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This article reconstructs the bureaucratic and legal processes that culminated in the creation of the modern national security classification system in Executive Order No. 10,290, issued by Harry Truman in 1951. It argues that classification was shaped by processes of improvisation endogenous to the federal bureaucracy, which produced the problems of overclassification, definitional vagueness, and ambiguous constitutional status that have haunted the secrecy regime until the present. In so doing, it provides new insight into the development of the modern presidency, the national security state, and American democracy, and suggests possible paths to reform the contemporary pathologies of the classification system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Expresses pessimism on the national security scheme of the United States based on controlling technical information. Details regarding the born secret status of the atomic energy information; Basic information on the development of the hydrogen bomb; Justification for nuclear secrecy; Suggested approach to the prevention of atomic bomb proliferation.

Deals with the origin of nuclear secrecy throughout World War II and the Cold War in the United States. Security measures at several nuclear laboratories; Decline in security restrictions after World War II; Stance of the Federation of American Scientists on nuclear energy; Contradictory effects of the limits to communication imposed by classification of government documents.

These cases are used to model options that U.S. government R&D procedures could emulate, and though Srivastava acknowledges that "degrees of openness" might apply given security restrictions for government projects, American technology innovation strategies "must evolve" (23-24). With I Innovation in a Secret World i , Tina Srivastava joins Sharon Weinberger and Christian Brose in highlighting the challenging environment of research and development and procurement in the United States Department of Defense.[1] The implications inherent in government innovation are obvious and compelling - technological superiority might well be a deciding factor in future conflicts and is therefore crucial to U.S. national security. [Extracted from the article]

Trying to forecast the human behavior involves acts and knowledge of motivational theories, applicable to profile of each organization and in particular to each individual's style. The anticipation of personal attitudes has not the only aim for a passive monitoring of professional activity, but also wants to increase performance of risk avoidance, in accordance with a specific organizational environment. The emergence and development of motivational forms and values, whose projections determine social crimes, are risk factors, affecting the professional activity of the person, but also affecting the performance and stability of the institution. Moreover, if the motivation determines attitudes aimed at compromising classified information, the resulting actions may be considered as threats to national security. The prevention of such threats can only be achieved by understanding motivational mechanisms and external conditions for the perssonel that make it possible to transform some intentions into real actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can states credibly communicate their intentions through covert policy tools, despite the absence of credibility-enhancing publicity? Most extant research suggests covert action and secrecy in general are uniquely uninformative and often used as an alternative to signaling. Yet episodes such as Richard Nixon's secret bombing of Cambodia suggest that leaders have used covert action to convey intentions and coerce adversaries. This article builds a theoretical framework for understanding signaling in the covert sphere, developing reasons why states find covert communication both intelligible (that is, the basic intended message is understandable) and credible (that is, the message is believable). We argue that two target audiences—local allies and strategic adversaries—tend to observe covert action and that the costs and risks incurred by initiating and expanding covert action credibly convey resolve. We assess our arguments empirically through careful process tracing of a set of nested covert interventions by Soviet and American leaders in conflicts in Angola and Afghanistan. Drawing on a trove of recently declassified material, we assess intentions and inferences related to covert signaling. We find that both strategic adversaries and local partners observed and drew inferences about resolve. Covert lethal aid programs thereby served as a credible indicator of resolve through three mechanisms we identify in the paper: sunk costs, counter-escalation risks, and domestic political risks. These findings have important implications for the study of coercive bargaining, secrecy, and reputation. They also shed light on an important policy tool contemporary policymakers will likely use, suggesting the kinds of effects covert action has and elucidating the basic interpretive framework needed to communicate messages with new methods like covert cyber attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the Dodd-Frank Act and National Security and their related whistleblowing provisions. It presents the difference between the laws based on their structure and application. It mentions the Whistleblower Protection Act of 198p, and Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (ICWPA) which protect communications of classified information from employees engaged in intelligence and counterintelligence activity to the U.S. Congress.

The article offers information on the sentencing complexities including introduction of classified information and degrees of potential harm in military national security cases under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). It distinguishes between the criminal prosecutions of the Department of Defense (DOD) from those by the Department of Justice (DOJ). It examines the role of the U.S. military justice in national security cases related to aiding the enemy, spying, and espionage.

What is wrong with government whistleblowing and when can it be justified? In my view, "government whistleblowing," that is, the unauthorized acquisition and disclosure of classified information about the state or government, is a form of "political vigilantism," which involves transgressing the boundaries around state secrets, for the purpose of challenging the allocation or use of power. It may nonetheless be justified when it is suitably constrained and exposes some information that the public ought to know and deliberate about. Government whistleblowing should then be viewed, along the lines of civil disobedience, as a collective cognition- and legitimacy-enhancing device. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States government leaks like a sieve. Presidents denounce the constant flow of classified information to the media from unauthorized, anonymous sources. National security professionals decry the consequences. And yet the laws against leaking are almost never enforced. Throughout U.S. history, roughly a dozen criminal cases have been brought against suspected leakers. There is a dramatic disconnect between the way our laws and our leaders condemn leaking in the abstract and the way they condone it in practice. This Article challenges the standard account of that disconnect, which emphasizes the difficulties of apprehending and prosecuting offenders, and advances an alternative theory of leaking. The executive branch's "leakiness" is often taken to be a sign of organizational failure. The Article argues it is better understood as an adaptive response to external liabilities (such as the mistrust generated by presidential secret keeping and media manipulation) and internal pathologies (such as overclassification and bureaucratic fragmentation) of the modern administrative state. The leak laws are so rarely enforced not only because it is hard to punish violators, but also because key institutional actors share overlapping interests in maintaining a permissive culture of classified information disclosures. Permissiveness does not entail anarchy, however, as a nuanced system of informal social controls has come to supplement, and all but supplant, the formal disciplinary scheme. In detailing these claims, the Article maps the rich sociology of governmental leak regulation and explores a range of implications for executive power, national security, democracy, and the rule of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is the second part of an extensive investigation on security. This part of the study focuses on the legislation of the institutions of decision and specialized coordination within the National Security System. The high degree of unpredictability of the undesirable effects of defiance's, challenges, hazards and threats on the possibilities of stagnation or even involution of the whole societal system causes the frequent redimensioning and adapting of the actional potential of the National Security System to the real, concrete, specific imperatives of the development of the Romanian society. There should be a correlation between the fundamental components of national security and the responsibilities of the operational management structures of the forces aimed at achieving their objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article centers on how classified information has been handled by the U.S. government and how it can be accessed by civilians. Executive Order 13526 states how national security classification should be managed. US citizens can request federal government information through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Secret documents website WikiLeaks, made classified information accessible to the public but its contents were treated as nuisance in 2010.

An essay is presented on the secrecy and self-governance regarding the U.S. national security and punishment of people who leaked classified information. It first explores the First Amendment rights of public employees and individuals and their limitations, one is the limited classes of speech. It examines the instances in which the government can punish the press for publishing classified information. The author also analyzes the concept of journalist-source privilege.

This essay examines the extensive and unusual research that I performed in connection with the writing of my scholarly trilogy, The Struggle Against the Bomb, a history of the world nuclear disarmament movement. Among the problems were the vast array of organizations, their millions of participants and supporters, the global dimensions of the project, and the need to examine the impact of the movement on public policy. There were also unexpected difficulties, such as the disruptions caused by military attacks and flooded offices. Among the opportunities were uncovering remarkable government secrets and, more broadly, discovering the degree to which government officials curbed their nuclear ambitions thanks to the power of public protest. Last, but certainly not least, the research provided me with the opportunity to meet some very interesting people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented on the mythologies of the U.S. military commissions. It examines the military commission myths including the role of military commissions in preserving the integrity and confidentiality of classified information, the potential impact of military commissions in convictions and sentences, and the significance of military commissions in providing the U.S. with long-term security. It looks into the track records and information of the federal courts and military commissions.

Information organization is influenced by ideology; whether it is a personal belief system, organizational practice, or national ideology. The role of classification is dichotomous. In library and information science the goal is to be explicit while its role in national security is much more opaque. This article attempts to disambiguate this distinction in order to better understand the ethical implications of the classification process through examples from three cases related specifically to national security: (1) a dictionary for use by the East German Ministry for State Security, (2) the rules and regulations for the House Committee on un-American Activities, and (3) current requests by the government “to report suspicious activity.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In November 2003 the United Kingdom National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office) released a previously classified file relating to the security aspects of the case surrounding the atom spy Klaus Fuchs. It includes an eight-page memorandum, submitted by the Director-General of MI5, Sir Percy Sillitoe, to the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. This document describes the security aspects of Fuchs's background and arrest. However, a careful examination reveals that MI5 deliberately misled the Prime Minister to cover their own incompetence. Furthermore, in recommending to Attlee that he make a statement in parliament, the document reveals that MI5 were prepared to allow Attlee to mislead the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduces a series of articles which deals with China's classified documents on religious and national security issues.

The May 2002 tranche of British Security Service files released to the Public Record Office included hitherto classified policy files containing documents on Secret Service Committee meetings held from 1919 to 1923. This body wrote an important yet relatively obscure chapter in British intelligence history: the post-First World War reorganization and retasking of British secret service machinery, the focus now being Soviet Russia. However, by encouraging the deliberate overstatement of the Bolshevik 'subversive' threat and then backing excessive measures to counter it, some British officials may have sown the seeds of government's later inability to detect a much graver peril to national security, that of Soviet espionage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The president of the United States issues a variety of directives to communicate to his staff and to the nation. One such directive is commonly referred to as a national security directive. National security directives have been used, in some form, by every president since Truman. Frequently classified national security directives can have wide-ranging impact on foreign and domestic policy and provide insight into the strategies of an administration. The use of national security directives and their availability is the subject of this article. The first part of the article provides a history of national security directives, by president. The second part offers suggestions on locating the text of directives. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Evaluates national security claims in the U.S. with regard to secrecy, surveillance and emergency police powers in order to determine what government measures are justified in the areas. Restrictions on international travel; Classification of government documents; Information on covert government surveillance.

The article presents the author's view on the current trends that give priority to national security, executive privileges asserted by presidents regarding personal transgressions and efforts against making information available to the public. It discusses the case of Private First Class Bradley Manning who is facing life in prison for allegedly releasing classified information to Wikileaks. The author claims that the information exposed by Manning has provided evidence of possible war crimes.