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Although violent threats are progressively more sophisticated, frequent, and deadly, this paper will argue that the root causes are not new. Ralph Bunche posited that to ensure peace, the principles and practice of true justice, equality, human rights, and democracy must be secured. However, instead of creating the foundation for enduring peace, we are witnessing the rise of inequality within and between nations. Indeed, even as the number of political regimes classified as ?democracies? increases, economic rights are deteriorating and social cleavages are growing within the current hegemonic order. Following Bunche?s intellectual tradition, which I argue is part of the historical materialist one, and using a critical realist method of analysis, I contend that the neo-liberal paradigm, now directing global transformation, is generating a complex supranational structure that compels states, competing in the global arena, to serve as conduit of global capital. States within this emergent global order move towards a common model, which consists of three mutually reinforcing elements. These are: a neoliberal economy, which aims at the ascendancy of market forces; a Weberian bureaucracy, reflecting processes of rationalization; and ?low-intensity democracy,? which focuses on formal electoral rights, with little consideration for the wider socioeconomic power structure. To elaborate, today?s global liberal market sustains a new strain of capitalism, one that concentrates an inordinate amount of power in the hands of corporations at the expense of ?democracy.? Contrary to what the neo-Marxist literature argues, the paper maintains that even though we will continue to witness opposition against this process, through different means, this will not result in the ?ultimate class struggle.? Instead we will see ?consensual? forms of social control with their mechanisms of ideological hegemony, and worldwide ?class warfare? among the poor, and between the poor and the middle class, whose members witness a decline in their standard of living. I argue that global capitalism, then, simultaneously creates integration at the structural level and fragmentation at the microlevel. Indeed, it exacerbates national, class, racial, and cultural disparities, interdicting the development of class solidarity. This study focuses on the emerging ?low-intensity democracy.? The research, through cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses, which employ both quantitative and qualitative methods, will examine the level of democracy in ?developing? (Bolivia and Uganda) and ?developed? states (Germany and Britain). Each states? level of democracy is then compared to the relative condition to one another and against itself over the previous decade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing American dominance and power in the world has frustrated various countries, societies, and individuals, and some have argued that this anger at American hegemony was the cause of September 11th. These people, such as Benjamin Barber, argue that Western cultural and economic imperialism are reshaping the world at the expense of various other cultures. As the American empire grows, it spreads its culture throughout the world, creating a more homogeneous world. This paper will focus on the growth of the American empire by examining American foreign policy and the use of force during the Clinton administration. From 1993 to 2000, the U.S. intervened or initiated the use of force in several places, including the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Somalia, Iraq, and Haiti. Why did the Clinton administration make these foreign policy decisions? Was it part of an attempt to spread American hegemony throughout the world or not? Or, as many have argued, were Clinton’s foreign policy decisions a result of his domestic problems and his own personal ambitions and goals? This paper will seek to understand what motivated President Clinton’s foreign policy decisions to initiate the use of force or to intervene in the intrastate conflicts of other countries from 1993 to 2000. In order to answer this question this paper will focus on one possible theory?diversionary war theory. Diversionary war theory is based on the idea that leaders of nation-states will use foreign conflict involvement to divert domestic attention away from internal problems. Many have criticized this theory, including Blainey 1998 and Levy 1989, but others have found evidence of a moderate link between variables like leader popularity and the diversionary use of force, such as Ostrom and Job 1986, James and Oneal 1991, and Morgan and Bickers 1992. Clinton faced a number of domestic distractions during his Presidency, most significantly his ongoing difficulties involving his alleged affair, and he may have felt the need to use foreign policy to divert attention away from these problems. Clinton has also has been quoted a number of times as saying that domestic politics is more important to him than international politics, and he may have used foreign policy to divert attention away from his domestic problems. This paper will focus on three specific independent variables: presidential approval, economic measures, and the media focus during the six months prior to the decision to use force or intervene. As the U.S. continues its dominance in the world, it is important to understand the motivations behind American foreign policy. Many people in the world today are less than satisfied with the U.S. hegemonic role in the world, because some of them believe that the U.S. is acting only in its own self-interest with no regard for how their actions affect the rest of the world. It is important to understand the reasons behind American foreign policy in order to determine whether the U.S. is a selfish and self-interested nation. This is a small step towards that goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will address the issue of change in international institutions and governance brought about by the global war on terrorism. It will apply the concept of new multilateralism as an analytical tool in order to map out an emerging qualitatively different approach to international organization. New multilateralism is most obvious and pronounced in Europe whose regional order traditionally has been highly institutionalized. European regional integration unfolding within the institutional domain of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will serve as a critical case study of the trend towards the establishment of new patterns of governance in the international system. The argument will proceed in the following way. First, the concept of new multilateralism will be discussed in reference to John Ruggie’s original definition of multilateralism as a generic principled institutional form in international life. Second, the paper will explore recent developments in the foreign policy domain of the European Union as an institutionalized intergovernmental political process. It will address the trend towards flexible forms of commitment and participation under the CFSP mechanism as an instance of the new multilateralism in international relations. The new multilateralism of the post-9/11 period, this paper will argue, continues the historical tradition of classical multilateralism by reflecting (in Ruggie’s words) American hegemony rather than American hegemony and by revealing the adaptive and reproductive capacities of international institutions. Similarly to classical multilateralism, it does not necessarily generate formal organizations but continues to respond to a demand for institutionalization of relations in the international system. In contrast to classical multilateralism, new multilateralism is based on a network of bilateral arrangements. In the spirit of multilateralism, it evokes a principled code of conduct, however, outside existing international institutions: it creates coalitions of the willing. New multilateralism is bilateral in approach and multilateral in cooperative action and outcomes. Thus, it accelerates transformation rather than stabilize international relations (which classical multilateralism did). It substitutes governance outcomes resulting from the existing universalist multi-purpose international institutions by single-purpose short-term arrangements in a variable geometry of participating countries. Without substantively changing the standards of international organization, new multilateralism reverses the attained level and patterns of complicated multilateral diplomacy. It is based on straightforward means-ends bilateral relationships resulting in flexible multilateral coalitions. Coalitions of the willing are increasingly being established as a multilateral response to international threats. They have become a source of governance in the international system. From the perspective of European regional integration, the continued institutionalization of a possibility for enhanced foreign policy and defense cooperation under CFSP, in parallel to the consolidation of strategic bilateral relationships and participation in ad hoc international coalitions, exemplifies a new pattern of regional relations produced by new multilateralism. The Convention on the Future of Europe reflects and reinforces that trend by creating new opportunities for variable-geometry coalitions within an otherwise highly structured institutional mechanism. This example indicates that the nature of European and with it, international, governance is changing. Regions no longer represent a formally institutionalized geopolitical environment. They are becoming increasingly defined in terms of threats, vulnerabilities, and capacities for response by flexible ad hoc security arrangements. The paper will conclude that the coalitions of the willing have emerged as a new multilateral source of authority and legitimacy in the international system beyond international organizations. Arguably, this change in the pattern of international governance is essentially deeper than the nature and scope of institutional change brought about by the end of the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The name of the 45th Annual ISA Convention reminds of Joseph Stiglitz’s well-known book Globalization and its Discontents and makes one wonder whether globalization is synonymous, or is leading to, hegemony - of who, over whom, of what kind? The ongoing debates in the Russian social sciences are focusing on these issues, but the discourses they produce remain cloaked largely in mystery for much of the scientific maintream. This paper, based on the results of several large-scale research projects conducted at the initiative of Mikhail S. Gorbachev and his Foundation for Socio-Economic, International and Political Studies and carried out by a prominent group of Russian scholars, analyses the responses Russian political sociology and sociology of international relations provide to the challenges of globalization considered in the context of the New World Order, the transformation of power relations in world politics, and the emergence of new centers of hegemony in global governance. The paper demonstrates that the main thematic lines of analysis of the complexities of globalization in Russia are influenced by the need for the country which used to be a former world superpower to reassess its current position and role and to adjust to the drastic global transformations of which it has been one of the major causes. It provides evidence in support of the claim that the concepts of national sovereignty, self-determination, and political self-determination in particular, are the key instruments in the analysis of Russia’s role and place in the globalizing world. Drawing parallels between the Russian globalization studies and the seminal writings produced by Western authors, it addresses the issues of academic preponderance and diversity, domination and exclusion in the currents of international political sociology, considering the ways in which relations of ruling shape scholarly discourses. The three parts of the paper outline the major questions, or thematic blocks, connected to the study of globalization in Russia. The first part presents how globalization is defined, how it is linked to the issues of power and hegemony in global governance, and what are its main characteristics and contradictions as perceived in Russian contemporary social thought. The second part reveals the theoretical reaction to the globalization challenges resulting in the development of the concept of Russia’s political and economic self-determination, which is applied to the analysis of the country’s behavior in the globalizing world. The third part presents the critical analysis of Russia’s role and place in globalization. It elaborates on the theoretical debates about the forced integration into the international economic, political and informational structures, making an enormous effort and jumping into the wagon of the current winners, versus a messianic attitude declaring Russia’s necessity to take the lead of the losers of globalization, the discontents opposing the trends of global hegemony. Stressing the increasingly significant role of corporations and corporatism, which in Russia takes the form of oligarchic rule, it considers the impacts of Russia’s choice of authoritarianism or democracy on the future world order according to various scenarios developed by the Russian scholars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does unipolarity select for unilateralism? Theories that derive the behavior of a hegemonic state -and particularly with respect to unilateralism - exclusively from the distribution of relative power are notoriously underdetermined; neorealism suggests that leading states use asymmetries in power to their unilateral advantage, whereas the hegemony literature suggests that leading states leverage potentiall temporary advantage into locking in a favorable institutionalized status quo. This paper argues that the current American response these competing international logics is mediated by political-intellectual traditions about American power. The paper will address why certain unilateral/multilateralist foreign policy traditions are priveleged at certain times, and how these traditions determine - or provide a casual condition for - how the United States responds to structural pressures towards international institutions and cooperation [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do human rights scholarship, activism and advocacy perpetuate a hegemonic discourse regarding the individual, the state, and civil society which?were they taken to a logical end?might actually frustrate the realization of human rights? This paper will explore this question with specific reference to the internationally recognized principle that all human rights are indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated. As an adjunct to the equally central principle of universality, the indivisibility of human rights is meant to overcome or ameliorate the divisions resulting from the codification of two categories of human rights?politic and civil; and economic, social and cultural?into two distinct international treaties. The blame for this division is often?and incorrectly?dumped on the doorstep of Cold War politics. In recent years, a growing number of human rights scholars, activists and advocates have bolstered the treatment of positive economic and social rights as real human rights. The very act of contending that economic and social rights share the same stage of legitimacy with political and civil rights makes us keenly aware of the extent to which negative civil and political rights remain at the heart of the discursive environment of international human rights. A real problem this paper will examine is a tendency among human rights scholars, activists and advocates to deploy rhetorically the principle of indivisibility in such a manner that it prevents us from unpacking the concept in any meaningful way. The unreflective treatment of such an important and central concept creates a great deal of confusion with regard to who holds rights, and what institutions are capable of instantiating rights in the modern world. In their efforts to counter the hegemony of political and civil rights, advocates of economic and social rights are forced to reproduce the dichotomies so prevalent in human rights discourses (e.g., negative vs. positive rights). An unresolved tension between the positive and negative nature of different kinds of rights?as most human rights advocates see them?centers around what role the state should play in the realization of rights. Because this tension is either used to in a Cranston-esque rejection of economic or social rights that brings all discussion to a halt, or treated as if the differences between rights were not important, our ability to see the state as anything other than the enemy of rights is significantly compromised. A contemporary approach to human rights that is willing to seriously consider a non-reactionary approach to the state as an institution of positive freedom is necessary to overcome these tensions and divides. And the good news is that the genealogy of human rights reveals sufficient support for a comprehensive theory of the state that is compatible with a robust vision of the indivisibility of human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) could be seen as an assertion and reinforcement of the hegemony of the United States over the Internet. By United States I mean not just the US Government, but also its industry, its technology and in many respects the values associated with a liberal democratic order in communications. The paper will describe and investigate the nature of his hegemonic system, making it clear that simplistic notions of US dominance imposed on an unwilling world don’t get one very far. What we see instead are several self-reinforcing cycles of the sort that made Silicon Valley the world capital of IT innovation and Hollywood the world capital for filmmaking: network effects and agglomeration economies and first-mover advantages. The hegemonic system did not follow traditional national lines. The Internet protocols were victorious in a standards war that pitted TCP/IP against protocols (OSI) that were backed not only by European governments and European telecommunications operators, but also by the US Department of Commerce and many US telephone companies. The early Internet community was international in scope; although it was centered in and mostly populated by US computer scientists, it embraced several European and Asian institutes. These non-US technologists were outside the mainstream in their own countries and both the US and the non-US technologists often showed more allegiance to their own epistemic community than to their governments. Nevertheless, when it came time to privatize and commercialize the Internet the US government did retain the ability to control the terms of the governance transition because US military and civilian contractors were operating the centralized naming and numbering spaces. More significantly, despite its initial promise that it would fully privatize ICANN, the US reneged and retained indefinitely an unusual form of unilateral contractual control over what is ostensibly an international organization. Not much later, concerns about security and terrorism post 9-11 reinforced the decision to keep a US grip on the root of the Internet, making the relationship between ICANN and the USG a delicate matter. In addition to clarifying the historical emergence of US dominance of the Internet this paper will have three parts: * First, by way of factual background, it will analyze the institutional relationships between ICANN and the US government. * Second, it will explore and describe the ways in which assertions of the identity of a distinct Internet community interact with regional/cultural and national identities in the politics of ICANN. In developing this analysis, a critique of academically romantic notions of diversity and difference will emerge. * Third, it will explore the extent to which ICANN’s creation was a direct challenge to the hegemony of traditional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), especially the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). It will pay particular attention to the efforts of the ITU to undermine ICANN’s legitimacy and assert a role for traditional IGOs in Internet governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Events around the globe since the end of the East-West ideological rivalry have been those of conflicts, many of which have precipitated unfettered violation of the sanctity of state sovereignty in the definitive character of Pax Ameriocana - an American centredness - often clothed in the garb of ‘Multilateralism’. The situation has caught the world - especially Third World countries - in the middle of a miscontrued duel between the United States and its allies with so much power and the rest with too little ‘sense’; such that betrays earlier promises and expectations of freedom, mutual respect and justice associated with the ‘new world order’. Among the several questions that thus beg for answers are: What were the underlying features of the vision of the ‘new world order’? How have they been preserved or sabotaged? Can genuine peace be realised under the present unipolar world that is structured in the definitive cahracter of Pax Americana? What kind of memory does this give about the defunct Cold War world order? To what extent has the image of the United Nations suffered a severe banter in the light of contemporary events in international affairs? What is the nature of the discontents the situation generates in Africa? To what extent does the continent absorb a disproportionate share of the burden of the ‘new world order’? This paper seeks to interrogate the incresing failue of the once eulogiosed ‘new world order’ that is now left in the wounds of American centredness with a view to showing how Africa absorbs a disproportionate burden of its hegemony and power construction. The paper intends to do this by combining theoretical and policy analysis with reference to specific incidents around the globe. Even though it does not intend to prescribe solutions, the paper will nevertheless advance an informed guess about the future, such that will lead to a better understanding of the hidden pious talk the ‘new world order’ depicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As scholars of international politics, we have spent much of the last 10 years arguing that the world will soon be multipolar (Layne, 1993; Schwarz and Layne, 2002). Relatively little scholarly effort has been devoted to understanding the current strange world of American hegemony. This is not entirely surprising: our most basic concepts and theories were based on a multipolar world; these were later supplemented by understanding bipolarity. This unipolar moment might not last, but it seems there may be some wishful thinking involved as well ? not policymakers and theorists alike may miss the Cold War, as the hegemony of learned theories tries to impose itself on reality. This paper confronts unipolarity directly by revisiting elements of Waltz’s Neorealism. Waltz was primarily fascinated with the effects of bipolarity, mentioning the possibility of unipolarity only briefly. This paper extends Waltz’s theory into the realm of unipolarity by considering the impact of a unipolar distribution of capabilities on international structure. In the context of this unipolar theoretical perspective, this paper applies concepts at the heart of Neorealism, chainganging and buckpassing, to the era of global terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role small and mid-size states have played in initiating and developing the landmine-ban issue, which eventually changed hegemon behavior toward landmines. It analyzes how small and mid-size states were able to generate international action toward support of the Ottawa Treaty banning antipersonnel landmines, which marked the first time a weapon in widespread use has been banned. The paper makes two interrelated arguments. First, small and mid-size states worked among themselves and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which helped the landmine issue gain international legal legitimacy, and intense media and public attention in order to counter hegemon opposition. Second, small and mid-size states changed hegemon perceptions toward the legality of landmine use by creating an alternative, majority voting based negotiating framework outside the UN based consensus-voting system. In comparison, most disarmament treaties are negotiated within the UN system, at the behest of hegemons and exclude small and mid-size states from important roles in the negotiating process. These arguments address the broader question of the small and mid-size state role in initiating and controlling the international arms control agenda by showing the potential conditions of how they can get governments, including hegemons, to prohibit weapons that are heavily used and which retain a military utility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anthony A. Loh Department of Political Science Vanderbilt University (615) 343-6046 Email: anthony.a.loh@vanderbilt.edu The events of 9/11 helped expose the underlying incompatibilities between an emerging American hegemony and the Westphalian system of international relations. In much of International Relations literature, the assumption is that the international system is given, while the distribution of power can take the form of multipolarity, bipolarity and unipolarity. Yet in the aftermath of the Iraq war of 2003, the United States has clearly consolidated its post-Cold War triumphant gains in political, economic and military leverages over the rest of the world, including its allies in Western Europe. It has sought to fill the void left by the former Soviet Union. A new systems structure appears to be emerging that is centered on the United States, and anti-hegemonial coalitions that could sufficiently balance it are becoming more difficult to assemble, although sub-state actors like Al Qaeda cell groups have risen to attempt to check the hegemon through insidious means and transnational networks. It is time for Waltzian claims to receive yet another nuanced revision or perhaps a complete rejection. At the highest level, systems structure may no longer be anarchical, whereas at the lowest (sub-state) level, it remains to be so. This paper explores the significance of these structural changes for international politics. There has been a near-explosion of IR literature on the United States becoming a new imperium. The central question addressed here is how this new American imperium differs from traditional-type territorial empires and what is its significance for U.S.-East Asian relations in the 21st century. The paper looks at the potential shifts in U.S. policies in South and North Korea, Japan, Singapore, Philippines, Taiwan, and China. These East Asian states have been watching closely the military and political outcome of the 2003 Iraqi war. The implications of American unilateralism ? with its doctrines on regime change and strategic preemption ? worry them. Some of them are authoritarian regimes and are regarded by the United States as proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. The shift in post-9/11 U.S. strategy from containing peer competitors to dealing with terrorist threats have lifted some pressures on China, but the neoconservative agenda to remake the international order will be sure to bear on regional security and stability. How will the United States deal with North Korea in light of the Iraqi campaign of 2003? Some East Asian states have already seen the need to revise their traditional relationships with the United States. South Korea, in its drive for reunification, might abandon its reliance on U.S. security umbrella and turn to China as the new power broker. Japan, America’s staunchest ally in the region, might choose to remilitarize rather than continue to rely on the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Still other East Asian states might be polarized into pro-U.S. and anti-U.S. camps, especially since there is little cohesiveness among them to begin with. The limits of U.S. military power are particularly felt in the East Asian context. Yet the question that concerns all of East Asia is how the U.S., with its global military supremacy, would exercise its political rule as a neoimperial power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explaining EU hegemony toward the Mediterranean: theory deficits through the negligence of natural resources In the mid 90s, as part of the globalization process, EU states started to intensify their efforts to create new opportunities for investment and trade in the Mediterranean region. To that effect they launched the so-called Barcelona process with its centerpiece of an Economic Free Trade Area between EU and Mediterranean Barcelona participants. According to neo-liberal theory the economic liberalization of the Mediterranean would be of mutual benefit to both parties involved: investment and free trade would foster the region’s economic development, would reduce poverty and generate stability. Particularly investment in the Maghreb countries would be very attractive for European business in view of the region’s availability of cheap labour, favorable investment conditions and access to new markets. Critics of globalization and neo-liberalism, however, in particular Neo-Gramscians, consider the EU Barcelona process as an instrument of the EU elite for incorporating the Mediterranean region in their hegemonic bloc, to the profit of the EU and Mediterranean elite and at the expense of the Mediterranean ordinary population. Now, eight years after the launching of this initiative, it seems that the critics of globalization got it right: the living conditions of the populations of most of the Maghreb countries have not improved, in some countries they even worsened. But a close look at the reasons for the worsening living conditions of some Maghreb countries suggests that the reality is more complex than the theory is capable to grasp. While there is no doubt that EU companies profit from the unilateral trade between both regions, and that deregulation and privatization programs have already had their devastating effects, investment in labor intensive sectors is not taking place and is not expected to start off any time soon. So far the biggest share of the otherwise little EU investment in the Maghreb is taken up by a sector which Neo-Gramscian have difficulties to explain: investment in Algerian and Egyptian energy sector with the prospect of significant expansion in future. But as a Marxist approach the neo-Gramscian one has little regard for the role of natural resources in the economic process and for the fact that in contrast to the abundant availability of cheap labor, we are confronted with the limits of some critical natural resources. Therefore, empirical research led by Neo-Marxist theory would miss important motives for the EU’s consolidation of a hegemonic bloc with the Mahgreb countries’ elites: EU governments’ concern about energy supply dependencies and European energy companies’ objective in accessing the region’s cheaply extracted natural resources. Recognition of such a different form of EU exploitation of the Maghreb countries’ wealth would be imperative for a successful political strategy to improve the conditions in these poverty-stricken countries. While a Neo-Marxist approach in principle is well suited to explain the dynamics of the Euro-Mediterranean process, this paper will argue that important undercurrents of this partnership are left unexplained by the Neo-Gramscian theory, if it does not shed its orthodox Marxist tenet of ignoring nature and the constrains set by the limits of nature. The paper will start to discuss the general negligence of nature in IR theory in the age of globalization and will discuss - as Daniel Deudney has put it - how to bring nature back in. The empirical part is going to highlight the importance of the role of energy in Euro-Mediterranean relations and in particular the energy import dependencies of the European Union from Maghreb countries [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses an emerging interaction between bilateral and multilateral security arrangements for conflict resolution in Asia since the 1990s by emphasizing the correlation of Asian hegemony management with foreign policy strategies of the US, China and Japan. As protracted conflicts of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits have threatened regional prosperity and stability, regional security institutions have become an important policy concern in the post-Cold War era. Detecting nascent multilateral institution-building in Asian regional security, this paper asks how and why US-led bilateral alliances interact with multilateral security arrangements such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN-Plus-Three. In order to examine this puzzle, the paper focuses on three points: (1) foreign policy strategies of three countries, (2) domestic interests concerning the feasibility and legitimacy of supplementing bilateralism with multilateralism in Asian security, and (3) impacts of Asian hegemony management on establishing regional security institutions. The paper compares the three countries’ preferences to regional security by focusing on the relationship between bilateralism of the US-led alliances and multilateralism. It then tries to demonstrate that both the dynamics of Asian hegemony management and the policy preferences concerning bilateralism and multilateralism are essential in understanding regional security arrangements in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of global governance has emerged as a key theoretical approach since the 1990s. Applied to the transformation of international security, it has suggested a shift from the state-dominated bipolar system of the Cold War era to a new multipolar and multilateral security architecture in which state, non-state and international actors collaborate in the making and implementation of security policies. Then came September 11, 2001 and the war in Iraq. Today we appear to be more likely to discuss the nature of American hegemony and the stability of a unipolar international system. Observing the clash between these two competing perspectives of international security, the aims of this paper are threefold. First, this paper seeks to examine the respective theoretical assumptions underlying the concepts of hegemony and governance. Second, it examines the competing hypotheses proposed by these two theories with regard to international security. Third, it discusses in how far the empirical evidence since September 11, can be taken as indication of either a hegemonic strategy by the United States and balancing or bandwagoning behaviour by other major powers, or the continuation of security governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper illustrates the inadequacy of understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, more broadly, conventional studies of power and security in violent conflicts, through traditional IR tools. Both the theoretical hegemony of Neorealism and the military hegemony of Israel in the region are called into question by the asymmetrical warfare between Israel and the Palestinians. Contrary to Neorealist expectations about war in the international system, the Israeli military has never faced a regular Palestinian army; this has also confounded the Israeli military, which was designed to fight inter-state wars with normal Arab armies. Since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the first Palestinian uprising in 1987, the predominant form of Israeli-Palestinian confrontation has been low-intensity conflict, between a conventional Israeli military and Palestinian guerrilla movements, paramilitary organizations, and individual suicide bombers. This paper discusses how militarily weak actors can render strong actors’ power irrelevant through a combination of various strategies, objectives, and tactics. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict illustrates that the primary threat to stability and security in the Middle East no longer results from interstate war, but rather from violent domestic disputes waged on the basis of ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism, terrorism, and other transnational issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Observers of the current world scene reach strikingly divergent conclusions when characterizing today?s world order. Although there is much talk of a unipolar power structure, many are not convinced identifying a multitude of power centers, which is only temporarily and superficially veiled by the extraordinary superiority of the U.S. military. Some perceive the United States as ?the New Rome,? while others see a hegemon in ongoing decline. In a more normative vein, some depict the unmatched power of the U.S., and the high-handedness that comes with it, as a threat to world peace and an obstacle to the solution of common problems such as the management of climate change; others argue just the opposite describing the U.S. as the ?indispensable nation? and U.S. power, and the willingness to use it, as the decisive factor for order and stability in the international system. These opposing views are not only a matter of factual and evaluative differences, i.e. differing opinions on what is the case or what states of affairs are desirable; rather, they are firmly rooted in the existence of a multitude of concepts of hegemony in International Relations ? conceptualizations and definitions of which many who employ them are hardly aware of. The aim of this paper is to develop a first an idea about how to make. use of this multitude of conceptualizations via a metatheoretically guided conceptual analysis in general. What should follow from this analysis is a systematic overview and categorization of the most influential approaches to the phenomenon of power concentration, or hegemony, in world politics. The literature on the topic will be analyzed using a set of guiding questions as for example ?Which conditions have to be met for a state to be considered a hegemon?? or ?How do hegemons behave and why??. The goal of the paper is not confined to unearthing the divergent theoretical ideas that are present in the current scholarly and journalistic discourse on hegemony and power asymmetry. By clarifying, reconstructing, and systematically comparing the concept of hegemony, the paper ultimately seeks to contribute to a better understanding of hegemony itself. Eventually, a reformulated and multidimensional concept of hegemony will be presented in order to provide coming research with a clear idea about its descriptive and normative connotations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the past 10 years, organizations of disabled persons around the world have come to see the international human rights framework as a strategic conveyor of the core ideas of a new, social model of disability. The human rights framing of disability positions people with disabilities as rights-holders, thereby discrediting medical/charity models of disability wherein people with disabilities are classified as sick people in need of a cure or handouts. This challenges the disability movement to equip its constituency to become active claimants of their rights. At the same time, the disability community faces the challenge of becoming claimants who are effectively embraced within the mainstream human rights movement. Here, the challenges are many, and the strategies of so doing are highly contested within the disability movement. This paper explores the origins of the shift to a rights-based approach within the international disability movement and examines the challenges that this refocus presents. It analyzes the conscious adoption of a rights-based approach to disability advocacy by organizations engaged in an emerging transnational advocacy network on disability and assesses both internal and external pressures related to this development. In so doing, the paper contributes to the critique that questions the human rights movement?s receptivity to new areas of standard-setting and challenges the hegemony of civil and political rights that prevails in mainstream human rights practice. Within this context, this paper provides an important case study of a much neglected but increasingly visible human rights issue area, offering some preliminary observations and suggestions for deepening the constructivist analysis of non-state actors in the progressive development of international human rights law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the issue of making the EU a gender-aware or gender-sensitive organization, i.e. genderizing it in the gender consultants’ parlance. Such a transformation would have a significant impact in making the EU not only post-hegemonic, but also post-patriarchal. Considerable steps have been taken to genderize the EU, but so far these have suffered from being largely based on a limited and top-down perspective. Nevertheless, the paper argues, there has been a significant developing country input into the EU’s gender agenda. In terms of development policy, gender made its first appearance in the l984 Lome III Convention, often taking a traditional ‘welfare approach’. The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 showed huge strides forward in gender awareness, including the ‘gender and development approach’ and efforts at mainstreaming gender. However, ngos and others have been extremely critical of the EU’s lack of commitment on the ground to implementing a gender-aware approach to development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper proposes ‘hegemonic discourse’ as an analytical framework for studying the conditions of production, reproduction and change of social life at a global scale. It is suggested that social agents and subjects cannot exist beyond, outside a certain ‘hegemonic’; their actions and their reactions, their voices and their silences, their support and their resistance, all constitute moments in the reproduction of social life and as such are dictated by a certain ‘hegemonic’. Within this context ‘everyday life’ is proposed as the key ‘explanatory’ factor; for the ‘hegemonic’, is about the production and reproduction of everyday life, and thus everyday life is what gives life to, reproduces and changes the ‘hegemonic’. However, the fact that everyday life and the ‘subject’ cannot exist beyond the ‘hegemonic’ should not be interpreted as an argument for social stagnation, discourse reification, and inevitability of change. Hegemonic discourses, as social spheres, cannot but be inherently incomplete, which can only exist through their social reproduction and the changes that this brings with it. Furthermore, the biopolitical nature of the ‘hegemonic’, in terms of the production and conceptualisation of social life itself, does not neutralise the politics of the ‘hegemonic’, in terms of who gets, what, when and how. It is exactly this challenge, of bringing under a common analytical framework the traditions of politics and biopolitics, that the paper addresses through the employment of ‘hegemonic discourses’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Once the most important whaling nation (70 percent of world whaling), the United States has become, in under a century, the champion of the struggle to save the whales. This paper reflects on the American role in the transformation of the International Whaling Commission into an anti-whaling regime. It seeks to analyse the American construction of a ‘green hegemony’ in this issue-area, paying particular attention to the external vs. internal dimensions of this process. Three aspects come under scrutiny: -Externally, the American position is at odds with its stance on most other multilateral environmental treaties. How did the whales become the chosen issue of the US’s international environmental policies? -The role of non-state actors. American environmental NGOs have proved particularly important in altering the negotiating position of the state at the table of the IWC. The paper explores how the state-NGO relationship impacts on the elaboration of an international environmental policy -Internally, the US position sits uneasily with the whaling cultures of its ‘first nations’, which continue to whale under the ‘aboriginal subsistence’ exception. How does this affect the continuance of the US’s position as hegemon? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Naval superiority has long been correlated with superpower status and hegemony. However, the growing importance of aviation raises doubts regarding the functional value of navies in the 21st century. Nevertheless, navies remain the most expensive service in the military, and form a heavy burden for many nations’ security budget. This paper tries to examine the motivations behind naval procurement across all coastal states. It does so by revisiting Mahan’s classic theory of naval power and offering a statistical test for its validity. The results show that it is hard to explain naval procurement in traditional strategic terms. The paper proceeds by offering a prestige driven explanation for naval procurement. While Naval power started as a prerequisite for great power status, it became so closely associated with being a great power, that by now it operates as a status symbol desired by great powers contenders, even when its functional value is increasingly challenged. Naval power is one of several institutions of prestige in the international system that serve as a mechanism for establishing hierarchy and deference. An effective system of institutions of prestige is essential for the stability of non-coercive hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores Western European hegemony and power. The focus, however, is not European hegemony over other parts of the world but over non-European immigrants INSIDE of contemporary Europe itself. The paper is a case study of recent Danish legal, educational, and political attempts to better the integration of particularly Muslim immigrants in Denmark. My focus is on how Europe is constructed through these discourses on Muslim immigrants - and how the immigrants in turn are often constructed as alien to European values and norms. By denaturalizing the concepts which these discursive representations rely on (the citizen, the European, the immigrant, etc.), I tease out the silencing or forgetfulness of these representations (for example that Europe is complicit in creating a world of inequality). And based on a close textual reading of the law, the political initiatives, the mandatory civic courses for immigrants, etc., I argue that non-European immigrants in Denmark are kept in a state of eternal Diaspora inside of Europe - despite an official rhetoric of integration. The ambition is to unpack and politicize the Euro-centrism which informs discourses on Europe and which naturalizes the idea of Europe as a moral, acting subject under extreme pressure from Muslim immigrants. Finally, I discuss the theoretical implications of my study which transgresses the national (Danish) and speaks to the construction of regional or international identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the predominance of a state-centric methodology in the study of the Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA) process is not adequate to understand the process of transnationalization of politics that is currently taking place along the Western Hemisphere. Transnational advocacy networks of civil society organizations and social movements are engaged in building coalitions with key political actors within the 34 countries that participate in the FTAA initiative to advance an alternative view of hemispheric integration, by linking trade issues to a development agenda. Dominant approaches to hemispheric integration, interested in inter-state diplomacy and in the domestic politics associated to policymaking processes, are not able to grasp the emergence of a transborder political sphere increasingly influential in Hemispheric relations. The political significance of the transnational advocacy networks mobilized by the FTAA process is derived from their bottom-up attempts to create a common consciousness among its member organizations and across different sectors to challenge the hegemonic neoliberal approach to hemispheric integration. In this respect, the contribution of the discussion of social constructivism about issues of identity and understanding is particularly relevant. The possibility of hemispheric collective action at the level of transnational social movements necessitates the creation of a political subject/agent able of coalescing different sectors and political identities into a common hemispheric agenda. Agency entails the transformation of the normative understandings of the model of capitalism currently in dispute in the FTAA process. Drawing from the recent literature on transnational social movements, a neo-Gramscian ontology and the insights of social constructivism, the paper proposes a critical IPE framework to understand the process of bottom-up regionalization around the FTAA initiative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cultural debates gained dramatic ground in the UN context at the start of the 1990s. During the Cold War and decolonization eras, ideological and economic concerns characterized much of the contentious discourse across the UN agenda. Peace and security, economic and social cooperation, and human rights were interpreted through the ideological lens of the East-West rivalry or through the anti-colonial perspective of the newly independent states. In the 1990s, the UN as an institution was no longer riven by the superpower standoff. The growing success of the Asian tigers foreshadowed the Washington consensus in the development debates and undercut some of the core elements of the dependency school that had been, until that time, the most important resistance to hegemony in global governance. What replaced these two organizing discourses was a new focus on culture and cultural relativism that created new types of resistance to the hegemony of the West within UN politics. Perhaps the earliest intimation of the new culture wars occurred in 1993 at the 2nd World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. There, long-held assumptions about universally shared norms of human rights were called into question as the Bangkok Declaration stated that culturally divergent regions and nations had the right to interpret human rights norms in light of cultural differences. This paper will utilize the conference as a means to explore how the human rights discourse is used to challenge the dominant, hegemonic conception of human rights which is essentially liberal, individualistic, and universal. This paper argues that the primary means of hegemonic resistance within the UN system rests upon these cultural foundations rather than material, economic or ideological grounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

CONTESTING HEGEMONY? THE ISLAMIC NATION AS A DOMINANT ACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Sakah S. Mahmud Transylvania University, Lexington, Kentucky and The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies University of Notre Dame Abstract September 11, 2001, the war against terrorism and the defeat of Iraq have played into the hands of the Islam versus the West perspective in world affairs. The fact is that whether one accepts the theory that Islam as a religion is responsible or whether the events are the result of other social and political factors present in the Middle East, Muslims and their religion hare been put on the defensive. The events have also resulted in enlightened debates among Muslims around the world concerning the role of Islam in world politics. At the center of this debate is the nature and role of the Islamic Nation that is far removed from the terrorism debate into a focus on a legitimate and leading actor in international relations. This development leads to a number of questions that are important to international relations theory and practice. What kind of actor would the Islamic Nation be? What are its attributes? And how would it function as an actor in World affairs? And finally how would it fair in comparison to other dominant actors in contemporary international relations? Answers to these questions are important in the light of the fact that the debate the post September 11 will continue to haunt international relations for the foreseeable future. In this paper I analyze the above debate and argue that for the envisioned Islamic Nation to become a major actor in World affairs it would first have to fight within itself for legitimacy. That is, an internal struggle for peace and against the faction advocating violence. Following that and on a positive note, it would have the numbers and perhaps the economic resources to win that internal struggle and to play a major role in international relations. However, the paper also argues that the next phase would be measuring up to other dominant actors where the Islamic Nation would face major challenges in organizational structure and power capabilities to enable it to play such a dominant role. In the final analysis while the idea of an Islamic Nation would continue to draw our attention and enrich scholarly debate. It may even continue to challenge theoretically, current hegemonic powers, the above challenges would limit its potential and actual role as a dominant actor in international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development and regulation of high technology are defining features of modern capitalist economies. The U.S. and the European Union represent the richest markets for technological innovation, and transatlantic disputes over technology-related issues ? such as nuclear power, biotechnology, and information technology - make headlines on a regular basis. These disputes also reveal fundamental differences in thinking about risk management and the role of American hegemony in governing risk. America is often responsible for the creation and global diffusion of new technologies, and it deliberately attempts to impose its own free-market, science-based approach to the regulation of technology-related risks. Europe offers a competing approach, largely based on the precautionary principle, which involves a broader societal-based conception of risk. This paper investigates this principled debate by first developing a comprehensive analytical framework for the major competing approaches to governing such technologies. It then applies this framework to the question of America’s potential and real power (hegemonic or otherwise) to influence global technology governance. The paper also assesses the possible challenges America faces in this domain from Europe and other countries, particularly in the developing world. It concludes by examining the extent to which the U.S. and Europe will be able to reconcile their differences and thus facilitate a global regime for balancing knowledge diffusion and technology regulation, possibly through the use of technological fixes, public-private partnerships, and transnational actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The absence of a common and operational security strategy has been viewed a critical weakness of the European Union as an international actor. This is true in particular when the Union is faced with political and military issues and conflicts where its wide array of non-military instruments may prove insufficient or irrelevant, indicating that the Union is lacking not only in the clarity of its goals but also in the efficiency of its means. A comparison on both accounts is most often made with the United States. Not unexpectedly, in the aftermath of its most recent debacle in the Iraq crisis, the Union has formulated its first common security strategy (European Security Strategy, 2003). The paper reviews the ideational, institutional and structural factors that determine the culture, function and power of the Union as a strategic actor. More closely, the paper assesses the construction of strategy and the determinants of strategic behaviour, and the consequent growth of EU actorness. The convergence of strategic cultures among the members, the institutional capability of the Union as the basis of its functional position, and its power to affect the structure of the international order provide elements in the emergence of strategy. In the context of strategic behaviour, the paper looks at the management by the Union of the strategic triangle of idealism, functionalism and realism as guidelines for action. In dealing with the strategic responses of the European Union to the hegemony or pre-eminence of the United States, the paper notes their differing approaches to the relationship between Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian strategic cultures as the basis for international change. The strategic policy of the Union, based on its institutional strengths in soft power complemented with nascent hard power, is outlined as the combination of engaging the United States in binding multilateralism and pursuing equal partnership in global issues, consequently providing a restrained U.S. power with legitimacy. How the United States will respond to the transformation of power in international security remains a complex and open issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Along with the domestic-foreign frontier, the distinction between public and private spheres of human activity constitutes a fundamental tool for delineating that which constitutes International Relations. In this paper, I argue that the visibilization of non-hegemonic voices requires that such boundaries be broken, primarily due to the constraints that asymmetrical relations of power and hegemony place upon marginal points of view in the field. In particular, I explore the everyday world and quotidian practice as privileged spaces in which to observe peripheral forms of knowledge. Making use of conceptual insights derived from feminist and postcolonial thinking, among others, I discuss the importance of such non-monolithic spaces for bringing into focus new questions and issues occulted by dominant IR discourses. In this sense, everyday life is observed as the principal site of agency for marginal voices, in which the indeterminate nature of power/knowledge relations can be brought to light. Finally, the paper analyzes distinct ways in which globalization links quotidian practices to national, regional and global processes. I conclude that the examination human activity taking place in everyday life constitutes an important tool for a comprehensive understanding of global politics today, in particular in the periphery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As non-sovereign bodies, international organizations like the United Nations lack the power to coerce, bribe or buy compliance with international norms. Their only source of power is their capacity to mobilize support on the basis of legitimacy. The paper examines theories of power to set out the role of legitimate power in governance and looks at how it has been and could be used by international organizations and civil society to constrain the actions of hegemons. By examining the role of legitimation as part of the creation and maintenance of international regimes, the paper will argue that evidence will show that hegemons have needed international legitimacy in order to maintain their own power and that, as a result, organizations that can convey it will have their own kind of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper challenges the conventional understanding of the formation of the Bretton Woods institutions, which emphasizes the preponderance of U.S. and English power in the form, design, and inclusive nature of the institutions. Andrew Moravscik’s Liberal theory offers an inside-out framework that cuts to the foundation of foreign policy decision making and provides the greatest purchase on explaining the style and substance of the Accords, besting both hegemonic stability theory and neo-liberal institutionalism. Applied to this instance of cooperation, Liberal theory both examines the alleged onset of American hegemony and demonstrates why the post-World War II superpowers’ preferences should be understood as superior and inextricably bound to a palpable domestic-level preference structure. This paper brings to bear extensive archival, biographic, and secondary-source research combined with quanitative methodology to analyze this instance of cooperation. I conclude that liberal theory has unappreciated purchase in the budding literature on informal institution building and calls for a synthesized approach to understanding institution construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely believed that multinational corporations (MNCs) control the international political economy. This is not surprising given that various MNCs have annual sales exceeding the GDP of many countries and that MNCs spend billions of dollars shaping cultural preferences and political outcomes across the globe. Has economic power truly enabled multinationals to achieve political hegemony? On the one hand, realists argue that states remain preeminent in the international system. On the other hand, globalists assert that multinationals have become all powerful. In this paper, which represents part of a larger research project examining the power balance between corporations and states, I address this question in two ways. First, I present an analytical framework highlighting factors that shape the state versus multinational balance. Second, I present a case study that looks at the power of states versus MNCs during the HIV/AIDS crisis (when large pharmaceuticals confronted developing countries). My paper refutes the globalist argument by showing that the developed countries triumphed even though tangible factors would have led one to expect otherwise. Nevertheless, my study does not fully support the realists because it also demonstrates the importance of international norms, framing discourses, and transnational civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

America is widely recognized to be a powerful hegemon today. It is important to understand what the American approach to arms control might be like over the next twenty years. Will it mirror the departures of the current Bush administration, or will it go off on different trajectories? Using the broad definition of arms control that is found in the official U.S. State Department arms control and disarmament glossary, this paper offers a historically informed discussion of how the United States got to the point it is today in arms control and where it may go from here. This is not an attempt at prediction or forecasting so much as a discussion of plausible possibilities and relevant trends. Focusing on weapons of mass destruction, and especially on nuclear weapons, I conclude that arms control is not dead in American diplomacy but is evolving. The paper describes that evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the influence of liberal hegemony on the contemporary theorizing and development of civil society in post-communist Eastern Europe. The paper will attempt to argue that liberal hegemony has misguided attempts to understand and solve disenchantment in Eastern Europe through civil society. The paper will suggest that the Eastern European vision of civil society - as imagined by Havel and Konrad - is more appropriate for understanding the connection between civil society and disenchantment in Eastern Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current debate on the post-9/11 world is heavily concentrated on the foreign policy of the United States; that is, it is based on the reductionist approach (Waltz 1979). The nature and potential change of the international system has been ignored. It is clear that the current hegemony of the United States in international system justifies one to ask whether international system is changing from anarchical towards hierarchical. This is a big question of high theoretical, empirical and practical value. In order to find any answers to that question, a lot of extensive and intensive systematical research is required. Therefore, instead of suggesting a solid thesis, the present paper is a survey of ideas and findings on which the suggested project might be based on. First, the paper discusses the basic concepts of the systemic approach as introduced by Waltz (1979) as well as his analysis of the existing international system both before and after the end of the Cold War. Second, the problematic of the study of power in international system is briefly discussed. Third, major features of the current international system are examined. It is maintained that some clear features of hierarchical international system can be recognized; at least it is possible to share Tim Dunne?s (2003) view that even if the present tendencies do not establish ?a new global order but altogether they have forced us to confront its becoming.? It is claimed that the United States? position as the lead state of the emerging hierarchical system is based on its overwhelming military power (the ?command of the commons? as suggested by Posen 2003), the strategic doctrine and political will to use that power, and the justification obtained for war on terrorism from the 9/11 attacks. War does not disappear from the new system, but instead of anarchy, there is only one enmity; that between the terrorists (and the rogue states that support them)) and the defenders of freedom, of which the United States is the leader. ?War on terrorism? is the ordering principle of the new system; it is the United States?s function to define the terrorists, whereas the others? function is to support the United States in this war. Finally, it is suggested that more research into the basic issues of the new system is required, particularly on 1) theory and analysis of international system/politics in Waltzian sense, looking beyond his ideas by adopting more recent knowledge and approaches of the field; and 2) the bases and mechanisms of the present international system, with emphasis on military and ?constructionist? power, with main reference to international law and war on terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the use of different forms of power by a (leader/patron/hegemonic) state to get the other (non-leader/client) states cooperate with its policies: the use of different forms of power in obtaining cooperation from other states in exercising economic sanctions against a target state. Most of the literature on cooperation operate on the level of bargaining power where the policy changes are directly visible to or observable by the researcher. In this paper, I attempt to show how bargaining power model is not adequate in capturing the complete picture of the relationship between Turkey (a non-leader/client state) and the US (leader/patron state) in their cooperation and non-cooperation with regard to Iraq during the Gulf Crisis and the US War Against Iraq, respectively. In that regard, I attempt to show that the three levels of power (Krause 1991) is a much better and more comprehensive framework in understanding and explaining the power relationship between Turkey and the US. There are three main objectives of this study: (1) to shed more light on the cooperation process, (2) to challenge the conventional wisdom in the area of cooperation that states? cooperative or non-cooperative behaviors are best understood or explained on the bargaining level, and (3) to challenge the utility of paradigms, in this case the rational choice, in the discipline. This study attempts to show why a client state cooperates with a patron state even when this does not look as the best interest to that state, i.e., that state?s first preference is not to cooperate or that state does not have a dominant strategy to cooperate. Similarly, this study also aims at showing why a client state does not cooperate with a patron state even though cooperation seems to be the best interest to the client state. My working hypothesis is that Turkey?s cooperation (or non-cooperation) with the US with regard to the Iraq issue can not be fully understood or explained by using solely a bargaining model which focuses on directly observable (visible) results of a policy or an observable policy change that, for example, could be utilized by either empirical non-quantifiable, or empirical quantifiable data. Lisa Martin?s (1992) game theoretical model is a good framework to look at the relationship between the two states on the bargaining level. But it does not take into consideration the two other levels of power, i.e., it focuses on bargaining power, and omits structural power and hegemonic power. A comprehensive framework of different forms of power relationship between a patron state and a client state is needed to explain the cooperative/non-cooperative behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To realists, unipolarity is short-lived and conflict-ridden; other states will ally against the preemininent state, thus restoring the balance of the system. Yet, historical evidence suggests that unipolar periods have been more than just short-lived interludes, and that states sometimes tolerate unipolarity. Why? This paper identifies historical instances of such tolerance, and suggests an answer to their longevity beyond hegemonic stability theory. By overlooking the normative aspects of hegemony, hegemonic stability theory confuses unipolarity and hegemony. A hegemon is a pre-eminent power in a unipolar power, but not all unipolar systems are hegemonies. Unipolarity is exercized through military and economic power; hegemony also involves normative power. Implying: if a pre-eminent power is non-hegemonic, it will be perceived as acting only in its own self-interest; other states will then ally against it, establishing a balance of power. However, if a pre-eminent power is also a hegemon, it will be perceived as acting in the interest of the entire system; other states may then consider it legitimate and refrain from balancing ? in which case unipolarity may persist. The paper also discusses US foreign policy, in particular since 9/11 and the war in Iraq, in the light of this view of hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since September 11, 2001, people, especially in the United States, have been asking for answers and seeking explanations for why the terrorist attacks of that day happened. Among the responses offered we find some people believing that the cause of such events can be attributed to such feelings as jealousy and differences in culture. While these may have a role to play in the reasons for such attacks, these are not the only reasons. Those explanations are easy to create but far more difficult for researchers to believe. This paper is an attempt to examine the role that the states viewed as the victims of such hostilities actually has to play in them. During a period of hegemony, a hegemon is much like a parent or other authority figure and the other states in the international system are much like the children or subordinates. From psychological and organizational studies and literature we know that children and subordinates often respond negatively and destructively to inconsistent parenting or management. Should states controlled by people be viewed any differently? Can the international system be compared to families and organizations in this way? With the range of influence possessed by a hegemon, particularly at its height, one can expect to see hegemons attacked more frequently than other states. From previous studies, we know that these attacks increase as hegemons exhibit greater vulnerability, but nothing indicates why some hegemons are attacked more frequently than others at similar points in their positions as hegemons. The hypothesis examined in this paper is that hegemons with greater degrees of inconsistency between their foreign policies and their foreign policy rhetoric, as well as greater inconsistencies between policies, are the victims of outside attacks more frequently than other hegemons at similar points in their positions as hegemons. If this is correct, it can help shed some light on the role of policy making and policy makers in both the cause and solution of such international events as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the coming of age of US hegemony in the 20th Century and its implications for regional peace in Latin America. Specifically, the paper examines empirically the notion of "hegemonic peace" and its relation to the "external-peace-and-internal-violence" paradox in South America since the end of the Chaco War in 1935. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds on and revises two models for the construction of norms. One is outlined by Ward Thomas in The Ethics of Destruction (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002, p. 3) where Thomas holds that norms are the product of political processes. Thomas describes in a general way a collection of circumstances that are often present when new norms are created. These circumstances include technological change, the presence of a hegemon and the alignment of the hegemon’s interests with the terms and import of the norm. The second model was offered by Ethan Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society International Organization 44, no. 4 (Autumn 1990) pp. 479-526. Nadelmann emphasizes the importance of certain agents he calls moral entrepreneurs in the articulation and observation of norms. Drawing on these two models, the paper identifies in the development and deployment of precision guided munitions (bombs guided by lasers, global positioning system satellites and internal terrain mapping memories) an opportunity for the construction of more stringent norms for the avoidance of unintended killing in air warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the struggle at the World Trade Organization(WTO) over attempts to launch negotiations on a comprehensive set of rules regarding state treatment of foreign investors. The paper looks at the various attempts to push this agenda at WTO ministerial meetings starting with that in Singapore in 1996 and concluding with the September 2003 ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico where once again proponents will try to reach agreement to launch negotiations. The paper looks at why powerful proponents of such rules, in particular members such as the EC, Japan(and to a lesser extent the United States) and other developed country members (along with international business organizations) have had such difficulty in forging a consensus. Several factors are identified including: 1.The growing role and impact of developing country members in the WTO and the strong opposition of leading countries such as India 2. The erosion of the hegemony of the Washington consensus on trade and investment liberalization in the discourse around globalization and economic development. 3. The transnational campaign of opposition to the negotiation of investment rules at the WTO of a coalition of development, environmental and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Research material has been gathered via interviews with NGO representatives, officials of the WTO secretariat and national representatives to the Working Group on Trade and Investment at the WTO, established in 1997 as a compromise to study the issues surrounding investment rules after the Singapore ministerial meeting. In addition the submissions, minutes and reports of the Working Group for the last six years have been analyzed. Finally the dynamics of the discussions among WTO members, and the NGO campaing at the Cancun ministerial, where this issue is expected to generate major conflicts, will be examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The virtue of the ‘variety of capitalism’ approach (Hall & Sockice, 2001) is that it challenges the notion that capitalist globalisation apparently entails the growing impotence of nation states and the increasing homogenisation of social formations. There are, however, a number of analytic problems with this approach, which this identifies. Apart from an inadequate and misleading conceptualisation of the relationship between state and market in the era of globalisation, the most severe problem is to treat all the advanced capitalist states as equal units of analysis. This occludes the overwhelming power and penetrative capacity of the American state and capital vis a vis even the other leading capitalist states in the world today. On the basis of this critique, the paper argues that European capitalism must be theorised within the framework of American neo-imperialism. In this light, the paper critically examines various recent attempts to theorise the nature of American empire and points the way to a more adequate theorisation. The paper presents historical and empirical evidence that challenges the presumption that the material base for the maintenance of American hegemony has eroded. But this does not mean that contradictions for the American imperium and neo-liberal globalisation do not exist. But strategic advance for the left in this context will have to entail far more than defending or extolling existing European models of capitalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The peaceful resolution of border conflicts is an important component of the hegemonic order that the EU seeks to construct in its near abroad. This paper draws on newspaper reviews and preliminary elite interviews to analyze how the various forms of EU influence directed at the Turkish elite have influenced their decision-making with respect to Turkey?s relations with Greece. I am specifically interested in how coercive, inductive, and persuasive forms of EU influence have interacted in shaping elite decision-making in Turkey. This paper also uses the specific case of EU influence on Greek/Turkish relations to further our understanding of the microprocesses of hegemonic influence at a more general level. While the literature routinely underlines that material and ideational/normative hegemonic influences mutually reinforce one another, there are not detailed analyses of how various hegemonic influences are perceived, acted upon, and manipulated by different elites, and how, through these micro-processes, make an impact in the target states/societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States has a long-standing interest in the political events of South Asia. This paper focuses on the continuity and change in the nature of U.S. hegemony in this region after the end of Cold War, and more particularly after September 11. Having witnessed the collapse of the state in Afghanistan and the potential for state failure in a nuclear Pakistan, the concerns relating to this region are extensive. Religious fundamentalism, social and political instability, cross-border terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and environmental crisis are just few of the problems addressed in the paper. The variety of potential dangers emanating from this region makes this region and U.S. policy towards it a paramount concern for both theory and practice of international relations. At the theoretical level, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether the continued use of the neo-realist theory is justified, based on its record of past policy successes and failures. One of the core arguments against neo-realism is that its level of analysis is too rigid, thus failing to recognize internal constraints in state affairs, particularly the social and cultural factors. After examining the foundation and application of the neo-realist policies of the U.S. toward the region, this paper evaluates the success or failure of U.S. policy in terms of addressing the important concerns of the region. This evaluation is based on an analysis of the stated goals compared to the results of policy actions. The paper concludes with suggestions for a more realistic understanding of the problems in South Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the logic of current international politics (power politics)? In my paper, I try to analyze and understand the contemporary logic of international politics  particularly the logic of power politics. I argue that after 911, the world has turned into a power political state of mind, in which securitization seems to be a way of rule. From the perspective of power politics, international order seems to have elements of both an imperial and hierarchic system. The framework for analysis of this paper has three interlinked dimensions and elements. Firstly, the sphere of national security thinking provides the overall setting. The indefinable content of immanent national security explains the origins of securitization, of which forms the second element of the paper. I argue that securitization is both a useful tool for analysis and a way of ruling in existing world politics. With the help of securitization the politics and interests of national security is executed that results in hegemonic order. In the paper, my attempt is to explain why the combination of national security, securitization and hegemonic order constitutes a model, which explains, at least in part, the current logic of world politics . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bush administration’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 was to declare war on terrorism. The aspects of this war that have received the most attention have been the unilateral and military nature of the US response. What has been overlooked is another part of the Bush administration’s reaction: an effort to reconfigure the international norm of sovereignty as it applies to state sponsors of terrorism. The US has adopted the view that by supporting terrorists, states forfeit their sovereign right to autonomy over their territory. This has been accompanied by an effort to persuade or compel the international community to accept this view as well, as can be seen in US efforts to garner international support in the military campaigns against Afghanistan and Iraq. This raises several theoretical questions, which this paper will try to address. First, is this merely a hegemon acting to reshape the international community to suit its national interests? Realists and neoliberal institutionalists disagree about the value of international institutions; will a dominant state reject institutions that it doesn’t think serve its interests, or will it try to modify them to avoid the costs of creating replacements? Constructivists and proponents of the English School argue that the shared rules, interests, and values of the international society of states will influence the behavior of its members. US behavior over the last two years includes elements that support each of these views; it has adopted a with us or against us approach, but at the same time has worked to persuade other states to revise the norm of sovereignty. Second, can a state unilaterally reshape international norms? The US appears to be trying to change shared understandings of when states retain the sovereign right to non-intervention by other states. The US is tacitly arguing that by supporting terrorists, states forfeit their right to internal autonomy, because they have not fulfilled the responsibilities inherent in sovereignty. (This effort on the part of the US is not entirely new; during the 1990s the US government tried to shape international attitudes toward rogue states, but without arguing that these states had forfeited sovereignty.) While some studies have examined the role of individuals and international organizations in shaping international norms, the role of the state in reshaping international norms deserves further attention. This paper will contribute to this inquiry. It will examine the efforts the US has made to persuade other states to adopt a similar stance toward state sponsors of terrorism, and responses by other states and the international community in forums such as the UN and regional organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper conducts an initial exploration of the links between European Union (EU) social exclusion policy and economic integration. The paper outlines the historical development of the social exclusion concept, and locates the EU interpretation of social exclusion in that historical context. Understanding that the EU’s interpretation is a moving target, the paper nonetheless identifies current core principles of EU social exclusion policy, including in particular the exchange of best practice. Finally, the paper conducts a preliminary analysis of EU-sponsored projects that attempt to combat social exclusion. Based on this outline and analysis, the paper argues that while EU social exclusion policy involves a broad variety of non-state, state, and sub-state actors, those actors are encouraged to a narrowly delimited model of social inclusion, thereby discouraging some salient forms of social inclusion. In other words, the EU legitimizes a particular definition of inclusion amongst social actors. EU social exclusion policy therefore augurs a new dynamic of cultural hegemony: hegemony through regional economic integration. As such, the paper links to current discussion of transnational norms and their potential to influence, inspire, or reproduce domestic power dynamics. Yet the paper takes a critical stance toward such norms, for example by revealing that the principles anchoring EU social exclusion policy hold close affinities to corporate management principles of competitiveness. Thus, the paper questions the supposed limits of regional economic integration, and suggests that such integration involves a larger cultural and ideological project that produces hegemonic definitions of social practices. Of particular importance is EU encouragement of the culture-ideology of consumerism. At the same time, the EU-sponsored projects illustrate that the broad array of social actors implementing EU social exclusion policy have some agency relative to the Commission and other Brussels-based institutions. As a result, they possess some power to influence the cultural impact and ideological content of EU social exclusion policy and European integration more generally. While EU social exclusion policy encourages a culture-ideology of consumerism, the agents involved in policy implementation may stem this tide. Students of international organization(s) and of cultural politics can find dynamics of great interest in contemporary European societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What role do ideas play in the establishment and maintenance of hegemony? The proposed paper seeks to answer these questions by building upon the model of international relations (Role Realignment theory) described in International Political Science Review 24/1 (January 2003), and refined in The Precarious Balance Revisited: The War on Terrorism and System Transformation (CEISA/ISA Conference, Budapest, 26-28 June 2003). The paper will explore the proposition that this theory sheds light on the process of endogenous norm generation in international relations. The model incorporates ideas/ideology as endogenous variables alongside traditional measures of power in a closed-system model that emphasizes the process dynamics through which ideas/ideologies compete for acceptance/dominance in international relations. The four major variables (foreign policy role elements) are operationalized using metrics that can be tested historically, producing an explanatory rather than a normative theory. Findings will emphasize U.S. foreign policy role behavior and its impact on America’s leading role in world affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with meta-hegemony, that is hegemony within IR and IPE as fields of study, and examines the notion of self-interest as a key component in the dominant discourse of both fields. Specifically, why is self-interest such a seductive theoretical base for a paradigm (e.g., Realism and Smithian IPE)? To what extent does the assumption of self-interest limit scholars in their ability to build theory that accurately reflects the world, and what shortcomings are inherent in any body of theory based on premise of self-interest? The paper outlines the self-interest based components of Realism -- as a dominant discourse in IR theory, and free-trade liberalism -- as a dominant discourse in IPE. These discourses are then examined in context of a constructivist notion of ‘social interest’ in an effort to explain how flawed discourse can remain dominant in a given field of study even when these flaws are recognized. The paper concludes with a more complex, hierarchical understanding of ‘interest’ that may be applied in a meta-hegemonic as well as paradigmatic sense, and calls for a serious reconsideration of the assumptions built into the dominant theoretical discourses of IR and IPE. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hegemonic Governance and International Trade: Systemic and Dyadic Effects This paper examines the impact of hegemonic governance on interstate trade. The questions of whether and how this particular type of international leadership affects the international political economy have lately received scant attention in the political science and economics literatures. This is unfortunate, given the potential explanatory power of this rich theoretical perspective. This paper has three (3) objectives. First, we review the theoretical arguments and earlier empirical investigations linking hegemonic leadership to international economic stability. Although the majority of previous studies tend to find support for the hypothesis that hegemony is not a necessary condition for financial stability (measured in terms of free trade), these examinations leave many important questions unanswered, or at best, with ambiguous answers. Thus, we develop a more complete theoretical argument explaining how hegemony affects interstate trade ? at the system, sub-systemic, and dyadic levels of analysis. The theory of hegemonic governance stipulates that strong hegemony increases trade across the system and also within nation-state pairs where the hegemon?the state with the ability, the will, and the acceptance of other states to assume leadership?has a stake. Finally, we use comprehensive, multidimensional indicators (from Sacko 2003) to conduct a much?improved assessment of the effects of both the hegemonic power and hegemonic interest of the United Kingdom (1816-1945) and the United States (1946-1992) on interstate trade. We find that hegemonic governance does not statistically significantly affect aggregate, world trade. Hegemonic governance, however, is statistically significantly and positively related to both major power sub-system trade ? and to trade within dyads strategically relevant to the hegemon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will discuss some of the theoretical and explanatory insights of my research, pertaining to US soft power and the nature of world order. The definition of soft power I adopt is a socially constitutive one, and the role of soft power in international regimes and institutions: legitimating rules, generating symbolic power, structuring the social contexts of negotiation, will be discussed. This theory of soft power is developed as a critique to dominant accounts such as Nye’s, as well as conventional neorealist and neoliberal explanations of the way the US achieved and maintained hegemony. I adopt insights from theories of social power within the hierarchical systems to give a better account of the way the US has shaped its international role. This paper will focus on the theoretical rethinking of soft power and a historical focus rather than presenting a critique of the current US administration’s foreign policy. Sarah E. Graham Australian National University. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]