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The article discusses the 10th presidential election in Iran. The author examines how the inherent contradiction in the postrevolutionary constitution became the point of reference for both the idea of republicanism and autocratic theocracy. The author talks about how the basic principles of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 are seriously contested. Subjects of the article also include the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Iran's development of nuclear energy, and religious codes since the revolution.

Why do states stay revolutionary for so long? The question of why and how some political players of a country successfully pursue a revisionist strife against the status quo has neither theoretically nor empirically received systematic attention. I use a current policy issue, the crisis regarding Iran, as a single-case study to examine the issue. This article argues that answers are found in the interconnected realms of domestic politics and revolutionary ideas. In Iranian politics specifically, it is both the ideological conservative faction's occupation of key constitutional positions and pursuit of revolutionary ideas, which have caused the recurring and large degree of revolutionary zeal. In turn, this has had a significant effect on the extent of the Islamic Republic's socialization to regional and international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In some respects, the Western perspective on Iran and Afghanistan is a Euro-centric one, emphasizing the restrictive character of the Iranian regime and the threat caused by the hotly debated nuclear program, in the current discourse on the situation in Afghanistan, Iran does not play any role and its position is largely unknown. The following essay focuses on the history of Afghan-Iranian relations and highlights Iran's position and self-image in the wider region. As the title suggests, bilateral relations between the two countries are characterized by continuity and shifts. In addition, the paper sheds light on Iran's skillful handling of international affairs and politics, though the strategic maneuverings of Iranian policy makers have not always helped to reach the envisaged targets. Regarding Afghanistan, the Iranians have been sophisticated players, but the essay argues that Iran's relations with its eastern neighbor are shaped by both domestic factors and circumstances on the global level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anti-Semitism is deeply ingrained in Shi `i Iran, both religiously and historically. Apart from being the first enemies of Prophet Muhammad, Jews have been been the subject of gross accusations, such as having a desire for world control, exaggerating the dimensions of the Holocaust, committing genocide, using blood in making unleavened bread, and distorting Holy Scriptures. The establishment of a Jewish state, Israel, added a political dimension to the already hostile religious attitude towards the Jews. This hostile religious-political attitude was contained to a large extent under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, but it burst out with vigour after Khomeini and his fellow clerics took over the reins of power in 1979. Faced with the constraints of international game rules and the pressure of a Western public opinion sensitive to expressions of anti-Semitism, the ruling clerics attempted to conceal their anti-Semitism by adopting a number of tactics, such as issuing far fewer public anti-Semitic statements, or by allowing others, through 'freedom of speech', to 'freely' express their anti-Semitic views. This is in line with taqiyyah (concealment) -- one of the basic principles of Shi `i Islam. The primary purpose of this article is to show that in spite of its repeated public announcements in differentiating between 'Jews' and 'Judaism' (the religious dimension), on the one hand, and 'Zionism' and 'Israel' (the political dimension) on the other, the Islamic regime in Iran not only fails to make such a differentiation, but actually often identifies the two as one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines political developments in Iran, where the ruling regime of mullahs will achieve 30 years in power in 2009. The author discusses the mixture of religious dogma and Iranian nationalism that creates a tension within the country. There is also a strain of western liberalization present that complicates issues of economic prosperity.

Ayatollah Montazeri was a Khomeinist who came to regret being Khomeini's unabashed protege. Though he has never abandoned the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, he has sought to reconceptualize it by furnishing it with democratic principles. In this, he has not been credible, although he has managed to portray himself as a reformer among some Iranian activists who themselves have credible reformist credentials, such as Akbar Ganji. But other reformists believe that the principles of the mandate of the jurist permit authoritarian abuses. And those among them who seek a mujtahid's support for overthrowing that doctrine would prefer to turn to the writings of Ayatollah Dr. Mehdi Ha'iri (d. 1999). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a tendency in Western capitals to dismiss adversarial Iranian behavior as the work of rogue regime factions, which are not representative of Tehran's true intentions. Following a Baghdad press conference providing evidence of Iranian weapons shipments to Iraq, U.S. officials raised doubts about Iran's actual culpability. The weapons shipments do "not translate to that the Iranian government per se, for sure, is directly involved in doing this," Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted the next day. On February 14, 2007, President George W. Bush said, "What we don't know is whether or not the head leaders of Iran ordered the Qods Force to do what they did." Likewise, when the lslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seized fifteen British sailors patrolling a waterway between Iran and Iraq, commentators suggested that responsibility may rest more with freelancing commanders than the Iranian government. Identifying the true decision-makers in the Islamic Republic is essential not only for accountability but also to ensure that any Western diplomatic outreach is targeted at those who have the power to affect regime behavior. Unfortunately, as U.S. officials again debate negotiations with the Islamic Republic, they simultaneously embrace Iranian reformists and dismiss pariah behavior as the actions of isolated rogue elements. Such an assessment is backwards, though. The IRGC represents the core of the Iranian state, and Iran's reformists are those who, by acting on their own without either state support or any ability to deliver on promises are, in the Iranian context, the true rogue elements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article advocates the use of institutional theory study the development of Islamist political parties. The author notes that civic institutions are weak in Muslim countries generally, magnifying the threat posed by Islamist political organizing. The problem of developing civil society is presented as a function of the authoritarian political systems of Muslim countries. The examples of politicized Islam in the authoritarian states of Iran and Saudi Arabia presented as instances where the Shari'a law and ideas about the politicisation of Islam have served to undermine democratic principles.

The article discusses the reasons why Iran is not a good representative of Islamic civilization. Details about Iran's Persian past and the influences of Persian culture on Islamic states are provided. The dialogue between Islamic states and the West is explored and the domination of Western culture is examined. The religionization of modern nation-states and their role in the recognition of universal values are described. The adaptation of Iran to the modern world and modern values is also discussed.

Since its revival in 1989, the reproductive health and family planning program of Iran has made great strides in raising the contraceptive prevalence rate and reducing fertility. The majority of couples are using modern methods promoted and provided by the national program, although a sizable proportion of couples continue to depend on the traditional method of withdrawal. The longstanding urban-rural gap in contraceptive prevalence rates has been reduced to about 10 percent, which is mainly the result of better-educated urban couples' continued practice of withdrawal. Despite its enormous success in meeting the needs of married couples, in narrowing the urban-rural gap in access to and use of modern contraceptives, and in reducing fertility, the Iranian family planning program is open to criticism for confining its target audience to married couples and failing to address the issue of abortion. The restrictive aspects of the program are often justified on the grounds of religious values and fear of encouraging sexual promiscuity. Because of the theocratic nature of the political system and the immense power enjoyed by Shiite ulama (religious leaders), no step can be taken to address these restrictions without their implicit support and approval. This study describes some of the ethical issues facing the reproductive health program of Iran and indicates how pragmatic approaches adopted by the ruling Shiite ulama to solve some of the social and medical challenges of a rapidly modernizing society may be extended to overcome ethical hurdles faced by the reproductive health program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the possibility of a confrontation between Iran and the U.S. U.S. President George W. Bush labeled Iran as evil due to its nuclear program and support of terrorism. He comments that hardliners prevented former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami from enacting social reforms and have oppressed Iranian citizens. The election of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad led to increasing defiance by Iran toward the international community and attempts to influence Iraqi politics.

This article focuses on the two political factions in Iran, the Jihadi (traditionalist combative) and the Ijithadi (creatively interpretive) and their competition and accommodation since the Revolution. The author argues that US-policy and developments in the region have favoured the Jihadis and enabled President Ahmadinejad to act more intransigently and assertively than would otherwise been the case. At a time of profound shift in the sectarian and strategic balance in the region, the challenge for the US and its allies is to widen the arena for Ijithadis within Iranian politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Offers observations on the state of science in Iran as of November 24, 2000. Effects of the reign of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on scientific research in Iran; Efforts to rebuild science and technology departments in Iranian universities.

Offers an analysis of political rivalry in Iran under the presidency of Muhammad Khatami. Political factions in Iran; Ideology of Islamists; Islamic pluralism; Significance of the 1997 presidential election that catapulted Khatami into power.

Analyzes the debate over the Islamic leadership and the role of Velayet-e Faqih in Iran in the era of President Muhammad Khatami. Basic tenets of the Iranian Revolution and its contradictions; Prevalence of the political state over religion; Political, religious and clerical crisis.

Presents a case study of Iran sixteen years after the Islamic Revolution. Iran's claim to the islands of Bahrain archipelago; Iran's military reconstruction and pursuit of a nuclear strategy; International relations.

The article presents a discussion related to the fundamental contradictions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. There has been a common tendency among many western commentators to see the outward manifestation of the state in the Islamic Republic of Iran as made up of different factions. The executive branch led by President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is believed to represent a moderate faction, while the former speaker of the Majlis, the Iranian Parliament, who until recently controlled the legislature, is supposed to be the leader of the radicals. The views of the radical faction are usually presented in a variety of newspapers published in Tehran, namely "Salaam, Jahan-e Islam," and "Bayan." Rafsanjani is also labeled as a reformist president as well as a pragmatist. The moderate faction controls the radio and television in the country, as well as a number of newspapers and periodicals, such as "Ettelaat," "Jomhuri-e Islami," and the "Tehran Times." Some Iranian observers have also pointed to another, a conservative faction, purportedly led by the powerful clergyman Azari Qomi, whose views are usually advocated in the daily newspaper "Resalat."

Provides insight into the potential direction that Muhammad Khatami's administration might take in the areas of economic system, political structure, and foreign policy in Iran. Reference to the assassination of the Ayatollah Khomeini, a revolutionary leader; Factors which have played a crucial role in shaping the Islamic Republic economic policy; Information on United States President Bill Clinton's policy towards Iran.

Discusses the political developments in Iran during the establishment of its theocratic Islamic Republic status in 1979. State dominance over civil society as decreed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini; Transformation of state institutions; Difficulty in finding Khomeini's successor; Problems facing the Islamic Republic.

Discusses the fall of the Shah of Iran from the perspective of the Soviet Union. Soviet Union's policy against any outside intervention in the internal affairs of Iran; United States-sponsored plan of creating a bourgeois coalition government in Iran; Support by Ayatollah Khomeini of the creation of an Islamic Republic and his rejection of U.S. interference.

Discusses the economic and political factors that influenced the Iranian revolution in 1979. Overthrow of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's government; Role of Western powers on the revolution; Conspiracy to dislocate the Iranian oil production; Economic mismanagement causing inflation.

The author reflects on the Islamic fundamentalism movement in Iran. The author inferred that the necessary conditions of democracy exists in the Islamic Republic but the sufficient requirements such as a civil society, individual liberties, and free press were absent. He averred that the movement has failed to deliver its promise of bringing economic development to the country.

The article discusses the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran. The article calls the Iranian revolution a populist, parallel to other Third World populist ideologies and movements. The revolution's populist nature derives from the multi-class coalition and unifying cross-class discourse. The article argues that populist revolutions have limited transformative potential, and that the Iranian revolution in particular did not entail a shift from one mode of production to another. This is partly because its leadership was rooted in a petty-bourgeoisie incapable of agreeing on an economic program, partly because of the extent of state and national resources expended toward the war with Iraq, and partly because of the constraints of the world-system. After locating the causes of the revolution in economic, political, and ideological developments, the article examine its trajectory, discusses the type of state and economic policies which resulted from the revolution, and assess the extent of social transformation. A central argument is that in the years following the Revolution, the Constitution, political structure, economic policies and disclosure of the Islamic Republic were eclectic, an amalgam, and best described as populist. This was a function of the transitional, exceptional nature of the post-revolutionary state, which focused less on the accumulation process in the immediate interest of capital than on the legitimization and consolidation of political power.

The article reflects on the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran in particular and on revolutions in general. The 1979 Iranian Revolution, like many other major revolutions, was unpredictable. The unpredictability of revolutions indicates that they are highly contingent, historically constituted event. A revolution cannot be reduced to a mere negative phenomenon: a structural crisis of the state, erosion of its legitimacy, or paralysis in the face of challenges. Revolutions are not only those rare moments in the life of a society in which millions of people have the option of entering the stage of politics as actors, when they have a unique chance to shape their own future and that of many generations to come. They are those moments when people actually take a chance on having a new beginning. Taking a structuralist approach, this article focuses on the vulnerability of the late Pahlavi state to revolutionary challenges that made possible the 1979 Revolution. It focuses on asking how a new political Islamic sociability became the dominant discourse of the 1970s. It is argued that Islamic politics is not a throwback to centuries ago, nor a reaction against over-modernization. Rather, it has its birth and meaning in exactly the same socio-cultural processes that produced secular modern politics of Iran. Indeed, it was formed in a conflictive battle with them.