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The Sino-Japanese relationship has become increasingly complex, conflictive, and of global consequence. The relationship has reached a point that while the two governments increasingly tie their fate together economically, growing rancor among the Chinese public over WWII and contemporary issues threatens to tear them apart. Since the mid 1980’s, anti-Japanese mass protests in China have been conducted on the streets, college campuses, and, in recent years, on the Internet. This paper has two objectives: (1) to detail the growing anti-Japanese mass movements in China and (2) to study the linkages between Chinese domestic public opinion on Japan and foreign policy decision-making. While there are some notable exceptions, the vast majority of public opinion literature has used Western democracies as case studies when detailing the links between public opinion and foreign policy. Many scholars automatically assume that the affect of domestic public opinion on foreign policy in authoritarian societies is insignificant. However, recently there have been academics that study Sino-Japanese relations that challenge this view and contend that growing anti-Japanese sentiment has a constraining impact on the available foreign policy options regarding Japan. However, none of these scholars look at exactly how Chinese domestic pressure has influenced the government and to what extent this pressure has impacted foreign policy decisions. This paper will attempt to address this gap and assess the whether Chinese public opinion has a role in moving Sino-Japanese relations toward conflict or cooperation ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The policy puzzle for this project focuses on the rhetorical basis for the engagement policy toward China and the strategies employed by recent administrations to maintain their policy against political opposition. Since Tiananmen Square and the end of the Cold War, the engagement policy debate has become more polarized and the dominant engagement frame has been challenged by more negative interpretations of Chinese intentions. This policy situation raises three important conceptual questions. Why do particular policy frames (like engagement) become dominant and how are they maintained over time? Under what conditions do dominant policy frames become vulnerable to new arguments that require a reframing of the policy issue? What effect does the either-or dichotomy that dominates discussion over Sino-American relations have on an administration’s ability to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy? This paper draws on literature in issue framing from studies in social psychology, public opinion, the media, social movements, and foreign policy to address these questions. The premise underlying this study is that policy framing entails a three-level game, rather than just a two-level game. First there is a game among advisors who work to influence the president’s policy agenda and policy decisions. Second, administrations work to balance international policymaking to domestic political realities. This paper is part of a larger project focusing on the impact strategic framing has on foreign policymaking context in the Nixon/Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II administrations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the controversies around Tibet in March 2008, the contrast between two uniform images in the Chinese and the Western public opinions is striking. Not only the people in the mainland, but even the overseas Chinese, who are often critical to the CCP, ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does the Chinese government sometimes allow and sometimes suppress nationalist, anti-foreign demonstrations, and what are the consequences of this choice for China's international relations? I suggest that anti-foreign protests in authoritarian systems are like "audience costs," a source of bargaining leverage in diplomatic negotiations. The mechanism, however, is new. The risk that anti-foreign protests will turn against the government, combined with the escalating costs of making international concessions, enable authoritarian leaders to signal resolve and credibly claim that their hands are tied by domestic constraints. This finding has important implications for research on domestic politics and international relations, since it suggests a mechanism by which public opinion can influence the foreign policy of authoritarian regimes. I utilize a "natural experiment" to test the argument, comparing the occurrence of anti-Japanese protest over the period 1978-2005 in Hong Kong and mainland China, with Hong Kong serving as the control group. To further illustrate, I present a case study of the 2005 anti-Japanese protests in China and the negotiations over U.N. Security Council reform, drawing upon more than 100 interviews with nationalist activists, protest participants, and government officials in China, Japan and Hong Kong. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan and China are the major powerbrokers in East Asia. Japan has the second largest economy in the world, while China is an emerging economic and military power. The nature of their relationship, whether confrontational or cooperative, will help to determine the level of peace, stability, and prosperity in East Asia, and beyond. Therefore, the importance of this relationship cannot be underestimated. Yet as the two countries have become economically more interdependent, they have become politically more estranged. In fact, in recent years we have witnessed decisions by each government that have seemed designed to provoke rather than pacify one?s neighbor. I argue that the explanation for this largely lies in domestic politics. In this study, I seek to examine one aspect of this: the role of the Japanese media and public opinion in foreign aid policy towards China. Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been one of the main pillars of Japan?s China policy since 1979. The form that Japan?s ODA strategy towards China has traditionally taken is one of ?long-term engagement,? or a steadily increasing stream of economic benefits to promote good relations. However, there were three times during this period when Japan?s foreign aid policy towards China strayed from its normal trajectory of engagement: economic sanctions after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, the 1995-1996 freeze of grant aid after China?s underground nuclear tests, and the 2000-2001 review and reduction of ODA to China. In my paper I will examine the interaction among media coverage, public opinion, and policymaking in each of these cases. My argument is that the media performed its role as ?trickster,? serving both the public and the state. It did this by allying with either the public or the state at different stages. The media carried out three tasks: conveying information both between and among the government and the public, mobilizing public opposition to initial government policy, and helping to convince the public of how the policy that was finally decided upon was a good compromise. In other words, it focused, escalated, and then extinguished attention.My research design combines qualitative and quantitative approaches. I will begin by conducting a content analysis of Japanese print media coverage, charting trends in items including policy position, volume of coverage, type of article (straight or opinion), and information sources (such as government or business). I will then compare these trends to those in public opinion. Finally, I will conduct a statistical analysis of public opinion, media coverage, and the evolution of policy decisions in each of these three cases, determing the degree to which there is a correlational and/or causal relationship. In examining the role of the Japanese media and public opinion in these aid policy decisions, I seek to discover the interrelationship among the media, the public, and policymaking, and shed some light on the role of domestic politics in the relationship between a status quo power and an emerging power. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on the link between public opinion and foreign policy have thus far focused on democratic states. How is foreign policy influenced by the public opinion in authoritarian states where the public cannot easily punish the leaders for undesirable fore ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author finds that Taiwanese have a weak sense of extended deterrence, but they are willing to choose independence than to remain status quo across the Taiwan Strait were they attacked by China. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]