Search

This article analyzes the Egyptian regime's quest to establish Islamic legitimacy for the transition from conflict to peace with Israel between 1977 and 1981. Based on an integrative analysis of a wide range of sources, it demonstrates that Islamic argumentations were at the core of Egypt's official state campaign for peace. The appeal to Islamic justifications facilitated the regime's efforts to describe its innovative peace policy as a natural link in the chain of traditional religious sequences and enclosed it within deeply socially embedded Islamic concepts and principles. Through a comparative analysis with the Islamist anti-peace campaign that the regime sought to refute, the article highlights that 'Islam' has no essential, consensual stance on peace with Israel. Rather, it demonstrates that different Muslim actors draw divergent – sometimes diametrically opposed – positions from Islamic texts in accordance with their particular needs and outlooks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the policy of former Egyptian President Muhammad Hosni Mubarak toward Israel. Topics discussed include indication of the initial seriousness of Mubarak's commitment to the normalization agreements about the peace treaty with Israel, information on Israel's war with Lebanon, and reason he decided to ignore Article 8 of the peace treaty.

The article addresses the challenge of intelligence in identifying strategic changes that may signify political opportunity. It identifies the similarities and differences between military and political surprises, including the hostility of a military surprise. The relationship between intelligence and the leadership is discussed, as well as the possibility of improving cooperation between intelligence and academic communities.

The article focuses on the failure of first Rogers plan which was proposed by the U.S. State Department for peace between Egypt and Israel and path that led to formation of political initiatives, their goals, and reasons for their failure. It mentions disagreement between the State Department and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger for the regional status quo for American interests. It also mentions peace agreement would include an agreement on the establishment of demilitarized zones.

Does trading oil promote peace between rival countries? Despite the optimism of liberal theories on the value of economic interdependence, countries worry more about the possibility of being cut off from vital oil supplies than about forgoing the potential economic gains of trade. The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace is an exception to this rule, as the inclusion of oil trade agreements during negotiations succeeded and eventually became a positive aspect of the relations between the two states. However, this resulted not from the promotion of economic interdependence during negotiations, but from its avoidance. The United States guaranteed to compensate Israel for any breach in the oil agreement. This permitted Israel and Egypt to trade freely without imminent concern of becoming too dependent on one another. In consequence, they slowly built mutual trust over the years. Israeli and US declassified documents shed light on the creation of this unique oil trade agreement during the final phase of peace negotiations. We argue that a third-party guarantee to compensate for a breach in energy trade is often a necessary condition for such deals to succeed, provided that the guarantor meets certain preconditions unique to energy trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its potential significance, scholars gloss over the concept of the firstborn son in Joseph and Aseneth with little regard to its meaning. The title of the firstborn son (πρωτότοκος) reminds us of the rivalry and the conflict between Israel and Egypt in Exodus. In particular, the death of the firstborn son of Pharaoh evokes the destruction of the firstborn Egyptians in Exodus. One of the main motifs in Joseph and Aseneth is the rivalry between Joseph and the firstborn son of Pharaoh; Joseph the firstborn son is described as the victor of the competition. The death of the firstborn son of Pharaoh alludes to the destruction of the firstborn sons of the Egyptians in Exodus 11. Therefore, the motif of the firstborn son in Joseph and Aseneth refers to Israel's self-perception with regard to the superiority of the Jews over the gentiles (or Egyptians) as seen in Exodus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1969 and 1971 US diplomat Joseph Sisco was the driving force behind all initial steps to resolve the Israeli‒Egyptian conflict. But despite his tremendous efforts, his ability was limited as President Nixon did not throw his weight behind these efforts. Three main initiatives were taken during the discussed period: the Rogers Plan, the Rogers Initiative, and Sadat’s initiative for an interim agreement. Most of Sisco’s efforts concentrated on the latter initiative. His failure to reach an interim agreement, coupled with his inability to persuade Israel and Egypt to accept the Rogers Plan, led the region to political stagnation, from which the two parties only emerged in the aftermath of 1973 Yom Kippur War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article explores the wellsprings of U.S. President Jimmy Carter's policies vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Carter administration succeeded in facilitating a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt but failed to achieve a wider peace settlement. The author discusses the declassified records in U.S. archives about the matter. He also explains the role of domestic political considerations of various kinds in U.S. policymaking toward the Middle East.

This article deals with the Israeli–Egyptian talks after the October 1973 War, which are known as the Kilometer 101 talks since most of them took place at this spot on the Suez–Cairo road. After 17 years of indirect Israeli–Egyptian discussions, representatives from both sides met for direct talks that led to an agreement that allowed solving the exigent problems, like prisoners of war exchange and supplies for the encircled Egyptian Third Army. After about a month the talks ended, allegedly due to disagreement on disengagement and separation of forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on role of arbitration in political settlement along with information on Egypt/Israel Treaty of Peace signed on March 26, 1979 provided that Israel would withdraw to the "recognized international boundary" between Egypt and Mandated Palestine. It mentions Israeli diplomat helped the U.S. to avoid a serious mistake in midst of arbitral process and the U.S. as a witness to Peace Treaty. It also mentions approach of Yitzhak Shamir, former Prime Minister of Israel, on the same.

This article analyses the Cairo International Book Fair as a “field configuring event” (FCE), namely, as a recurrent mass event that both reflects the social fields surrounding it and contributes to the shaping of these fields. More specifically, it is argued that the Cairo International Book Fair constitutes a major FCE in Egyptian society, which plays a significant role, not only in the publishing field and in the cultural and economic fields at large, but also in the political field. Focusing on the political field, the article traces how the Cairo International Book Fair in recent decades both reflected key struggles and developments in the Egyptian political field and affected these struggles. In the 1980s, the fair served as a platform for voicing and negotiating various positions toward Egypt’s relations with Israel; in the 1990s, it served as a platform for negotiating the relations between Islamists and Liberals; and in the 2000s, it served as a platform for negotiating the “permitted” level of criticism toward Mubarak’s regime. The article thus shows that the Cairo International Book Fair constitutes a useful prism for examining developments in the Egyptian political field over the years. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses relations between Egypt and Israel along with its impact on material culture. Topics discussed include archaeological and extrabiblical sources related to their relations between Egypt and ancient Israel during the early Iron Age, Egyptian-style seals distributed in the Levant and commemoration of achievement of the Pharaoh Sheshonq I, founder of the Twenty-Second Dynasty by inscribing a monumental triumphal relief at the Temple of Karnak.

The history of Israel's turbulent relations with the Eastern bloc nations during the Cold War has one exception, Romania. Unlike other Warsaw Pact members, Romania did not sever relations with Israel following the 1967 war. Central to these relations was Romanian Communist leader Nicolai Ceausescu, who managed to establish himself as an important figure among both Arabs and Israelis. This article will examine Romanian–Israeli relations during the 1970s and especially Ceausescu's role in the Egyptian–Israeli peace negotiations. Recent Israeli and some Romanian documents released from the Israeli State Archive and the Begin Centre reveal much about Israel's attitude towards Romania and Ceausescu's involvement in the Middle East, and serve to shed light on a heretofore neglected aspect of Israeli foreign policy. Some of the main issues to be addressed are Ceausescu's influence on Egyptian and Israeli decision makers, Israel's prime motives in maintaining a close relationship with Romania, the importance of Romanian Jewry's position to Israel's policy vis-à-vis Romania and the extent to which these relations represented a back channel that facilitated some contact with the Kremlin. All these will be examined against the larger backdrop of the Cold War and the Arab–Israeli conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An essay is presented, which was adapted from previous articles by the author, which discusses the development of Israel's alliance with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, within the context of Israeli-Arab relations and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the late 1940s through the mid 2010s. The role that mutual animosity towards Iran plays in the Saudi-Israeli alliance is discussed. Egypt's relations with Israel, including the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, are also discussed.

As part of the peace accords with Egypt over 30 years ago, Israel was required to evacuate the Sinai Peninsula and to transfer its three military bases to the Negev. The largest of them was moved to Tel Malhata in the northern Negev. Toward its establishment, it was necessary to evacuate and resettle the Bedouin residents. The article reconstructs and analyzes the steps that preceded this process, including specific legislation, attempts to reach agreements during the legislative process, and the program that was ultimately accepted and implemented. It traces the circumstances that made it possible for the resettlement to take place without extensive public protest and without the authorities having to resort to enforcement. It examines the implications of this process for the long-term relationships between the State of Israel and its Bedouin citizens. Moreover, a complex of factors is presented, both changing and permanent, internal and external, that influenced the outcome. The contribution of this study lies in its scrutiny of the successes, limitations, failures, and future implications of the process through the perspective of time. Thus, it can serve as the basis for understanding the contextual changes that have taken place from then until today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses changes made in textbook "The Geography of the Arab World and the History of Modern Egypt" by Egyptian government over country's relation with Israel.

The article offers news briefs related to the Arab countries as of September 1, 2015. Topics include Egypt's involvement in Israeli and Palestinian diplomatic initiatives, the terrorist group Islamic State's control of the Yarmouk refugee camp in Syria and the deteriorating living conditions in the camp due to escalating violence, and the advancement of the Syrian rebel groups in the southern region of the country.

The article discusses the bold economic policies and moves of Egypt's President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to address fundamental challenges of the country's economy.

The article discusses the presidency of Egypt's President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, focusing on the implications of legitimacy sources to the country's democracy and relations with Israel.

Rabin differed considerably from the average ambassador – a representative receiving and issuing reports. He viewed himself not only as a diplomat, but as capable of shaping policy with respect to both the Arab–Israeli conflict and the relationship with the United States. During his term as ambassador to Washington he displayed sober realism with regard to the political, and to some extent the military, reality – the very realism that was absent from the government that sent him. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines Israel's decision to launch the 1956 campaign against Egypt. While the current literature tends to argue that, in 1956, the campaign was a response by Israel to security threats, it is suggested here that, if so, these threats certainly did not predetermine any specific response. Israel could, for example, have responded by adopting a defensive posture. In reality, domestic factors were just as influential as external ones. The most important of these was the severe economic crisis caused by mass immigration to Israel during 1948–1951. This crisis in turn led to the creation in 1953–1956 of a war coalition whose three components—David Ben-Gurion (Prime Minister and Minister of Defence), MAPAI's party bosses and the army—had different interests but shared the idea of a war against Israel's Arab neighbours as a way in which each could advance its preferred aims. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An essay is presented is given to the U.S. President Jimmy Carter's relationship with the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in his diplomatic efforts in negotiating peace between Egypt and Israel during the late 1970s, with a particular focus on the influence of evangelicalism on Carter's relationship with them. Carter's perspective on the role that faith played in the 1978 Camp David Accords is discussed.

The article presents the speech of former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban before the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in 1995 on the peace process in the Middle East is presented. Eban discusses the different kinds of foreign policies employed by Israel towards its neighboring countries. It cites the role of the foreign policy in fostering diplomacy between Israel, Egypt and Jordan.

With the conclusion of almost every round of hostilities between Israel and one of its neighbours the idea of international forces is being raised once again. This is basically an improved and revised initiative for stationing international forces to supervise (and perhaps impose) a ceasefire between the parties. In the Arab–Israeli framework, it is in essence the old approach which has been in service since 1948. Only one force, UNEF, stands out as not having been approved by the Security Council and clearly failing its intended but vaguely defined mission. The current analysis leads to the conclusion that in this particular regional conflict, the positioning of international forces must always come within the context of a more comprehensive settlement. That way, by violating a force's mandate, each party would lose either land or diplomatic recognition. Moreover, if a Middle Eastern peacekeeping operation is to take place in the future, it has to include organic units of the warring parties, encouraging peaceful interactions. Such units should reinforce organic units from countries acceptable to all parties. Hopefully, future missions, taking into consideration some of the approaches suggested here, can continue to contribute to regional processes for peace. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the impact of the discovery of oil and natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. Topics include the potential regional dispute or cooperation in the area due to the oil discoveries, the relation between Israel and Egypt that can be affected by a regime change in Egypt, and the possible solutions for the monetization of the energy resources in the Levant basin.

The article discusses changes in Israeli foreign policy after the Yom Kippur War and the "step-by-step" diplomacy of Henry Kissinger. The government of Golda Meir reached disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria, but it was Yitzhak Rabin's government that made the first real changes in Israel's stand. The team of ministers who led the negotiations insisted on commitments from Egypt that would effectively take it out of the war, in return for giving up the strategic passes in Sinai. However, the key element--a United States presence in Sinai--was added only after the breakdown of talks in March 1975 and a crisis in relations with the Administration. Many elements of the interim agreement, including the renunciation of the use of force by the parties, served as a precedent for the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editors discuss various reports within the issue on topics including the aftermath of the 1991 military action known as Operation Desert Storm, civil-military relations in Tunisia during the movement known as the Arab Spring, and Egyptian foreign relations with Israel under former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak.

This article is the first academic study of Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel under Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011). It challenges a deeply entrenched conventional wisdom that Egypt pursued a cold-peace foreign policy towards Israel throughout this period. We demonstrate that Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel was dynamic – comprising cold peace (1981–91), a hybrid foreign policy of cold peace and strategic peace (1991–2003), and a pure strategic peace posture (2003–11). We also use the case of Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel as a heuristic to develop a conception of a new type of peace, strategic peace, as an intermediary analytical category between cold and stable peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Menachem Begin was the sixth prime minister of Israel and the first from the right wing. He was in his post six years (1977-1983). The main claim of the article is that two main features led to his behavior during his term as prime minister. The first was dominant in his first term (1977-1981) and its central achievement was the Peace Agreement with Egypt. He was pragmatic, moderate, and his wish was to become accepted by the international community. The second feature was dominant in his second term (1981-1983), whose central event was the war with Lebanon (The First War with Lebanon). Begin was extreme, unbalanced, and his behavior during was the main reason for his resignation and his collapse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the predicament of Palestinian Islamic organization Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyah (Hamas) involving its challenges on its confrontation with Israel for a political strength in November 2012. It states the highlights that the confrontation focuses on the significance of Hamas' relationship with Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood. It also emphasizes the role of Egypt during the confrontation as well as the widespread perception regarding the brotherhood.

This article attempts to contradict the commonly accepted assumption in Israel and the West that in April–May 1973 Egypt and Syria were about to open war against Israel and were deterred by a series of measures that Israel took, including partial mobilization of the Israel Defence Force (IDF) reserves. The article ventures to separate the apologetics and (flawed) memories from the information provided by the now available documentary evidence. After presenting the prevailing Israeli version, the article analyses the memoirs on the Egyptian side about the preparations for war and determining D-Day, to refute this version. Based on the contemporary protocols of government and general staff meetings and political-military consultations, it argues that the Israeli government, general staff and intelligence community did not regard at the time the outbreak of war as an imminent threat. The steps they took concerned the medium and long run, and were irrelevant in the short run. Similarly, the mobilization of reserves was not connected to the alarm of war but to the Day of Independence parade in Jerusalem. The article claims on the basis of these protocols that the reason for the excitement was the collapse of the Israeli intelligence’s conception that Egypt would not resume hostilities before it could hit at the interior of Israel, and Syria would not go to war without Egypt. The arrival of Libyan Mirages and Iraqi Hunters to Egypt in April fulfilled this condition and the possibility of war could not be dismissed offhand. Israel responded to the new situation by the book. It shared the information and analysis with the White House and the CIA; it refreshed the IDF planning down to the divisional level and the IDF general staff held a series of thorough discussions to estimate the situation. The bottom line of this process was a government directive to the IDF to prepare for war at the end of the summer of 1973 (as it actually happened). In the latter portion of the article I explain why this directive was ignored when it was put to test in late September and early October of 1973. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A major school of thought in Israel asserts that: (1) a cornerstone of the Israeli security doctrine is gaining early warning based more on changes of the enemy's capabilities and less on learning its intentions; and (2) that deviation from the doctrine caused the strategic surprise experienced by the state on the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. This assertion is examined here by looking into another case in which Israel was also militarily surprised. In February 1960 the Egyptian Army deployed offensively along the joint border, while the IDF remained unaware of the situation. Israel's conduct during the affair – known as the Rotem Affair – was based on lenient assessments (derived from sigint) regarding the Egyptian intentions, ignoring their capabilities. It transpires, therefore, that dominance of ‘early warning of intentions’ has been the rule rather than the exception. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses changes in U.S. foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean region, particularly examining challenges to the historic triangular U.S.-Turkey-Israel and U.S.-Egypt-Israel partnerships. It examines the origins of these partnerships in the Cold War. The author argues that the partnerships were supported by military governments and are being challenged by the rise of civilian politicians in Turkey, under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and in Egypt, where the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 overthrew leader Hosni Mubarak. Other topics include the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, trade, and the role of Europe in Eastern Mediterranean security.

The article discusses the issue of Israeli national security in the context of the Arab Spring Uprisings that broke out in 2011. It examines Islamist influence and the potential for Islamization in the region. The author considers the regional balance of power and reflects on Israel's relations with Egypt and Jordan. Other topics include the response of the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama to the uprisings, threats to Eastern Mediterranean sea lanes, and Israel's abilities to defend itself.

The Arab–Israeli wars since 1948 resulted in several peace treaties between Israel and its neighbours brokered by the US, the Soviet Union and European countries in an attempt to achieve a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East. All efforts however proved ultimately futile, with the resumption of war several years after each peace treaty had been signed. For example, after the Six Day War of 1967, all parties agreed to accept a peace treaty based upon United Nations Resolution 242. However, six years after the tabling of the resolution, war broke out again on October 1973. Another long process of peace settlement ensued which culminated in the Camp David Accords, brokered by President Jimmy Carter. These peace accords, signed between President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel on 17 September 1978, led directly to the Israel–Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979. Despite its success, the 1979 treaty yet again failed to achieve the just and lasting peace settlement that had been expected. In all these treaties, the core issues of the conflict, such as the Palestinian refugee problem and the status of East Jerusalem, failed to be resolved. This article examines the British attitude and perspective towards the peace settlement after the 1973 war, focussing on the proposal for an International Peace Guarantee and the initiative of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. Based upon declassified archival records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office available at the National Archives in England, it unveils the attitude of the British government towards the UN Resolutions as well as its collective initiatives with the European Community to establish a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented on possible developments in Egypt after the election of Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi, its implications on Israel, and Israeli policy. It provides an analysis of power in Egypt which comes from the government, the military, and civilian protestors. It discusses the fundamental concerns of Israel in relation to Egypt which are the possibility of Egypt becoming an enemy, Sinai to become a platform for attacks, and possible support of Egypt to Hamas government.

Triadic deterrence is the situation when one state uses threats and/or punishments against another state to coerce it to prevent non-state actors from conducting attacks from its territory. Under what conditions is triadic deterrence successful? Some attribute outcomes to the balance of power between states. By contrast, we argue that the complex asymmetrical structure of this conflict requires attention to the targeted regime's relationship to its own society. The stronger the targeted regime, the more likely deterrent action will prove effective. Moving against non-state actors requires institutional capacity, domestic legitimacy, and territorial control, which only strong regimes are able to furnish. Whereas strong regimes can act to uphold raison d’état, weak regimes lack the political tools and incentives to undertake controversial decisions and enforce them. We illustrate this argument through analysis of between- and within-case variation in Israel's attempts to deter Palestinian groups operating from Egypt between 1949 and 1979, and from Syria since 1963. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the diplomatic efforts undertaken by the U.S. Department of State and the Israeli and Egyptian governments to end the War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt along Egypt's Suez Canal. Emphasis is given to the cease-fire's relationship to the U.S. practice of supplying Israel with war planes and armaments and Egypt's stationing of Surface to Air-3 (SA) missiles on the Canal's western bank. The article also examines how the U.S. used the cease-fire to limit Soviet involvement in the Middle East.

The article looks at the role of concerns about the Arab-Israeli conflict among the grievances that motivated the Egyptian revolution in 2011. The author takes issue with what she says is the widespread view that the revolutionaries were solely focused on domestic concerns. She says that by 2011 the Egyptian public had long been opposed to the Israel and Palestine-related policies of the government of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and that this grievance, too, helped to spark the revolution. She also argues that political organizing and public demonstrations in opposition to Israeli attacks on Palestinians over a number of years laid the groundwork for organizing the 2011 revolt.

The article discusses diplomacy and repression in Egypt during the period between 1977 and 1982, particularly what the author states was the policy of repression under former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. It discusses Sadat's policies during the time period and the author's assertion that Sadat's rule reverted to a more authoritarian style that resembled that of former Egyptian president Gamel Abdel Nasser during the Cold War. The article also examines the resignation of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011, and the potential impact his resignation might have upon the peace treaty signed by Israel and Egypt, and whether Mubarak's resignation signals more democracy in Egypt.

This paper explores the nature, background, and evolution of the 'Camp David consensus.' Under this consensus, Egyptian intellectuals and political movements broadly accept that the Egyptian regime must deal constructively and 'correctly' with Israel as a state, but insist that society has the right and responsibility to resist Zionism. The consensus rests on particular ways of understanding Israel, and the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, that can be traced back to the formative years of the Egyptian republic under Nasser. This has served the interests of both regimes and opposition movements and in this sense represents a 'double instrumentalization' of foreign policy. The paper, which examines a range of regime and intellectual pronouncements during the Nasser and Sadat periods, as well as more recently, challenges the growing use within International Relations, particularly in the Middle East context, of the concept of 'identity' to explain state behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The army may not oppose a civilian president, but it wants to maintain four things: its privileges, stability, peace with Israel and its relationship with the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The monument to the 180 Division of Steel soldiers who fell in the Sinai Peninsula during the Six Day War was erected on the outskirts of the young city of Yamit ten years after that war. This article shows how the changing narratives of this monument reflect the events that Israel, and especially this area, have experienced during the last thirty years. Although located on the site of a Six Day War battlefield, this monument, from the outset, became associated with Yamit. In April 1982 the memorial was the last stronghold of the opponents to Israel's evacuation of Sinai according to the peace treaty with Egypt. Demolished shortly after the evacuation, the ruins of the memorial turned into an icon of the end of the Jewish settlements in Sinai. Shortly afterwards, a replica of the monument was erected within Israel, in the western Negev. The new monument, along with the remains of demolished houses from Yamit that were placed nearby, constitutes a complex memorial to the evacuated settlements, while the Six Day War remains as a dim background memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's perspective on the Gaza war during the winter of 2008-2009. The discussion focuses on the political and military context of the war, especially the disengagement policy of Israel after 2005, Israel's initiatives regarding Egypt and the Gaza Strip, and the implications of these policies for the West Bank. Israel's war on Lebanon in 2006 is discussed. A strategy of deterrence based on targeting the civilian population instead of seeking victory on the battlefield is mentioned. The author says that the Gaza war achieved nothing and violated the laws of war.

The article focuses on the assessment of Israel-Egypt relations after the thirtieth anniversary of their peace agreement. Based on the article, the agreement only achieved a non-war situation but that were still no real peace and a policy of coexistence. Egypt would not accept continued Israeli presence in the Sinai and would want Israeli withdrawal to the international border set by the British Mandate. Groups in the Egyptian public that reject Israel include Islamic group, Nasserite political ideology supporters and Egyptian nationalism advocates.

The article examines Egypt's pursuit of peace which led to the signing of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty by then Egyptian President Anwar El-Sadat. It provides an overview of the Arab-Israel conflict in the Middle East. Information is presented on the steps taken by Great Britain to resolve regional violence in the Middle East following the end of World War I, including the nullification of the Balfour Declaration which recognizes the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire as fully autonomous states. It describes the battles between Egypt and Israel. It outlines the efforts of El-Sadat to bring democracy and peace to Egypt.

The article discusses the peace negotiation between Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin mediated by U.S. President Jimmy Carter. It notes on the political situation in Israel under Begin's administration concerning the West Bank policy. Though Sadat crusaded against these policies, he started the peace talk. Meanwhile, Carter's plans on how to resolve the conflict between the two nations and how to achieve the settlement are presented.

The article discusses the process of recognition of the state of Palestine at the United Nations (UN). Topics mentioned in the article include the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, Palestine membership at the UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and Israel's foreign relations with Egypt.