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The article focuses on the decision of the administration of former U.S. President Donald Trump to designate the Yemeni group Ansar Allah or the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) and a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) on January 19, 2021. Topics discussed include the association of the Houthis with Iran, effect of the military advancement of the group in Yemen, and significance of the decision of President Joseph Biden to allow transactions with the Houthis.

The article offers information on Iran's foreign & defense policies. Topics discussed include deploying U.S. forces to deter Iran and interdict its arms shipments to its allies and proxies; enhancing its international prestige and restore a sense of "greatness" reminiscent of ancient Persian empires; and advances its national security goals in part by providing material support to regional allied governments and armed factions.

The article focuses on military and financial support to allied regimes and groups as an instrument of the foreign policy of Iran. Topics discussed include the consideration of the country as the U.S.'s state sponsor of terrorism, foreign terrorist organizations, military support for regional proxies and allies, and the specialized anti-tank systems.

Iran's foreign policy is the product of many, and sometimes competing, factors: the ideology of Iran's Islamic revolution; Iranian leadership's perception of threats to the regime and to the country; long-standing Iranian national interests; and the interaction of the Iranian regime's various factions and constituencies. Some experts assert that the goal of Iran's foreign policy is to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that Iran asserts favors the United States, Israel, and Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. Iran characterizes its support for Shiite and other Islamist movements as support for an "oppressed" underclass. Others interpret Iran's foreign policy as more practical than ideological-an attempt to protect Iran from U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to change its regime. Iran employs a number of different tools in pursuing its foreign policy. Some Iranian policy tools are similar to those used by the United States and its allies-traditional diplomacy, the promotion of Iran's values and interests in international meetings, and supporting the election or political prospects of leaders and groups friendly toward Iran. Other tools Tehran uses are more problematic to U.S. policy: Iran provides direct material support to armed groups, some of which use terrorism to intimidate or retaliate against Israel or other regional opponents of Iran. Iran's armed support to Shiite-dominated allied governments, such as those of Syria and Iraq, have aggravated challenges from Sunni insurgent groups by fueling Sunni popular resentment. Iran's foreign policy overwhelmingly focuses on the Near East region, including on U.S. operations, allies, and activities in that region. It is that region where all the various components of Iran's foreign policy interact. Iran's foreign policy also seems to be directed at influencing the policies and actions of big powers, such as those in Europe as well as Russia, that are active in the Near East-either as partners or antagonists of U.S. interests in that region. Much of Iran's foreign policy also appears intended to thwart or at least mitigate the effects of international sanctions imposed on Iran. Some aspects of Iran's foreign policy might yet shift as the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States and its partner negotiating countries (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) is implemented. Under the JCPOA, many of the international sanctions that have hobbled Iran's economy are to be lifted, removing at least some obstacles to finalizing a number of pending joint regional energy and transportation projects. Some experts assess that the JCPOA might cause Iran to try to put aside longstanding animosities. Iran's elected President Hassan Rouhani has stated that the JCPOA is "a beginning for creating an atmosphere of friendship and co-operation with various countries." However, some experts and officials argue that Iran's foreign policy will not change significantly, and that sanctions relief will provide Iran with more financial resources to fund policies and factions that most challenge the interests of the United States and its allies. Iran's Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, continues to assert that Iran's foreign policy must not change as a consequence of the agreement. Key hardline institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), appear to be moving to thwart any broad realignment by Iran or any compromises of its core foreign policy goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on U.S. efforts to persuade all of Afghanistan's neighbors to support a stable and economically viable Afghanistan as of December 2014. Topics discussed include the integration of Afghanistan into several regional security and economic organizations and U.S.-Pakistani cooperation on Afghanistan. Information is also presented on the bilateral government-to-government relations between Afghanistan and Iran and India's development activities in the country.

The article presents an update on the relation between Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). UAE leaders assert to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that Iran is key threat to their country. They expressed concern that the July 2015 Iran nuclear agreement could reflect a reduction in the U.S. commitment to Gulf and regional security.

The article discusses the clandestine nuclear cooperation between Iran, North Korea and Syria possibly related to nuclear weapons. Topics discussed include North Korea's assistance to Syria in building a nuclear reactor that may have been part of a Syrian nuclear weapons program, concern by U.S. intelligence officials that North Korea might export its nuclear technology or fissile material and public statements by U.S. officials that there is no nuclear cooperation between Iran and North Korea.

The article presents unclassified and declassified U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) assessments showing the lack of evidence that Iran and North Korea engaged in nuclear related trade and that Syria received ballistic missiles and related technology from North Korea. Topics discussed include ballistic missiles of Iran, North Korea and Syria, hearings by U.S. Congress over their nuclear and missile programs and reporting requirements established on these countries' missile and nuclear programs.

The article focuses on the prevalence of international cooperation in terms of pressuring Iran with sanctions as of March 2014. Topics discussed include the convergence between U.S. and European approaches on Iran, the oil exports of Iran, and the move made by the European Union (EU) to freeze the assets of Central Bank of Iran. Also mentioned are the sanctions imposed by the U.S. on Iranian banks, and the trade, banking and energy Iran sanctions imposed by Japan and South Korea.

The article focuses on the security issues being faced by Israel involving Iran and its neighboring Arab states like Syria and Egypt. It discusses the country's reluctance to accept initiatives concerning diplomacy on the Iranian nuclear issue, Israel's reliance on the U.S. for military support and the presence of ungoverned spaces in Israel that could attract terrorists. It also provides information on its neighboring Arab countries such as Iran, Syria and Egypt.

The article examines the foreign policy issues of Kuwait as of November 8, 2013. It discusses the cooperation between Kuwait and the U.S., particularly in relation to regional security. It explores Kuwait's relationship with Iraq following the latter's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The nature of Kuwait's connection with Iran, from the time of the late Saddam Hussein's leadership of Iraq, upto the period when Kuwait lends its support to international efforts to sanction Iran, is also discussed.

The article focuses on the foreign policy of Iran, which is said to be a product of the ideology of its Islamic revolution, superimposed on long-standing national interests. It describes its foreign policy objective as beyond defensive in its attempt to overturn the power structure in the Middle East which it believes favors the U.S., Israel, and Sunni Muslim regimes. A discussion on Iran's support for international terrorism according to the U.S. Department of State is also provided.

The article discusses the U.S. policy options toward Iran. Some U.S. concerns about Iran include the latter's nuclear program. A background on the U.S.-Iran relations since November 4, 1979 when radical students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran and hostage some diplomats is provided. The support provided by the U.S. to Iraq in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War are discussed. The diplomatic policy toward Iran of the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama is also discussed.

The article discusses Iran's foreign policy and its support for terrorist groups. The influence of Iran's Islamic revolution on its foreign policy is discussed. Interpretations of Iran's foreign policy by the U.S. and Iran's supporters are explained, with Iran's policy aimed at providing support for an oppressed underclass in a region dominated by elites. Efforts to enforce strict sanctions against Iran by countries in the Middle East and the U.S. are discussed.

The article reports on the response of the U.S. to Iran's foreign policy and other options to deal with its nuclear program. A background is provided on the U.S.-Iranian relations since the 1979 Revolution. It shows the approach of U.S. President Barack Obama to Iran policy and the military options to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran as Israel threatens a unilateral strike. Successive administrations have put containment efforts on Iran and the Obama administration proposes a regime change in Iran.

The article reports on the concerns of the U.S. government about Iran and the policy responses of the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama. It describes the political regime structure of Iran and looks at the country's political stability and opposition. It examines the strategic capabilities of Iran and its weapons of mass destruction programs. It discusses the relations of Iran with the Persian Gulf States and its support for terrorist and militant groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

The article reports on U.S. concerns about terrorist and insurgent groups in Latin America. A State Department study "Country Reports on Terrorism" showed terrorism activities rose by 40% between 2010 and 2011, mostly by Colombian terrorist and leftist Andean groups, while threats of transnational attacks remained low in most of the region. A 2011 report focused on Iran's increasing relations with Latin America particularly Venezuela and with its ties to the radical Islamic group Hezbollah.

The article discusses sanctions against Iran by the U.S. and other countries. The provisions and amendments to the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) is presented. An overview of the ban on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran, including allowed and prohibited activities, is offered. A comparison of U.S., United Nations (UN), and European Union (EU) sanctions against Iran is also provided. How the sanctions have affected Iran's nuclear program, political regime and economy is described.

The article discusses the U.S. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, "Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses," with focus on foreign policy and support for terrorist groups. It explores Iran's relations with the Persian Gulf States and the Iranian policy in Iraq. It focuses on Iran's support for Palestinian militant groups and the Lebanese Hezbollah. It also examines Iran's foreign policy in the Causes and Central Asia, South Asia, Latin American and Africa.

The article discusses U.S. foreign policy approaches to Iran from the Carter to the Obama administrations. After Iran refused to accept the path of engagement and choosing instead to preserve all elements of it nuclear program, the Obama administration in 2012 emphasized pressure through sanctions. As Iran's nuclear program continues to advance, the U.S. announced it would take action to halt it though not specifying whether the action would be military.

The article examines Iran's foreign policy and its support for terrorist groups. According to the article, Iran's foreign policy is centered in its Islamic revolution and the belief that the U.S. ultimately seeks to overturn the revolution. A U.S. State Department report released in August 2011 stated that Iran remains the most active state sponsors of terrorism. The article also discusses Iran's relationship with the Gulf States, Iraq, Syria, Palestine militant groups and Hezbollah.

The article discusses the support of Iran for terrorist groups and the foreign policies of the nation. It cites the alleged plot of Iran on assassinating the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the U.S., Adel al-Jubier and other terrorist acts of Iran from 1983 to 1996 including bombings of French and U.S. embassies in Kuwait, the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. It also notes the policy agreements of Iran with Persian Gulf States, Iraq, Syria and Pakistan.

The article discusses the foreign policy of Iran and its support for terrorist groups. Iran's relations with the Persian Gulf monarchy states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are said to be concerned about the regime's strategic influence. The support given by Iran for Palestinian militant groups is perceived by the U.S. as an effort to obstruct the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Iran's relationships with the terrorist groups Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah and Syria are tackled.

The article discusses the strategic capabilities and alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs of Iran. The Iranian armed forces' ability to cause damage to the U.S. and its allies in the Gulf region is tackled. Concerns arise over Iran's nuclear program despite its claim that it is for peaceful use. Diplomatic efforts to address Iran's program include the Paris Agreement on November 14, 2004. Some possible measures to be taken by the United Nations (UN) against Iran are cited.

The article focuses on the relationship between the U.S. and Islamic regime of Iran as of 2011. The common long-term interest of the countries in stability in the Persian Gulf and South Asia is emphasized. The Green Movement is considered by some observers as a possible replacement of the current regime. Also presented are the charts that list the economic indicators and illustrate the structure of the government.

The article discusses the U.S. foreign policy toward Iran as of 2011. The seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979 marked the beginning of the U.S.-Iran estrangement. The strategy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq was adopted by the administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton in 1993. The goal of an increase in presence of Persian-speaking U.S. diplomats in Iran in 2006 was to facilitate Iranian participation in the democracy-promotion programs of the U.S.

The article reports on Iran's foreign policy and its support of terrorist groups. It describes Iran's relations with the Persian Gulf monarchy states as well as its policy in Iraq. It outlines Palestinian militant groups' support for Iran, including Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah, and discusses the strategic alliance of Iran with Syria. It also cites the country's policy for Central Asia, including its rights to Caspian Sea resources, as well as in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

The article reports on the military strategic capabilities and weapons of mass destructions programs (WMD) of Iran. It describes the conventional military arsenal, revolutionary guard and Qods forces of Iran, and discusses the nuclear program and related international diplomatic efforts of Iran, including the Paris Agreement. International response to Iran's nuclear program is led by the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama with a strategy of incentives and sanctions.

The article focuses on the foreign policy of Iran. The Islamic revolution of Iran is the main basis of the country's foreign policy that is blended with a near obsession about U.S. strategic power. Monarchy states in the Persian Gulf does not openly support conflict between the U.S. and Iran and their relationship with the country is relatively normal with some states even selling their oil products to Iran like the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.

As the Administration and Congress move forward to pursue engagement, harsher sanctions, or both, regional actors are evaluating their policies and priorities with respect to Iran. Iran's neighbors share many U.S. concerns, but often evaluate them differently than the United States when calculating their own relationship with or policy toward Iran. Because Iran and other regional concerns-the Arab-Israeli peace process, stability in Lebanon and Iraq, terrorism, and the ongoing war in Afghanistan-have become increasingly intertwined, understanding the policies and perspectives of Iran's neighbors could be crucial during the consideration of options to address overall U.S. policy toward Iran. Iran's neighbors seek to understand and influence changes in the following areas: • Iran's regional influence, • Iran's nuclear program, • Iran's role as an energy producer, and • Iran's support for terrorism and non-state actors. Although the Obama Administration may share many goals of the previous administration on Iran, it also sees the need for new strategies and approaches. The Obama Administration has advocated a policy of engagement with Iran to determine the nature of its nuclear program and address other subjects of international concern. While post-election turmoil in Iran delayed these efforts temporarily, it appears that the Administration is committed to pursue engagement through the P5+1 framework. At the same time, some Members of Congress have called for increased sanctions on Iran. The United States, Israel, and the EU proposed the end of 2009 as a deadline for Iran to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate on the nuclear issue. That deadline has lapsed with no visible progress toward a resolution and the Administration is now working with its P5+1 partners to determine a course of action for 2010. Regardless of how they decide to proceed, any actions on the part of the Obama Administration, Congress, or the international community, and any developments in or provocations by Iran, will have implications for U.S. interests in the region as Iran's neighbors react and reevaluate their policies accordingly. This report provides a description of Iran's neighbors' policies and interests, options for Congressional consideration, and an analysis of potential regional implications. For more information on Iran and regional perspectives, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and Relations with the United States, by Carol Migdalovitz; CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, by Christopher M. Blanchard; CRS Report RS22323, Iran's Activities and Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R40653, Iran's 2009 Presidential Elections, by Casey L. Addis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Iran is subject to a wide range of U.S. sanctions, restricting trade with, investment, and U.S. foreign aid to Iran, and requiring the United States to vote against international lending to Iran. Several laws and Executive Orders authorize the imposition of U.S. penalties against foreign companies that do business with Iran, as part of an effort to persuade foreign firms to choose between the Iranian market and the much larger U.S. market. Most notable among these sanctions is a ban, imposed in 1995, on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran. That ban has since been modified slightly to allow for some bilateral trade in luxury and humanitarian-related goods. Foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms remain generally exempt from the trade ban since they are under the laws of the countries where they are incorporated. Since 1995, several U.S. laws and regulations that seek to pressure Iran's economy, curb Iran's support for militant groups, and curtail supplies to Iran of advanced technology have been enacted. Since 2006, the United Nations Security Council has imposed some sanctions primarily attempting to curtail supply to Iran of weapons-related technology but also sanctioning some Iranian banks. U.S. officials have identified Iran's energy sector as a key Iranian vulnerability because Iran's government revenues are approximately 80% dependent on oil revenues and in need of substantial foreign investment. A U.S. effort to curb international energy investment in Iran began in 1996 with the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), but no firms have been sanctioned under it and the precise effects of ISA-as distinct from other factors affecting international firms' decisions on whether to invest in Iran-have been unclear. While international pressure on Iran to curb its nuclear program has increased the hesitation of many major foreign firms to invest in Iran's energy sector, hindering Iran's efforts to expand oil production beyond 4.1 million barrels per day, some firms continue to see opportunity in Iran. This particularly appears to be the case for companies in Asia that appear eager to fill the void left by major European and American firms and to line up steady supplies of Iranian oil and natural gas. Some in Congress express concern about the reticence of U.S. allies, of Russia, and of China, to impose U.N. sanctions that would target Iran's civilian economy. In an attempt to strengthen U.S. leverage with its allies to back such international sanctions, several bills in the 111th Congress would add U.S. sanctions on Iran. For example, H.R. 2194 (which passed the House on December 15, 2009), H.R. 1985, H.R. 1208, and S. 908 would include as ISA violations selling refined gasoline to Iran; providing shipping insurance or other services to deliver gasoline to Iran; or supplying equipment to or performing the construction of oil refineries in Iran. Several of these bills would also expand the menu of available sanctions against violators. A bill reported by the Senate Banking Committee, S. 2799, contains these sanctions as well as a broad range of other measures against Iran, including reversing previous easings of the U.S. ban on trade with Iran, and protecting investment funds from lawsuits for divesting from companies active in Iran. A growing trend in Congress is to alter some U.S. sanctions laws in order to facilitate the access to information of a growing student-led opposition movement in Iran, and to sanction firms that sell the regime internet-monitoring gear. Some see the various legislative proposals as supporting Obama Administration policy by threatening Iran with further isolation, while others believe such legislation would reduce European cooperation with the United States on Iran. Still others say these proposals could backfire by strengthening the political control exercised by Iran's leaders. For more on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, it has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the UN Security Council has responded to Iran’s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment and heavy-water nuclear reactor programs by adopting several resolutions which imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite this pressure, Iran continues to enrich uranium, install and operate additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also continued to produce centrifuge feedstock, as well as work on its heavy-water reactor and associated facilities. Whether Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program is, however, unknown. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in December 2007 assessed that Tehran “halted its nuclear weapons program,” defined as “Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work,” in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is “keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons” and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is “inherently reversible.” Intelligence community officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA. Although Iran has cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to an extent, the agency says that Tehran has not gone far enough to alleviate all of the IAEA’s concerns about Iran’s enrichment and heavy-water reactor programs. The IAEA continues to investigate the program, particularly evidence that Tehran may have conducted procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. This report expands and replaces CRS Report RS21592, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, by Sharon Squassoni, and will be updated as necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the perceived threat of Iran to Bahrain. Topics discussed include the accusation of Bahrain government on the plan of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to attack officials, the declaration of Lebanese Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, and the government's support to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for the nuclear program of Iran.

The article focuses on the foreign policy of Iran and outlines several factors that could cause alterations on its policy. It refers on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) which is an international agreement on the nuclear program of Iran, the P5+1 and the European Union. According to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani that JCPOA is the beginning for creating an atmosphere of friendship and co-operation with various countries.

The article focuses on the foreign policy of Iran toward Syria amidst crisis in the Islamic states. Topics discussed include the assertion of the U.S. to oust Syrian President Bashar Al Asad, the material support of Iran to the Syrian government, and the recruitment of the regional Shiite fighters to assist the Syrian force.

In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations thatIran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities; the agency ultimately reported that some ofthese activities had violated Tehran?s IAEA safeguards agreement. The agency has not stateddefinitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude thatthe country?s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board ofGovernors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, thecouncil has adopted five resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1835) was adopted inSeptember.The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA?s investigation of itsnuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywaterreactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguardsagreement. However, a September 2008 report from IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradeito the agency?s Board of Governors indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council?sdemands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactorprogram. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol.Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questionsregarding Tehran?s nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, butElBaradei told the agency?s board in June 2008 that the agency still has questions regarding?possible military dimensions to Iran?s nuclear programme.? A September 2008 report fromElBaradei stated that the IAEA ?has not been able to make progress? on these matters.This report provides a brief overview of Iran?s nuclear program and describes the legal basis forthe actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as eventswarrant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Iran's influence over the post-Saddam government in Iraq is substantial and growing because the dominant parties in Iraq have long-standing ties to Tehran. A key U.S. concern is that Iran, seeking to ensure the political prospects of its proteges, has expanded support for Shiite militias that are responsible for much of the sectarian violence. Since December 2006, the Administration has stepped up efforts to reverse Iranian influence in Iraq, but some see this as an indication that the Administration intends to confront Iran more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the Administration's "National Security Strategy" document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception, generated first and foremost by Iran's developing nuclear program, intensified following the military confrontation between Iranian-armed and assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the Administration's focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic strategy to the forefront. The Bush Administration announced May 31, 2006, it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies if Iran suspends uranium enrichment. However, Iran did not comply with an August 31, 2006, deadline to cease uranium enrichment, contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 (July 31, 2006). After almost four months of negotiations during which Russia and, to a lesser extent, China, argued that diplomacy with Iran would yield greater results than would sanctions, the Security Council agreed to impose some modest sanctions on trade with Iran's nuclear infrastructure and a freeze on trade with and the assets of related entities and personalities. (Resolution 1737, passed unanimously on December 23, 2006). Other Iranian policies -- particularly its material support to groups that use violence to prevent Israeli-Arab peace or undermine pro-U.S. governments -- are attracting growing U.S. concern. These groups include Lebanese Hezbollah that is challenging a pro-U.S. government in Beirut and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad that refuse to accept negotiations with Israel. Some U.S. officials also believe that Iran is purposefully harboring several senior Al Qaeda activists, although Iran claims they are "in custody." U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq and causing the deaths of U.S. troops by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias, some of which are participating in escalating sectarian violence against Iraq's Sunnis there. Although still focused on international diplomacy to curb Iran's nuclear program, the Administration is increasingly pursuing a containment strategy, including a naval buildup in the Persian Gulf, efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade with Iran, and pressure on foreign banks not to do business with Iran. Amid signs that the pressure is causing increased strains among leaders in Iran, the Administration strongly denies it is planning on military action against Iran. Still, some in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran. However, few experts believe that U.S. promotion of pro-democracy or anti-regime elements would likely succeed in wholesale replacement of the regime. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RS21592, Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, by Sharon Squassoni; and CRS Report RS22323, Iran's Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman. This report will be updated as warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India's growing energy needs and its relatively benign view of Iran's intentions will likely cause policy differences between New Delhi and Washington. Given a clear Indian interest in maintaining positive ties with Iran, New Delhi is unlikely to abandon its relationship with Tehran or to accept dictation on the topic from external powers. However, India-Iran relations are unlikely to derail the further development of close and productive U.S.-India relations on a number of fronts. See also CRS Report RL33529, India-U.S. Relations, and CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses. This report will be updated as warranted by events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to an Administration national security strategy document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." Over the past five years, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain or end what it views as the potential threat posed by Iran, including pursuing limited engagement directly or through allies. However, support for a policy of changing Iran's regime has apparently gained favor within the Administration as Iran has resisted permanent curbs on its nuclear program. In the nearer term, the Administration is intent on slowing or blunting Iran's nuclear program through concerted action by the United Nations Security Council. Because Iran continues to advance its nuclear program despite international criticism, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure. International concerns on nuclear issues and other strategic issues have been heightened by the accession of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hardliner, as president. Iran's nuclear program is not the only major U.S. concern on Iran. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence against the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, including Hizballah in Lebanon and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Hamas is forming a new Palestinian government following its victory in January 25, 2006, elections, a development that might cause Hamas to distance itself from terrorism. Alternately, Hamas might hold fast to its rejection of Israel and look to Iran or other hardline Middle Eastern states to circumvent any U.S. or Israeli efforts to pressure the new Hamas-led government. Some senior Al Qaeda activists are in Iran as well, although Iran claims they are "in custody." U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert its influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to armed factions, possibly including anti-U.S. Shiite Islamist factions. However, most Iranian-supported factions in Iraq are supportive of the U.S.-led political transition roadmap, and the two announced in March 2006 that they would hold bilateral talks on the issue of stabilizing Iraq. Iran's human rights practices and strict limits on democracy have been consistently criticized by official U.S. and U.N. reports, particularly for Iran's suppression of political dissidents and religious and ethnic minorities. However, Iran holds elections for many senior positions, including that of president. U.S. officials generally see the human rights issue in Iran in a broader context, and not necessarily as a direct threat, in and of itself, to U.S. interests in the region. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RS21592, Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, by Sharon Squassoni; CRS Report RS21548, Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities, by Andrew Feickert; and CRS Report RS22323, Iran's Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman. This report will be updated as warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the working relationship developed by Iran with North Korea on ballistic missile programs starting with the acquisition of Scud missiles from North Korea in 1980. Topics discussed include an annual threat assessments describing recurring trends between Iran and North Korea such as the latter's export of ballistic missiles and Iran's use of North Korean ballistic missile goods and services and Syria's reliance on North Korean and Iranian assistance for its missile programs.

The article looks at the relations between the U.S. and Iran. It notes the long-standing mistrust between the U.S. and Iran's Islamic regime which it claims will be difficult to reverse. The significance of the election of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on the U.S.-Iran relationship is discussed. Charts are presented that show the selected economic indicators in Iran including per capita income and proven oil reserves and the structure of the Iranian government.

The article presents a conclusion on the U.S.-Iranian relations. It sees the difficulty to reverse the long-standing mistrust between the U.s. and the Islamic regime of Iran. It shares the arguments of some observers that a regime change in Iran will pave the way for a diplomatic breakthrough, strategic benefits, and alignment with the U.S., while others cite possible U.S. control over Iran.

The article reports on the deep mistrust between the U.S. and Iran's Islamic regime as of April 2013. It shows that while some view the two countries as having a long-term interest on stability in the Persian Gulf and South Asia regions, some hold that no diplomatic breakthrough is possible unless the regime changes, and see the potential of the Green Movement in supplanting the regime. Others reportedly argue that a new regime would not necessarily align with the U.S.

The article reports on trade and energy deal between Russia and Iran which include exchange of Iranian oil for Russian goods, and cancellation of a ban to deliver S-300 air defense system sold to Iran.

The article focuses on international implementation and compliance to U.S. secondary sanctions. Topics discussed include sanctions against Iran, U.S. Executive Order 13608 which provides the Department of the Treasury the ability to sanction and identify foreign persons who help Iran in evading multilateral and U.S. sanctions, and the use of hawalas by Iran to evade financial sanctions in South Asia and Middle East region.

The article reports on the Iranian assistance to the economic development for Afghanistan by providing infrastructure funding, power transmission lines in the provinces bordering Iran, and providing fuels to Afghanistan.

The article reports on the role of Iran to the national security of Afghanistan. Iran sought to exert its historic influence over western Afghanistan as protector of Afghanistan's Shiite and other Persian-speaking minorities. The administration of U.S. president Barack Obama saw the potential cooperation of Iran in combating Afghan narcotics and in helping economic development in Afghanistan.

The article discusses the state of political relationship between Iran and Afghanistan. The author highlights the goal of the Iran to reestablish its position in the eastern, central, and northern regions of Afghanistan and discusses the effort of Iran to gain support from Afghanistan by supporting the ousting of Afghan President Hamid Karzai by providing funds to government leaders in Afghanistan. Also highlighted is the alleged involvement of Iran to international terrorism.

The article discusses the state of political relationship between Iran and Uzbekistan. The author mentions that both countries do not share significant language or cultural link contributing to the rivalry between two nations due to factors including difference in language and culture from 1991 to late 1990's. Also presented reports of bombings, acts of terrorism, and assassination purported to be the doings of Sunni extremist movements in both countries are also presented.