Search

This paper explores the emerging 'triangle' in commercial relations between the EU, China and the United States, using the concepts of 'complex interdependence' and 'bi-multilateralism' as organising and evaluative devices. The paper argues that in the 'triangle' there are important areas of unevenness and variation reflecting differences of power, institutional factors and norms, but that nonetheless there can be discerned important elements of 'complex interdependence' as defined by Keohane and Nye. This can be observed in the bilateral relationships between the three parties; at the same time, however, the EU-China-US relationship is central to power, institutions and norms in the changing multilateral commercial system, centred on the World Trade Organisation. This means that many of the commercial policy negotiations between the three parties are essentially 'bi-multilateral': on the one hand, the management of bilateral relations creates externalities for the multilateral system, and on the other hand the evolution of the multilateral system creates new forces shaping the management of bilateral relationships. The paper explores two cases, China's entry into the WTO and the management of trade disputes over textiles, to illuminate the ways in which 'bi-multilateral' elements enter into the EU-China-US 'triangle'. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1975, American foreign policy in Southeast Asia can be characterized as "benign neglect". After the 9/11 attack, the Southeast Asian region has become refuge of Al Qaeda members and a "second front" of US global counter-terrorism operation. The rapid rise of China presents new challenges to US foreign policy. China's growing influence comes at the expense of US power and influence in Southeast Asia, hastening US-China competition in the region and increasing the probability of the outbreak of conflict. In order to prevent the decline of US influence in the region and maintain its sole super power status in the world, the US has sought to enhance and promote its relations with ASEAN countries, this way, the US has taken steps to become re-involved in the region. The purpose of this paper is to clarify expectations of future US strategy towards Southeast Asia by exploring the causes of US re-involvement in Southeast Asia as well as strategies the Bush administration undertook. This paper analyzes US goals and interests in the region, influences of the development of terrorism on the US and the effects of the rapid rise of China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a heuristic model for the international development of nonproliferation education programs. The paper draws on the examples of five nonproliferation education programs at U.S. universities, plus a program currently being developed at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. Three phases of the developmental process are studied for both international and domestic programs: program development, curriculum development, and sustainability. Lessons learned from each of the three phases are combined into a developmental model, intended to serve as a guide to the further development of these programs by practitioners. The factors that contribute to program development, where the focus is on creating a viable institution of learning, are much the same for domestic and international programs alike. The factors that contribute to curriculum development are different for domestic and international programs. For domestic programs, the locus of development is the organization. For international programs, the center of gravity is a collaborative network. In the latter, the central challenge is maintaining the commitment of multiple participants, all in the pursuit of a shared intellectual enterprise. As a curriculum matures and comes to be recognized as the hallmark of a program, the need for a robust international collaborative network diminishes. Domestic and international programs eventually converge in their developmental paths, with each facing similar sustainability issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of Southeast Asia have paid increasing attention to the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in mediating the relations between the US and China. ASEAN has created a strong reputation for itself as a regional organization that embodies norms promoting respect for sovereignty and non-intervention. ASEAN scholars have argued that ASEAN norms have been adopted by China. This development has afforded ASEAN a more meaningful political institutional role in the region than its relative power merits. ASEAN is exercising a form of normative power in the Asia Pacific.This paper examines this argument from a critical constructivist perspective. ASEAN often does not function as a coherent bloc. The individual states of ASEAN have different perceptions of national interest and their behavior is described by a variety of theories. How do these differences affect the ability of ASEAN, the organization, to act in a coherent way? How is this potential incoherence perceived by the larger powers of the region and what are their respective approaches? China has decided to treat ASEAN as a coherent entity; the US has not. What are the long-term political consequences for these great powers of their respective strategies? This paper is based on field research conducted in the Asia Pacific in 2007. It examines the significance of the regional rhetoric around the ideas of shared norms and values. How credible are these claims and what are their strategic implications? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study on Japan's informal political actors and networks will not only provide a foundation for us to further understand Japanese politics and foreign policy but will also enable us to get a better idea of how networks function in a larger context, namely between Tokyo, Beijing and Washington. Social network is not only an important part of Japanese policy making but also a crucial factor in the China-Japan-U.S. triangular relationship. Instead of providing equal attention to each parties of this triangle, this paper will focus on Japan's informal political actors and networks by examining the process of normalization in its relations with China. In addition to detailed analysis of political actors in Japanese politics and society, it also provides an account of Beijing's reaction in this significant process. In the concluding part, this paper also provides some preliminary analysis in making international comparisons particularly with the United States. Thus, it will also assist us in understanding the networks between the three powers in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Far from the realists? description, little has shown that China is taking a revisionist strategy against the American hegemony. Rather, China has taken a prudent policy to improve her global leadership while her comprehensive cooperation with the United States has never been excluded. China might not satisfy with the U. S. hegemony; however, China is far from the capabilities to overcome the strategic limits that her title of „Rising Power� has generated. Besides, China is not certain that the 2008 financial crisis has already speeded the decline of American hegemony. And finally, China has evaluated that she could not surpass American comprehensive power before the end of 21st century. This paper will describe firstly China?s evaluation on the relative global power distribution from the perspectives of China?s �low-profile� strategy. Then the focus will put on the dilemma that China has suffered from the global second rank. The final part will explore challenges that hamper China?s low-key rising strategy. It concludes that China is a second-tier global leader for she has neither intentions nor the capability to generate a Chinese hegemony in the coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates crises in which the Chinese government requested an apology from the United States, and the official and popular reactions to these incidents. Two contentious episodes are studied: the 2001 EP-3E airplane collision near Hainan Isl ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

“…American blacks, your struggle is our struggle! The people of the world stand together with our American black brothers!” [quoted from an article in the People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), 9/9/63] This paper challenges international relations' silence on race in the global order by examining the influence of transnational racial categories on globalizing governments and how they define themselves and their interests. I will argue that in the 1950s, the newly-liberated Chinese Communist government began to develop a radical orientation for its foreign policy and international relations in which the explicit recognition of race, racial identification and cross-racial solidarity, Third-worldism, was an important political discursive component. To support this argument, I will exam a process of racialization, the “…extension of racial meaning…” to something that most political scientists believe is devoid of such concerns - foreign policy initiatives and international relations by examining three major events that prompted the development and dissemination of a discourse of a racialized foreign policy orientation. These three events are â€"(1) the planning for the Afro-Asian Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 18-24, 1955; (2) the reportage in the CPC’s flagship newspaper, the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) on the African-American Civil Rights Movement, particularly the major events of the pivotal year, 1963; and (3) The construction of the TanZam Railway in the 1970s. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the increasing economic and strategic clout of China and the vulnerability of the American power in the Gulf, the US policy makers are searching for a new strategy in the Asia Pacific region. Their ultimate purpose is to neutralize the preeminence of China.Pentagon is trying to forge a new alliance of three well-established democracies-US,India and Japan. On April 16,2007 all the three nations began a joint military drill in the Pacific. More or less at the same time, the first India-US Defence Joint Working Group met in New Delhi.These two develpments have certainly raised the temperature in Beizing.Recently China has raised its defence budget by 17.8 percent and successfully tested its antisatellite ballistic missile.No doubt the Pacific military exercise by US, India and Japan has been taken as an alarming signal by China.The proposed paper will try to explore the evolving strategy of the US in the Asia Pacific region.One has to explore as to what extent such a three nation joint exercise is addressing the unprecedented rise of China in the politico-economic and strategic affaires of the region. We will also examine as to how far the existing American policy of strategic engagement with China is being reexamined. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid ascent of China to great power status has caused much concern among politicians and academics alike. The prospect that China may eventually attain parity with the United States dramatically increases the likelihood of security challenges between itself and the West. There has been a great deal of attention given to this issue by policy analysts and media outlets; however, the rise of China has not received commensurate attention in the international relations literature. Power Transition Theory posits that states require not only the capability, but the willingness to overtake the system leader. While China’s ability to surpass the US is a possibility, our understanding of its willingness to take on systemic leadership is relatively indeterminate. In this analysis, we employ Power Transition Theory in order to address the following questions: is China dissatisfied with the status quo and, if so, will it be willing to assume the role of dominant power? Our paper attempts to answer these questions using conventional measures as well as participation in regional and supra-regional structures. In doing so, we hope to gauge China’s dissatisfaction with the status quo and its potential willingness to advance its preferences in the international arena. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mainstream discourse on cross-strait relations tends to reproduce the "crisis" than transform it. Analysts in Taiwan are complicit by loyally following US concepts, prescriptions, and strategies for the region. Some, however, are beginning to contest this traditional subjugation of Taiwan's interests and identity to US and Chinese hegemony. Nonetheless, they still abide by the US paradigm of triangular relations. This paper notes a third, emerging discourse that reframes US-China-Taiwan relations through a postcolonial understanding of sovereignty, cross-strait relations, and Taiwanese subjectivity. We characterize these three options, in reverse order, in Hirschman's terms of "exit," "voice, and "loyalty." But we amend these with Ling's differentiation of "formal" and "substantive" mimicry for "loyalty" and "voice," respectively. Both reflect conditions of postcolonial hybridity that mature, eventually, into a paradigmatic breakthrough or "exit." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. I begin with an examination of Cold War foreign policy across the various presidential administrations. I then move to an examination of post-Cold War foreign policy concentrating on the Clinton and Bush presidencies. I focus on comparing various administration approaches to the Taiwan crisis and how and why policies varied within and between administrations. I discuss the numerous international and domestic factors that have contributed to U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China. Throughout, I attempt to capture the competing interests involved and how these actors and events have complicated both foreign policy processes and outcomes. I conclude with a discussion of policy implications for the present and future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of the United States in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of World War II. Special emphasis is placed on three major debates between China and Japan where the American role appears to have been critical: (1) the history issue; (2) the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute; and (3) the Taiwan issue. The central argument is that a series of institutional innovations, in Sino-Japanese relations introduced by the United States after the end of World War II, reinforced the U.S. alliance with Japan, and often rather indirectly accounts for the continuing tense relations between China and Japan. These developments, including the Tokyo War Crime Trials, the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the Okinawa reversion treaty in 1971, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, have had a major influence on Sino-Japanese relations that endures today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes the U.S.-China relations and its impact on the Korean Peninsula. It outlines the key motivations behind the making of Chinese foreign policy and then reports on the current stability and uncertainties between Beijing and Washington. As a result of its overall objectives in diplomacy, Beijing is seeking a shared strategic interest with the United States on the Korean issue. The PRC prefers the continued survival of the DPRK regime and develops ever-closer relations with the ROK; it's basic policy towards the Korean Peninsula remains pro-status quo and antinuclearization. However, the uncertainties and complications of the Sino-American relations profoundly affect China's strategic calculation about Korean Peninsula and indicate changes and problems in the Chinese Korea policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "Understanding Prospects for Cooperation and Competition in U.S.-China Relations: A Review Theory and Practice" prepared for the "Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association" held in Honolulu, Hawaii. It examines the volatility of the U.S. foreign relation toward China. It highlights the same assumptions of U.S. presidents Bill Clinton, George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush on the nature of the Sino-American relationship.

The article presents the conference paper titled "Modeling Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan's Linkage Politics: Foreign Policy Implications for China-Taiwan-U.S. Relations" prepared for presentation at the "International Studies Association 2005 Annual Convention" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It emphasizes that China and the U.S. should avoid getting connected into any issues related to the Taiwan election.

On the basis of the English school concepts of balances of power, great powers and middle powers, the paper argues that the US and China advocate competing concepts of regional order in the Asia-Pacific. The US prefers an order based on the instruments of war, whereas China gravitates towards instruments of diplomacy. Sino-US policies produce an unstable pattern of balancing marked by fluctuating alliance and partnership commitments, a low level of predictability, and considerable freedom of action. This intermediate type of order leaves middle powers such as ASEAN, Russia and South Korea with extraordinary responsibilities for preserving the balance. It is engendered by China’s efforts to postpone agreement on permanent mechanisms of regional order, pending the realization of its development potential allowing it to influence regional order on a par with the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is increasingly becoming a focal point to policymakers and international relations analysts. In answering the challenge of a rising China posed to the United States, realists propound containment approach while liberalists back engagement approach. However, by positioning analysis from a kind of ideal-type thinking, scholars of both schools did not pay enough attention to the exact shape and content of the current Sino-US relations, particularly the increasing transnational interactions across the pacific, as well as their potential influence to the relationship between China and the United States. This paper intends to compensate the above drawback by probing the transnational relations between China and the United States as well as their possible implications to China’s foreign policy, especially China’s foreign policy to the United States, in a comprehensive way. More specifically, two related questions will be addressed in this paper. The first question focuses on the issue of how exactly interdependent the current Sino-U.S relations is. By following Karl Deutsch’s transnational communication thesis as well as Nye and Keohane’s case study of the relationship between the United States and Canada as well as Australia from the prism of complex interdependence ( Nye, Keohane 2000), this paper will look over a wide range of issues between China and the United States, striding from the most noticeable economic exchanges, to tourists across two countries, missionary, students exchanges in both official and unofficial way, as well as military, religious connections in an extensive way. Basically those issues will be examined in a comparative wayâ€"both historically and horizontallyâ€"to contrast the past with the present, to contrast the Sino-U.S. links with the historical Soviet-U.S. connections. By this comparison, we hope to get a relatively clear and comprehensive picture with regard to Sino-U.S. communications and transnational relations.Second, this paper will tackle the problem that to what extent, in which aspect, the increasing interdependence between China and the United States have affected or even changed China’ s policy choice or its approaches to Sino-US relations. Basically, this paper will argue that China’s increasing interdependence with the United States not only leads to the Chinese leaders to redefine China’s national interests, but also leads China to adopt more liberal elements in its foreign policy approach. In addition, China’s growing interconnections with the world also caused the Chinese foreign policy decision making to become more decentralized. All those new elementsâ€"we can further add the factor of the increasingly matured international institutions, might work together to challenge the doomed logic of security dilemma as articulated by realists and consequently lead to China’s peaceful rise. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is part of an ongoing agenda to fill the current gap in studies of intelligence with regard to covert intervention. The paper posits a means-driven decision-making process, in contrast to ends-based approaches founded on rational models. A cybernetic approach finds that goals are hazily defined and, consequently, that matching desired outcomes to goals is problematic. Decision-makers do not construct maximising policies, but instead assemble policies that suffice from a repertoire of models of action. The paper traces the development of plans for US covert interventions in the cases of Tibet and Afghanistan. It surmises that in both cases, policies were not tailored to achieve identifiable long-term objectives. Extremely broad organizational goals imparted direction to policies but the policies were driven by the available means to intervene. Policies were therefore the result of configurations (and re-configurations) of instruments to hand and were judged according to sufficing rather than optimising criteria. The paper concludes with comments on the application of second-generation cybernetic approaches to covert intervention in general. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China as a regional and global power is once again a central foreign policy concern of the United States. Much of the scholarship on Sino-American relations focuses on China's continued rapid economic growth and its implications for the American economy and, more generally, America's preponderance of power on the world stage. This paper studies one aspect of the bilateral relationship - the dialogue between the two countries having to do with America's calls for China to be ?more open and transparent? about its internal affairs with the rest of the world. With reference to Chinese ?white papers? on foreign policy and U.S. government reports on China's military capabilities and intentions, the paper explores China's understanding of this Western concept and why America deems a more open and transparent China essential to a potential strategic partnership between the two countries in the years to come. The paper hypothesizes that, for America, transparency's importance has to do with encouraging the transformation of China toward pluralism and liberal democracy. Therefore, lasting peace between the two countries is, in America's perspective, closely bound with the end of authoritarian rule in China and China's accountability to its neighbors and the United States. Sensing a trap, China remains cautious about America's advocacy of transparency. It invokes instead the principle of sovereignty, which implies the non-interference of states in each other's internal affairs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pending rise of China has been one of the most debated issues in international relations during the last decade. This situation creates problems for surrounding East Asian states, the majority of which are currently allied with the United States. What happens if China becomes a regional or even world leader? Will East Asian states be forced to choose between two competing powers? This paper seeks answers to these questions by examining prominent realist theories in relation to small state behavior in the international system, and applying each to the context of China and its surrounding states in Northeast Asia. First, I begin with an overview of the literature dealing with the rising power of China. Second, I seek to correctly understand the fundamental basis of the small state debate by examining in detail Waltz?s balance of power theory. An analysis reveals a fundamental flaw in interpretation: Waltz?s balancing hypothesis pertains to situations of multipolarity, rather than the current situation of unipolarity in the international arena. Waltz?s theory, when applied, predicts states will automatically align with the rising power against the dominant power. Given this finding I offer some facts on small state behavior in East Asia that show this may not be the case. Next, I turn to Walt(1987)?s balance of threat theory and discover Walt, while often understood as prescribing balancing behavior for the international arena, is actually unable to provide predictions for either bandwagoning or balancing in East Asia. I analyze the limitations of Walt?s theory and conclude the ambiguity of his conditions of state behavior, problems in operationalization of state actions and the lack of recognition of the role played by credibility in threat perception, undermine the ability of his theory to fully explain small state action in the context of our situation. Finally, power transition theory is revealed to provide inadequate, albeit roughly accurate, explanations of events in East Asia because of its overwhelming focus upon major powers. This paper deals briefly with its limitations and offers suggestions for further research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The revisionist-status-quo dichotomy has been a dominant framework in analyzing the relations between a rising power and established great powers in general, and Sino-US relationship in particular. This paper intends to denaturalize this identity discourse and deconstruct its meaning in the first place. Although it is an effective heuristic cue for the established powers to manage a new entrant, it is not a value-free baseline for understanding the interactions between a rising power and the putative international society; it is even a biased standard for gauging the relations between China and the United States. In a great sense, this identity discourse is the source of misperception between these two great powers. The second part of this paper explains the rationale of China?s foreign policy by analyzing the "peaceful rise" discourse in Chinese academic and policy circles. This is a nationwide intellectual practice of conceptualizing China?s national interest and its future role in international society. This discussion reveals China?s rationale in dealing with two distinct sets of foreign relations: the relations between China and international society, as well as the strategic interactions between China and the United States. Almost all Chinese scholars? opinions confirm China?s desire to be a ?responsible major power?, and even a few hardliners express no more than ?defensive realist? concerns. Based on the above analysis, the third part of the paper further denaturalizes the socialized security dilemma between the US and China by analyzing their strategic interactions in East Asian area. Although the US, as the only superpower with the aim of maximizing influence in global and regional affairs, will naturally feel a threat from a newly rising power, the nature of the game between the two powers, in most situation, is cooperation and competition for providing public good to international society. Nowadays the transformative nature of international society as an intervening variable limits the chance that a state uses military force to solve disputes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper focuses on Chinese foreign policies towards Taiwan, Japan and the Korean peninsula and the consequences of these policies for Asia-Pacific security. Northeast Asia is a strong-hold of the US alliance system and China's near abroad, thus affecting China's influence on global security. If China cannot accommodate the region into its overall foreign policy strategy, its suggestions for a post-Cold War security order are likely to appear unconvincing to the international community. The paper emphasizes the weaknesses inherent in China's contemporary foreign policy strategy, thereby pointing to the possibility that China might fall into the rank of secondary powers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The episode of Chen Shui-bian transit diplomacy bypassing the United States and his earlier decision to put the National Unification Council and Guideline into abeyance in 2006 had put Beijing-Taipei-Washington relationship into serious tests. It remains to be seen if Taipei's most recent steps of renaming some state-owned enterprises may escalate into tensions as before. While Chen's New Year address and state visit to Nicaragua via US homeland in 2007 caused little problem for the State Department, the PRC's discontent remained evident. It was against this backdrop that the paper was proposed.This paper examined the role the US played in the institutionalization of the status quo across the Strait from a sociological new institutionalist perspective. My research questions are: In what way did the United States help institutionalize the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait? And in the process, how did the US act through "cross-Strait peaceful co-development" institution to shape the interest or identity of Beijing and Taipei?It was maintained that there existed an ongoing institutionalization process through which the US constructed the status quo that was supported with varying degree by Beijing and Taipei. The three joint communiqués and the TRA could be seen as setting the first stage of institutionalization through formal codification which emphasized the peaceful process in any attempt for final resolution by both sides. Since the late 1990s, the construction and reproduction of the CSPCD institution by the Americans, which generally follows a pattern of "neither use of force nor de jure independence," has been undertaken primarily through policy statements or actions. They normally uphold such core values as "prosperity," "stability" or "peace," and help sustain the regulative, normative or cognitive elements of the CSPCD institution. The main purpose is to shape the policy discourses, preferences, interests or identity of Beijing and Taipei. It was also argued that although the detailed record of what the institution has achieved was certainly mixed, there appears to be an overall tendency for Beijing and Taipei not to incessantly challenge the status quo. As such, it might be concluded that the institutionalization of status quo was considerably effective, though not completely successful. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through my study of the making of U.S. China policy from President Nixon through George W. Bush, it has been possible to isolate interaction patterns among central advisors in their advisory systems (discussed by scholars such as Alexander George, Graham Allison, Thomas Preston, among others) and to isolate three factors that affect foreign policy decisions: the structure or level of centralization, the level of cooperation, and the level of presidential involvement. First, it is safe to assume that all presidential administrations have a certain level of centralization and formal structure, but they differ in practice in the involvement of the traditional stakeholders in foreign policy such as the national security advisor and secretary of state. Second, the focus on group dynamics reflects the distinction between highly cooperative settings where consensus is the likely outcome versus situations where bureaucratic politics flourishes. Third, the level of presidential involvement and decisiveness (and indecisiveness) can be a decisive factor in controlling the level of cooperation within each advisory system. The purpose of this paper will be to explore how these three factors affected the group dynamics across these six U.S. presidents and ultimately affected policy decisions toward China. Given that I have already completed the in-depth case studies that serve as the data-set for this paper, this will be an unique opportunity to systematically explore how and when the group process shapes the policymaking process and decision outcome in comparative perspective. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Textbooks on IR theory proudly claim that they are lively, reader-friendly, and research-based. In the paper I am going to focus on the latter part of the claim, i.e., the claim that textbooks are research-based. First, I question the claim that textbook accounts of the IR discipline?s own history are based on research. It seems to me to be more common to reproduce traditional narratives than to take new research into account. Second, having substantiated the critical part of the paper, the follow-on task is to reflect on alternatives to the current state of affairs. Issues to be addressed include the following: If new research concludes that the ?great debates? story is largely unfounded, then how should we present the discipline?s development to students in an accessible and reader-friendly fashion? If IR theory has been cultivated outside the US, how should a textbook present the global cultivation of theory, including contending understandings of the term ?theory? itself and if understood in the same key, then contending theories as such? Furthermore, it has been claimed that ?ideas don?t flow freely?. One such idea is the theory of hegemonic stability which on the one hand is understood quite differently in the US and China, respectively. On the other hand, it could be seen as a theory that is ideally suited to make students think counter-intuitively about world politics. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the basis of Kissinger?s concept of balancing, the paper investigates whether ASEAN has contributed to the consolidation of coexistence in Southeast Asia. According to Kissinger, a stable order requires that balancing is embedded in a consensus as to what constitutes permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. Kissinger?s analysis of early 19th century European diplomacy emphasizes that comparatively weaker powers often play a crucial role in engendering stable orders because it is their only chance of obtaining determining influence on security arrangements in their neighbourhood. ASEAN can be viewed as an entity that has attempted to create a Southeast Asian order of coexistence to pre-empt attempts from external powers at imposing unilateral designs for regional order and that has tried to maintain a stable balance between the US and Chinese presence in the post-Cold War era. The paper argues that ASEAN?s apparent success in creating a stable balancing situation is conditioned upon the existence of a regional environment where great power interests has so far remained sufficiently separate that the US and China have been able to pursue competing versions of regional order without much disagreement. The endurance of ASEANs order of coexistence has therefore yet to be put to the test. If Sino-US security concerns come into conflict, for example over sea-lanes such as the Malacca Strait where their strategic interests intersect, this is likely to have a dampening effect on the efforts of indigenous powers at maintaining coexistence. The paper concludes that the US is a revolutionary power that does not base its Southeast Asia policy on the ASEAN principles of state conduct. US policy therefore constitutes the principal impediment to the preservation of a regional order of coexistence. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although there has been increasing attention paid to the triangular relationship between the United States (US), the European Union (EU), and China, the divergencies between the American and European approaches to China does not loom large in mainstream International Relations (IR) literature. Yet the inter-relations of these two developed powers and one developing power are of great significance for world politics, especially for the studies of North-South conflict and cooperation. Why does the US keep seeing a rising China as a threat while the EU increasingly views China as a potential partner? This paper seeks to explore the reason behind the EU and American divergencies over China. Unlike most IR theorists who impute the fundamental explanatory power to national interest, I put more emphasis on the identity issue of political actors. Applying a social constructivist approach, I examine how the US and the EU identify itself in the postwar period, e.g. as a unilateralist and a multilateralist respectively, give directions to how they perceive other countries such as China and how they then define their interest. This paper argues that the increasing divergencies between the US and the EU in their self-identities leas to their divergent policies toward China. The first section of this paper conceptualizes identity and its influence on state behavior, providing a theoretical background for the following discussion. In the second part, these considerations are applied to the explanation of the divergencies between the American and European approaches to China. I rely heavily on textual analysis to trace the development of identity. Major information sources include scholarly works and media reports. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research question of this paper is: “Does economic growth make China a threat?” Bearing this question in mind, I review the “China threat” literature and its counter-arguments since the early 1990s. This paper examines the offensive realist theoretical basis for the “China threat” literature, and it outlines several oversimplifications that the “China threat” arguments often suffer. Moreover, it is argued that while the “China threat” literature tends to support its arguments by rejecting the liberalist interdependence peace hypothesis and democratic peace hypothesis in the China context, a Marxist dependency framework may be more relevant to explore China’s capabilities and intention to pose a threat to the United States. And, in order to fully assess the strategic implications of China’s economic growth, we need to place the economic growth in the background of economic globalization as well as to take China’s domestic social relations in the process of economic growth into consideration. My conclusion is that economic growth will not make China a threat. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT:One of the more puzzling empirical phenomena of the post?Cold War period in Southeast Asia confounds both neorealism and neoliberalism: namely, the absence of a sizable arms race or security dilemma among claimants of territory in the South China Sea despite conflicting state interests and the absence of ?hard? institutions to help resolve those disputes. These structural theories cannot account for why, in the presence of an anarchical international system, rapidly expanding potential hegemon, and weak material position, Southeast Asian states have demonstrated the cooperative behavior that they have. Nor can they explain why, despite an overwhelming material advantage, geographic distance, and influential position of the United States in many of the international institutions in which China is now a somewhat cooperative member, U.S. policymakers and their constituents demonstrate markedly stronger suspicions about China?s assumption of great power status? This paper has two primary objectives: to present evidence that demonstrates the inability of structural interest-based theories to explain variation in international responses to China?s rise and so doing to offer an explanation from an identity perspective that examines the possible explanatory role of Othering discourses in foreign policymaking. The paper will begin by rejecting the null hypothesis, derived from structural theories, that countries can be accurately modeled as unitary actors whose behavior is an outcome of the international system. Then, through a study of the discourses with which U.S. and Philippine political leaders discuss China?as measured by government-sponsored research, public opinion polls, defense spending trends, and various other indicators of interstate perceptions?it will attempt to demonstrate that language and discursive frames serve as a powerful intervening variable mediating the impact of power and efficiency in the international system. Initial findings suggest that in an atmosphere of uncertainty U.S. policymakers utilize established sense-making images and discourses to make sense of their situational environment and rely on dispositional and racially derived assumptions about China that are common throughout the American public, and ignore or repress assessments that contradict the policies and perceptions supported by that society?s social rules. Contrastingly, notably less hostile speech-acts characterize the ?Rise of China? discourse in the Philippines. In this sense, each nation?s discursive framework provides its leaders with a unique language that provides policymakers with an understanding, as Wittgenstein describes it, of ?how to go on.? As such, political discourses, values, and beliefs can no longer be considered merely the reflections of political structure, but causal agents that can determine whether political outcomes are hostile or amicable. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International relations are often believed to be saturated with various combinations of danger and opportunity. This, for many American neoconservatives, will be particularly manifested in the next decade or so, a period which presents a window of opportunity for the United States to cement, once and for all, its global strategic supremacy, before a rising China is able to mount challenge. Underlying this double sense of danger and opportunity is their perception of a rapidly developing threat from an undemocratic China. Unlike conventional realists, who see China as a long-term military threat susceptible to calculated containment, neoconservatives are convinced that the China menace is compounded by its authoritarian regime, an ultimate obstacle to their grand vision of a new American century. Consequently, in line with their sense of urgency, neoconservatives suggest an aggressive policy triad of confronting China by supporting democracy on Taiwan, strengthening alliances, and beefing up America's military power. This paper argues that despite, and perhaps because of, the setbacks of the neoconservative experiment in Iraq, there is every possibility that their fixation on China will gather further momentum. And in light of its practical consequences in the Middle East, the paper argues that the neoconservative China strategy would have serious implications for U.S.-China relations. Based on the recipe of military strength and moral clarity, this neoconservative policy would launch U.S.-China relations onto a dangerous path to confrontation which neither side could afford. If anything, it would squander a rare window of opportunity for the two countries to cooperate for peace and stability in East Asia and beyond. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although many choice-theoretic models of international interaction makes use the concept of an audience of third parties who witness bilateral interactions and then adjust their own behavior accordingly, very little empirical research has attempted to uncover how decision-makers define and categorize their own audiences. Using near-verbatim transcripts of negotiations between Henry Kissinger and his associates and Chou En-lai and his, I characterize the audience for this dyad based on the content of their conversations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A study of Russia’s increasing military wariness suggests countervailing tendencies may not be exclusively Russian; but Medvedev’s forays to use China to redress European balances resonates traditional IR imperatives, placing the SCF on the line : (a) It ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What threatens us? Rationalists in IR focus on the material determinants of threat, such as military and economic power, energy and other material resource dependencies. Constructivists and others who work more in the symbolic realm focus instead on identities and ideas as determinants of threat perception. There is little empirical or theoretic work seeking to bridge this symbolic-material divide. There is also little work on cross-national similarities and differences in the perception of threat. For instance, are there significant differences in the ways that Chinese and Americans experience threat? And finally, while prospect theory has been applied to IR, little work has explores cross-national similarities and differences in the experience of gains and losses in the international realm. Using a 2x2x2 experimental design, this study seeks to empirically explore the determinants of threat perception among US and Chinese students. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking a gender sensitive approach to Social Identity Theory in Anglo-American, Chinese and Russian negotiating contexts suggests that gendered social identities significantly correspond to "ideal type" diplomatic negotiators across cultural contexts. In the US, the identities of the "ideal man" and the "ideal negotiator" converge as an individualistic, self controlled, rational, male actor who seeks to "expand the pie" through problem-solving negotiation in order to maximize the benefits available. In China, the "junzi" (ideal man) and "ideal negotiator" are male actors who are tightly in control of their relationships, and consequently able to use the relationship games of guanxi and paradigms of wen / "joint quest" or wu / "mobile warfare" to promote the achievement of their "principled" goals. In Russia, both masculine ideal types and typical negotiators are strong members of fraternal communities, who utilize position-appropriate tactics to achieve group goals at the expense of subordinated and feminized opponents. In all three, gendered structures on individual, state and global levels reinforce each other in perpetuating diplomatic demographics, goals, and institutions which privilege dichotomous, and primarily masculine- over feminine-typical social identity roles. This critical interrogation of the intercultural diplomatic negotiation literature suggests that investigating other key social identities may also provide models which can be selectively drawn on in order to both understand the sources of potential conflict or cooperation, and provide a tool to improve negotiation processes and outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Pax Americana II, the period after the Cold War, and the strategic choices of Japan. It states that the transformation of the international system from bipolar to unipolar results in a more assertive U.S. policy. It cites the decision of the U.S. government to restore its alliance with Japan and initiate talks with China to prevent the financial market crisis. It offers an overview of the defense policy of the Japanese government.

The article looks at the future of cross-strait relations after the election of fourth-generation leaders in China in 2002. It cites that China has adopted a cool dealing strategy toward Taiwan after Chen Sui-bian was elected President in 2002 and condemned the defensive referendum proposed by the president. It argues that maintaining status quo in Taiwan Strait is the key to pursue the stability and peace in the strait. It explains the factors that resulted to the conflict in Taiwan Strait and the role played by the U.S. concerning the issue.

That China has been politically and economically playing an important role in the world has great impact to regions all over the world, especially in East Asia. After the Cold War, Japan has gradually walked out of its past "one nation pacifism," actively participating in the international affairs under frameworks of "U.S.-Japan alliance" and the U.N. It is to fulfill its dream of becoming a "political great power." Therefore, Japan has also been playing an important role in the regional issues. On November 2002, North Korea decided to reactivate its uranium-enriching program. It has raised the tension in the region of East Asia; it has also disturbed international relations in the region. The U.S. expects China and Japan, two great powers in the Northeast Asia, intervene in the North Korea problem, hoping to solve the problem with multi-literal agreement. Can the North Korea nuclear crisis shorten the diplomatic distance between China and Japan, establishing the "military strategic partnership," or showing the radical paradox between the two countries? Examining interactions between China and Japan in the North Korea nuclear crisis can clarify the thinking of two countries' regional strategies and benefits of competition and cooperation in politic, security, and economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the effect of the increasing economic interdependence on the U.S.-China bilateral relationship since 1978. It argues that as dyadic trade interdependence increases, it is less likely that there will be high-grade conflict, which includes actions such as ending a diplomatic relationship or using military force. It explores the relationship between trade interdependence and conflict. It examines the impact of trade interdependence and dependence on cooperation.

Study will determine the external and internal influences on the Eisenhower adminstration in its making of U.S. policy toward Tibet. Using the Kegley-Wittkopf model, research will focus on foreign influence from external sources such as China, India, Taiwan and the Tibetans themselves. Internally, the study will determine which governmental, societal, role and individual sources influenced Eisenhower in determining policy outcomes. It is hoped that the study will further illuminate U.S. foreign policy deliberations and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shift of US strategy toward China from Clinton’s strategic partner to Bush’s strategic competitor has had negative impacts on relations between the two nations. Since George Bush took office, America’s diplomacy has transformed from multilateralism to unilateralism. US image has further transformed from benign to predatory hegemony after conducting the war against Iraq without consulting the UN Security Council. The change is significant because it increases the discontents, globally in general and Asia in particular. The article explains why China is one of the most dangerous discontents based on the Power Transition Theory. The theory is chosen because it has an established empirical record when applied to past periods of war and peace, and because the elements required for long-term forecasts can be roughly approximated (Kugler, Tammen, and Swaminathan, 2001, p.2). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the friction between Washington and Beijing has increased because United States has become as the sole superpower on the one hand, and China has emerged as a regional power on the other. It is consistent with power transition theory: conflict occurred because of the divergent views on status quo between the global and regional hegemonies. One of power transition theory’s hypotheses is that great powers are most likely to wage the war for control of the international status quo when a power transition occurs between the dominant state and a discontent challenger. Lemke’s empirical study (2002) finds the theory is generalizable to regional interactions, and thus relative power and the status quo do not constrain behavior only among the very strongest of states. China has dissatisfied with the status quo for two reasons, as Lemke suggested. First, it had little or no say in the construction of the existing status quo and enjoyed no direct or indirect benefits from it. Second, it employs different domestic institutions for the allocation of values in its society from those used by the dominant power. Because Lemke finds strong statistical relationships between parity, dissatisfaction, and war within local hierarchies, China’s discontent becomes significant. Worse, US war on terrorism further raise the specter of unconstrained American interventionism abroad and enhanced American domination of the international system in ways that Beijing feared could have grave long-term implications for China itself (Miller, 2002). Beijing sees China’s security threatened both in terms of the precedents it sets and in terms of the expansion of the American military and political presence around China’s periphery. Given the size of China’s stake in a stable bilateral relationship the United States, Beijing was naturally not convinced by the so-called Bush Doctrine. Clear evidence showed that China’s commitment to the status quo is declining. Politically, in addition to refuse to renounce the use of force, Beijing’s irrational rejection to Taipei’s entry to WHO exemplifies China’s discontent with US supports for Taiwan. Beijing’s enthusiasm about establishment of a free trade area between China and ASEAN is a clear sign of dissatisfying with global economic status quo. Deploying more missiles along the Taiwan Strait shows Beijing discontent with Washington’s continued arms sales to Taipei. The more America insists on constructing a unipolar world, the more resistance it is likely to generate, from China and others(Harry Harding, 2003). Thus, there are at least three implications for American diplomacy. First, Washington can accommodate Beijing by sharing with China opportunities for setting international agenda. Second, do not despise China’s role on the Korean Peninsula. For Beijing, it is unacceptable if America to extend the same logic in Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq to justify intervening in North Korea. Third, Washington should not push Taipei too hard because Taiwan may eventually find its interest better served by switching its diplomacy from leaning only on Washington to keeping equal distance from China and the United States. Thus, for Washington, it will be a better way to stabilize the relation across the Taiwan Strait by helping establish the Confidence-Building Measures (CBM). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper is concerned with the questions of the role metaphors play in the discursive construction of the Sino-American relationship, and the role metaphors play in Othering processes in international relations more generally. To this end, I examine sev ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does the history of U.S.-China foreign policy making tell us about the future relationship between the most powerful country and the largest and fastest growing developing country? Does bilateral reciprocity promote cooperation? Is there any adaptive pattern in the foreign policy making between the two countries? This paper aims at answering these questions using machine-coded monthly events data and VAR time series analysis for the period between 1990 and 2005. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper scrutinizes the current and future state of Sino-American relations. The positive and negative factors that characterizes Chinese-U.S. relations are closely interwoven and often run into one another. On the negative end is the battle currently underway between the two powers for "hegemonic status" in the Asian Pacific. On a more positive note is the building of greater economic (and mutually beneficial) partnership between Washington and Beijing. Perhaps most importantly, Washington and Beijing have several vital common interests, notably in the war against terrorism and the desire for strategic stability in the Pacific, South Asia, Middle East and Eurasia. Key concepts and issues discussed/examined include: emerging superpower, security threats, Taiwan, North Korea, "harmonious world," Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), and Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper intends to analyze the impact of China’s foreign policy in Africa to United States interests in Africa. During the winter of 1884-1885, the imperialist powers met in Berlin to divide the African continent among themselves. That conference was the springboard for the imperialist countries’ “Scramble for Africa.” Over the next several decades England, France, Germany, Portugal, and Belgium carved up the continent and established colonies for hegemony and exploitation. Today a “New Scramble for Africa” is occurring. This time, however, a non-Western-nationâ€"Chinaâ€"is actively involved in that “scramble,” and is vigorously challenging Western influence and interests in Africa. This development is a result of China’s rapid industrial growth over the past two decades and its deepening integration into the global economy. The focus of that competition is over access to raw materials, especially energy resources, and hegemonic influence. This competition is perhaps best indicated by the controversy over the civil war in the Darfur region of Sudan. Furthermore, China’s involvement in Africa is occurring at a point when the United States has accelerated its military involvement in Africa. This is reflected by United States military assistance to over 40 African states since the mid-1990’s, and the establishment of an United States African Central Command that will be put into place by Fall, 2008. What is the outline and scale of China’s involvement in Africa? What are China’s objectives in Africa? How has China’s involvement in Africa challenged United States interests there? How has the United States responded to China’s role in Africa? What are the implications of Chinese involvement in Africa to United States-Chinese relations? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares and contrasts the soft power resources of China and the U.S., and discuss on the wielding of soft power in their bilateral relations. There are so many uncertainties between these two gigantic powers in the Pacific Asia. Will China adopt a revisionist approach and use its increasingly stronger national power to challenge the status quo power, or continue to stay patient and low-profile in a long term? Will the U.S. step up its efforts to assemble an effective international alliance to contain China’s rise, or allow Beijing to emerge as an active and decisive leader in a region and actively engage China into the role of responsible great power? Traditional study of US-China relations focuses on both countries’ hard powerâ€"the ability to use economic inducement and sanction and/or military threats and invasion to get its way. A discussion of soft powerâ€"attraction and agenda-settingâ€"in the U.S.-China relations may provide us some new cues to the future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the paper is an investigation into the construction of US and Chinese identities within the context of their interactions with one another in the Post-Cold War context. Traditional research in this area has thus far tended to rely on individualist and positivist assumptions, with a distinct lack of attention being paid to the role of culture, identity, language, or emotion: each of which I believe is fundamental to understanding the interactions that have taken place between the US and China. As such, I aim to highlight some of the unquantifiable factors that tend to be overlooked by rationalist theories. Using specific case studies which allow a more thorough, empirical example of how these states interact with one another at particular junctures, I hope to link the theoretical world with one of policy. The core concepts relate to an investigation into the relationship between foreign policy and political identity, and attempt to gain a greater understanding into the complexities of this bilateral relationship too often simplified for the purposes of other theoretical paradigms. One of my primary aims is to provide a link between representations of identity, and policy choices and their implementation. Another key aim is to direct attention to the effect of culture and emotions on cross-cultural negotiations in ‘crisis’ situations.I propose to analyse the political discourse in each states’ foreign policy documents as a means of identifying the shared ideas and analytical frameworks by which policy makers analyse the relationship, generate policy options, and then choose from in their actions/reaction. By highlighting the evolution of discursive constructions over a given time period it enables me to highlight how key events are responded to in official policy discourse. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do we know whether a new power is emerging? If a new power really is emerging, what is the status quo power doing? The paper’s main goal is to explore these key IR questions in the context of the current case of emerging China. As China engages in “peaceful raising”, the effects of the emergence of a new power must to be taking place all around the world. China’s presence in Latin America is a crucial test of such process because the United States considered Latin America as their geo-economic and geo-strategic “backyard”. What changes are caused by China’s role in the region? What was/is the response of the hegemonic power? Is China a threat to American interests in Latin America? The so-called 2004-2005 “offensive” of China in Latin America was both source of hope and worry in the region/subregions, and of certain alarm in the United States, which since the original times of the Monroe Doctrine has rejected external power projections in the region.The goal of the paper is to provide an empirically grounded analysis of the new role of China in Latin America. I will take stock of the relations, seeking confirmation and refutation of some initial trends in the economic (trade and investments), political and security realms, as well as the initial American responses. Specific instances of China’s relations with Latin America â€"such us that with Venezuela and Cuba) will be analyzed in detail. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are we witnessing a rebirth of Sinocentric Eurasia? If so, what exactly does this mean and what are the associated risks and opportunities for the countries on the Eurasian continent and beyond? This contribution addresses these and related questions with caution, informed by profound skepticism of mirror imaging, a habit of deriving an understanding of China's international behavior and intentions from the tenets of (Western) International Relations theory. All too often, China is viewed as nothing but an "eligible state" in the "balance of power" tournament, a game deemed eternal and universally applicable. On this view, China stands to "challenge" the global and regional hegemony of the United States in a similar manner as the United States stood to challenge the British hegemony and, allegedly less impressively, the Soviet Union stood to challenge the United States. What is lost in the process is a possibility that China may not be the United States. It may not be the Soviet Union either. It may be an altogether different "animal," unintelligible from inside Western/"Westphalian" International Relations. One obvious difference is that whereas the United States and the Soviet Union were typically not at ease with international institutions unless they could be in charge of their decision-making processes, the Chinese seem increasingly at home with a web of international institutions while at the same time maintaining loyalty to Deng Xiaoping's dictum "never take a lead." The paper makes an issue of this difference through a comparative analysis of three case studies: Chinese "normative power" strategies within the key Eurasian institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Chinese "win-win" and "remunerative” power" policies toward two adjacent regional blocs, the ASEAN and the European Union. It concludes that although it is too early to gauge with any degree of precision the success of China's "grand strategy," it seems unambiguous that the Chinese approach to regional and global institutionalization differs drastically from those pursued by the "great powers" over the course of the 20th century. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]