Search

International audience; Notre propos est de fournir un éclairage économique sur certaines des dimensions liées au traitement concurrentiel des restrictions verticales. En effet, celles‑ci peuvent avoir des effets pro-concurrentiels qui sont susceptibles de conduire à un effet net positif sur le surplus du consommateur, notamment au travers d’un impact positif sur la qualité des produits et des services et sur les incitations à investir et à innover pour les firmes. Il s’agit d’interroger, selon une perspective d’économie industrielle, différentes dimensions de ces accords verticaux susceptibles de justifier une exemption par catégorie

International audience; In the European rail industry, to enable competition in the market, entrants should be granted access to a large set of complementary services, beyond access to the tracks. For an efficient and effective entry, temporary access to quasi-essential complementary assets like rolling stock, mechanical maintenance workshops, data, schedules, etc. is required. In the liberalized rail sector, several observed anticompetitive practices involve distorted access to these quasiessential facilities. Therefore, competition agencies must deal with litigation between the incumbent and new entrants. Most cases have been settled, resulting in commitments from the incumbent. We argue that such transitory and case-by-case remedies fail to produce favorable conditions for a secure and efficient entry. Thus, we propose to systematize such remedies through asymmetric and enduring ex-ante regulation.

GREDEG Working Paper No. 2020-56; During the 1920s, two different proposals of a regulated competition competed in the US. The first, inspired by trade associations, was advocated by Herbert Hoover. This approach echoes a managerialist view of a coordinated competition under state support. The second - promoted by Louis Brandeis - provides an alternative view of what a regulated competition should be: avoiding a ruinous competition through information exchange among small firms. From his involvement in the Wilson’s campaign team in 1912, to his dissent in the American Colum ruling of the US Supreme Court in 1923 and his position against the National Industrial Recovery Act in Schechter Poultry in 1935, we argue that Louis Brandeis was constant in his opposition to such a convergence between Big Business and Big Government. His intemporal coherence relies in his Jeffersonian approach advocating for a dispersion of economic powers for both efficiency and political purposes. At the opposite, both the trade associations’ movement and the NIRA experience pertain to a Hamiltonian perspective that is based on an equilibrium between the economic gains resulting from concentration or coordination and a strong political control.Available at: http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr/working-papers/GREDEG-WP-2020-56.pdf

International audience; This article conducts a detailed analysis of the concept of economic dependence and exploitative abuse based on how their treatment in competition law and economics and their enforcement in European case law have evolved. Although the theoretical roots of these concepts lie in economic theory, these issues have been ignored or considered only scantily in the context of competition law enforcement. An effects-based approach should take these problems into account and could provide insights into how to portray the impacts of these abuses. We draw on two examples – from the agri-food industries and the digital economy – of relevant economic dependence issues. This paper highlights the existence of a paradox: although industrial organization models provide relevant tools to characterize these abuses, assess their effects, and devise remedies, it seems that they are seldom used by competition law enforcers.; Cet article analyse les concepts d’abus d’exploitation et de dépendance économique, non seulement sous le prisme de la jurisprudence concurrentielle européenne mais également sous celui de l’économie industrielle. Bien que les racines théoriques de ces concepts reposent sur la théorie économique, ils ont été ignorés ou peu pris en compte dans le contexte de l’application du droit de la concurrence. Une approche fondée sur les effets (effects-based) devrait tenir compte de ces pratiques et pourrait fournir des indications sur la façon d’analyser leurs impacts. Nous nous appuyons sur deux exemples tirés des industries agro-alimentaires et de l’économie numérique. Le présent article souligne l’existence d’un paradoxe : bien que les modèles d’organisation industrielle fournissent des outils pertinents pour caractériser ces abus, évaluer leurs effets et concevoir des mesures correctives, ils demeurent peu utilisés dans la pratique décisionnelle.

The opening up of the French long-distance bus industry is one of the outcomes of the Loi Macron . In this study, we build a unique data set of several representative bus routes and show that the effects of the liberalization have been encouraging in terms of fares, new entry, higher frequency, and higher quality. First, with regard to international routes that used to be under cabotage, we find that relaxing quantitative restrictions has led to the expected results on the Lyon–Torino and Paris–London routes. Second, with regard to domestic routes newly created from the Loi Macron , mostly all procompetitive expected variations in the variables have been observed, except for fares. Indeed, we show that bus operators used an initial aggressive pricing strategy to induce demand for the new services and then increased fares once customers became accustomed with the service.

International audience; The paper analyzes the interactions between trade and renewable energy policies based on the EU-China solar panel dispute which is the most significant antidumping (AD) complaint in Europe. We build a price competition duopoly model with differentiated products and intra-industry trade in photovoltaic (PV) equipment. We show that an optimal antidumping duty always increases with the feed-in tariff (FIT) program set in the home country. An appropriate antidumping duty - nullifying the dumping margin - decreases with the FIT program. We show that optimal FIT increases with the AD duty. Therefore, trade and renewable energy optimal policies may complement one another. Lastly, we introduce R\&D activities in the PV sector, and international spillovers. We show that R\&D makes the optimal FIT lower and increases the dumping margin. These effects are reinforced by technological spillovers.

En avril 2014, la Commission européenne a révisé ses Lignes directrices sur les aides d'Etat en matière d'énergie et d'environnement. Dans cet article, nous montrons comment l'analyse économique des effets des aides participe à la politique de la concurrence et propose un cadre rigoureux d'évaluation. Nous soulignons cependant que la manière dont les Lignes directrices présentent la nécessité des aides publiques est discutable. Deux logiques s'opposent en réalité, l'une distributive consistant à ne pas pénaliser les pollueurs domestiques vis-à-vis de la concurrence internationale, l'autre incitative dont l'objectif est de régler des externalités résiduelles. La Commission semble admettre trop rapidement les limites des politiques environnementales et ne met pas suffisamment en avant les externalités positives technologiques liées à l'innovation.

The duration of appellate court proceedings is an important determinant of the efficiency of a court system. We use data of 234 firm groups that participated in 63 cartels convicted by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to investigate the determinants of the duration of the subsequent one- or two-stage appeals process. We find that while the speed of the first-stage appellate court decision depends on the court’s appeals-related workload, the complexity of the case, the degree of cooperation by the firms involved and the clarity of the applied rules and regulations, the second-stage appellate court proceedings appear to be largely unaffected by those drivers. We take our empirical results to derive conclusions for both firms that plan to file an appeal as well as public policy makers.

International audience; The iPhone exclusivity deal illustrates the complex issue of exclusive arrangements in high-tech industries. Previous law cases on broadcasting right restrictions also highlighted the risk of anticompetitive foreclosure through such contractual clauses. This paper questions the French competition authorities' decisions in the light of economic analysis. If such exclusive agreements foster incentives to invest and innovate, they may also be considered as exclusionary practices.

International audience

The iPhone case illustrates the issue of exclusive dealing in high tech sectors. Previous law cases on broadcasting right restrictions highlighted the risk of anticompetitive foreclosure through such contractual clauses. This paper aims at confronting the French competition authorities' decisions with controversial debates in the field of economic theory. If on one hand such exclusive agreements foster incentives to invest and innovate, on the other hand they can be considered as exclusionary practices., L'affaire de l'exclusivité d'Orange sur les terminaux iPhone met en relief la problématique des clauses d'exclusivité dans le domaine des industries de haute technologie. Les contentieux déjà noués sur les droits audiovisuels avaient illustré les risques induits par ces dispositifs contractuels en termes de verrouillage du marché. Il s'agit dans le cadre de cet article de confronter la pratique décisionnelle des autorités nationales de la concurrence avec les controverses de la théorie économique. Les clauses d'exclusivité sont certes bénéfiques en termes d'incitations à l'investissement et à l'innovation mais peuvent s'avérer des vecteurs de stratégie d'éviction anticoncurrentielle.

International audience; This paper aims to analyze the effectiveness of asset transfers in preventing unilateral effects of a merger. We show that asset divestitures allow the remedying of certain price increases. Market size negatively impacts the scope of the divestiture package, while the number of merging firms increases with it. In spite of the required asset sale, parties' profitability remains ensured in most cases. Buyers always make profit from their purchase if industry fixed costs are rather low. We also add the alternative of a second buyer and compare outcomes with both consumer and welfare standards. Furthermore, as many mergers lead to efficiency gains, we integrate specific cost synergies and show that the higher synergies, the smaller the divestiture share. In the case when no buyers are available, we show that the option of divesting to a start-up entity is bound to fail if firms' technology remains the same. Lastly, we find that product differentiation can reduce the efficiency of the asset transfer.

En France, la récente affaire de l’eau semble sonner le glas du contrôle a posteriori des concentrations. L’objectif de cet article est de souligner pourtant l’intérêt de ce type de contrôle en montrant son rôle crucial pour les autorités de concurrence comme complément du système actuel des notifications. En présentant les limites d’un contrôle exclusivement ex-ante, nous montrons que la possibilité d’agir ex-post sur les structures du marché pourrait engendrer des comportements plus vertueux dans le contrôle amont en réduisant les effets de sélection adverse. Le contrôle a posteriori permettrait également une action positive sur les comportements des acteurs une fois la fusion réalisée, qu’il s’agisse des stratégies des firmes ou des nouvelles possibilités offertes aux autorités en matière d’incitations comportementales. Malgré ces effets favorables, la mise en œuvre d’un contrôle a posteriori des concentrations doit être abordée avec précaution car se poseraient en particulier des problèmes de sécurité juridique. Ces derniers pourraient cependant être compensés par une affirmation de la compétence du Conseil de la concurrence en matière de concentration. A recent French merger case involving two large water companies seems to toll the death of ex-post merger control. This paper aims at highlighting the interest of that type of control by showing its crucial role for competition authorities as a complement of the current notification system. Stressing the limits of an exclusively ex-ante control, we show that the possibility to act ex-post on market structures would lead to more virtuous behaviors in the ex-ante control by reducing adverse selection effects. The ex-post merger control would also permit new means of action on agents’ behaviors after the merger. Despite those positive effects, the implementation of an ex-post merger control should be attentively carried out in particular because some legal security problems could emerge. However, those issues might be offset by increasing the competence of the French competition authority in merger cases.

Évaluation SMART - auteur hors Unité au moment de la publication; International audience; This paper aims to build and empirically evaluate a discrete choice model of merger remedies as a basis for policy analysis. The database consists of 229 merger cases accepted in Phase I or Phase II of the European merger process between 1990 and 2005. We focus on the following question: Which merging firms’ characteristics lead the European Commission to decide whether to require conditional acceptance? Although a lot of empirical studies have been carried out these last years, ours is distinguished by at least two original features. First, we explore determinant factors of the Commission’s decisions with a neural network model differentiating cases accepted with or without remedies (either structural or behavioral). Secondly, we implement three multinomial logit models. We find that variables related to high market power lead more frequently to a remedy outcome, no matter the phase. Innovative industries such as energy, transportation and communications positively affect the probability of a behavioral remedy. Lastly, former Competition Commissioner Mario Monti’s policy appears to be pro-remedy, i.e. seeking concessions from merging parties.

International audience