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Although the importance of non-state actors in international relations is now widely acknowledged, formal state-to-state ties remain an essential measure of a state's strength in the international community. When traditional components of sovereignty are eroded, what options remain open to states seeking to forestall international isolation? Drawing on a case study of Taiwan, this paper explores the potential and the pitfalls of using paradiplomacy as a substitute for traditional diplomacy. I argue that Taiwan uses paradiplomacy for three primary purposes: as a 'hedge' against weakness in the central-level US-Taiwan relationship; as a tool for developing long-term relationships with rising political stars; and as a performative strategy for asserting Taiwan's statehood by showing others that it acts like a state. While paradiplomacy enables Taiwan to strengthen ties to US policymakers, these efforts have become increasingly complicated as mainland Chinese influence on local US politics increases. This paper thus sheds light on paradiplomacy in the US-Taiwan relationship, but also on the ways in which American federalism can complicate US foreign policy toward East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is Taiwan's overseas community, and how does it connect with Taiwan's diplomacy? The ad hoc organization representing migrants from Taiwall, the Overseas Community Affairs Council, evolved from the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) of the Republic of China (ROC), established in 1926. The jargon overseas Chinese is the English translation of the Chinese term huaqiao. The latter refers to migrants from China and their descendants who consider themselves sojourners from China, but not all ethnic Chinese residing abroad would accept the huaqiao identity. The ideas concerning huaqiao and Taiwan's diplomacy constitute the theme of this paper. It adapts Joseph Nye's thesis of soft power (cultural diplomacy) and Jacques deLisle's concept of sharp power (political warfare) to interpret the two views on the articulation between Taiwan and migrants from China. It points out the Chinese nationalist embeddedness of the huaqiao concept and the ways in which nationalists drew reference from the history of Chinese migration to Taiwan in the seventeenth century to construct the huaqiao discourses. It also traces the institutional foundation of the Kuomintang's (KMT) huaqiao policies transplanted to Taiwan after 1949. The debate over Taiwan's overseas community policies reflected the twofold question: the competition between Taiwan's cultural diplomacy and the People's Republic of China's political warfare over overseas Chinese mobilization and the construction of Taiwan's national identity after democratization. In conclusion, I highlight the importance of de-nationalizing the huaqiao ideas to ensure a democratic approach for Taiwan to connect with its migrants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The different responses to the COVID-19 pandemic around the world are opening new fields of study in Political Science and International Relations. The need to constantly maintain and enlarge its international space has led Taiwan to develop innovative ways to showcase its response to the pandemic, as well as its willingness to assist other countries. To do that, different instruments associated with types of non-traditional diplomacy have been used. This paper suggests that in the case of Mexico, some features of public and parliamentary diplomacy can be identified in the implementation of the "Taiwan Can Help" Campaign. Through the analysis of the multiple donations of groceries and medical supplies to different communities in Mexico, one of the countries in Latin America with no official diplomatic ties with Taipei, this paper presents how the campaign has been carried through cooperation projects between representatives of the island and lawmakers in the host country. This pattern replicates the strategy followed by Taiwan in nations with mature economies, forging closer ties with parliamentarians in countries with democratic systems, as a way to advance a positive image consisting in shared values and a common future. By focusing on the implementation of this type of public diplomacy during the pandemic, this paper seeks to contribute to a much larger debate around the state of international relations in a post-COVID-19 world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing evidence from existing archives, parliamentary proceedings, presidential speeches, newspaper reports and oral testimonies, this paper demonstrates the extent to which Malawi sustained diplomatic relations with Taiwan and China from 1961 to 2014, within the broader context of southern Africa. While trade dictated the diplomatic choice of the so-called 'two Chinas', individual leadership styles as well as domestic politics remained the decisive factors. However, the paper argues that the process was dynamic, complex and highly contested – and that the broader idiographic context of southern Africa mattered. For while local circumstances created the need for diplomatic relations, it was the international political economy that acted as the impetus behind the establishment and shifting sustenance of the relationships. In making this argument, the study draws attention to how global forces interacted historically with local political economies within southern Africa to shape discourses of diplomacy as well as how economic challenges forced states to make compromises – including undermining human rights – in the making of these diplomatic relations over the last two generations in post-independence Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's opposition to PRC demands such as acceptance of the '92 Consensus' and 'One Country, Two Systems' formula since 2016 has invited a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, designed to coerce Taiwan into compliance. Given the stark asymmetry in economic size, military capability, and diplomatic status, Taiwan provides a case for studying coercive diplomacy that takes the form of threats to punish. Material differences suggest that Taiwan should capitulate, and 'cheap talk' theses expect PRC threats to have no discernible effect, while balance of threat arguments expect resolve. In this article, we use the survey data collected in the 2016, 2019, and 2020 rounds of the Taiwan National Security Study to examine how Taiwanese respond to China's intensifying and expanding threats. Our paper identifies four strategies that the public sees as responses to PRC coercion: isolation, bandwagon with China, balance against China by allying with the USA and Japan, and hedge by deepening economic ties with China while aligning with the USA and Japan against China. We show that the popular support for balancing against China rises as PRC coercion grows and Taiwanese citizens increasingly perceive China to be a threat. Our findings imply that citizens in a liberal democracy can develop the will to pushback against pressure from an authoritarian regime despite sharp asymmetries in capabilities and material limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of Chinese communities abroad has become increasingly significant in Beijing's public diplomacy strategy. This is not only the case for Overseas Chinese communities, but also for people who migrate between China and Taiwan. This paper will explore how a group of Chinese migrant women, the mothers, wives and daughters-in-law of Taiwanese citizens, have become a target of Beijing in its cross-Strait diplomacy and how they have responded to Beijing's initiatives. This paper gives a timely account of Beijing's non-traditional diplomacy in the context of cross-Strait relations, as a constructed and gendered process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In 2009, health authorities from Taiwan (under the name "Chinese Taipei")a formally attended the 62nd World Health Assembly (WHA) of the World Health Organization as observers, marking the country's participation for the first time since 1972. The long process of negotiating this breakthrough has been cited as an example of successful global health diplomacy. This paper analyses this negotiation process, drawing on government documents, formal representations from both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and key informant interviews. The actors and their motivations, along with the forums, practices and outcomes of the negotiation process, are detailed. While it is argued that non-traditional diplomatic action was important in establishing the case for Taiwan's inclusion at the WHA, traditional concerns regarding Taiwanese sovereignty and diplomatic representation ultimately played a decisive role. The persistent influence of these traditional diplomatic questions illustrates the limits of global health diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does it mean to say a state is angry? To answer this question, this paper theorizes a diplomacy of anger. Specifically, the diplomacy of anger involves a vehement and overt state-level display of anger in response to a perceived violation. Although the diplomacy of anger threatens precipitous escalation in the face of further violations, it can be ameliorated by conciliatory gestures and will subside over time absent new provocations. What is more, the diplomacy of anger can also exercise a reciprocal influence on the emotional dispositions of those that practice it. The diplomacy of anger thereby contributes to constructing particular issues as sensitive and volatile, and thus outside the realm of standard bargaining interactions. To examine the analytical purchase of this approach vis-à-vis standard accounts of coercive diplomacy, this paper looks in-depth at the 1995–96 Taiwan Straits crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Latin America and the Caribbean have been a major battleground of the "foreign policy war" between Taiwan and the PRC over international legitimacy, and recognition. This paper analyzes the growing rivalry between China and Taiwan and its implications. The first part of the paper examines the importance of Latin America and the Caribbean for both Being and Taipei. The second section explores political aspects of their involvement in the region. The third part assesses how Being and Taipei use economic diplomacy to meet their diplomatic objectives in Latin America. The fourth section examines the implications of the increasing rivalry between Taipei and Being in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2004, the EU has created 11 EU centers and two center-modeled programs in East Asia as an integral part of its public diplomacy in order to 'promote the study, understanding, and support of the EU and its policies.' All of these centers were jointly established by the EU and local universities, and more than 50 % of their funding is offered by the EU institutions. Among these centers and programs, the EU Center in Taiwan (EUTW) distinguishes itself from the others in two ways. On one hand, similar to the EU Center in Singapore, it acts as a national center rather than a university center. On the other hand, it was jointly inaugurated by a consortium of seven universities rather than one or two universities across the island. Therefore, this paper aims to evaluate the EU public diplomacy in Asia with the help of soft power theory and an in-depth case study of the EUTW. I will firstly review the development of the EU Studies and EU-related communities in Taiwan before the EUTW was formally inaugurated in May 2009. In the second part, I will present an in-depth analysis of the structure and functioning of the EUTW in terms of EU public diplomacy on the island. In the third part, the work of EUTW in the promotion of study, understanding, and even support of the EU and its policies will be evaluated with help of an institutionalist framework. In the end, I will give a balance sheet of the EUTW in terms of EU public diplomacy before drawing into some conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we analyze how citizens evaluate their president, especially focusing on why voters lower their evaluations at an individual-level perspective. We assert that citizens raise their evaluations of a new president when their expectations are met and lower their opinions when his or her performance disappoints them. Furthermore, the evaluations of the president are not only affected by a government's economic and diplomatic performance, but are also influenced by individual awareness of salient political issues, the contents of the news, and their own perceived influence on politics. We test the theoretical hypotheses using Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) panel survey data. The statistical results support our theoretical hypotheses and show that when PresidentMa's performance did notmeet respondents' expectations of unification and economic prosperity, the respondents updated their evaluations ofMa. In addition, it also shows that the extent of respondents' media exposure and political efficacy are significantly associated with the change in their opinions of Ma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses how Taiwan exercises "soft power" and uses public diplomacy to engage with the international community, and to compensate for the absence of formal diplomatic relations with major powers. The research suggests that Taiwan's strategies of international engagement are constrained by its external and internal political environments. The international system (structure) has locked Taiwan into a set of challenging arrangements over which it has little control or influence, while Taiwan's public diplomacy architecture and the activities organised and undertaken by its government agencies in Taibei and its representatives abroad (agency) reveal, at best, a misunderstanding of how Taiwan's soft power might be exercised more effectively. The strategic thematic choices of legitimacy (invoking Taiwan's international status) versus credibility (which in soft power terms offers the most benefit), and the decision to privilege cultural over political themes in international communications, all have profound effects on the success of Taiwan's soft power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines U.S. policy toward Taiwan and explores several proposals for change that an American administration may wish to consider. The author suggests that, while the United States should not overhaul its current relationship with Taiwan, some modest adjustments in policy may be warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article informs that the Dutch government stated in a telex to the shipbuilding conglomerate Rijn-Schelde Verolme (RSV) that it had approved the sale of two submarines to the Republic of China. It mentions that warships to Taiwan and in return managed to obtain both a restoration of diplomatic relations and easier entry to the Chinese market. It further informs that how to judge the government's decisionmaking with international relations theory.

Facing the ever-growing interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, Mainland China's strategy towards Taiwan is undergoing a profound change, that is, transcending the staunch realpolitik mentality and turning to an institutional arrangement in policy making. Especially since President Hu Jintao took up his position, the Mainland has endeavored to improve cross-Strait relations through the institutionalization of a series of sensitive issues, such as the proposals and signatures of some long-term accords aiming to advocate economic cooperation, promote social exchanges, weaken political opposition and foster mutual trust. By taking the Mainland's national development strategy shift, Taiwan's domestic reality and 'institution deficit' in cross-Strait relations into consideration, this paper analyzes the reasons, efforts and features of the Mainland's recent institutional-orientated policy transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the recent incursion by China (meaning both Beijing and Taipei) into the Caribbean and Pacific. The general contours of Chinese trade and investment are discussed to provide a background context for a more specific exploration of Chinese aid, especially to small islands across the two regions. A review of recent literature primarily from Western sources reveals that the main strategic use of aid by Beijing (People's Republic of China - PRC) has been to support the demands of its growing economy but secondarily to isolate Taiwan (Republic of China - ROC) diplomatically. This conclusion, illustrated with several case vignettes, is based on the focus of Chinese aid on those islands retaining diplomatic links with Taipei as well as on the political manoeuvreing this Cross-Strait rivalry has spawned. The paper further suggests that the types of projects Beijing and Taipei have funded, like those of their Western counterparts before them (Australia, Japan, United States), yield limited long-term island development gains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan is a revisionist power. Its independence movement challenges a vital status-quo interest of mainland China's opposition to a dejure Taiwan declaration of independence and maintaining, however ambiguously, Taiwan's commitment to the ‘one-China’ formulation. Why is it that a small and vulnerable island off the coast of a great power has continued to challenge the vital interest of that great power and risk war? Adopting a ‘levels of analysis’ approach to Taiwan's mainland policy, this paper addresses this question by examining four prevalent explanations for Taiwan's revisionist diplomacy: (1) the mainland deterrent is ineffective, reflecting Taiwan doubts about either mainland capabilities or mainland resolve to wage a retaliatory war; (2) in an example of the security dilemma in alliance politics, US commitment to Taiwan, although aimed at deterring PRC use of force, encourages Taiwan to challenge the status quo because the Taiwan leadership is confident of US intervention and US ability to defend Taiwan; (3) because of the development of a ‘Taiwan identity’ and of corresponding domestic political pressures, the Democratic Progressive Party has been compelled to adopt a pro-independence policy; (4) Chen Shui-bian has a personal commitment to Taiwan independence and has been willing to challenge the mainland's interest in one-China, despite risk of heightened conflict and regardless of domestic political considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The PRC-Taiwan diplomatic rivalry has not spared the South Pacific islands, a region only rarely mentioned within a Western strategy for Asia. This paper argues that the PRC and Taiwan have, since the 1970s, become players in their own right in Oceania, raising new variables in an uneventful area. Beijing and Taipei have made energetic efforts out of all proportion to draw such tiny islands to either camp. The elusive reasons are dissected herein. Wary of Western hegemony, the region's leaders have turned to Asia for offers of trade and aid, and have played the PRC and Taiwan against each other. This paper seeks to: explain Beijing's and Taipei's goals in lands that yield seemingly negligible gains; show how such activism has impacted Oceania; determine the region's perceptions and reactions; portray the relative position of all players; and point out future problems. The study is divided into contentious points crystallized over time: Cold War decolonization and the Chinese/Taiwanese arrival; aid, trade, and investment; fishing disputes; the role of China's navy; the region's nuclear-free zone; UN and South Pacific Forum dialogues; and the region's social economic, environmental ethnic, and security concerns. The study concludes that the supremacy of Chinese and Taiwanese global commercial considerations aims to demand a specific institutional-geopolitical alignment in Oceania. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains why some countries recognise Taiwan despite attempts by the People's Republic of China to pressure some to switch recognition? We argue for moving beyond 'dollar diplomacy' claims to unpack additional economic influences that might help explain why some states favour Taiwan. Using cross-national evidence from all countries (1950–2016), we find multiple economic factors influencing recognition and conclude that Taiwan's comparative success in certain regions cannot be explained by broad structural factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's foreign aid policy is largely a response to its China-imposed international isolation. Taiwan provides aid without stringent accountability conditions to countries in Africa, the Americas, and the South Pacific in order to maintain official diplomatic relations in the face of Chinese opposition. Often at odds with this is Taiwan's interest in seeking western support through being seen as a responsible aid donor. Domestic political constraints on Taiwan's aid budget accentuate the tension between these two interests. Taiwan's aid program can be seen as the product of these three competing and enduring pressures – maintaining the count of official diplomatic relationships, improving its international reputation, and containing aid spending. Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's tacit ‘diplomatic truce’ with China – part of a wider warming of intergovernmental relations across the Taiwan Strait – has reduced significantly the squeeze between these three pressures on Taiwan's foreign aid policy. It has allowed the Ma administration to improve Taiwan's reputation, while maintaining or even reducing its aid expenditure, and still retain the same number of official diplomatic relationships. Nevertheless, the Ma administration has not wanted to alienate recipient governments while the prospects for the diplomatic truce with China remain uncertain. There remains considerable continuity with past practices, and the government's handling of aid as a foreign policy tool is still largely opaque and unaccountable. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper compares the soft power capital and public diplonwcy strategies of Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. The premise is that Taiwan's international status and the absence of formal diplomatic recognition by major powers are a serious constraint on Taiwan's ability engage in meartingful outreach with the global community. The focus of the discussion is a paradox: Taiwan should be more successful at soft power since it is the personification of political values which should make it attractive to the liberal-democratic world; and yet the People's Republic of China - an authoritanan regime - is attracting far more attention and seems to possess and exercise far more soft power capital than Taiwan. This suggests that measurements of hard power and the models advanced by traditional approaches to international relations are more convincing ways to understand Taiwan's present predicament and its soft power. However, current strategies - operationalised by both Taiwan and the PRC ∼ enjoy limited success for different reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the diplomatic relations between Taipei, Taiwan and Australia from 1966-1972. In 1966, the decision of Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt to open a diplomatic mission in the capital has been viewed as one of the more unique episodes in the history of Australian diplomacy in Asia during the Cold War. Though formal, it is noted in the article that the diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan has not been a priority by the Australian government. Australia has maintained a nominal alliance with the nationalists in China, but does little to develop or strengthen their relationship.

Taiwan has had to conduct a foreign economic policy (FEP) within a constricted international space given the island's "contested statehood" predicament. While the dynamic nature of Taiwan's newly industrialized economic development and the government's "resourceful" economic diplomacy strategies have provided Taipei with increasing room for FEP maneuvers, the "mainland China" factor continues to loom large. This paper contends that the People's Republic of China (PRC) exerts orientating gravitational forces upon Taiwan's FEP that are growing in strength. These forces comprise two main aspects. The first concerns the gravitational pull of the PRC economy upon Taiwan's economy that centers on the burgeoning growth of cross-Strait commerce and the ever more palpable transnational economic space this interaction is creating. Here, Taipei must primarily weigh the risks and benefits of further economic integration with mainland China. The second aspect relates to the domain of economic diplomacy, where Taiwan must navigate in a wider international economic system in which the PRC is exerting increasingly powerful economic and political gravitational forces. Discussion on this broad issue is examined in the context of Taiwan's pursuit of economic security in the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to describe and evaluate the factors that have affected Taipei's current practices of economic diplomacy. The central contention is that Taipei's economic diplomacy is facing different challenges from those of the past, and that this policy is both provocative and constructive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have pointed to the period 1958-1962 as the beginning of Taiwan's transition to export-oriented industrialization. Although the Nationalist Party (KMT) had traditionally supported state socialism, the KMT began to oversee economic reforms in the late 1950s, setting Taiwan on the course of export-led growth under a capitalist model. Using archival materials from both the United States and Taiwan, I argue that the reforms resulted from U.S. influence on how the KMT understood the role of economic development in its grand strategy. U.S. arguments succeeded in creating political support at the highest levels of the KMT leadership for a reform-oriented faction in the economic bureaucracy. This finding shows how an aid donor can promote economic reforms even when the recipient is strategically important for the donor: although threats to enforce conditionality may not be credible, the donor can influence the recipient through persuasion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scholarship elucidates the extent to which Chinese literary and film culture during the high socialist period (1949-1976) was engaged with the world. This article builds upon the literature by examining how Chinese films were distributed and exhibited in this period in nonsocialist countries. With Australia as my case study, I argue that China exported films to nonsocialist countries mainly noncommercially, that is, not for profit but for propaganda and diplomacy. Once there, Chinese films were disseminated and shown with the help of a variety of local communist, leftist, or otherwise People's Republic of China (PRC)-friendly individuals and organizations. The films, therefore, circulated in the world not just through the formal alliances among brother nations of the socialist bloc, but also because of what I term a "surrogate infrastructure" that bound various peoples and communities on the left at both the local and global levels. By consulting Chinese government documents as well as Australian newspapers, I demonstrate that, despite the language barrier, a didactic film art, and a Cold War geopolitical context that impeded the global flow of Chinese films, the noncommercial route nevertheless limned an alternative mapping of the 1950s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article responds to the argument that Beijing has been using economic incentives to cause recipient nations to switch their diplomatic allegiances, which ultimately means breaking off ties with Taiwan and recognizing the PRC. It can be concluded that the empirical data confirm China's use of dollar diplomacy. In the case of most of the analysed countries capital flows and economic benefits were provided shortly before diplomatic ties were established. For all of the countries, their diplomatic recognition of the PRC enabled rich economic, trade, and development links with China. However, the volumes of capital flows were unstable and the awarding of economic advantages was not automatic and even in states which saw the biggest input of capital and the most lucrative economic deals, China's use of dollar diplomacy leaves several questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rich and complex recent International Political Sociology (IPS) literature on state recognition has completely ignored the process of de-recognition. The present article uses the case study of Taiwan’s efforts to preserve its ‘diplomatic allies’ in the Caribbean in order to fill this gap. Taking advantage of the IPS development of the constitutive theory of recognition, it introduces and analyses the concept of state de-recognition while emphasizing the deep contradiction between present international law principles and the political reality of national identity building as well as the de-linking of political science and international law understandings of recognition made possible by the progress of the constitutive theory. De-recognition is perceived as resulting in a hierarchical relationship between recognized and de-recognized political entities that is arbitrary and ethically questionable as it ultimately reflects the denial of the right to self-determination of peoples. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on Taiwan's foreign relations with Japan and China. It is stated that Taiwan has been a sensitive issue in Sino-Japanese relations; and recognizing the relative importance of China and Japan to Taiwan is very useful in understanding their triangular relations. It is mentioned that China's policy toward Taiwan is an uncertain factor that restrain's Taiwan's diplomacy; and China and Japan have good relations and Beijing, China, and Taiwan may have friendly relations with both the nations. The article also discusses the implications of national identity for foreign relations; and Taiwan's democracy and cultural experiences under Japanese colonization.

This is a translation of an article that reconsiders the controversy surrounding the Satō Eisaku Cabinet's China policy from 1970 to 1972. Previous studies have not focused sufficiently on how top officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussed China policy during this era. Based on recently declassified but still fragmentary Japanese diplomatic documents, this article, by carefully organizing these fragments and then comparing them with previously published secondary sources and declassified US diplomatic documents, uncovers historical facts of central importance for understanding Japan's postwar foreign policy. In particular, this article finds that the Foreign Ministry failed to formulate a strategic response to the drastic transformation of the international situation in the early 1970s, thereby indicating that discord within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party was not the only reason for Japan's delayed and reactive response. It also finds that the Ministry decided to establish diplomatic relations with China and severe relations with Taiwan as early as immediately after the Taiwanese government was expelled from the U.N. in October 1971, even though Japan waited for nearly another year before acting. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Through in-depth interviews and the collection of related data, this study shows that hosting mega-sports events reflects the Taiwanese government's objectives to create diplomatic status and national identity as well as to maintain the government's hegemony. In short, by hosting the Baseball World Cup, the government seeks to resolve its current crisis, to transfer the people's disappointments about the economic recession and political chaos and to regain the people's enthusiasm for baseball. In addition, the event functions as a diplomatic resource and is used to rebuild the people's patriotism and national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an examination into cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and China as of 2012, focusing on the paradoxes seen in the overlap shared between domestic and foreign policies of Taiwan. Four paradoxes are named, including the difficulties created by Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995, internal polarization in Taiwanese politics regarding nationalism, Taiwanese economic dependency on Chinese trade and investment, and rapprochement since 2008. Each of these four issues are discussed in turn, citing how each shows both promise for continued relations and continuing difficulties between the two nations.

Whether or not bilateralism and regionalism have threatened multilateralism has been debated in the literature. In recent years, the United States has argued that the increasing numbers of regional and bilateral trading arrangements made under the Bush administration are 'complementary' to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Accordingly, the case of Taiwan's bilateral trade negotiations with the United States and its accession to the WTO provide a useful case study for examining the relations between bilateralism and multilateralism. This article not only aims to study the role of bilateralism and multilateralism in Taiwan's liberalization process, it also seeks to compare the two types of trade diplomacy in terms of power relations, decision-making and negotiation, and the influence of negotiation on economic liberalization. The article is divided into three sections: the first section focuses on US–Taiwan bilateral trade negotiations during the 1970s and 1980s; the second section mainly discusses the process of Taiwan's WTO accession; and the final section examines Taiwan's bilateral and multilateral trade diplomacy after its accession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the United States' role in maintaining peace between China and Taiwan. China maintained that it plans to reunite the two countries as a matter of policy. The United States has led international efforts to maintain a separate government in Taiwan. The author questions future U.S. foreign policy after U.S. President George W. Bush leaves office.

Emboldened by the ascendance of economic issues on the global agenda and the erosion of security-driven bipolar structures, Taiwan in the late 1980s decided to use its economic advantages for diplomatic gain. Examination of changes in three phases of Taiwan's initiatives indicates that its inter-governmental organization strategies and targets correlate well with domestic politics and external factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An appraisal of the failures that have resulted from pursuing various ways that were designed to help Taiwan widen its international elbow room by gaining access to international forums as well as alternative ways that may allow Taiwan to “return to international society.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the advocacy of overseas Taiwanese, particularly those in the United States, and their influence on US foreign policy and subsequently upon democratization in Taiwan. It concentrates particularly on the work of a Taiwanese non-governmental, non-profit advocacy group in the US—the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA). This article first composes an organizational history of FAPA by investigating the questions and processes of why and how FAPA was formed at the local level in the US. Further, it analyzes how the organization mobilized its relatively modest local resources in the US through grassroots diplomacy to promote Taiwan's visibility in the US, to influence the US government on Taiwan-related issues, and to attempt to impact upon Taiwan's democratization. Through the presentation of FAPA's organizational history, this article ultimately tries to answer the question of whether a non-governmental organization such as FAPA and its grassroots diplomacy has had an impact on US foreign policy and Taiwan's democratization. Besides adding to the existing scholarly literature on the causes of Taiwan's democratization, this study on the formation and effectiveness of FAPA seeks to contribute to studies on NGOs' or non-state actors' grassroots diplomacy and lobbying efforts on governmental policies. Because FAPA functioned as an important diplomatic channel for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan's first opposition party in the post-World War II era, before it matured into a fully-developed national opposition party in the 1990s and consequently unseated the Kuomintang (KMT) in 2000, this article is also an examination of an opposition movement's informal diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia has close alliance links with the US but also growing links with China. While the US and China have many interests in common they also have many differences that periodically lead to significant tensions and such tensions could remerge in the future and pose challenges for Australia's diplomacy. The major potential risk in the future seems likely to be over Taiwan. This article notes that despite the improvement in the US-China relationship since 9/11, there are still strong anti-China interests in the US and anti-US interests in China that could pose difficulties for that relationship. It concludes that, with the exception of Taiwan, any such difficulties are unlikely to be of great significance for Australia. Provided the recent more effective US management of the Taiwan issue is maintained, balancing Australia's relationships with the two countries should not be especially problematic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the consequences of the launch of a normalization initiative with China by U.S. President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. President Nixon and Kissinger succeeded in redirecting U.S. foreign policy. They had also been right to continue normalization relations with China. The consequence for this is their betrayal of an ally in the form of Taiwan. The U.S. not only forfeited the right to Taiwan's people to self-determination but their ability to avoid Communist rule. They failed to see that other U.S. citizens would be determined to help Taiwan defend itself and the country's capability of having its own political reform. Such shortsightedness misled everyone. It has a big impact on U.S. integrity, diplomacy and democracy.

Analyzes the economic and social diplomacy between China and Taiwan. Background on the trading partnership between the countries; Factors which contributed to the huge amount of investment flows from Taiwan and China; Implications of the advantage of Taiwan over China; Conditions under which the status quo of the relationship may be maintained.