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Utilizing Baumgartner and Jones (1993) theory of punctuated equilibrium, we examine several terrorist attacks that occurred in the U.S. and Japan during the past decade: the World Trade Center Bombing of 1993; the Sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995; the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995; and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The analysis demonstrates that earlier incidents failed to mobilize sufficient public interest to bring about major change. Only in the aftermath of September 11, was sufficient public attention focused on homeland security to bring about significant change. We also examine the institutional evolution of homeland defense in the U.S. and the creation and missions of the Office of Homeland Security and proposed Department of Homeland Security. The paper concludes with a critical assessment as to whether the new organizations have been given the necessary tools to adequately confront the threat posed by terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although terrorism was not considered a significant national security threat before September 11,the attacks revealed the limits of power. The paper explains why coercion did not work against terrorism in the post Cold War period. It evaluates American policy from 1993 to 2001 and concludes that preponderant power cannot provide security from terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Enigma of Article 2(4)Ian HurdNorthwestern UniversityAbstract for APSA 2006for the full paper, please contact me directlyArticle 2(4) of the UN Charter forbids all UN members "from the threat or use of force" in their international relations. It has been signed by the US and all other 191 UN members. There are three striking features of Article 2(4) for American foreign policy. First, it represents an extreme case of self-binding by the United States on the most important issue of national security, namely the right to use force, which came precisely at a moment of American military dominance in the international system. Second, it was unconditionally supported by the US in 1945 and did not generate any controversy in the American delegation to San Francisco. Third, American foreign policy since 1945 includes many cases of the use of force, but all have been presented by US leaders as consistent with Article 2(4). These three facts lead to a puzzle: why did the US foreswear the use of force in international relations, particularly at the height of its dominance and without apparent deliberation or dissent on the issue within the US administration? Did the US sign on to Article 2(4) knowing it would likely violate it? If so, what was the incentive to agree to it, and why did it not to change the wording in 1945? It is surprising that the US should accept a limit on its right to use force. Scholarship on Great-Power politics emphasizes the driving motivation to accumulate and preserve the capacity to act autonomously, and even those who see value in soft power and self-restraint argue that military unilateralism should remain an option. Article 2(4) contradicts this. The existing literature on compliance in international law provides two primary explanations for why the US would agree in 1945 to limit its right to use force: either the US knew it could violate the clause and so it was not concerned with its content, or it saw the self-defense exception as a free pass by which it could justify force when it wanted to. I consider both of these explanations and find them to be unsatisfactory. The diplomatic records of Charter negotiations do not support the premise behind both of them that the US saw Article 2(4) as an unwelcome but violable constraint. Therefore, I pursue a third explanation: that the US was genuine in its commitment to Article 2(4) but also held strongly to the self-identity of a 'peace-loving' state. Being convinced of American peaceful intentions in foreign policy, the negotiators at San Francisco could not imagine the US ever wanting to use war as an aggressive tool and so saw Article 2(4) as unproblematic. The self-defense clause in Article 51 was important but not as a mere justification to cover duplicitous behavior. Rather, it affirmed what for the US negotiators was self-evident - that any American use of force would be, by definition and a priori, defensive. This leads to three implications. It affirms the view that Great Powers, like other states, take seriously their commitments to international rules and work to avoid breaking them. However, it also shows the extent to which self-identity shapes interpretations of rules, compliance, and behavior, so that a sincere commitment to the rules does not necessarily lead to compliance as judged by outsiders. Differences in perception and interpretation are fundamental to the study of compliance, not simply intervening variables. Finally, it demonstrates that the internalization of international norms can exist alongside non-conforming behavior. Constructivists who research norm internalization should be careful not to assume that successful internalization produces norm-following behavior. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

please see the uploaded paper ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on to develop an understanding of the partnership developed and the implications of the developing security relationship. India's relationship with the U.S. is best characterized as soft alignment. Relations between India and the U.S. were relatively poor on many levels during the cold war.

The article focuses on to use one of the theoretical frameworks of international relations theory-security dilemma to analyze the U.S. strategic rebalancing and its impact on U.S.-China relations. Security dilemma arises when the means a state tries to increase its security decreases the security of others. Throughout the Cold War there was no security dilemma in the U.S.-China relations, since the U.S. strategy was containment against China.

The article presents information on the factors contributing to the data-sharing practices of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) fusion centers, with focuses on organizational history of the fusion center. It is stated that information sharing will occur more easily among organizations if personnel from the organizations are physically present in the fusion center.

This article tests the hypothesis that ordinary people favor punishing badly behaved foreign actors to make them "pay" for their crimes, rather than purely to protect national security interests. In an online survey administered to a random national sample of U.S. citizens, individual differences in retributive principles predicted support for punishing transgressor states, but only when human casualties were explicitly mentioned. Retributiveness also predicted support for the torture of terrorist detainees. These relationships controlled for partisanship, ideology, humanitarian and security values, and beliefs about the efficacy of force. Retributiveness was not related to support for torture or for punishing international transgressions among political sophisticates, for whom beliefs about deterrence were more salient than among less politically aware citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jean Guilleman (MIT 2007) establishes the Bush Administration's logic of national security for biological weapons as dichotomous between their choice of a self-governed code of "right" behavior and "effective" legal restraints. A compromise system resulted after the cold war that delivered responsibility for the operation of the system to state-based and international scientific academies and organizations. Scientific procedures to create transparency in research for the purpose of preventing applications to bioweaponry and bioterror is a rational activity and should have high utility as implemented by rational actors within rational scientific organizations. However, a major concern is the empirical record of scientists acting in past events as if in a moral vacuum - where research and engineering were achieved for human destruction and state weapons and terror. Guilleman argues that rational methods of codes of behavior must be combined with transparency in open research communities that do not morph into closed enclaves over time. We seek to add to this logic by investigating a further dimension within this particular scientific community. What is the level of ethical knowledge and moral training for the bioscientist in a specific community that is now pursuing an open policy of transparent biosecurity? The International Gene Synthesis Consortium announced in November 2009 is now engaged in the implementation of a gene sequencing screening protocol toward the prevention of doing work that would aid and abet biological weapons developers and/or terrorists. Using survey instruments and in-depth interviews - we seek to utilize the openness of these companies to elucidate the level of ethical knowledge within their scientific ranks and to provide an analysis as to whether or not this adds value to the code of behavior model of biosecurity that Guilleman puts forth as best effort at the end of the Bush Administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the political attitudes of American Muslims. It covers a wide range of attitudes, including social issues and church/state topics, economic issues and foreign affairs. It focuses on the impact of three different kinds of predictors in shaping Muslims' views in the areas which include their religious beliefs, practices, and identity, their experiences with discrimination as minorities living in the U.S. and their demographic characteristics.

This article seeks to explain the diffusion of the REAL ID Act resistance among U.S. states. It discusses why states have responded to the act as they have to the requirements. It draws upon the text of state statutes, state reports and legislative debates concerning the issue. It highlights a reaction against the coercive federalism that appears to be resulting from a number of homeland security measures.

The article analyzes the professional and political implications of the resignation or retirement of U.S. generals and flag officers or when they have serious disagreements with civilian policymakers. The analysis is concerned with several major aspects of the issue, including ensuring sound military professionalism and effective national security policymaking between the civilian and military leadership. Policy recommendations aimed at both active-duty and retired military leadership are also presented.

The article examines complaints by state and local emergency management officials about their lack of involvement in the disaster plans issued by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). According to the author, the officials' complaints indicate that the reorganization that created the DHS complicated shared governance. Dispersing federal homeland security personnel and resources from Washington, D.C. to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions is recommended.

The article discusses the impact of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. immigration policy. After the incident a renewed push towards policies that increase government control over migration flows was noted. Though the instrumental and political stakes are high, securitization did not lead to generalized closure towards immigration. Instead, the new homeland security priorities make it difficult to provide access to the large waves of refugees.

The article explores how the representations and practices of petro-terrorism came to be spectacular moments of U.S. and international security discourses. In particular, it discusses how state discourses of security regulate bodies and violence through the language of terrorism, and to what extent this articulation of petroleum violence facilitate or necessitate gender and sexual violence within the international system.

The article demonstrates that the physical threat to U.S. security today is not greater compared to the Cold War or other periods. It shows that the existential threat that many in the U.S. fear that they face is not to their literal existence, but rather to their preferred conceptions of how the world ought to be organized. It highlights one of the key problems this definition of existential threats leads to, which is a rush to an unnecessary preventive wars.

We examine the dynamics of the terrorism policy disruption for policy subsystems addressing various facets of public risks that comprise the broader homeland security agenda. This leads to insights about the dynamics of policy disruption across subsystems and of the emergence of homeland security as a substantive area for policymaking. The effects of large policy disruptions like the threat of terrorism can play out in a variety of ways among affected subsystems. Key indicators that we examine are the extent of attention to the triggering disruption, resultant volatility in subsystem policymaking, redefinition of subsystem organizing principles, and the make up of subsystem participants. Our analyses of these for eight policy subsystems show shifting attention to terrorism accompanied by increased policymaking volatility, a weak organizing policy glue of homeland security, and powerful organizational counterweights to the massive Department of Homeland Security. These are indicative of subsystems under stress rather than of a transformation of the prior subsystems to embrace the new homeland security agenda. These findings underscore the limits of ideational and structural reforms in bringing about cross-subsystem policy change. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study set out to evaluate the extent to which decision makers are subject to known biases in foreign policy decision making. Using the Decision Board computerized platform in an experimental setting, we found that high-ranking military officers were likely to employ satisficing strategies en route to choice, had a "preference over preference" bias for a particular alternative by "locking in" to that alternative while ignoring information on other alternatives, and they were not as influenced by framing and certainty effects. The significance of these findings, their relevance to poliheuristic theory, and their policy implications are then discussed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study finds that the issue of preventing terrorist attacks has received surprisinglylittle attention in the press and only sporadic interest by pollsters. When it comes tohomeland security, how to protect the nation and its people from actual attacks takes aback seat to press coverage of threats and other aspects of terrorism and its politics thatAmerican leaders, the terrorists themselves, and the press give precedence in establishingthe political agenda. This inattention to the difficult task of preventing furthercatastrophic terror attacks may affect the nation's vigilance as time has passed since 9/11. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly to terrorists, is commonly held to be the single most serious threat to the national security of the United States. Assessed in appropriate context, that could actually be seen to be a rather cheering conclusion. The likelihood a terrorist group will come up with a nuclear weapons seems to be vanishingly small. However, the obsessive quest to control nuclear proliferation particularly since the end of the Cold War has enhanced the appeal of or desperate desire for nuclear weapons for some regimes. In addition, the quest has been a necessary cause of far more deaths than have been inflicted by all nuclear or even all "weapons of mass destruction" detonations in all of history. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States—a liberal democracy—responded to the communist regimes' transition to market economies but not necessarily democratic politics by separating trade from security policy: opening trade to reforming economies but maintaining military superiority over non-democratizing military powers. Congressional attempts to use trade sanctions against market opening economies accused of human rights violations or weapons proliferation failed, while heavy investment continued in developing weapons to deter such countries. In Congress, this "liberal-realist" foreign policy emerged by "ends-meet-the-center" voting, in which bipartisan centrists prevail over extremists of both parties, or by "ideological bipartisan" voting, in which lawmakers on the same ideological side of both parties coalesce. Such patterns persisted in spite of majority party changes, divided governments, or economic downturns. The requirements for such voting patterns: an exogenous agenda setter, issue compartmentalization, inter-party politics, and ideological overlap between the two parties, strongly suggest the existence of a bipartisan, centrist, and pro-business group of lawmakers who serve as the domestic anchors of U.S. trade and security policy. Empirical evidence corroborates this claim, implying that to further understand foreign policymaking, it is necessary to tailor the standard models of Congressional lawmaking, incorporate empirically established policy preferences, and to go beyond the unitary actor-single preference models. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States has increasingly found itself faced with a 'Goldilocks' dilemma - how to find that ethically and legally "just right" answer to the operational questions of the day. Namely, how can the United States project national power to effectively dissuade, deter, and defeat national security threats while remaining consistent with accepted norms of behavior? Due to recent U.S. interventions and the continuing domestic and international debates over there legality and legitimacy, the United States is increasingly at risk of becoming a pariah in the eyes of many members of the international community. This chapter navigates the shoals of the U.S. national security strategy that lie between traditional international law restricting the internationalization of internal armed conflicts and the rise of new emergent international norms, which call for an increased use of international intervention to quell such conflicts. Finding a "just and right" balance in American grand strategy is essential for attaining a future of viable, legitimate and sustainable security policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. failed to establish security in the aftermath of major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This marked a significant departure from U.S. state-building after World War II, such as Germany, Japan, and Korea, where the U.S. successfully established security. Consequently, this article asks: Under what conditions are state-building successful in establishing security? To answer this question, it examines the universe of state-building since 1945. I argue that success requires the use of overwhelming force and resources. Specifically, state-building is more successful the greater the number of troops and police in the immediate aftermath of combat, the greater the amount of financial assistance, and the longer the duration. Current arguments fail to explain this variation. Some contend that state-building is never effective. Others contend that effectiveness is largely a function of structural factors that foreign powers cannot control. Still others contend that effectiveness is correlated with multilateral participation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. government often creates ad hoc advisory commissions on national security issues. Recent examples include the 9/11 Commission and Iraq Study Group. Yet few scholars have examined the impact of commissions. I argue that commissions can help increase support for a presidential, congressional, or partisan agenda, and can help policymakers overcome collective action problems by providing a focal point for debate. I test hypotheses about the sources of commission influence with an original data set of 39 national security commissions that reported between 1981 and 2005. I find that commissions are likely to have greater impact when they are established after a national security disaster or scandal—a finding that challenges the conventional view that such commissions only perform symbolic damage control. I also find that the recommendations of presidential commissions are adopted more often than those of agency or statutory commissions, and that, absent a crisis, commissions addressing highly salient issues are not more likely than those addressing less salient issues to influence policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) has become increasingly involved in protecting the security and safety of European citizens. The latest additions to this new policy space are counter-terrorism policies and critical infrastructure protection. A central role for the EU in guarding against global terrorism and infrastructural breakdowns may seem evident. In reality, the precise nature of such a role remains unclear. Enthusiastic rhetoric is not always matched by firm action, and the political commitment of national leaders to supranational policies is often vague. One way to gauge the prospects of a "capability/expectations" gap, and to make a fine-grained assessment of the nature of European cooperation, is to compare the institutionalization of these two sectors. An institutionalization approach allows us to uncover the degree to which new structures, rules, and norms are becoming embedded - and thus influencing cooperative behavior in the EU. We build a generic framework for measuring, and categorizing, institutionalization within sectors. We then apply the framework to the two policy sectors, finding that counter-terrorism is best categorized as an "ascending" sector whereas critical infrastructure protection is a "nascent" one. Neither sector can be categorized as a "mature" area of cooperation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National homeland security initiatives create local governance dilemmas. We conceptualize local policymaking on homeland security issues as collective action problems. Overcoming collective action problems requires the construction of local "performance regimes," or urban coalitions to ensure sustained cooperation across nested institutions involving both formal intergovernmental agencies and informal institutions. Constructing interest-driven and high performing operational alliances across institutions and jurisdictions are increasingly important public management tasks as federal systems contend with homeland security concerns. We analyze city performance on homeland security by using DHS 2007 Tactical Interoperable Communications Scorecards data for 48 urban areas. These data provide summary assessments of local interoperability capacity as well as local governance attributes. Regressing DHS funding to localities and governance attributes on local interoperability scores indicates that resources are not sufficient for generating effective local performance. Governance attributes—particularly characteristics of nested institutions—are important intervening factors shaping local performance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hurricane Katrina laid bare the inabilities of state and local governments to handle immobile citizens—children, the elderly, ill and disabled persons in hospitals, and institutionalized individuals—in emergency situations. This research, based on a mail survey of a wide array of Florida county and city officials conducted in the Spring of 2007, examines how local government officials have incorporated immobile special needs populations and the agencies that serve them into their emergency management plans (natural disasters; terrorist acts). The study concludes that there is still a lack of attention to children and the disabled and an absence of established networks with private sector agencies serving these populations. The research demonstrates the usefulness of controlling for the type of jurisdiction, population size, and the type of position held by local government officials in gaining a better understanding of how these factors influence vulnerability assessments. We find significant differences in assessments among first responders and their more generalist counterparts. In general, those individuals serving in first responder capacities were more likely to identify the spectrum of population vulnerabilities as of "major" importance to emergency planning efforts. First responders are more familiar with the challenges associated with managing immobile populations and are therefore more likely to prioritize their importance when it comes to emergency preparedness. In addition, first responders in both counties and municipalities rate the quality of their interactions with public and private sector agencies serving immobile populations more highly than non-first responders. Because of their functional responsibilities, first responders tend to have better networks in place with those agencies providing services to the immobile. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Covers the Supreme Court case of United States v. Reynolds (1953), which first recognized the state secrets privilege, allowing the government to withhold documents from private litigants and even from judges. In this particular case, it was later learned that the Air Force accident report withheld from three widows who sued the federal government over the deaths of their husbands in a B-29 crash did not contain state secrets. The state secrets privilege is currently being invoked in such cases as NSA surveillance and the "extraordinary rendition" cases, where individuals such as Maher Arar and Khaled el-Masri are sent to foreign prisons for interrogation and torture. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), the moribund public policy of "civilian defense" got a new name: "homeland security"; although the semantic change had its supporters and detractors (the Orwellian ring did not sit well with many), it did not translate into an efficient national policy. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has endured public ridicule since it was established, but why does it seem so inept? My question is: why the push for a highly centralization of civilian defense/homeland security bureaucracy in the face of sixty years of failure in this particular policy arena? I contend that, given the structure of the American state, a massive, centralized, and growing bureaucracy that is primarily a policing entity is a problematic institution for the implementation of a comprehensive national civilian defense policy. This essay has three parts: In the first section, the DHS is considered in historical perspective. What came before and how did it affect the organizational structure of the homeland security apparatus? In a sense, the DHS is a bureaucratic institution that was born to fail; that is, it is pastiche of emergency management agencies that seemingly are not equipped to handle a variety of civil defense policies. This ad hoc approach to state-building is not, for the most part, a result of incompetent professionals or legislators (most of whom are trying to do good); instead, it is a consequence of an enigma related to American political development (APD): the American state has proven supremely adept at war mobilization and war-fighting, but not at creating long-term internal security bureaucracies. The second part of the essay examines a particular kind of policy (an old strategy): deterrence by denial as one possible way to define civilian defense/homeland security policy. Finally, the third section of the essay concludes with some ideas of possible ways to re-conceptualize a public policy of homeland security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this study is to demonstrate that although the original purpose of the White House national economic adviser was to serve as an "honest broker" of economic policy advice, the political and policy roles of the position have greatly expanded. Empirical research and theory has delineated that advisory roles and role expectations are significant explanatory forces that provide scholars with a useful vantage point in discerning the relative impact of policymakers on policy decision-making (for example: Link and Glad 1994; George 1980; Mulcahy 1986). Based on primary source documentation from presidential archives, congressional testimony, speeches, and secondary accounts, this study observes that the national economic adviser has evolved into the president's primary staff member in the realm of domestic and foreign economic policy. Although the treasury secretary, US Trade Representative, OMB Director, and CEA Chair have great statutory and political authority over particular economic issues, the national economic adviser has tended to serve the president as his primary economic policy guru. Several political roles have been observed. First, the national economic adviser has become the primary administrator of the economic policy process. This formal responsibility is critical, since the size and responsibilities of the economic bureaucracy demand that an individual or group manages the process. Second, though most national economic advisers perceive themselves as neutral brokers and deny playing policy roles, they tend to play the role of influential advisor-advocates of specific courses of policy action. Third, the national economic adviser is also a gatekeeper-guardian of the president's economic policy agenda. They seek to protect the White House from criticism, perform unpopular tasks such as firing personnel, saying "no" to particular requests, and preventing individuals and groups from dominating policies. Fourth, as mediators, national economic advisers go to great lengths to quell internal bureaucratic strife and please domestic and international constituencies. The combination of these observed roles suggest that although others have traditionally been perceived as the president's most important and credible source of advice on key issues, national economic advisers, with their close proximity to the president, their strong White House perspective, and their relative freedom from bureaucratic pressures, are the president's preferred source of economic policy advice. Moreover, one could argue that the national economic adviser is the policy equivalent of the national security adviser within the White House decision-making system. This study concludes that the expanding roles of the national economic adviser challenge the original notion of the NEC serving as an honest broker of the economic policymaking process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a serious risk that we are prone to over-diagnosing security dilemmas. It is already well-known that pervasive uncertainty over intentions affords states with revisionist intentions the opportunity to strategically misrepresent their intentions. Incomplete information over other states' perceptions affords these states parallel opportunities to misrepresent their threat perceptions. Their motive is to secure the highly advantageous concessions that can be extracted from status quo states persuaded that an adversary is not only peaceful but fearful, and hence persuaded that they are enmeshed in a security dilemma. As a result, scholars attempting to code events as security dilemmas must be hesitant to rely on publicly-expressed threat perceptions. More reliable indicators of sincere perceptions are behaviors such as military force postures and, especially, privately-expressed perceptions of threat. I use these alternative sources of evidence to argue that a substantial gap appears to exist between the publicly-expressed security concerns of Nazi Germany and the USSR during the Cold War and their leaders' actual perceptions of threats of aggressive war. If true, this would mean they deliberately deployed misleading perceptions and in the process generated false security dilemmas. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. citizens expect Congress to address key policy issues ranging from health care to education and homeland security. Some critics argue that lawmaking today is mostly a symbolic or rhetorical exercise designed to score political points rather than a genuine collective effort to promote social welfare. Does the American Congress have the institutional capacity and/or political incentive to be an effective problem solver? What political or other factors tend to improve or reduce the quality (along dimensions such as appropriate priority setting, technical soundness and instrumentality) of Congress's legislative product?"That was the assignment posed to me by the organizers of this conference.In addition, the policy areas of housing, education, and criminal justice were specified as ones in which problems might be solved. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today everyone knows that in the coming century India, like the Medici, has the intention and potential to enhance its wealth, prestige, and power.In this context, observers of world politics are wondering: How will India pursue those intentions? What will it do to realize its potential and assure its security? In the last year and half since the proposed Indo-US nuclear deal was announced, numerous experts have tried to induce answers to these questions from what is still a small universe of cases including India's attitude toward Iranian nuclear policy and energy (particularly pipeline) policy, toward US missile defense initiatives, toward the enlargement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, toward Chinese activity in South Asia (particularly vis-à-vis Pakistan and Nepal). But, above all, observers have focused on a proposed deal between the US and India on nuclear cooperation.The dimensions and general features of the arena in which India will act are clear. It is a triangular space with China, India, and the US at the corners. The view that a rising India will be the fulcrum of balance in Asia is now increasingly common. A 2004 editorial in the Chinese People's Daily is a good example. "Steadily warming India-US relations have resulted in widespread attention to the geopolitics of Asia. It is difficult to predict whether or not India will become a strategic ally of the US or of China, but the sudden attractiveness of India will sooner or later alter the regional balance of power between the three countries" (Joseph, 2004). The 2005 Indo-US deal was interpreted by many observers to be an obvious American effort to draw India onto the US bandwagon.In the real world, of course, actors are motivated and constrained by power, wealth, and prestige. Syncretic approaches such as the currently fashionable "analytic eclecticism" draw selectively on all three international relations traditions in rendering "explanatory sketches" of important international security questions such as the durability of US-South Korean alliance, the possible revisionist aspiration of a rising China, or whether it is international institutions rather than balance of power dynamics that are shaping strategy in South East Asia. Explaining the future direction of Indian strategy within the China-India-US triangle is as analytically demanding a problem as one is likely to find in contemporary international relations.The conclusion I draw from what follows is that India is very unlikely to balance or to get on the bandwagon. Equipoise is the policy dictated by India's geography, power capabilities, identity, and potential to be a robust actor in global and regional politics. Like the old and now discredited Indian grand strategy of nonalignment, equipoise shuns formal alliances. The term draws on the realist balance of power idiom to identify an alternative stance - neither balancing nor bandwagoning - that is in dynamic equilibrium. That equilibrium is struck between domestic and international dynamics; balancing contradictory domestic cultural and political forces (such as nationalism/cosmopolitanism, anti-Americanism/pro-Americanism, self-sufficiency/trade-optimism) and international appeals and threats (such as American democratic/technological/commercial affinity, American unilateral neo-Imperialism, Chinese commercial appeal, and Chinese threatening intrusion/pressure). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is climate change a valid national security issue for the United States? Even taking a narrow definition of national security issues-threats to a state's core values for which it would be willing to go to war or use force, one can identify a number of ways in which climate change already constitutes a national security issue to which security specialists in the United States should pay attention. In part 1, I explore the definitional terrain of "environmental security" by offering an account of "national security" and "grand strategy" that accords with traditional conceptions of security. I also identify criteria by which climate change could constitute a threat to national security and the U.S. in particular. In parts 2-4, I assess whether the potential effects of climate change constitute national security threats for the United States. In part 2, I examine the directs effects of climate change on the territorial United States, including abrupt climate change and extreme weather events. In part 3, I discuss the effects of climate change on the extraterritorial interests of the U.S. including the links between extreme weather events and violent conflict, natural disasters and humanitarian intervention, and, finally, climate change and soft power. The final section explores the security externalities of energy and climate change, looking at the links between oil dependence, terrorism, and climate change as well as the proliferation problems associated nuclear power as a remedy for climate change. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the shock of 9.11 in 2001, people all over the world began to be anxious for the peaceful way to settle down the disastrous hatred among various cultural communities. In my presentation, I shall explore some lessons for responding to violece by listening to the voices of female survivors of state violence. I shall focus on ethics of care to propose the alternative to the idea of national securiy in order to envision a peaceful world. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the differences and similarities between the classic statement of American strategic thought in NSC-68, a National Security Council (NSC) classified report, and the National Security Strategy as articulated by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush. It uses a qualitative and historically driven framework for analysis so as to examine the impact of both documents in light of the role of grand strategy for a nation. It also investigates the Bush security strategy for its ability to be a new classic of strategic vision.

The article examines the phenomenon of the national security mom or mother and the role she played in the 2004 U.S. presidential elections. U.S. President George W. Bush's better showing with women in 2004 were attributed to security moms. In 2000, Bush narrowed his deficit among female voters to five percentage points from 11, evidence that security moms doubted U.S. presidential candidate John Kerry's ability to fight terrorism.

The article examines the manner by which state leaders and presidents use the tenets of prospect theory in their speeches to persuade their audience on national security strategy in the U.S. National security strategy becomes effective when political leaders mobilize domestic support through the maintenance of the current status quo or change the existing status quo. The researcher suggests a theory of framing application in the group setting to explain this phenomenon of changing public's perception related to the 2003 war in Iraq.

The article argues that the projected U.S. national missile defense (NMD) has less to do with a vital defense against the stated nuclear missile threats than U.S. primacy and therefore, with NMD, it is likely for the public to see more instability in regional politics in Northeast Asia. From the perspective of realism, security threats in international relations are inevitable unless the international system itself changes. Power resources available to a state determine how the state acts in response to international incentives or threats.

The article examines the policies adopted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It addresses the question of internal and homeland security institutions in the broader literature. It proposes a modified punctuated equilibrium framework to explain the emergence of homeland security policies. It compares the institutional development of civil defense policies in the early Cold War period with the policy responses to 9/11 that have been articulated through the emergence of the DHS.

The article examines how uniquely powerful hegemons behave in uniquely institutionalized environments. It proposes two additions to work on substitutability, suggesting that the sources of substitution derive from strategic interactions with other states, which may involve norm contestation. The author then applies this argument to developments in different sectors of maritime security since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S.

The author suggests that markedly higher levels of conjunction are required to implement plans and strategies important to biodefense in the U.S. She asserts that such conjunction must take place between agencies and organizations, among intelligence resources, the Defense Department and the White House, Federal and State entities and institutions, the private sector and others in order to take biodefense to a level which is reasonable, responsible and responsive.

Research on natural and technological disaster management policy often finds there are meaningful disincentives for state and local governments to be proactive in terms of preparedness effort. We investigate local government preparedness activities on homeland security issues in an effort to explain what factors might promote or inhibit local governments? level of policy commitment. Specifically, we assess the extent to which preparedness at the local level is consistent across differently-sized cities and across occupational positions of local officials. We then consider those differences along with internal local government characteristics, potential threat vulnerability, and state administrative context to explain local governments? preparedness activities and local officials? overall commitment to homeland security preparedness. We find that perceived vulnerability to threat and certain aspects of administrative capacity are linked to local government preparedness efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The public is generally assumed to ?rally around the flag? in the event of national emergencies, often granting the Executive expanded support to respond as needed to promote national security. Since September 11, 2001, the Executive Branch has presented terrorism to the public as a matter vital to national security. It has linked much of its policy agenda to the persistent threat of terrorism and, more recently, it has focused much of its reelection campaign strategy on the same. Public support for the President and U.S. policy in the aftermath of terrorist events has been high, but it is not as uniform or long lasting as these reelection strategies might suggest. Our analyses indicate that public support for the President and his policies varies as a function of the national value of the materials or people targeted by the attacks; the public?s assessment of the risk of a subsequent attack affecting them; and, to some degree, presidential cues. This variation lends support to the work of Bruce Jentleson and others suggesting that, even in the context of a terrorist attack, the public exercises some prudence when offering its policy support to the President. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Looks at issues surrounding the crisis of the transatlantic security community. Example of structural changes in world politics; Analysis of the policy disagreements between the U.S. and Europe; Claims on the contemporary crisis in U.S.-European relations.

This study will attempt to historicize America?s New Imperialism by locating its practices in an emerging post-Cold War security discourse. That is, in an ongoing discussion among American ?intellectuals of statecraft? concerning the official strategic or ?geopolitical? threats or problems that confront America in an era of complex globalization. In this poster, I look at the origins, practices, and ambitions of neoconservative statesmen and develop a genealogical framework for understanding why, despite the obvious constraints of soft power, they have opted to pursue a unilateral agenda. In closing, I look at the ‘counter-scripts’ confronting neoconservative discourse in the aftermath of the failure to capitalize on an initially successful invasion of Iraq. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the events of September 11, 2001, the protection of public and private infrastructures has become a major public policy issue in the United States and other countries. They are deemed critical, because they are essential to the functioning of modern societies, and because they are large technical systems that are particularly vulnerable to disruptions. The assessment of vulnerabilities of these complex and interrelated systems is the subject of a plethora of programs, activities, and agencies within the U.S. However, there could be interesting differences in dealing with critical infrastructure protection. In particular, countries like Germany that are similarly advanced and dependent on information infrastructures, but have a different tradition of public-private sector relations, might provide a useful comparison. It is argued here that the recognition of the criticality of infrastructures for national security, economic security, public health and safety, and public confidence is altering the relationship between the public and the private sector in the United States. The change is not only temporary, but structural, and seems to be indicative of a system of coordination that is more akin to the continental European model of corporatist structures than the North American free market system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents research which investigated the emergence of protective federalism in the U.S. in 2003. Importance of federal system to the challenges posed by the threat of terrorism to the nation; Contribution of protective federalism to the national security in the country; Risks associated with the implementation of the political change.

Offers a look at the national security strategy of the U.S. as depicted in the film "Minority Report." Theme of the film; Overview of the film; Depiction of the concept of preemptive justice and moral clarity in the film.

Examines the endurance of the belief of U.S. citizens on civil liberties and personal security after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the country. Reasons behind the fear of terrorism; Factors that affected the trust of the people to the federal government; Background on willingness of the people to concede their civil liberties for safety and security.