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Despite the fact that the Constitution assigns to Congress the power to declare war, Congress has not done so since World War II. In place of a declaration, the Congress has produced a series of authorization of force resolutions, the most famous of which is the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the most recent, against Iraq. This paper will argue that authorization of force resolutions are unconstitutional, since they do not provide a means for the people’s representatives of decide the question of war or peace. To make this point, the paper analyzes the way in which the term, "authorization," is used in the debate over the respective war power of the Congress and the Commander-in-Chief. The paper then concludes with practical suggestions on how the Congress might declare war in the future. Specifically, the Declaration of Independence and the 1898 declarations against Spain are analyzed for guidance on the form, content categories, and sequencing of conditional and absolute declarations of war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the international community, and in particular the United Nations, has undertaken significant reform of its policies and practices with respect to the use of sanctions. The policy changes in this area are reflected in official statements, a new methodology and new processes for assessing the humanitarian impact of sanctions, and the use of targeted, rather than comprehensive sanctions. Drawing on evidence from the cases of Iraq, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, this paper argues that these policy reforms have largely been driven by human rights and humanitarian concerns and by pressure on the United Nations to take greater care to protect civilians when using sanctions. The paper concludes that while the reforms made in this area thus far have in part responded to concerns about human rights, the reform of sanctions policy is not yet complete. Further changes are needed if the international community is to reconcile the challenges of peace and security with demands for greater respect for human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conference paper prepared for presentation at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), in Washington, D.C. is presented. It examines insurgency wars and the civil war of Syria through the Iraq insurgencies of 2006-2009. It also highlights points from Iraq and planning for Syria and insurgency wars of future.

How does security privatization affect democracies' propensities to go to war, and to be victorious in war? This paper seeks to answer this question, assessing both historical and contemporary cases of private security company employment by democratic states to trace the processes through which these firms impact conflict decisions. I examine the case of the Hessians in the American Revolution - as a historical, grouped, profit-motivated predecessor to private security companies - in addition to the cases of Croatia in the 1990s and Iraq in more recent years. In doing so, the paper aims to contribute to the literatures on the democratic peace and the democratic advantage, and highlights the potential for future trends in the private security industry to have a strong impact on both the practice and theory of democratic peace and war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the public relations implications of possible U.S. responses to the insurgent use of mosques? To the extent that defeating the insurgency in Iraq involves a successful appeal to Iraqi "hearts and minds", understanding public perceptions regarding just and unjust behavior in war provides a useful analytical tool. I am particularly interested in how the Hadith (oral traditions relating to the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad) and Muslim just war theory treat the implications of conflicts at sacred sites.I begin with a brief overview of the Islamic sources used in this paper to evaluate the just war implications of fighting in mosques. I then qualify my use of these sources by considering the challenges posed by a biased selection of sources, misrepresentation of these sources and the questionable relevance of these findings to the current situation in Iraq. In the third part of this paper, I briefly survey the empirical pattern of mosque use by insurgents in Iraq, the American response to this practice and the three challenges that this situation poses to just war theory. Each of these challenges is examined in turn in the three sections that follow: the limitations on the use of force within a sacred site; the protection of civilians in or near the mosque; and the requirements that the site itself be safeguarded from violence. I offer insights into the ethical implications of each scenario based on the relevant Muslim oral traditions and jurisprudence.To demonstrate the potential contribution of just war reasoning to the management of conflicts at sacred sites despite these challenges, I conclude the paper with an analysis of a significant historical precedent, the Saudi response to a hostage crisis in Islam's holiest shrine, the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979. This incident highlights the importance of cooperating with religious authorities who can interpret laws restricting conflict at sacred sites in a manner that is conducive to the successful conclusion of military operations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Victorious state impositions of democracy upon defeated states posed many challenges. Beyond the critical issues such as creating stable democracy institutions, victors often must socialize the vanquished to a new democratic norm-set. But because this must be done in the wake of war, the process is inherently coercive. In this paper, I build on existing models of state socialization to propose a way coercive socialization may proceed. To further refine the idea of coercive socialization, I detail the manner in which the US and its victorious allies forced a democratic transition in West Germany and thus socialized the vanquished state after the Second World War in a coercive manner. The paper is thus intended to contribute to the growing literature on state socialization and the in-depth analysis of the case cited by many as a model for the transition of Iraq into a liberal democracy may point to some of the many reasons the transition in that state has thus far failed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that there is an emerging consensus among realists that the U.S. should abandon its hegemonic strategy and adopt an offshore balancing strategy. Here, Iraq and the so called war terrorism (or "long war," or "global counter-insurgency," as some American officials sometimes refer to it) have been the catalysts. Increasingly, it is recognized that U.S. aims in the Persian Gulf/Middle East - and the American military presence in the region - have fueled terrorism, and caused Iran to self-defensively seek to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. A number of leading realists now argue that the best strategy for the U.S. is to extricate itself from Iraq, reduce its regional footprint, and adopt an offshore balancing strategy.In this paper, I make the case for offshore balancing as America's next grand strategy. In so doing, I argue that offshore balancing can be considered as a "wedge" (or wedge-like) strategy for two reasons. First, at the great power level, it can be used to break up potential alliances directed against the United States, and also to force possible future rivals of the United States to focus their security policies on each other rather than on counterbalancing the U.S. Second, in the Middle East an offshore balancing posture would help drain away much of the opposition to American policies that fosters Islamic terrorism directed at the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the turbulent years following Israel's creation, successive generations of policy makers and government elites heeded David Ben Gurion's advice to ally with non-Arab states flanking an Arab dominated Middle East. Although Israel found several partners for its "Doctrine of the Periphery" none was more beneficial than Iran. United by their distrust of their Arab neighbors and shared strategic concerns, Tel Aviv and Tehran developed a mutually beneficial de facto alliance spanning several important dimensions of diplomacy including trade, information sharing, and military cooperation. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, after the Shah's overthrow, dissolved the once fruitful alliance. Saddam Hussein's revanchism, however, resulted in a massive Iraqi offensive aimed at capitalizing on Iran's post-revolutionary weakness. Shortly after, Iran and Israel revived their de facto alliance in the form of covert arms sales and intelligence sharing despite Tehran's bellicose rhetoric vis-à-vis the Jewish state. This paper applies the poliheuristic theory (PH) of decision making to Israel's choice to support Iran during its eight year conflict with Iraq. Making use of primary and secondary sources, this project examines Israel's decision along political, economic, diplomatic, and military dimensions. This paper addresses why Israel elected to reconstitute its relations with a rhetorically anti-Semitic Iran and well as how this decision was made. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I start the process of analyzing the rhetoric and discourse about Iraq's WMD program in the 1990s. I start from the premise that there are institutional and ideational factors which are jointly necessary for determining foreign policy choice. The fact of the matter -- that Iraq had a WMD program -- was not in dispute, either in the 1990s or even during the 2002 run-up to the March 2003 invasion. What was in dispute was the substantive meaning of Iraq's WMD program. In this paper I draw on the public policy literature on problem definition and on the constructivist and discursive literatures in international relations to analyze the way the "Iraq Problem" was defined and assessed and, therefore, the relationship of that assessment to the Bush administration's campaign in 2002 and 2003 to portray Iraq as a clear-and-present danger that required a military, as opposed to diplomatic, solution. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some of the most intense debates surrounding the war in Iraq have been between its neoconservative supporters and its Realist critics. This paper examines the differing positions of these two schools of thought. The first two sections examine the neoconservative case for the war, and the Realist criticisms of those claims. The final section examines how part of the power of neoconservatism in the run-up to the war lay in its capacity to adopt rhetorical strategies and mobilise social constituencies in a direct assault upon Realists. The paper concludes tht these events have important implications for both Realism and for the relationship between theories of international politics and debates over foreign policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this paper is to elucidate Jordanian foreign policy in the two US-led wars against Iraq, and in the process to shed light on foreign policy-making in non-democratic regimes in the Arab Middle East. The second image of international relations, which stipulates that domestic politics is most responsible for generating foreign policy, is borne out in the Jordanian case. Public opinion, economic pressures, and leadership at the top (especially that of the late King Hussein) played the most salient roles in shaping Jordanian foreign policy in the two conflicts. Thanks to a liberalized domestic political structure that existed in Jordan from 1989 to 1993, public opinion was able to strongly influence Jordanian foreign policy in the first Gulf war in 1990-91 in the direction of close relations with Iraq. After a fundamental reorientation in foreign policy toward peace with Israel and a strong alliance with the United States after the first Gulf war, Jordan became dependent on the US for trade and aid. This economic factor pushed Jordan to discreetly offer the US-led coalition the use of facilities in Jordan during the second Gulf war in 2003. As for monarchical leadership, King Hussein and his son, King Abdallah II, each imprinted Jordanian foreign policy with his own leadership style. After examining each of these key factors which influenced Jordanian foreign policy in the two Gulf wars, the paper goes on to look at alternative explanations and their shortcomings: namely, neo-realism, international law, and public sphere theory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A wide range of efforts has been offered on "winning the peace" in Iraq. This paper examines the judgments of several comparative studies on post-conflict nation-building, and it introduces 1990s Russia as an additional source of "lessons learned". Beyond the widely recommended attention to the large and small technical tasks, or "factors", in the areas of security, democracy, administrative capacity, and economic reconstruction, this paper points to the importance of "dynamics" such as a real and lasting commitment by the United States and the coalition, the emergence of widely supported and particularly talented Iraqi leadership, and increased evidence of "learning" among Iraqi elites and masses and among the coalition and international community. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the unanimous passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 in November 2002, the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) found itself operating under incompatible mandates. Resolution 1284, which established UNMOVIC in December 1999 to replace UNSCOM, envisioned a less confrontational approach to arms inspections. Resolution 1441, however, presented Iraq with an ultimatum and a short timeline for full compliance to avoid serious consequences. This paper develops a theoretical account of how UNMOVIC, and its Executive Chairman Hans Blix, managed the conflicting external pressures on the organization in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. I draw on principal-agent theories of delegation to international institutions, and on theories of organizational culture from organizational sociology, to explain UNMOVICs response to its dilemma. The incompatibility of resolutions 1284 and 1441, and the dissension on the Security Council regarding 1441's interpretation, constituted a very complex set of principal-agent relationships between member states, the Security Council, and UNMOVIC. The paper argues that UNMOVICs management of this situation reflected its organizational culture. The paper also considers implications of the argument for the integration of rationalist and sociological institutionalist perspectives on international organizations, and for the future of UN arms inspections. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bush Administration's definition of political success in post-Saddam Iraq has changed almost as frequently as their rationale for the initial military invasion. Gone are the heroically optimistic predictions of peace, economic development, religious tolerance, and multi-cultural civil society in Iraq, which would then serve as the first falling domino in an irresistible cascade of democratization throughout the Middle East. Chastened by rising military, financial, and political costs, the Administration now speaks more soberly of satisfaction with a fairly stable, some-day reasonably democratic government for the New Iraq.Despite the fact that the characterization of success has been a moving target, one definition of abject political failure in Iraq has remained a constant: the fragmentation of the country into separate, possibly warring ethno-religious enclaves. The Bush Administration's emphatic warnings regarding the consequences of Iraqi balkanization have been echoed by the governments of at least eight Arab countries in the region.Notwithstanding the Administration's best efforts, however, recent events indicate that civil war and territorial partition are increasingly likely outcomes. For instance, July 2006 was the bloodiest month so far in terms of sectarian violence in Iraq. The peril of the situation was inadvertently acknowledged the following month by a leaked diplomatic note to British Prime Minister Tony Blair. In the note, the outgoing British ambassador to Iraq William Patey warned that civil war and a division of Iraq "is probably more likely at this stage than a successful and substantial transition to a stable democracy". Patey's warnings were echoed just hours later by two senior American military commanders in testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. Iraq's former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi has stated, "If this is not civil war, then God knows what civil war is." Given the preexisting hostilities between the ethnic and sectarian groups of Iraq, partition of the country in the event of civil war is increasingly probable.The heuristic exploration of just such a hypothetically fragmented Iraq is the subject of this paper. Specifically, it will apply traditional geopolitical methodologies of analysis to assess the political, economic, and military viability of an Iraq trisected into Sunni, Shi'a and Kurdish political entities. In doing so, the paper will trace the roots of ethno-sectarian conflict in Iraq and compare Iraq to two divergent models of national devolution.The paper concludes that the invasion of Iraq was ill-advised from a geopolitical perspective, that the demographic conditions within Iraq suggest that civil war and partition are likely outcomes, and that while the Kurdish and Shi'a regions would be quite viable as independent states, the Sunni rump state would face daunting political, economic, and military challenges. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, ?winning the war? has been considerably easier than ?winning the peace?. As a result, much attention has turned to the issue of what accounts for ?successful? military occupation. In the current War on Terror and in the occupation of Iraq, pundits and policymakers discuss a myriad of occupational objectives ? democratization, state-building, winning over the locals, economic reconstruction, and pursuing terrorists ? as if the full range of these goals was served by the same policy. In this paper, I argue that the objectives of military occupation cannot all be met simultaneously. Instead, I show that, in order to achieve some important goals, occupying powers must be prepared to sacrifice others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bush administration has formulated a foreign policy that combines elements of realism with liberal internationalism as part of its strategy to fight the War on Terror. Tenets of American exceptionalism provide a resonant political cultural resource for sustaining an inherently contradictory policy. This paper analyzes elite media com-mentary and editorials prior to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to see if these tenets are successful in drawing support for US military action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Primarily an extended experiment in thought, this paper explores the possibilities for the future of Iraq after the Second US-Iraq War and the toppling of Saddam Hussein. The writings of Leo Strauss and Friedrich Nietzsche form the basis of this thought experiment; they are applied to the Iraqi case, and their meta-philosophies are examined and compared. Now that the veil (hijab) has been ripped off of Iraq, who or what will provide the boundary (hudud) for its citizens from a horrible nihilist reality? Although neither Strauss nor Nietzsche performed any extended meditations on non-Western culture, a careful examination of their respective philosophies can provide clear direction: if not for actual policy making, then rather for speculation on the future of non-Western cultures in the age of globalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of this paper is on the post World War II creation of the West German armed forces and its role in the country’s transition to a legitimate, stable democratic political system. I develop a two-level explanation that highlights the importance of both domestic and international level variables. For German decision-makers, national military institutions played two vital roles: it acted as a costly signaling mechanism and provided a critical venue for exposed veterans and new generations of Germans to democratic values, the importance of rule of law and civilian control of the military. Simply, the Bundeswehr helped signal West German ‘responsibility’ and ‘trustworthiness’ and functioned as a type of ‘civil society’ from above. Finally, I conclude with some lessons learned for current efforts at state and nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the U.S. is involved in wars, the president's job approval rating bears a reciprocal relationship to opinions of the war. Yet the strength and direction of the relationship between opinions of a war and the president managing it vary considerably across presidents and wars. The connection was, for example, much stronger for GW Bush and Iraq than for Truman and Korea or Johnson and Vietnam. This paper documents these variations through a preliminary examination of a comprehensive set of survey data covering presidents and wars from Truman through Obama. Variations in the war's causes, justification, costs in life and money, and trajectory, as well as the president's degree of responsibility for initiating the fighting, emerge as plausible explanatory variables. The extent to which partisanship has shaped joint evaluations of wars and presidents also varies and has increased substantially over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large literature has examined the factors that influence immigration attitudes. Yet prior tests have considered only a few immigrant attributes at a time, limiting their capacity to test several hypotheses simultaneously. This paper uses conjoint analysis to test the influence of nine randomized immigrant attributes in generating support for admission. Drawing on a two-wave, population-based panel survey, it demonstrates that Americans view educated immigrants in high-status jobs favorably, while they view those who lack plans to work, entered without authorization, come from Iraq, or do not speak English unfavorably. The results are consistent with norms-based and sociotropic explanations of immigration attitudes. Remarkably, Americans' preferences vary little with their education, partisanship, labor market position, ethnocentrism, or other attributes. Beneath partisan divisions over immigration lies a consensus about which immigrants to admit, a fact which points to limits in both theories emphasizing economic threats and those emphasizing cultural threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

British and American intelligence agencies produced bad estimates of Iraqi capabilities before the war in 2003. Why? Official postwar inquiries concluded that intelligence analysts fell victim to a series of familiar pitfalls that caused them to draw false inferences from limited information. Others blamed policymakers in London and Washington for pressuring intelligence officials to exaggerate the threat. Both arguments are half-right. Analysts certainly began with incorrect but plausible assumptions of Iraqi capabilities, meaning that their estimates were always likely to conclude that Iraq possessed at least some latent unconventional capabilities. Subsequent policy pressure, however, caused intelligence officials to lean toward worst-case scenarios and stifle dissenting views. The politicization of intelligence also inhibited reassessment in the months before the war, despite new information from UN weapons inspectors that conflicted with standing estimates. This paper explores the evolution of British and American assessments and the pattern of intelligence-policy relations in both countries. It also explains why it is often impossible to understand the content of threat assessments without understanding the political context in which they are written. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dynamics and outcomes of civil wars are shaped by processes of change largely unaccounted for in current studies. We contend that wars are characterized by processes in which weaker actors are more likely to undergo radical changes such as fragmenting into multiple separate groups. Although extant work does not directly examine the fragmentation of combatants, fragmentation has occurred in almost 45% of civil wars that occurred after 1989. Some of the empirical literature addresses these complexities, albeit in understandably limited ways. Driven by the need for tractability, formal theories focusing on uncertainty and credible commitment problems assume constancy in the number and preferences of warring actors. We explore how the fragmentation of combatants affects the duration and outcomes of wars. Given our focus on fragmentation, we primarily apply this paper to civil wars. A number of results are consistent with our expectations; several counterintuitive results also emerge. For example, we find that when combatants undergo fragmentation, the duration of war does not always increase and such wars often end in negotiated agreements. We discuss empirical cases, such as Iraq, Congo, Chechnya, and the Sudan that illustrate the importance of fragmentation. More generally, this study demonstrates the value of accounting for diverse changes in actors and circumstances when studying the dynamics of war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses whether Private Security Companies (PSCs) inhibit success in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Skeptics object that PSCs (1) are unreliable in a non permissive COIN environment, (2) are grist to the insurgence mill as they employ aggressive tactics and alienating the population, (3) trigger credibility problems as they enjoyed impunity and (4) increase friction as they are not subordinated under the chain of command. Though many objections bear some substance, in neither case this means that PSCs need to be excluded from COIN operations. I argue that the problems were aggravated by the flawed COIN approach, the U.S. armed forces entertained prior to Iraq. Yet, parallel to the COIN learning process, the military also learned how to operate alongside armed contractors and how to integrate them. However, although some improvements were implemented, lessons learned have not yet been institutionalized and there is therefore a risk of running in the same problems in Afghanistan again. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can states successfully remove threats and advance their interests by overthrowing and replacing foreign governments? Under what conditions might foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC for short) prove more or less successful? The removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq has brought renewed attention to these questions, but the practice of FIRC is hardly a new phenomenon: there have been roughly ninety instances of FIRC since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, and FIRC was a common occurrence during major conflicts of the past, such as the Peloponnesian, Thirty Years, and Napoleonic Wars. Although states have toppled foreign government relatively frequently-and the practice moved to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy during the Bush administration-the effects of this policy instrument are not well understood. This paper argues that the utility of FIRC for interveners depends heavily on two categories of variables: the goals it seeks to achieve and conditions in the target state. First, FIRC is most successful when it is least ambitious, notably when it seeks only to restore a ruler who has been overthrown by a domestic revolution or coup. Interventions that hope to obtain more extensive regime change goals--such as establishing reliable long-term control over strategic territory or democratization of the target--are less likely to succeed. Second, FIRC is more likely to endure and prove successful for interveners when target states are relatively wealthy, institutionally developed, ethnically homogeneous, and have been thoroughly defeated in war. Each of these factors reduces the likelihood of domestic opposition to regime change in the target and increases its capacity for self-governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do leaders resort to deception to sell wars to their publics? To the extent that the academic literature has dealt with the issue, the focus has been on the Iraq War and the failure of the marketplace of ideas in that case. Chaim Kaufmann, most prominently, has argued that the Bush administration inflated the threat in the run-up to the war and could have not secured public support for it otherwise. In this paper, I argue that the focus on the Iraq War is misplaced in three ways. First, the deceptions that theBush administration resorted to in the run-up to the war were modest by historical standards. Members of the administration did exaggerate the imminence of the threat, but were quite transparent about their intention to go to war and about their reasons fordoing so. This is in contrast to other cases, such as the Vietnam War, where the public only became aware that major war was in the offing after the fighting had started. Second, it is not clear that deception was decisive in building support for the war. The public, after all, was predisposed toward regime change well before the administration began its public relations campaign. Moreover, leading Democrats in Congress were aware of the gaps in the administration's case, yet chose to authorize the use of forceanyway after only perfunctory debate. Like the administration, they expected the war to result in a quick and decisive victory and so had few incentives to register their dissent. If they had anticipated the protracted war to follow, the Democrats would have beenmore likely to challenge the administration's claims. Finally, the administration would have been more likely to resort to large-scale deception had the marketplace of ideas not failed. If public opposition had been more robust, leading officials would have been forced to take evasive measures, like renouncing the use of force and manufacturing pretexts, lest they provoke a backlash. I conclude, on these grounds, that deception is likely to play a more decisive role in a future war with Iran than it did in the one with Iraq. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on American public opinion, addressing three broad clusters of issues. Section One presents survey findings on six questions about the war: Did the United States do the right thing in using force against Iraq? How well is the American military effort going? Has the undertaking in Iraq made the U.S. safer from the threat of terrorism? Has the war in Iraq been worth its costs? How long should the U.S. keep its military forces in Iraq? And finally, to what extent have the war and American difficulties in achieving the administration's central goals—a secure and democratic Iraq—divided the country along partisan lines, thereby reducing the prospects of bipartisan cooperation on foreign policy? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the dynamics of wartime alliances and coalition warfare through the prism of the U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. I argue that even during wartime, alliances and coalitions serve purposes beyond capability aggregation, and introduce important complexities into the operations that are absent in unilateral ones. I explore my empirical finding that multilateralism is the preferred strategy of democracies and the assumptions that underpin the use of coalitions for the purposes of garnering legitimacy. I discuss the costs and benefits of the increasing reliance of the United States on multinational operations. I conclude with a forward thinking assessment of the conditions under which states should seek to fight with their friends, when they should either opt not to fight or fight alone. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I compare American information control policy in Germany (1945-1949) and Iraq (2003-2006).The comparative analysis indicates that the American information control policy was very different in the two cases. In Germany, the U.S. Army and the Office of Military Government U.S. in Germany exerted rigorous control over the media to block Nazi and Soviet propaganda, and to introduce the American political agenda. In Iraq, the Coalition forces did not establish rigorous information control, and the Pentagon was more concerned with the manipulation of the American press than with regulating information in Iraq. As a result of this strategic error, the insurgency and civilian movements opposed to the American presence in Iraq have been able to control information and spread their anti-American messages. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can we measure compliance with the demands on which economic sanctions on Iraq were conditioned with rigor and precision? We argue that it is possible, but only with a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches to the study of compliance. This paper uses structured, focused comparison of cases to guide the construction of a spatial model for the study of sanctions compliance. It then uses that spatial model to examine the patterns of compliance that Iraq exhibited with the demands of the United Nations Security Council economic sanctions regime in the 1990s. We argue that a multi-method approach allows scholars to compare relative partial compliance in an innovative way. The sharpness that this methodological innovation brings to the study of compliance, we argue, provides deeper insight into the political relationship between sanctioner and sanctioned than current work on sanctions is able to provide. Our model is uniquely able to demonstrate that Iraq's relative partial compliance increased through the early and mid-1990s, decreased in the late 1990s, and increased again in the months following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. We conclude by formulating hypotheses concerning the reason behind these policy shifts on the part of the Iraqi government, which provide insight into the question of whether Iraq was the 'threat to international peace and security' that the United States claimed in its petition for Security Council aid in the invasion. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The lengthening war in Iraq and frequent revelations of foiled terror plots around the world have raised questions about whether certain aspects of the war on terror are in fact feeding, rather than tamping down, animosity between the architects of terror and their targets. In this paper we examine the side of that equation that is closer to home: the actions within democratic polities that result in lower or higher levels of intolerance for members of immigrant groups (particularly immigrant groups that are associated with political violence and terror). The likelihood and degree of intolerance is at least in part the result of the way that the media and government respond to and frame events, as these things in turn impact threat perception. We examine whether public sensitization to threat from members of an immigrant group affects intolerance for them, as measured by the frequency of hate crimes and discriminatory acts after terrorist events. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sanctions on Iraq (1990-2003) posed an excruciating moral and strategic political dilemma. The sanctions caused immense human suffering, while doing little to unseat Saddam Hussein from power. For some, this reality created an urgent moral imperative to lift the sanctions immediately, at whatever cost. But given the absolute brutality of Saddam's regime, lifting the sanctions - and awarding the tyrant a significant political victory - seemed at best a problematic moral stance. Saddam bore some responsibility for the horrific effects of the sanctions, both in his refusal to comply fully with UN disarmament resolutions and in his cynical manipulation of the flow of humanitarian relief for his own domestic and foreign political ends. The difficult moral decisions were compounded by perplexing strategic concerns. The sanctions succeeded in preventing Iraqi acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and significantly weakened Iraqi military capabilities, but at the same time actually strengthened Saddam's domestic position, and by the late 1990s had evolved into a potent instrument of Iraqi foreign policy. Because sanctions are often presented as an 'ethical' or 'humane' alternative to war, they carry a particular moral burden which makes them an easy target for accusations of hypocrisy. This paper argues that the distinctively moral tone of the international argument about Iraq explains otherwise puzzling outcomes: the empowering of an otherwise quite weak transnational activist network; the rhetorical entrapment of the United States and the UK into backing the creation of an unprecedented humanitarian relief programme within the sanctions regime ("Oil for Food"); the sudden collapse of compliance with the sanctions in the late 1990s; and ultimately the failure of the United States to win international backing for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The strategic payoffs to moral argument generated great incentives for hypocrisy, which had the unfortunate result of stripping away the very possibility of generating legitimacy not only for the sanctions, but for virtually any policy towards Iraq. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies of state-building in the post-colonial world have suggested anumber of explanations for how tribes may inhibit the ability of central authorities toextend a monopoly of violence over their peripheral territories. Because work in thisliterature tends to view state-building at the macro-level, these theories cannot adequatelyaccount for the fact that the creation of institutions to govern tribes is in fact often anuneven and non-linear process. In this paper I examine the relationship between tribesand states in two ways. First, I draw on literatures from anthropology, history, law, andeconomics to derive hypotheses about why and how tribes shape the operation ofinstitutions of taxation and policing. Second, I examine the plausibility of thesehypotheses by looking at local variation in the success of the British in governing tribesduring the military occupation and civil administration of Iraq (1914-1920). In particular,I find that three factors provide considerable leverage in understanding the uneven resultsof British institution building in Iraq: 1) the extent to which tribes are mobile, 2) theexistence of conflicting property rights systems, and 3) the existence and severity offeuding. I conclude by discussing what this analysis teaches us about the broader studyof tribes and state-building. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the experience of the Local Governance Project (LGP) in Iraq. The discussion documents how LGP and LGP2 contributed to changing interactions between citizens and government, and reaching across individual social and ethnic groups. In post-war Iraq, such social capital could be a positive contributor. Its potential, however, is limited by the absence of the conditions necessary for stability and reconstruction. Violence and insecurity, the actions of conflict entrepreneurs, and the resiliency of the shadow state raise doubts about the prospects for governance reform. Lessons include: a local governance focus can build reform constituencies resistant to reversal by central-level actors; local governance can provide multiple arenas for contestation thus reducing winner-take-all political dynamics, reformed local governance cannot support democratization without a security and political framework that raises costs of resorting to violence; acceptance of governance reforms depends upon the extent to which they are perceived as effective and legitimate, but such changes are likely to be fragile in post-conflict societies; short-term reconstruction timetables increase the risk of relying on existing power structures and on weak newly-created institutions, which lay an insufficient foundation for fundamental governance reform and new state-society relations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Americans have been more widely divided by party in their evaluations of George W. Bush than they have been about any president in the more than fifty years the approval question has been polled. They are also more widely divided by party about the wisdom and necessity of his Iraq war than they have been about any major U.S. military action undertaken during the same time span. These two phenomena are closely related, yet the structure of their relationship is far from transparent. In this paper, I review a selection of the inordinately abundant survey data on the president and the Iraq war to document the polarization in public attitudes they have jointly provoked and to explore some of the questions the data can be used to address concerning the formation, evolution, and consequences of mass opinion on the war. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Suicide attacks are best understood when analyzed on three levels of analyses: an individual level, an organizational level, and an environmental level. This paper presents a multi-causal framework for the analysis of suicide attacks and applies the model to suicide attacks in Iraq following the U.S.-led invasion of March 2003. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I confront a burgeoning conventional wisdom among foreign policy scholars which holds that the US should tend to succeed in efforts to engage autocratic rogue states, such as North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Rather, I argue that domestic political pressures in the US and domestic political opportunities in the autocratic taget state will impel US administrations to oversell and overcommit to engagement, and impel the target state to reciprocate US engagement with merely cosmeticor tactical behavioral concessions. I proceed to test this theory in the "hard case" of the US engagement of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Owing to the highly asymmetric bilateral balances of power and interests that grossly favored the US during this engagement attempt, domestic political pressures mitigated the Reagan Administration's inclination to conditionally engage the embattled Baathist regime in Baghdad so as to reform troublesome Iraqi behavior in such issue-areas as Iraq's continued support for terrorism. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a preliminary look at the similarities and differences of the insurgencies in Iraq and Chechnay and at the similarities and differences of American and Russian counterinsurgency efforts respectively. It argues that the Russians have some inherent advantages in Chechnya--smaller country in terms of both terrain and population, greater will to fight the war--than the Americans in Iraq. However, Russian counterinsurgency policy, and in particular the over-reliance on force and failure to include Chechens in the local politics, has increased the likelihood of long-term failure. In Iraq, while the Americans have not conducted themselves flawlessly, their more measured use of force and incorporation of a wider swath of Iraqi society into the political scene increases the likelihood of long-term success. The danger for the Americans, however, is in the short-term. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conference paper about a geopolitical analysis of the political, economic, and military viability of hypothetically trisected Iraqi states is presented. The geopolitical analysis of a balkanized Iraq has begun with a qualitative comparison with similar cases, then teasing apart variables that might explain differing outcomes. It is noted that the fragmentation of the country into separate enclaves has been one definition of abject political failure in Iraq.

Examines the claim of U.S. President George W. Bush to a unilateral executive warmaking power, including the authority to wage pre-emptive war, within the context of the legislation, the Use of Force Act of 2001 and the Iraqi Resolution of 2002. Theory of war power according to Bush; Authority of the Congress to initiate military hostilities according to the U.S. Constitution; Problems with the delegation of the war power in the legislation that purported to authorize the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Explores the crossroads between empire and global cooperation based on the events that follow the war on terror in Iraq. Major factor triggering this crossroads; Nature or character of the emerging global empire; Hybrid character of the global arena.

Discusses the use of threat inflation and the marketplace of ideas regarding the U.S. war on Iraq. Requirements in assessing the risk of future failures of the marketplace of ideas; Threat inflation in the Iraq debate; Deterrability of former Iraqi leader Sadamm Hussein; Claims made by U.S. official in linking Hussein to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and to the Al-Qa'ida terrorist group.

As the American death toll in Iraq rises toward 1,000, some IR scholars may be per-plexed. Only a few years ago foreign policymakers in Western democracies, including the United States, were described as being extremely sensitive to the political cost of military com-bat casualties. I argue that the number of casualties a democracy will experience is influenced by several factors, including its military manpower system. I contend that democracies with conscript armies will experience fewer combat casualties than democracies with volunteer or professional forces, because the societal actors most closely impacted by conscript casualties are more likely to have the political power and access with which to constrain policymakers. Using several selection models I find that democracies with conscripts suffer the fewest casualties and democracies with volunteers experience the most casualties with democracy alone being respon-sible for numbers that lie between the previous two types of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the legitimate behavior of the U.S. Definition of legitimacy according to legal scholar Thomas Franck; Relationship between the U.S. and Panama after the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties in 1977; Support by political leaders throughout Western Europe to U.S. policies toward Iraq.

The US has entered an era of overt military interventions targeted at regime change and ?democratization.? The Bush administration inscribed the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq in the larger war against terrorism. The proactive military policy of the Bush administration is based on the premise that Al Qaeda can be eradicated through mega-police/special forces operations aimed at destroying its leaders and disrupting its organizational structures. The hypothesis is that the elimination of the leaders will bring about the collapse of the Islamic terrorist movements, removing the scourge of anti-Western terrorism. My claim is that the war against terrorism will not be won by mega-police/special forces operations alone. Furthermore, the resentment against the US is not restricted to the Middle East?in fact, it is global and has multiple origins. The US is facing a global danger?Al Qaeda?s example may take hold in the ?Third World.? Future terrorist organizations using Al Qaeda?s methods do not necessarily have to be Islamic, or based in the Middle East or in Asian countries with large Muslim populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International sanctions can be positive or negative, with no compelling reasons for when states choose one type over the other. Using contractual theory, I try to explain why the United States used negative sanctions in the case of Irak but is resorting to positive sanctions in the case of North Korea. I study sanction contracts as menus of contracts established to reduce the uncertainty about the resolve of the target country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In general, the American public pays very little attention to international affairs, a condition that does not seem to have been changed by the events of September 11, 2001. It seems to apply a fairly reasonable, commonsensical standard of benefit and cost when evaluating foreign affairs, and is about as accepting of involvement in foreign affairs as ever, but it does not have and never has had much stomach for losing American lives in ventures and arenas that are of little concern to it and does not value foreign lives highly. Although the President does not necessarily need public support in advance to pull off a military venture, there is little or no long term political gain from successful ones. When the value of the stakes does not seem to be worth additional American lives, the public has shown a willingness to abandon an overextended or untenable position with little concern about saving face. However, if they are not being killed, American troops can remain in peace keeping or nation building ventures virtually indefinitely for the most part, nobody will even remember that they are there. In general, it seems that there is a substantial potential for the occupation of Iraq to become a deep political problem for Bush. Under favorable scenarios, public attention will switch to domestic issues, particularly to the troubled economy. Under quagmire ones, people are increasingly likely to see the war as a mistake, and starting and continuing wars that people come to consider mistaken does not enhance a president’s re electability. If Iraq does become a quagmire, the Bush administration could probably withdraw at a bearable electoral cost. The messy aftermath of the war against Iraq suggests that all or most of that self infatuated talk about a brave new superpowered American "empire" and about triumphal "unilateralism" will fade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses an understanding of constitutions with reference to the case of Iraq. Iraq can be seen as a state with identitarian communities divided over the means by which to share power as well as by disparate and incompatible versions of state order. The Sunnis are Iraq's historic ruling community, who have formed the core of every regime in Iraq.

Nationwide panel surveys of Americans during the last three years of the George W. Bush Administration demonstrate that the level of public trust in the national government has a significant impact on the public's perceptions of threats posed by terrorism and its support for national counter-terrorism policies, including the war in Iraq. These effects vary depending on whether "trust in the government" is defined in terms of trust in the objectivity and truthfulness of the information it provides, trust in the integrity of national politicians not to exploit that information for political or partisan purposes, or trust in the efficacy government policy. Unpacking the concept of trust in government helps to clarify the conditions under which changes in trust are likely to affect the government's ability to shape public opinion and mobilize public support for its policy initiatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, author presents gradual and integrated explanation accounting for the variation in the effects of military defeats on war-proneness of Germany versus Iraq. It mentions types of states according to their war-proneness which includes revisionist, incoherent and status-quo states. It also talks about post-World War I and post-World War II while comparing Germany and Iran.

Using geo-referenced terror events and ethnicity information, this article seeks to explore if and how elections contribute to violence in Iraq. Analyzing the December 2005 and March 2010 parliamentary elections and the January 2009 governorate elections, I assess whether partisan and/or ethnic competition over votes increased violence in a predicatable manner. I find that election violence did increase during election periods, and that they did so in districts where partisan competition was the highest. Even though the results show that election violence was lower when the two largest parties were of the same ethnic group, the more proportional that political parties were (in terms of number of seats held in a district) the higher the violence. The number of ethnic groups was not found to be a significant determinant of election violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]