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Following World War II, General Heinz Guderian claimed authorship of the development of Germany's Panzer arm, which he had led to successes at the war's start. In fact, Guderian had little influence on the foundation of the Reichswehr's mechanized forces. He had built on the work of Germany's first armored warfare theorist: Ernst Volckheim. One of a few German officers to command a tank in World War I, Volckheim was Germany's leading theorist of tank warfare in the 1920s. His work would reshape decisions crucial to Germany's development of armored forces in World War II. This article reassesses Volckheim's influence on German training, doctrine, and tank design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the analysis of two contemporary German films on the war in Afghanistan – Auslandseinsatz (Till Endemann, 2012) and Zwischen Welten (Feo Aladag, 2014) – through the philosophical lens of the 'just war theory', this article discusses how the classic genre of the 'boots on the ground' war film is used to reflect on the ethical justifiability of military force in the context of Germany's strategic culture at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The article argues that these two films are paradigmatic examples of a new and specifically German subgenre of the war film I suggest calling the 'humanitarian military film' that has its roots in the particular historical constellation that led to the development of the country's current military culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay looks at the activities of the Bavarian, Saxon, and Württemberg military plenipotentiaries stationed at German General Headquarters during the First World War. Prior to unification, Germany's most powerful monarchs signed a series of agreements that created a contingent-based army. Managing relations between the army's contingents thereafter became the responsibility of the military plenipotentiaries. Examining their activities reveals that the wartime German army, despite the centralizing pressures created by a multi-front war of attrition, remained a federal institution in which sub-national interests could at times be marginalized, but never altogether ignored. Germany's military federalism remained alive and well, at least until the empire's "de-crowning" in the autumn of 1918. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tracks the rise of German dominance since Bismarck’s unification of Germany in 1871 and during the 20th century, when the Germans used their economic, demographic, and military power in addition to geopolitical theories, particularly the vital space theory, to support expansionism. The «German question» evolved in the wake of the two world wars as the European States’ main concern was how to maintain a peaceful, powerful Germany. Following the Ukrainian war, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared Germany’s goal to have the greatest army in Europe, modernize military industries, and allocate 100 billion Euros for the defense budget. Accordingly, as strong Germany, historically, has always sought to dominate its neighbors, the paper examines the possible scenarios for the rise of Germany and its dominance over the European Union. What will be the repercussions of Germany’s rise on the future of the European Union and its institutions, and the potential incentives for cooperation and collaboration among European nations? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By 1943, the German army deployed in the Soviet Union was engaged in a total war with an enemy far superior in material and manpower resources. Recognizing this disparity, German field commands instituted more systematic and conciliatory policies designed to mobilize Soviet resources for the German war effort. Attempts to win over the population changed following German defeat in the Battle of Kursk, however; German policy became more violently coercive. An examination of the policies and actions of three German divisions will demonstrate that the army's shifting conduct was due to its understanding of the reality of total war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although armies grew larger during the seventeenth century, size estimates are often inaccurate. This article uses diverse sources to produce accurate troop counts for Electoral Saxony during the Thirty Years' War (1618-48), concluding that its army was large only briefly. It also discusses Saxony's overlooked role in this war. This research suggests that the military revolution thesis should be revised: army sizes did not necessarily stabilize at higher levels and war did not necessarily "make the modern state." Saxony went to war using traditional means of raising revenue: different states responded to their challenging environment differently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the military participation of Germans in early modern colonialism, focusing on their service to colonial trading companies and colonial powers. It shows that the German colonial empire had a long pre-history, since German mercenaries provided a vital "tool of empire" for European colonial powers. It is argued here that the extensive participation of German soldiers in early modern colonialism demonstrates a hybridity in European colonialism in that national colonial empires relied on trans-national European human resources in addition to local manpower. The article examines German soldiers' identification with their colonial employers and shows that soldiers recruited as a group retained a stronger sense of separate identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Der Kieler Matrosenaufstand von 1918 ist bis heute die größte Meuterei in der deutschen Geschichte. Aus einzelnen Matrosenerhebungen entwickelte sich binnen weniger Tage eine landesweite Revolte in Marine und Heer, die in der Novemberrevolution gipfelte. Die deutsche Militärgeschichtsschreibung hatte jahrzehntelang große Schwierigkeiten mit diesem Ereigniskomplex, wobei das Quellen- und Deutungsmonopol der von Akteuren in Offiziersuniform dominierten amtlichen Kriegshistoriografie stark ins Gewicht fiel. Christian Lübcke kann auf der Basis bislang kaum beachteter Dokumente zeigen, dass in der Weimarer Republik, im Dritten Reich und noch in der jungen Bundesrepublik Sichtweisen dominierten, die wenig mit Wissenschaft, aber umso mehr mit Selbstrechtfertigung, Revisionismus und Apologie zu tun hatten To date, the 1918 Kiel Mutiny is the largest mutiny in German history. Within the space of a few days, individual uprisings by sailors developed into a countrywide revolt in the navy and army, which culminated in the November Revolution. For decades, German military historiography had great difficulties with this nexus of events, strongly influenced by the fact that official war historiography, which was dominated by actors in uniform, enjoyed a monopoly on sources and interpretation. On the basis of hitherto disregarded documents, Christian Lübcke can show that during the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich and the young Federal Republic views predominated, which had little to do with scholarship and much more with self-justification, revisionism and apologia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

»Die militärischen Ursprünge der Arbeitsschutzgesetzgebung im deutschen Kaiserreich«. Prussia, and since its founding in 1871 the German Empire, were pioneers in the introduction of general conscription and one of the largest military powers in Europe. At the same time, the German Empire was seen as a pioneer in public social policy. Using the example of labor protection, this article examines whether and to what extent connections existed between general conscription, power ambitions of governments, and social protection. It seeks to determine what role military reasons played in the expansion of German labor protection by analyzing the military's influence on legislation between the early 19th century and the end of the First World War. This examination will show that military arguments have gained great importance over time but have never, with the exception of the First World War, been the dominant motive for welfare reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the work of the late nineteenth-century German military historian Max Jähns. A career officer in the Prussian Army, he taught military history at the elite War Academy for fourteen years and was a prolific and highly respected author. Significantly, he focused not on operational history--for which the Imperial German Army was and remains well known--but on the place of military institutions and practices in the context of general history. This and the army's positive response to his work shed new light on the evolution of the new military history and the Imperial German Army's reaction to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the development of the strategic and tactical thought of Germany's Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz in the 1890s. Highlights of von Tirpitz's career as the chief of staff of the German Naval High Command or Oberkommando der Marine from 1892 to 1895; Historical significance of von Tirpitz; Details on how bruising bureaucratic conflict radically altered von Tirpitz's understanding of how to achieve power and influence within the navy.

Discusses the main factors that contributed to the unstable military condition of Germany in 1640s. Details on the campaigns between France and Bavaria in Germany during the years 1643-1648; Importance of military intelligence; Sources of military intelligence; Consequences of the intelligence situation.

Focuses on the German Volkssturm, a compulsory Nazi-administered local defense militia composed of all German males. Information on the goals of Volkssturm; Role of Adolf Hitler in the control of Volkssturm in the country; Key impacts of the National Socialist ideology on the Reich leadership; Analysis of the failure of the defense militia.

The article offers information on a project started by the Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg on war games in Prussia. Topics discussed include military simulation of Germany, training of military decision makers, history of war in German-speaking countries, civilians in 19th century and war games played by armies.

Copyright of Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Examines a number of unexplored questions regarding the German military during World War II. Examination of the oath of German officers to Hitler; Exploration of the number and nature of death sentences in the German armed forces; Description of the three types of formation in Germany's military during the war; Focus on the establishment of suicide units by Germany.

The article offers information on the periodical on topics including editorial board members Magnus Brechtken and Thomas Raithel; Subscription policy of the periodical along with a table of content for the issue on topics including German military histotiography; and German-American relations.

Information on the Militär(s) in der Politik. Soldaten und politische Verantwortung in Deutschland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, a conference organized by Zentrums für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr (ZMSBw) in Potsdam, Germany from March 22-23, 2018 is presented. Topics discussed include history of militarism, relationship between politics and military in Germany and political decisions of the region.

Information on Militärisches Entscheiden. Voraussetzungen, Prozesse und Repräsentationen einer sozialen Praxis von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, a conference on military decisions that was held in Münster, Germany from October 19-21, 2017 is presented. Topics discussed include military history of Germany, their decision making process and collaborative research on decision theory.

Information on the Einsatz ohne Krieg? Militär, Gesellschaft und Semantiken zur Geschichte der Bundeswehr nach 1990, a conference on military history that was held at the Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr in Potsdam, Germany from June 21-23, 2017 is presented. Topics discussed include Bundeswehr armed force after 1990, its completed missions and its military history.

In recent years, mostly in Anglophone circles, there has been a discussion regarding a "German Way of War". According to this thesis, the German Empire embarked on a military "Sonderweg" [special path] in contrast to other states. This was supposedly particularly evident in a more radical form of warfare exhibited during colonial wars and the First World War. This view postulates a continuity of German military culture between the First and the Second World War. The present article tests this thesis by means of an examination of the Eastern Front during the First World War and concludes that the supposition of a specifically German military culture during the German Empire and a continuity between the form of warfare practised on the Eastern Front of the First World War and "Operation Barbarossa" often bears the markings of a backward-looking projection. In comparison to the Austro-Hungarian as well as the Russian Army, the German military was the most restrained until late 1917. Ultimately the success of Bolshevism since late 1917 led to a radical mental change; the state of command now exasperated, as the counterinsurgency in Ukraine in 1918 demonstrated. Simultaneously the German Army also largely tried to go easy on the civilian population. A further surge of radicalisation was revealed in the conflicts in the Baltic States in 1919. These may have possessed a formative character for the later Nazi movement, but not for the military, who saw the "Baltic fighters" as "undisciplined rabble". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses sexual violence as social performance on the Eastern front during the Second World War by presenting a photograph which appears to show the rape of a woman by young German soldiers. Topics discussed include it not being clear from the photograph if it was actually an act of rape or mere mimicry but it being certain that the scene depicted is showing the woman as an object of amusement that mediates coercion and asymmetric power relations.

The article talks about sexual violence and rape by German soldiers against the Jews being pervasive during World War II and the genocide in the Soviet Union. Topics discussed include ways in which German Wehrmacht military actors were aware of the perpetration of sexual violence by their men and how they used this knowledge in light of political aims, operational needs and military objectives.

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses articles in the issue including the sexual violence perpetrated by soldiers of the German military, World War II normalizing violent sexual acts for German soldiers, and the German army's deployment of rape as part of a genocidal campaign.

The article "Wehr-, Kriegs- oder Militärgeschichte?" by Rainer Wohlfeil on German military and political history and the future of the Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsamt military history society originally published in the first 1967 issue of the military history periodical "Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen" is examined.

The article discusses the Norwegian Campaign of 1940 that was the first major joint and combine operation of the World War II in the European theater. It mentions the collaboration of the British and French military forces to attack the German forces. It notes the war declared by Great Britain and France against Germany in September 1939 due to Nazi invasion of Poland.

The recent opening to the public of large-scale National Socialist installations in Germany – like the Denkort Bunker “Valentin” in Bremen-Farge – has prompted questions on how to address the legacy of Nazi advances in science and technology in musealized spaces, and, more generally, how to curate inconvenient military history. To tackle these questions, the issue of affect is crucial. Curation must be able to confront articulations of right-wing extremist “reactionary” affect in and beyond the museum setting. This has been a challenge for Dresden’s newly redesigned Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr, whose anti-militaristic message is being drowned out by right-wing xenophobic demonstrations in Dresden’s streets. This paper seeks to counter current curatorial strategies that displace and suppress affect. By considering affect’s productive potential without ignoring the record of Nazi manipulations of affect, it proposes the concept of an ‘upstander’ museum and delineates a new methodology for rethinking affect in curatorial settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a report from a March 24-27, 2015 conference in Kiel, Germany on the role of the German navy in the history of Kiel held by the regional history department of the Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel university, the Stadt- und Schifffahrtsmuseum Kiel naval museum, and the Stadtarchiv Kiel municipal archive. Topics of presentations delivered included the role of the navy in Kiel's urban planning, interactions between military personnel and civilians in Kiel, and the role of military music in Kiel's social fabric.

The article compares and contrasts the military structure of three eighteenth-century armies, British, American, and German, by considering moral economy, negotiated authority, and contract. It considers how the term contract is understood to be the implied relationship between a ruler and his subjects. The use and limits of authority in the military is considered.

Drawing on theories of problems in warfare being ‘tame’ or ‘wicked’, this article explores continuity and changes in British and German doctrine through examination of wording, emphasis, and approach in field service manuals. This reveals significant continuities in German doctrine, especially the emphasis on initiative, but growing focus on rapid decision-making, coupled with forward command, to achieve surprise. British doctrine also displayed continuity, focused on controlling the battle and reluctance to allow subordinates to exercise initiative. A shift in British doctrine, from one similar to the German model towards a more restrictive approach, is identified between 1905 and 1909. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite considerable scholarly attention to the issue, there remains considerable controversy regarding the meaning of the term miles in pre-Crusade Europe, with many historians asserting that milites were knights, who dominated warfare through the practice of equestrian combat. This study seeks to examine the ways in which the main narrative sources for the German kingdom in the second half of the eleventh century use the term miles (plural milites). The two goals of this study are to determine the meaning that authors assign to the term, and the role that these authors attribute to milites in the conduct of war during this half-century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Imperial German strategic planning prior to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The author discusses Germany's lack of an integrated national strategy before 1914, explores the military power of Prusso-German king-emperor Wilhelm II, and examines the German constitutions of 1867 and 1871 in regard to military planning and authoritarianism. The strategy known as the "Schlieffen plan" is also analyzed.

Copyright of Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Two-front war took an important place in history, exclusively became with German grand strategy and foreign policy. In this research, Germany's relation with two-front war is discussed in political and military views. German strategy on invasion policy is formulized with rapid diplomatic activity including pacts and enforcements, entitling "anticlockwise invasion policy". German measures and Allied counter-measures over primary and secondary fronts coming with escalation of war, place of double-envelopment in the breaking point of the war, and going multi-front war are examined through mutual strategies. The study has also included the ignored alternative strategies of German leaders interconnected with its allies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The facts reported in this paper are the results of a study processed in December 1905 about the military policy of the German Empire and the Third Republic of France. The paper aims to analyze the complex events of international politics a few years before the outbreak of the First World War (1914). The assumptions of conflict and strategies concerning the German "enemy" and the contemporary French revanchism about a possible conflict between the French Third Republic and the German Empire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article investigates whether a military revolution took place in the German lands during the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, with the potential to transform institutions and to alter contemporaries’ attitudes not merely to war, but to politics and diplomacy. The scholarly debate about a metamorphosis of warfare during the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods involves three connected controversies: the meaning and timing of any ‘revolution’ in the conduct of war, the existence of a ‘total war’ in or after 1792, and the continuation of ‘cabinet warfare’ by the majority of the German states. Recently, historians have argued that the geographical and political diversity of the German states, in conjunction with popular criticism of the burdens and sacrifices of conflict in southern and western Germany, militated against a broad military revolution. This study contends that such reactions were themselves indicative of the transformation wrought by the conscription of more mobile and destructive mass armies in a seemingly unending series of wars, which ensured that military conflicts impinged more fully on civilian life. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses a collection of war letters held at the Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek (University and State Library) in Bonn, Germany. The author outlines the origins of this archival collection as an official government initiative in the early twentieth century, describes its contents, which date from 1724 to 1904 and consist primarily of correspondence from the Wars of German Unification between 1864 and 1871, and provides a prosopographical information of the soldiers who wrote the letters. Information about the digitization of the collection is also given.

The article reviews an exhibition in the Militärhistorische Museum der Bundeswehr (Military Museum of the Armed Forces) in Dresden, Germany on the cultural history of German military engagement.

The article offers a report from a July 6-7, 2012 conference in Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany on the political history of Prussia under the rule of Frederick II. Topics of presentations given included the development of European nations in the 18th century, Frederick's increased efficiency of the Prussian military, and Frederick's legacy to Prussia.

Die Kaiserlichen Schutztruppen waren im Unterschied zur Preußischen Armee und zur Marine der Kaiserlichen Kommandogewalt weitgehend entzogen. Dieser Bruch mit der konservativen Militärpolitik wurde dadurch ermöglicht, dass die politischen und militärischen Eliten in der Gründungsphase der Schutzgebiete und -truppen den absoluten Primat auf die kontinentale Sicherheit legten und ein ernsthaftes Engagement der etablierten Streitkräfte an der Peripherie entschieden ablehnten. Den Führungsspitzen der Armee und der Marine missfiel es aber grundsätzlich, dass die leitenden Stellen der zivilen Kolonialbehörden militärische Kernkompetenzen ausübten. Durch die ganze Institutionsgeschichte der Schutztruppe hindurch sollten sie daher in einem Konflikt mit den Kolonialbehörden über die konstitutionelle Stellung dieser militärischen Formation stehen. Zwar blieb die zivile Kontrolle über das Militär in den Kolonien auf dem Papier erhalten, sie konnte in ausgeprägten Bedrohungslagen dem Druck der Militärs jedoch nicht standhalten. So ignorierte der Kommandeur der ostafrikanischen Schutztruppe, von Lettow-Vorbeck, alle verfassungsrechtlichen Hindernisse und übernahm die militärische Macht im Schutzgebiet. Obwohl es sich dabei letztlich um einen Militärputsch handelt, war Lettow-Vorbecks Handlungsweise zutiefst in der preußischen Militärtradition verankert und machte es möglich, dass der Kommandeur zum Kriegshelden wurde. In contrast to the extra-constitutional position of army and navy in Imperial Germany, the German colonial troops were not under the exclusive command of the Kaiser. This contradicted Prussian military traditions. The specific constitutional position of Germany's colonial troops was largely the result of a lack of interest by army and navy. To the latter the colonial fringe was of little importance in a future war. Yet, as a matter of principle, the military authorities insisted on denying civilian administrators a say in military affairs. Consequently army and navy fought a long battle with the colonial office over the constitutional position of the colonial troops. In the end the notion of civilian control over the military in the colonies prevailed. But this victory over the traditions of Prussian militarism remained on paper. When crisis struck in summer of 1914, the military commander in German East Africa, von Lettow Vorbeck, ignored all constitutional obstacles and simply took control of the war effort. Although this action ended up in a coup it was deeply rooted in Prussian military tradition and therefore made it possible for Lettow Vorbeck to become a war hero. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on a transnational conference that focused on the military history of the national defense departments and armed forces of nation-states such as France and Germany from the 19th to the 20th century. It took place in Paris, France on June 20, 2011. Papers presented at the conference discussed topics including the army constitutions of nation-states, the management of colonial military troops, and the development of the French and German national armies.

The developments global politics has experienced over the past twenty years have altered the conditions for being a soldier in Germany like in many other countries as well. The way in which national defense had been understood lost plausibility with the end of the Cold War. Conflict and threat scenarios changed and the missions of the armed forces were largely reconceptualized to include multinational crisis management. The effects of this redefinition of tasks and of the unconventional military engagements are as yet underexplored. In particular, there are gaps in our knowledge of how institutional regulations and the formulation of the norms which inform social practices in society and the armed forces relate to one another under the changed political circumstances of contemporary military missions. The article addresses the related changes with particular consideration of the ways in which soldiers in Germany make new sense of their contemporary tasks and roles. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including military strategy, military preparations in peace time, and the German army.

The article discusses aspect of the learning process in the tactical warfare used by the German Infantry Division in the battlefield during the World War 1 (WW 1) in 1918 against superior enemy coalition. An overview of the war strategy introduced by Carl von Clausewitz which concerns the attack, delaying engagement, and defense is offered. It focuses on the France soldiers of the 11th Bavarian Infantry Division (11th BID) under the command of Lieutenant General Paul Ritter von Kneußl which are considered as an elite division during the war.

Seit den 1990er Jahren ist eine zunehmende Öffnung der Bundeswehr gegenüber den Medien zu beobachten, die sich maßgeblich auf die wachsende Beteiligung deutscher Streitkräfte an Auslandseinsätzen und damit einher gehenden neuen kommunikativen Ansprüchen zurückführen lässt. Wurde die Medienarbeit in der ersten Hälfte der Neunziger Jahre noch durchgängig reaktiv betrieben, kam es in den Folgejahren zu einer aktiveren Gestaltung der militärischen Medienbeziehungen. Wie offen oder restriktiv die Medienbeziehungen im Einzelnen gestaltet werden, hängt jedoch von einem komplexen Faktorenbündel ab. Beispielweise prägen die unterschiedlichen Systemlogiken von Militär und Medien, die komplexen Organisationsstrukturen innerhalb der Bundeswehr oder das verfügbare Personal und dessen Qualifikationen die militärischen Medienbeziehungen. Since the 1990s, the German Bundeswehr increasingly opened up to the media. This can be mainly traced back to the growing number of out of area missions in conjunction with new communication needs. In the beginning of the 1990s, military media relations were generally conducted in a reactive manner, whereas they were actively shaped in the subsequent years. How open or restrictive media relations were conducted in detail is dependent upon a complex combination of factors. As such, military media relations are shaped for example by the different systems logics of the military and the media, by the complex organizational structures of the German armed forces or by the available personnel and its qualifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Das Forschungsprojekt "Militär und Medien im 20. Jahrhundert" beleuchtet die Beziehungen zwischen Militär und Massenmedien vor allem aus militärischer Sicht. Neben dem Ziel, das Wissen zu diesem zentralen, jedoch bislang nur in Ansätzen untersuchten Thema der Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts zu erweitern, soll das Projekt auch einen Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis der Traditionen, Strukturen und Erfahrungen liefern, die das Verhältnis des Militärs zu den Medien(gesellschaften) prägten und aus welchen sich aktuelle mediale Selbstrepräsentationen des Militärs und der von ihm geführten Kriege speisen. Erste Forschungsergebnisse des Projekts werden in diesem Themenheft präsentiert. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]