which diplomacy, internal affairs and religious freedom coincide, including the Vatican's relationship with the Republic of Cuba, and the seemingly imminent recognition between the Holy See and Socialist Republic of Vietnam. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study will seek to add to understanding of crises in world politics through application of Poliheuristic Theory (PH) to crisis decision-making for two important states, Turkey and China. The research builds on previous analysis of Chinese crises, which found a considerable degree of agreement with predictions derived from PH. The present study moves that work forward in three ways. First, it introduces a new case, Turkey, to the analysis. Second, some additional hypotheses from PH are tested on both states. Third, the results for the two states are compared to each other, with a special emphasis on finding patterns related to anomalies. This study unfolds in five stages. After a brief overview, the next stage introduces PH in the context of crisis decision-making and derives hypotheses. This is followed by case selection and coding procedures. Findings are conveyed initially for Turkey and then in comparison with China. Evidence from each state supports the main hypotheses from PH, namely, Political Primacy and Diverse Dimensions, although the fit is better for Turkey than China with the latter of the two. Conclusions and directions for future research appear last. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite potential gains of significant oil resources and the fact that China has compromised in the majority of its territorial disputes, China has been unwilling to compromise on its claimed sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, against Japan. The purpose of this article is to explain China's reluctance to drop its territorial claim and compromise with Japan about sovereignty of the disputed islands. I argue that there have been strong incentives for China to maintain its territorial claim against Japan because the Chinese government has been able to use the territorial dispute to make bargaining gains on exogenous issues disputed with Japan. By provoking Japan through confrontational actions, China has used the dispute to gain bargaining leverage by achieving concessions on other disputed issues with Japan, or compelling or deterring certain Japanese policies or actions. Data analysis from 1978-2001 supports the theory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does participation in the global economy influence the pollution management practices of firms in a developing country? Research on trade and the environment leads one to anticipate that integration into the international economy should enhance domestic firm environmental behavior. Integration facilitates access to cleaner technology, exposes domestic firms to global norms of corporate environmentalism, and compels developing country firms to meet trading partners' environmental standards or risk losing market access. This article tests these propositions by exploring the environmental compliance of internationally-oriented firms in China-a country whose rapid economic expansion and increasingly prominent role as a foreign investor have considerable implications for protection of the global environment. It finds that there is no market-induced enhancement of environmental performance among Chinese companies. In terms of their compliance with environmental law, Chinese firms with connections to the global economy are either no better than domestically-oriented companies or, in the case of firms that export heavily, are worse. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the perspective of good governance, a competitive election is considered better than a non-competitive election. Competition will bring uncertainty of an election result. Each candidate, who assumes that they will have a chance to win, will outline their policy positions in the campaign to sway voters and win the election. Thus, candidates will be held accountable to voters for their policy positions. In other words, competition of an election will give each candidate an incentive to campaign and candidates will be held accountable to the electorate through campaigning. Throughout my field research in China's rural areas, I found the roles and functions of elections were very different from what I imagined. My game-theoretic analysis explores the effects of competitive elections on their outcomes. This is a significant question because previous studies tend to assume that competitive elections have a positive effect on elected cadres' accountability; in short, they assume that competitive elections are better than non-competitive ones. I challenge this assumption. My attempt is supported by many of the empirical findings from China's village elections, which suggest (1) competitive elections are often corrupt; (2) vote-buying candidates are often elected by competitive and corrupt elections; and (3) candidates elected by non-competitive elections are often not corrupt and provide public goods. My comparative-static analysis shows logic of how, given the institutional setting of village elections and unique characteristics of the village community, a vote-buying candidate is more likely to win if an election is competitive, and a good cadre is elected by a non-competitive election. The size of a village, the unit of elections, is very small and the laws regulating vote-buying are poorly enforced through they formally stipulate severe punishment. Therefore, incorporating these conditions, the model's comparative-static analysis implies that competitive elections tend to be corrupt and non-corrupt elections tend to be non-competitive. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What shapes and often reshapes congressional roll-call vote choices on the extension of Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status for China? The gradual engagement policy by the Chinese government in post-Tiananmen period has opened doors not only to American business interests, but also to religious groups and human rights activists. Few studies, however, deal with how those outside influences are translated into legislative outcome in the origin country including the United States. Building upon simple, conditional, and ordered logistic regression models, I estimate what determines vote choices by members of Congress (MCs) on the NTR extension for China in Congress. There are two main findings. First, partisan politics do not stop at the water’s edge, where party dynamics matter, along with constituency pressures and ideological preferences. Northern Democrats and new Democrats, for instance, use the NTR vote as a leverage to represent and promote their own group interests. Presidential party status is critical for vote changes in 2001. Second, a typical liberal-conservative conflict does not apply to a critical foreign policy issue such as NTR extension for China. With different motivations, liberal and conservative members of Congress vote together to disapprove NTR extension for China. The results imply that congressional politics of China policy play out not only around economic interests inviting less ideological divide in recent periods but also around non-economic issues such as human rights and religious freedom involving more ideological conflicts in the US Congress. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the growing hard power of China in the world today arising out of a growing economy and increased political power, there has been scant attention paid to the rise of their soft power. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike most extant studies of gender differences on political attitudes in China, which tend to seek explanation from respondents' own socioeconomic background and status, this study posits and finds a significant role for family socialization. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]