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This study estimates the competitive effects of horizontal mergers in the French long-distance bus industry. We examine the two mergers that followed the 2015 Deregulation Act (the Macron Law); we use an exclusive and exhaustive dataset that covers eight consecutive quarters. We analyze the merger effects by comparing bus links that were affected by mergers with those that were unaffected; we use difference-in-differences estimations. We find that the two mergers are associated with price increases of about 13.5% immediately that then moderate to 5.3%; and with the frequency decreases from - 21.5 to - 25.7%; we observe no effects on load factors. These findings show evidence of short-run anticompetitive effects, while the mergers under study were not scrutinized by the French competition agency, as they were below the notification thresholds.

Conceived as a theory of competitive harm, self-preferencing has been at the core of recent European landmark cases (e.g., Google Android, Google Shopping). In the context of EU competition law, beyond the anticompetitive leveraging effect, self-preferencing may lead to vertical and horizontal exclusionary abuses, encourage exploitation abuses, and generate economic dependence abuses. In this paper, we aim at characterizing the various forms of self-preferencing, investigating platforms’ capacity and incentives to do so through their dual role, by shedding light on the economic assessment of these practices in an effects-based approach. We analyze the different options for remedies in this context, by insisting on their necessity, adequacy, and proportionality.

International audience

The duration of appellate court proceedings is an important determinant of the efficiency of a court system. We use data of 234 firm groups that participated in 63 cartels convicted by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to investigate the determinants of the duration of the subsequent one- or two-stage appeals process. We find that while the speed of the firststage appellate court decision depends on the court’s appeals-related workload, the complexity of the case, the degree of cooperation by the firms involved and the clarity of the applied rules and regulations, the second-stage appellate court proceedings appear to be largely unaffected by those drivers. We take our empirical results to derive conclusions for both firms that plan to file an appeal as well as public policy makers.

International audience; Theoretical research has investigated the relevance of entry-inducing effects as countervailing factor to a merger-related increase in market power.We use route level data for the America West Airlines-US Airways merger (2005) to investigate whether such an effect can be identified empirically. Our results show that both entry-inducing and entry-dissuading effects can be observed depending on the type of affected route and the carrier under investigation.

The purpose of this article is to show, based on the case of the French market, that consumer perception of different funeral service offers, along with new entry in a special storing facility service (“chambre funéraire”), can be sufficient to impose competitive pressures on the various suppliers, including the former monopolist. With a discrete choice experiment implemented in Lyon, France, we find evidence that, contrary to widely shared beliefs about this specific market, demand for funeral services seems characterized by relatively high price elasticities, at least as soon as consumers are fully informed about the opportunities open to them in this market. Consumer behavior has actually changed in favor of a better assessment of the different possibilities of services supplied and of their relative price. We then implement simulations in local markets and show that, with good consumer information, the market power of the supposedly dominant firm is much less important than it is generally believed. Furthermore, simulations stress the procompetitive effects of setting up a new storing facility by any businesses. We finally show that, if some improvements can still be brought to the functioning of this market, they should come from a better regulation of consumer information and of the entry of firms.

French Abstract: En avril 2014, la Commission europeenne a revise ses Lignes directrices sur les aides d'Etat en matiere d'energie et d'environnement. Dans cet article, nous montrons comment l'analyse economique des effets des aides participe a la politique de la concurrence et propose un cadre rigoureux d'evaluation. Nous soulignons cependant que la maniere dont les Lignes directrices presentent la necessite des aides publiques est discutable. Deux logiques s'opposent en realite, l'une distributive consistant a ne pas penaliser les pollueurs domestiques vis-a-vis de la concurrence internationale, l'autre incitative dont l'objectif est de regler des externalites residuelles. La Commission semble admettre trop rapidement les limites des politiques environnementales et ne met pas suffisamment en avant les externalites positives technologiques liees a l'innovation.English Abstract: In April 2014, the European Commission has revised its guidelines on State aids for environmental protection and energy. In this article, we show how the economic analysis of the effects of the aid are useful in competition policy and proposes a rigorous evaluation framework. However, we emphasize that the way the Guidelines present the need of public support is questionable. Two logics are opposed in reality, the distributive one of not penalizing domestic polluters vis-a-vis international competition, the incentive one that aims to resolve residual externalities. The Commission appears to acknowledge too quickly the limitations of environmental policies and does not sufficiently highlight the positive externalities associated with innovation.

In this article, the authors interrogate legal and economic history to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the United States. They show that the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped the inception of antitrust law. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of U.S. competition law, they highlight U.S. economists’ caution toward antitrust until the Second New Deal and analyze the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. They rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm became collective—that is, the “economization” process in U.S. antitrust. Finally, the authors discuss the implications and possible pitfalls of such a conversion to economics-led antitrust enforcement.

In this article, we use a history of economic thought perspective to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the US. We show the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped antitrust laws in their inception. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of U.S. competition laws, we then highlight U.S. economists' very cautious views about antitrust until the Second New Deal. We analyze the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. We rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm was made collective, i.e. the 'economization' process took place in US antitrust. Finally, we discuss the implications, if not the possible pitfalls, of such a conversion to economics-led competition law enforcement.

Etude pour le Ministère de l'Ecologie, du Développement Durable et de l'Energie.

Among other factors, one can assess the efficacy of a competition authority by its ability to choose and implement its remedies. Up until now, a dense economic literature has emerged on retrospective merger studies to measure the efficacy of merger control. Yet, little attention has been given to remedies in the other major pillar of competition policy, i.e. abuses of dominant position. In this paper, we try to fill the gap by first highlighting what is at stake and second analyse the most emblematic cases. We focus on the European Commission, while U.S. cases serve us as benchmark., L'efficacité d'une autorité de concurrence se reconnaît entre autre dans sa capacité à choisir et à mettre en oeuvre ses remèdes. Jusqu'à présent, une littérature économique dense s'est développée autour d'études rétrospectives en matière de concentrations pour juger de l'efficacité du contrôle et des remèdes retenus. En revanche, peu d'attention a été consacrée aux remèdes dans le cadre d'un autre grand pilier de la politique de concurrence, à savoir les pratiques unilatérales. Nous nous proposons ici de combler ce vide en essayant d'en cerner les principaux enjeux et d'analyser les affaires les plus emblématiques. Nous prenons comme cadre d'analyse le niveau européen avec l'antitrust américain comme point de comparaison.

From a methodological perspective, this paper aims to review the various means to assess a competition agency's merger decision. The upward trend to measure the efficiency of competition policy shows the utility of a survey about the main existing quantitative tools. To this end, four different approaches are exposed: simulation with structural models, event studies, the difference-in-difference technique, and lastly, surveys. One can ask if these tools often used during an investigation phase for a merger proposal can be transposed for a retrospective study. The pros and cons of such models are emphasized so that complementarities among them are possible., Selon une perspective méthodologique, cet article présente les différents moyens d'évaluer une décision de concentration rendue par l'autorité de concurrence. La tendance croissante à mesurer l'efficacité de la politique de concurrence nécessite un point de synthèse des principaux outils existants. Quatre techniques envisageables sont exposées à cette fin : la simulation à l'aide de modèles structurels, l'analyse événementielle des cours boursiers, la méthode des doubles différences et, enfin, les enquêtes et tests de marché. Nous nous demandons dans quelle mesure ces outils habituellement utilisés lors d'une notification de concentration peuvent être transposés pour une étude rétrospective. Les intérêts et limites de chaque approche sont successivement relevés pour souligner leur possible complémentarité.

This paper aims to build and empirically evaluate a discrete choice model of merger remedies as a basis for policy analysis. The database consists of 229 merger cases accepted in Phase I or Phase II of the European merger process between 1990 and 2005. We focus on the following question: Which merging firms’ characteristics lead the European Commission to decide whether to require conditional acceptance? Although a lot of empirical studies have been carried out these last years, ours is distinguished by at least two original features. First, we explore determinanting factors of the Commission’s decisions with a neural network model differentiating cases accepted with or without remedies (either structural or behavioral). Secondly, we implement three multinomial logit models. We find that variables related to high market power lead more frequently to a remedy outcome, whatever the phase. Innovative industries such as energy, transportation and communications positively affect the probability of a behavioral remedy. Lastly, former Competition Commissioner Mario Monti’s policy appears to be pro-remedy, i.e. seeking concessions from merging parties.

A recent French merger case involving two large water companies seems to toll the death of ex-post merger control. This paper aims at highlighting the interest of that type of control by showing its crucial role for competition authorities as a complement of the current notification system. Stressing the limits of an exclusively ex-ante control, we show that the possibility to act ex-post on market structures would lead to more virtuous behaviors in the ex-ante control by reducing adverse selection effects. The ex-post merger control would also permit new means of action on agents’ behaviors after the merger. Despite those positive effects, the implementation of an ex-post merger control should be attentively carried out in particular because some legal security problems could emerge. However, those issues might be offset by increasing the competence of the French competition authority in merger cases.

A recent French merger case involving two large water companies seems to toll the death of ex-post merger control. This paper aims at highlighting the interest of that type of control by showing its crucial role for competition authorities as a complement of the current notification system. Stressing the limits of an exclusively ex-ante control, we show that the possibility to act ex-post on market structures would lead to more virtuous behaviors in the ex-ante control by reducing adverse selection effects. The ex-post merger control would also permit new means of action on agents’ behaviors after the merger. Despite those positive effects, the implementation of an ex-post merger control should be attentively carried out in particular because some legal security problems could emerge. However, those issues might be offset by increasing the competence of the French competition authority in merger cases.