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When an authoritarian state aims to shape citizens' views and behavior through the means of the mass media, how successful are political leaders in this endeavor? This paper studies this research question based on a study of legal mobilization through the mass media in China. Since the 1990s political leaders are building a "rule of law" in China. Legal reform is intended to appease the losers of economic reform and to ensure social stability through the use of laws and courts. Thus it substitutes for more radical political change. The development of Chinese labor law, in particular, has been advanced in response to increases in incidences of worker unrest in recent years. The central government has responded by providing citizens with a National Labor Law that signals protection to alienated citizens, establishes a new social contract between workers and the state, and is aimed at channeling workers' grievances into state institutions. Dissemination of legal news through the media constitutes an important part of legal reform. The state relies on "thought work" in order to actively create and shape a legal consciousness. The underlying assumption is that people believe what is written in the news and that a person's way of thinking directly translates into behavior. In this paper we examine how successful Chinese political leaders are in creating perceptions of the law as an effective "weapon of the weak" through the means of the mass media. Content analysis of news reports reveals that the mass media portray the labor dispute resolution process in an overly positive light. News reporting on this issue is relatively uniform across media sources. Statistical analysis of a randomly sampled survey conducted in four Chinese cities in 2005 demonstrates that exposure to news reporting about labor law-related issues successfully promotes the image of a pro-worker bias in the law among citizens, thus encouraging them to participate in the legal system. The state is able to achieve its political goal because of the lack of conflicting sources of information and lack of previous experience with the reformed legal system among citizens. However, as more citizens participate in labor dispute resolution, skepticism toward media reporting on labor dispute resolution and general dissatisfaction with the legal system is likely to grow since experiencing arbitration or litigation leads to more realistic appraisal of the legal system and better understanding of the limitations of the Chinese legal system. However, even these more knowledgeable and experienced citizens are influenced by media messages. We conclude that commercial liberalization of the media can co-exist with authoritarian political control and resilience. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper begins with an empirical puzzle. Why were anti-American protests allowed after the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, but prevented after the 2001 collision of a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet? I argue that the critical difference between these two crises was the bilateral bargaining context. The Chinese government viewed the 1999 bombing as a deliberate provocation to test China's resolve at a time of acrimonious negotiations over China's entry into the World Trade Organization. By contrast, the 2001 plane collision occurred soon after George W. Bush took office, when Chinese diplomacy was aimed at reducing the perception that China posed a threat to the United States. However, fearing that anti-foreign protests would lead to anti-government protests in 1999, the Chinese government orchestrated the anti-American demonstrations with a visible hand and undermined the perception that the protests posed a genuine risk. As a result, U.S. officials discounted the protests and warned the Chinese government not to use the bombing to gain leverage on other issues, such as China's entry into the WTO or U.N. negotiations over Kosovo. By stage-managing the protests, the Chinese government reduced the efficacy of protests as a bargaining tactic. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When an authoritarian regime reforms the state media, how does it affect the ability of the state to manipulate public opinion? A number of authoritarian regimes have deregulated local media markets since the late 1970s. This paper studies the relationship between newspaper deregulation, political news content, and public opinion in China. Interviews with Chinese media experts and content analysis show that media deregulation is associated with greater variation of news content, but alternative mechanisms of control keep diversity within narrow boundaries. At the same time, however, media deregulation makes a great difference to audiences. Data from the Beijing Area Study reveal that readers are more susceptible to news messages when newspapers are deregulated. If news content can be synchronized through alternative mechanisms of control, media deregulation is conducive to regime stability. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In April 2005, tens of thousands of anti-Japanese protesters took to the streets of China's largest cities, condemning Japan's textbook revisions, its U.N. Security Council bid, and its claim to resources in the waters between China and Japan. The anti-Japanese protests demonstrated the capacity for mass collective action among China's urban elite and potentially laid the groundwork for future challenges to the government itself. Given the risk to regime stability that these demonstrations posed, why did China's authoritarian leaders permit the anti-Japanese protests to go on for weeks before reining them in? The 2005 Chinese protests are just one illustration of a larger puzzle: when will authoritarian leaders allow and even encourage anti-foreign protests, and when will they seek to prevent or crack down upon anti-foreign demonstrations? In this paper, which presents the preliminary results of my dissertation fieldwork, I suggest that the government's decision to allow anti-foreign protests in April 2005 was a strategic choice--to use the specter of domestic instability and the escalating costs of domestic repression to gain leverage over Japan on the UN Security Council negotiations. Contrary to the standard literature on audience costs, I suggest that authoritarian governments can indeed generate credible signals vis-à-vis the decision to allow nationalistic protests. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elites often use social policies to garner political support and ensure regime survival, but social policies are not a silver bullet. Using two waves of Chinese national surveys, I find that a recent policy of abolishing school fees has significantly increased citizens' demand for greater government responsibility in financing compulsory education. I argue that policy awareness, instead of policy benefits, drives citizens' demand. Finally, I show that policy awareness has enhanced citizens' trust in China's central government, but not in local governments. This asymmetry in regime support has two sources: the decentralization of education provision and biased media reporting, which induces citizens to credit the central government for good policy outcomes. Given citizens' responses are primarily influenced by policy awareness that is promoted by the state media, this study casts doubt on the use of social policies to sustain long run political support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does the Chinese government sometimes allow and sometimes suppress nationalist, anti-foreign demonstrations, and what are the consequences of this choice for China's international relations? I suggest that anti-foreign protests in authoritarian systems are like "audience costs," a source of bargaining leverage in diplomatic negotiations. The mechanism, however, is new. The risk that anti-foreign protests will turn against the government, combined with the escalating costs of making international concessions, enable authoritarian leaders to signal resolve and credibly claim that their hands are tied by domestic constraints. This finding has important implications for research on domestic politics and international relations, since it suggests a mechanism by which public opinion can influence the foreign policy of authoritarian regimes. I utilize a "natural experiment" to test the argument, comparing the occurrence of anti-Japanese protest over the period 1978-2005 in Hong Kong and mainland China, with Hong Kong serving as the control group. To further illustrate, I present a case study of the 2005 anti-Japanese protests in China and the negotiations over U.N. Security Council reform, drawing upon more than 100 interviews with nationalist activists, protest participants, and government officials in China, Japan and Hong Kong. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]