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Despite discussions about China's rise as a global manufacturing titan and the world's third largest trading economy, few notice the unevenness of China's integration into the world economy. While some Chinese export producers have shown signs of climbing up the global value chain, most others are still trapped in a downward spiral of "race to the bottom" competition based on cheap prices. What accounts for this local variation despite the availability of cheap labor throughout coastal areas? Based on comparative case studies, the paper finds that contrary to the expectation of both neoclassical economics and state-led development theory, export upgrading was neither a natural product of market competition nor a sheer outcome of deliberate government promotion of capital-intensive investment. Rather it resulted from the complex interaction between foreign capital on the one hand and local export institutions that took root before the entrance of FDI on the other hand. While local institutions heavily influenced the direction and the magnitude of FDI's impact on local export activities, the influx of FDI at a particular period also revised the institutional arrangements governing the behavior of local governments and export businesses. This produced intended and unintended effects on the likelihood of ruinous competition or export upgrading. The paper concludes that in a transformed eraâ??one in which outsourcing and offshore production has increasingly segregated the source of proprietary knowledge from manufacturing, one should go beyond the pure focus on the amount of capital-intensive exports and high-tech investment, and should devote more attention to the important role of social coordination in overcoming ruinous competition and in nurturing the indigenous capacity for innovation and upgrading. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Foucault (1980; 2003) started to work on bio-power - which might be summarized as the maximization of state/national resources, including human resources -- he was clearly linking the state to the rounding out of the population as a whole. The focus on the intimate linkage of sovereign power and bio-power was made even more important since 9/11, when the exercise of sovereign power is used to justify the protection of population at home.The importance of state sovereign power in China is certainly unquestioned, even amidst economic reform. What is new in the governmental reasoning in China is that the full development of the individual now constitutes the source of the strength of the state, and that the full development of the individual involves, among other things, self-steering of the individual. The rationality behind this shifting is that the state realizes the knowledge economy is about competing globally for talents. This might be interpreted in terms of Foucault’s security (sécurité), “the future-oriented management of risk” (Valverde 2007, 172). "Knowledge economy", as a new concept, started to circulate in newspapers, magazines, media and Chinese leaders' speeches in 1998 since it first appeared in the 15th Communist Party Congress report. According to the rationalities of the state, the individual has to improve his/her physical, mental, psychological quality to prepare for and act as integral part of the new knowledge economy. This is fully in line with an emerging global elite consensus that is also evident in popularizers here in the West. Thomas Friedman's latest book The World is Flat (2005), popularizes the stakes in what he describes as a race to the top, one in which human capital/resources are identified as the deciding factor. Although Friedman does not say this, it is thus a global biopolitical race. Friedman pointedly identifies China, together with India and Brazil, as three most important players in the global race to the top.The proposed paper thus argues that China, although not a liberal society, is increasingly using governance techniques that remarkably resemble those used in the liberal society. In Foucault’s notion of governmentality, freedom is necessary to government. Individual's freedom is not a pre-given entity, but is a product of governmental steering through the desires, needs, interests, rights, and choices of individuals (Dean 1999, 149-175). Empirical materials for this paper derive from personal interviews I conducted in China and document analyses. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is attempted to research domestic changes in affecting China’s commitment to international institutions from international institutions-domestic institutions. It argues that some linkage factors which connect China and international system contribute to China’s strong compliance with international rules and norms. These factors cover coastal economic areas, outward sectors, and the rise of social middle class in China. With the rapid and deep involvement into global political economy system, positive changes happened in China’s domestic area. International institutions have great impacts on Chinese domestic political economy, and similarly, China must reform its domestic political economy system in order to meet global change and challenge. China has good reputation in complying global institutions. This paper concludes that domestic factors play key role in facilitating China’s compliance with international institution. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the efforts made by the international community on climate change, since the 1990s, the world has not yet reached an acceptable solution to tackle the problem. Disputes existed not only between the advanced economies and the emerging powers, such as the BRICS states, but also between the emerging developing nations and the least developed nations. The key issue was not about "whether" the climate change should be tackled, but rather on "how" to tackle it, namely, "what" should be done and "who" should make the decisions. As one of the greatest carbon emitters, China has often been blamed being responsible for the failure of reaching a binding international treaty at the Copenhagen Conference, yet China insists that it has the legitimated rights to develop its economy and that the Western nations should take more responsibilities. This paper aims to examine the current international architecture on climate change, and to explore the obstacles that prevented reaching a "fair" solution to tackle the issue, taking China's position as an example. It argues that although the approaches taken by the relevant parties are legitimate under their own circumstances, they are not beneficial to help reach a global solution to save the earth. To ensure more effective governance on climate change, some reform may be required to strengthen the global institutions and rules; but the emerging powers, including China, should also be prepared to bear more responsibilities at the international stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how China's economic expansion, U.S. interests, and Latin American economic and political demands intersect with regards to energy politics in the Americas. After briefly outlining China's meteoric rise and its corresponding increase in energy needs, we examine the PRC's recent moves in Latin American energy sectors. A number of Chinese-owned energy concerns have struck deals across a host of Latin American states and at first glance Chinese-U.S. conflict over the region's energy reserves may seem likely. However, we also find that the size and scope of these agreements is actually quite limited. Furthermore, the technical demands of extracting Latin American energy resources, the difficulties involved in transporting energy largely located near the Atlantic to the Pacific coast, the limits placed on foreign involvement in most Latin American states, and the region's politics all reduce China's ability to exploit the region's energy reserves. A final complicating factor for China is that her industrialization threatens manufacturing in a number of energy-producing states in the region. In short, while China's energy interests in Latin America have increased as of late, there are a plethora of factors that will likely prevent a significant Chinese presence for the foreseeable future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to answer three questions about contemporary Chinese political economy system: As a long-time commanding state and decentralized developmental state, for what causes Chinese government decided to perform regulatory reform policies and build a regulatory state in mid-1990s? What kind of structural obstacles will Chinese regulatory state building meet and face? Which unique characteristics does Chinese regulatory state possess? By taking drug safety regulation as a typical case of risk regulation, this article will provide a series of replies accordingly as below: It is the collapse of Interest Community of Government, Enterprise and Shiye Unit (ICGES) that fosters the regulatory state rising in contemporary China. Nowadays, three major structural obstacles are threatening Chinese regulatory state building due to the path dependence of its previous political economy system: problematic regulatory independence caused by decentralized developmentalism, administrative-relied regulatory style affected by commanding economy model and rent-seeking orientation of regulatory corruption brought by authoritarian political system. Therefore, the author is inclined to employ a term of "authoritarian regulatory state" to define the characteristics of current Chinese regulatory state in contrast to general regulatory states based on well-rounded market economy and democratic political system. If the readers agree with this analytical framework, we can argue that Chinese regulatory state building in still on the road from the case of drug safety regulation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unprecedented economic growth and development in China over the past two decades has been as impressive as it has been daunting. Surpassing all expectations, China's GDP continues to grow at an average of 6 to 8 percent annually since 1999. However such growth has not been without consequences including: 1) increased migration; 2) the increased gap between rural and urban development; 3) and the changing place of women in the economy and society as they are among the number of those migrating. The changing political economy of China has increased the costal-interior, urban-rural as well as gendered economic inequalities while exposing the inadequacies of social and labour policies to accommodate the changing needs of Chinese citizens. As a result, the rural and migrant women who have traditionally been marginalized continue to be vulnerable to the forces of market reform and globalization. It is therefore the purpose of this paper to show that while the changing political economy in China has afforded rural women an opportunity to enter the off-farm labour market with the hope of improved economic security, policy deficiencies continue to marginalize migrant rural women by categorically framing them as second-class citizens within the cities they move into. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Commentators assume that "the rise of China" is having a significant impact on the strategic landscape, but most of the existing literature remains divided or undecided on the effects and durability of growing Chinese power. Such discussions tend to focus on China's economic growth and selected indicators of military capability, as well as its greater diplomatic profile. I argue that such analyses do not provide answers to the critical question of how powerful China is becoming, because they do not begin with systematic indicators of power, and more importantly, of influence, in the region. For instance, how does relatively limited Chinese material assistance to strategically less contested states like Cambodia, or pariah states like Myanmar and North Korea, stack up against Japan's role of the region's most prominent investor? How do Chinese “strategic partnerships” measure up against American alliances in the region? This paper is divided into three parts. First, it develops a framework for measuring power and influence, which focuses on (a) material and ideational elements of power; (b) the perception and reception of power; and (c) the conversion of power into influence, especially the operationalising of 'soft' power. The second section applies this framework to China's record in East Asia since 1990, and assesses the nature, rate of growth, and limitations of Chinese power and influence. The final section evaluates the relative power and influence of other major powers in the region, especially the United States, Japan, and India. Overall, this paper offers a more coherent account of the changing 'power ledger' in Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores China?s quest for great power status within contemporary International Society. While the political and economic importance of China has increased greatly in recent years, China?s social standing, or legitimacy as a member of the ?great power club? has been an ambiguous one. China?s authoritarian political system and poor human rights record has, it has argued, been led to it being marginalised as an ?undemorcatic Other?, and its rise has resulted in considerable unease among many members of International Society. China is thus seen as an ?aspirant power?, a state which desires great power status, but feels that it either has yet to attain this position or has been denied this recognition. In this paper, I seek not to explore how the ?great power club? as constituted, but how China has grappled with the norms of legitimacy which denote ?rightful membership? in the ?great power club?. The process to seeking recognition as a great power involves three steps. First, the aspirant great power must identify which symbols/norms denote ?great power? identity in International Society. Second, it must invoke these symbols and attempt to persuade its peers that it is worthy of recognition as a great power. Finally, the aspirant great power?s ?audience? or ?significant peers? must be convinced that the state has fulfilled the particular social standards that make it worthy of ?great power status?. I primarily explore the second process. In particular, I explore who the Chinese have sought recognition from, and seek to explore why these actors constitute China?s ?significant peers?. I then turn to examining how this reference group influences China?s attempts to attain great power status. I will then explore the domestic debates and strategies which China employs to regain what it considers its ?rightful? place as a great power in International Society, and contextualise this with the norms of ?membership? for great power status in International Society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research question of this paper is: “Does economic growth make China a threat?” Bearing this question in mind, I review the “China threat” literature and its counter-arguments since the early 1990s. This paper examines the offensive realist theoretical basis for the “China threat” literature, and it outlines several oversimplifications that the “China threat” arguments often suffer. Moreover, it is argued that while the “China threat” literature tends to support its arguments by rejecting the liberalist interdependence peace hypothesis and democratic peace hypothesis in the China context, a Marxist dependency framework may be more relevant to explore China’s capabilities and intention to pose a threat to the United States. And, in order to fully assess the strategic implications of China’s economic growth, we need to place the economic growth in the background of economic globalization as well as to take China’s domestic social relations in the process of economic growth into consideration. My conclusion is that economic growth will not make China a threat. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the Chinese economy grows, will China emerge as a challenger to US military hegemony, or will the process of growth bring about domestic political change that will produce pacific relations between the US and China? Alternatively, will some other country in the region eclipse either nation (China and the US) as the primary security concern of the other? This paper will use extant models of economic and political development to answer this question. This will be done through an application of Barro’s (1997) model of the determinants of economic growth to predict the growth of the economies of the US, China and other Asian nations. Projected military balances will be forecast by positing various levels of national military spending. Most importantly, Burkhart and Lewis Beck’s (1994) empirical analysis of the relationship between economic growth and democratic development will be used to forecast the level of democracy one might expect at the projected levels of economic development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tackles the issue of corruption. "[Corruption] is China's greatest economic blight, its biggest social pollutant and an important political challenge," according to Hu Angang and Guo Yong, two prominent researchers at Tsinghua University. (Cit ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With one of the world’s lowest population growth rates and a rising “gender imbalance” due to the persistence of sex selected infanticide of girls, China’s demographic decline is dramatic. While the resultant security threats such as trans-border human trafficking and the prospect of regional instability have recently come to light, the economic effects of Chinese demographic decline have yet to be fully examined. This paper analyzes the way in which the Chinese fertility declines differ from those in the Russian, Japanese and European cases because the Chinese population is getting older before it gets rich. Despite the overall size of its population, the imbalance between wage earners and the aged and young populations will force Beijing to make economic tradeoffs in the years head. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most striking in international political economy in 1980s and 1990s is that China went through three kinds of transitions smoothly, i.e. from a command economy to a market-oriented one; from a rural, agricultural society to an urban, industrial one; and from a non-WTO nation to a WTO one, without leading to catastrophic turmoil or collapse compared to former socialist countries in East Europe and the Soviet Union. Around China’s successful transition and its robust economic growth, there have appeared two opposite schools: one is convergence school, which views China’s economic growth as the natural consequences of its “reform and open door” policy aimed at ‘normal’ or ‘standard’ market economy by incremental institutional adaptation and adjustment; another is experimentalist school, which argues that China’s robust economic growth is one part of an unique process with deliberate institutional design, or with somewhat institutional innovations such as “two track price system”, although without clear and coherent target, sequencing and pace. In this paper, we try to seek linkages between domestic institutional adjustment and international forces to explain the roles of China’s government in managing its transition and maintaining its successive economic growth.Four parts are included, part I focuses on what kind of roles the government has played in the transition from the command economy to a market-oriented economy by scrutinizing the evolution of two developmental paradigms and their smooth transition. In part II, we examine the correlation between industry policies and economic growth, and evaluate successes and failures of industrial policies through listing pivots of China’s automobile industrial policies and electronics industrial policies. In part III, we put the industrial policies in a broader context and explain why these kinds of industrial policies did work, or in some sense worked very well in promoting China’s economic growth in past two decades, and what kinds of challenges the policies has to face in the future. The final is concluding remarks, in which we point out some possibilities and challenges that China’s government is likely to confront in its attempt to foster further a market-oriented economy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most economists believe that China's foreign-driven, export-led growth has made the country one of the most successful developers in modern times. They also believe that the nature, speed, and scale of China's growth is positively reshaping and accelerating economic activity in other countries. This paper rejects this conventional wisdom. It argues that China's economic experience and the resulting restructuring of other countries' economic activity cannot be adequately understood in national or even inter-national terms. Rather, China's post-reform economic activity and production processes in other countries are being linked and collectively reshaped by broader transnational capitalist dynamics, in particular by the establishment and intensification of cross-border production networks by transnational corporations. Far from benefiting working people, these dynamics are increasing international imbalances and instabilities as well as heightening competitive pressures that work against the interests of workers in all the countries affected by them, including China. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on the "Communist Dynasty." Despite danger signs and contrary to what some pundits and observers predict, the Chinese communist party (CCP) is not going to collapse any time soon. Learning its lessons from the experiences and events which transpired in the former Soviet Union and East European communist regimes, the CCP has been more deft at handling the challenges and crises that comes with a transition to a market economy. The question, therefore, is not "Can the CCP continue to govern China?" Nor is it "How much longer can this Market-Leninist system continue?" Rather, the question we should be asking is "How much is the CCP willing to alter the political system to make the economic system viable?" In examining the various issue areas confronting the CCP (i.e., reform of the market and legal systems, democratization, etc.) this chapter posits that in the final analysis China's political economy will become a market-democracy but with very evident Chinese characters. Key concepts and issues discussed/examined in this chapter include: "mandate of heaven," fascism (authoritarian political system), "dynastic cycle," Mao, Deng, Jiang, Hu, party legitimacy, bao xian (ideological study groups), social contract, state-society relations, Tiananmen Square incident. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main object of my research is to analyze the impact of international free capital mobility on economic growth and development process in developing countries based on four cases studies of China, Korea, Chile and Mexico. The case studies will show varying effects of free capital flows reflecting the variations in paths and features of financial liberalization in these countries. In explaining factors affecting different patterns of financial liberalization the research examines the possibility and ability of developing countries in managing capital account liberalization and financial market opening. That is crucial not only to preventing negative effects of free capital mobility, but also to enhancing the autonomy of economic and social policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]