Search

This paper presents a new panel dataset measuring non-market coordination in OECD countries across several spheres of the political economy. The paper uses the dataset to test hypotheses about the origins and maintenance of non-market coordination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is part of a panel # 030982 entitled : Researching Women’s Movements and Gender Politic: Feminist Inquiry and Methodology in Empirical Research proposed by Jean C. Robinson Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been an explosion of in-depth studies of postsocialist societies crucial to broadening our understanding of postcommunist politics. While anthropologists have been contemplating feminist ethnography in the postsocialist states (e.g. Fieldwork Dilemmas: Anthropologists in Postsocialist Societies, 2000), little has been written by political scientists. This paper, based on my struggles to do fieldwork in Russia, the Czech Republic, and Armenia, will examine the limits to objectivity, the paradoxes of activism, and the obstacles of trying to the hit the moving target that is postcommunist civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tony Blair and Bill Clinton constructed a “Third Way” ideology that helped their parties win political power in the 1990s. This novel ideology created a middle path between socialism and neoliberalism that moved parties of the Left closer to the center of the political spectrum. Some scholars have tried to understand the Third Way by describing the factors that influenced its creation. Others have detailed the exact policies of the Third Way, asking whether it is really new or just a revision of an older ideology While these works have added to our knowledge of this subject, questions remain about this ideology. It is still unclear what barriers Blair and Clinton faced when trying to implement the Third Way. Did interest groups try to stop them? How did the media react to this ideology? In our paper, we deal with this issue by focusing on the implementation of Third Way policies. Basically, it seeks to highlight those factors that either promoted or prevented the passage of Third Way legislation in America and Britain. To address the issue of implementation, we present a case study of Blair and Clinton’s immigration policies. We ask, were Blair and Clinton’s policies similar? Or did these leaders enact different immigration proposals? By answering these questions, we are trying to highlight those forces in society that enhanced or prevented policy convergence. We argue that there are several “push” factors that make it more likely for Blair and Clinton’s policies to be similar. Economic changes in the US and UK, electoral difficulties confronting the Left, cultural change from materialism to post-materialism, organizational cooperation between Labour and the Democrats, and the attitudes of Blair and Clinton are all identified in this paper as factors that promote policy convergence. However, while policy convergence might occur in some cases, other variables exist that might create differences between Clinton and Blair’s policies. Specifically, they could face pressures from interest groups, public opinion, media elites, economic forces, and opposition parties when trying to implement the Third Way. These “pull” factors will make it difficult for Clinton and Blair to enact similar policies. Our paper examines these push and pull factors in an attempt to identify whether the Third Way can be successfully implemented cross-nationally. This topic needs to be considered for several reasons. First, as the Left struggles to find an ideology to replace socialism, scholars need to study the new ideologies that they adopt. This can tell us about the future direction of the Left and whether it will succeed as a political force in the upcoming years. Second, this topic has not received much attention in the literature. Most research deals with why parties are adopting the Third Way or considers the clarity of this ideology. There needs to be more focus on whether the Third Way is being successfully implemented in the US and UK. Third, there is a need for more comparative scholarship when it comes to this topic. Most of the literature looks at the Third Way without comparing it to different cases and contexts. Our approach is comparative and examines this ideology in America and Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The responses of African states to the HIV/AIDS epidemic have varied greatly. This paper will analyze the political reasons that South Africa and Ghana have addressed the HIV/AIDS epidemic in different ways. I will examine the cases of South Africa and Ghana because of their different political experiences, HIV infection rates, and levels of economic development. Politically, South Africa endured over forty years of apartheid and a recent democratic transition. After years of military rule, Ghana recently underwent a transition to democracy. In terms of the HIV/AIDS issue, South Africa has an HIV-positive rate of 20 percent among its 18-49 year old population, while Ghana’s infection rate is 3 percent . South Africa’s GNP per capita of $3,210 is ten times higher than that of Ghana ($390). Data for this paper come from government documents, news accounts, and interviews with policy-makers. This paper questions how several variables shape policies on HIV/AIDS in each country: civil society associations, dependence on donors for health revenue, democratization, political leadership, media coverage, public opinion, and the neopatrimonial nature of the African state. In doing so, the paper illustrates the complex relationship between political forces and aspects of the disease itself that make policy-making to address HIV/AIDS problematic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political inclusion of minorities has rarely been studied cross nationally and when it has it is most often used as an independent variable. Most often political inclusion is assumed as a component of democracy. This paper explores those factors that increase the probability of minimal political inclusion for minorities. We aggregate the treatment of Minorities at Risk to the state level and examine the causes of minimal political inclusion at the state level. In this paper we examine the impact of democracy on both the international and domestic level on states minimal political inclusion of their minorities. Controlling for a countries wealth and the international security environment. We find that democracy both as an international norm and as a regime have a positive impact on a state having minimal political inclusion for its minorities. The other variables, were not significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper substitutes variables for countries in analyzing attitudes toward democracy in six Asian nations: Korea, China (Mainland), Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and Thailand. The working hypothesis of the paper is that national differences in attitudes and opinions reflect underlying socioeconomic variations across nations, rather than inherent cultures within the nations. According to this hypothesis, urban-rural configurations of the populations should dominate opinion orientations, rather than idiosyncratic characteristics of these nations. The fundamental rural-urban cleavage will explain attitudes toward traditionalism-modernism which, correspondingly, will contribute to an explanation of attitudes toward democracy. The data for the study come from probability samples across the selected nations in a multi-nayion study using the same questionnaire in 2001. The analysis shows that rural-urban cleavages, seldom used in cross-national comparisons, are significant explanatory factors within nations. This study examines whether these within-nation associations are also significant for explaining attitudes and opinions in a cross-national analysis. The essential issue is: Is within-nation variance greater than variance among nations on the issues of interest? The inclusion of both developed and developing Asian nations permits examination of whether levels of development contribute to national profiles of public attitudes toward elements of democracy such as preference for democracy over authoritarian forms of government, satisfaction with democracy, desire for democracy, and other indicators of democratic support and consolidation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is concerned with the effects of ethnicity on trust relations in a diverse community. In particular, I am asking if an emphasis on ethnicity, via multicultural politics, has an effect on trust relations, and if so, how that effect manifests itself. I am posing this question in the context of a range of critiques launched at multicultural politics. There are, it seems to me, two general categories of critiques faced by multicultural politics. On the one hand, critics go so far as to accuse multiculturalist politics of creating the problem to begin with. According to these general critiques, diversity is a fact of life, but not a fact that matters all that much to politics, and multiculturalists have created a problem out of, as it were, thin air. In this category of critiques, multiculturalists are accused of creating problems at the social level as well as the political level. On the other hand, multiculturalists are accused of misidentifying the problem faced by diverse communities. Multiculturalists wrongly identify the fact of diversity as a social and political problem that must be dealt with in a concrete way. A variant on this critique suggests that while multiculturalists may indeed have properly identified ethnic and racial diversity as a problem facing contemporary democracies, the solutions they propose – multiculturalist policies – are largely ineffective. In this paper, I consider each of these critiques from the perspective of trust relations; I argue especially that each raises important questions about trust relations in a diverse citizenry. By way of introduction, I explain the import of trust to democratic politics. In the first section of this paper, I outline the critiques launched at multicultural politics in general. In the second section, I argue that ethnicity – as reflected by multiculturalists and their critiques – is a subject that oftentimes must be dealt with in partnership with trust. I hope, ultimately, to show that the critiques launched at multiculturalist politics are wrong-headed, because although they do properly recognise the danger posed by a political and social emphasis on diversity, they do not recognise the trust issues that at the heart of their critiques. When critics argue that emphasis on multiculturalism damages the sense of social solidarity that ought to pervade a polity or the quality of democratic decision-making in a polity, they are correct. They do not recognise, however, that these are all symptoms of damaged trust relations – trust relations damaged by the fact of diversity, not multicultural policies – the solution for which cannot be to ignore the claims by advocates of multiculturalist politics. I propose that any successful multiculturalist policy will include a recognisable trust-building or trust-strengthening component, so that any effective policy will necessarily not have the damaging effects that critics worry about. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws upon the writings of 20th century philosophical thinker Michael Polanyi to illuminate aspects of the political thought of Edmund Burke. In the process, an effort is made to make progress toward a new understanding of relationships among politics, culture, and thought. In some of his earliest public and private writings Burke displays an interest in non-rational dimensions of learning and knowledge, and in the role of worldviews in shaping learning and thought; this early interest would inform his later political writings. Michael Polanyi is known both to recognize objective truth and to emphasize the personal nature of knowledge; he also explores the nature of learning and belief much more explicitly than does Burke. By combining Polanyi's more systematic thought with Burke's political-philosophical insights, this paper identifies and highlights aspects of the nature of thought, knowledge, and reason, with special attention to their relationship to politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increasing the homogeneity of a party’s support across the nationâ€"party nationalizationâ€"is a key concern to new democracies. This paper tests the impact historical development, intra-party and institutional variables in explaining party nationalization in Central America. During the 1990´s, five of the six Central American countries experienced transitions to democracy. Although there are similarities in the democratization trends, my data covering the years 1980-2008 show remarkable, inter- and intra-country differences in terms of geographic distribution of the parties’ vote. An important focus of the paper is to distinguish among factors that explain differences between parties, among countries, and across time. Specifically I hypothesize that historical development factors and institutional elements are associated with party nationalization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Women enter college with less self-confidence and different educational aspirations than men. Gender-role attitudes (modern versus traditional) are involved. This paper examines the effects of political ideology (liberal versus conservative), family background, and peer group relationships on student attitudes and goals. It is hypothesized that the gender gap in educational attainment is greatest among conservative male and female students. The sample for this study consists of white students at a liberal arts college in the south (n=1774). Students were asked how smart they thought they were compared to others and their educational goals after graduation from college. Among those on the far left of the political spectrum, there is little difference between female and male students in their self-confidence and how far they intend to go in school. However, as one moves from the far left to the far right, the gender gap in self-confidence and educational goals widens appreciably. Highly conservative male students have the highest level of self-confidence and educational aspirations while highly conservative females have the lowest. This gender difference by political ideology is not due to religious fundamentalism or social conservatism. Rather, it has more to do with the values and way of life associated with economic conservatism. The paper closes with an analysis of which family background and peer group factors explain why these gender differences are found among (highly) conservative students. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines democracy as an international norm, and the problems encountered establishing it in Africa. The paper argues that each country's unique characteristics act as filters through which international norms are implemented. Uganda is used as a case study to generate hypotheses that can be untilized to study ways in which democracy is defined, or ways in which its institutions are adopted.Three hypotheses that we can use to explain democracy in Uganda are presented in this paper. First, it is hypothesized that countries with a history of violent ethnic conflicts are more likely to prefer no-party/one-party democracy. Second, it is suggested that the meaning of democracy in African countries is defined by the dominant elite faction. Third, it is hypothesized that African leaders who are capable of providing security are more likely to succeed in framing a norm differently from the international standards. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public opinion and foreign policy in Latin America has been sparsely studied in its own right. This paper seeks to test hypotheses drawn from the study of American and comparativist politics. Since the 1920s the impact of public opinion on American foreign policy has been a point of both optimism and dismissal. Liberals have argued that public opinion has the potential to promote peace while pessimists have questioned the stability of public opinion and the ability of the public to make decisions toward foreign policy. Within Latin America, the study of public opinion and foreign policy has been largely overlooked as the emergence of the scientific study of public opinion occurred during a period of authoritarian rule. The rebirth of democracy and liberal economics in Latin America began within the "lost decade" of economic crises of the 1980s. Democratic and structural adjustment reforms since the 1990s have changed the region dramatically making issues of trade a potential touchstone for every citizen. This makes the present the opportune moment to study the public opinion and foreign policy nexus within the Latin American context. Specifically, this paper asks whether public opinion toward economic integration can be predicted by established hypothesis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we study the role of political parties in a legislative environment that makesdecisions over both ideological and distributive policies. We develop a simple model inwhich the majority party leadership, seeking to achieve non-median policies as a means ofmaximizing the probability its party retains the majority, trades off distributive bene¯tsto obtain non-median ideological policy. The key prediction of the model is that moderatemembers of the majority party receive disproportionately large side-payments from the partyleader. This prediction receives support when tested against data from the 104th and 105thCongresses. In the second half of the paper, we demonstrate several important consequencesof a legislative environment with vote-buying: vote-buying biases ideal point estimates andgenerally causes researchers to overstate both the true level of polarization and the degreeof party homogeneity. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to a long held belief in post-authoritarian Taiwan in the omnipotence of democracy to ensure the island's autonomy in the face of China, this paper argues that toward the end of the second Chen Shui-bian administration the 'marginal utility' of Taipei's use of democracy in garnering international sympathy has been drastically decreasing; recent examples include its failure to persuade major members of the 'liberal democratic community', the United States in particular, to support or at least acquiesce in its proposed referendum on joining the United Nations under the name of Taiwan held alongside the presidential election in March 2008. The underlying reason, however, is not found in the blame game between Taipei and Washington as to whether the United States is bowing to Chinese pressure at the expense of Taiwan's democratic deepening, or Taiwanese ruling elites' tactic of mobilising mass support is unnecessarily provocative which could end up drawing the US into an unwanted conflict with China. Rather, this paper suggests that the quarrel is indicative of the emergence of a new standard of civilisation based on the degree of democratic-ness in world politics. While mainstream security discourse in Taiwan has been deeply embedded in the binary structure of a democratic, peace-loving Taiwan versus an authoritarian, war-like China, in urging Taiwanese leaders to 'responsibly' strike a balance between promoting their political values and protecting their people's vital interests, senior US officials too unwittingly reproduce the rhetoric of democracy as civilisation. Unable to comprehend the operation of this civilised/barbarian trope in which Taiwan as a 'maturing' democracy (meaning potentially trouble-making) has been located between the West and the rest for the purpose of strategic appropriation, Taipei mistakenly believes that it has occupied the moral high ground vis-a-vis the great powers to 'go it alone' as seen in the UN referendum. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By making the spread of democracy a foreign policy goal, the U.S. is assuming that external factors influence the process of democratization. This paper examines this assumption more closely, looking at how the international system, and specifically conflict within the international system, affects the spread of democracy both regionally and globally. A number of studies have documented a relationship between democracy and the international system both spatially and temporally. Although these studies pose a number of explanations for temporal and spatial trends, none of them test their hypothesized causal mechanism. They only provide evidence of aggregate trends at the global and regional levels. This paper seeks to go beyond analysis at the aggregate level to test one of the hypothesized casual mechanisms, namely emulation. Drawing on Waltz's argument that competition in an anarchic environment leads states to emulate the most successful states in the system, I argue that the success of democracies in the international system prompts other states to emulate them. According to Waltz the driving force of emulative behavior is conflict and so a test of this mechanism begs the broader question: What is the impact of international conflict on the likelihood that a state will become a democracy? I test three sets of hypotheses. The direct emulation hypothesis suggests that states should imitate their competitors: thus nations that have lost wars to democracies should democratize. The indirect emulation hypothesis posits that nations should imitate the most successful states in the system: thus the likelihood of a democratic transition should be a function of the United States relative power and the regime type of the most militarily powerful state in a country's region. The socialization hypothesis predicts that countries imitate states they interact with on a more amiable level: thus states with democratic allies should be more likely to democratize. I use a logit estimator to test these hypotheses. Contrary to Waltz's expectations, I find that emulation prompted by military conflict does not play a major role in the democratization process, with one exception. I find some evidence indicating that countries are more likely to undergo democratic transitions if the most powerful country in their region is democratic. The more powerful the leading country, the greater the influence of its regime type on the likelihood that a country in its region will experience a democratic transition. Thus, if the leading country is a democracy, the more powerful it becomes the more likely countries in the region will democratize. If the leading country is an autocracy, the more powerful it becomes the less likely countries in the region will democratize. I also find support for the socialization hypothesis: the more democratic allies a state has the more likely it is to undergo a democratic transition. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can a quantitative relationship between corruption and democracy be demonstrated? This paper studies the quantitative relationship between democracy and corruption and its consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The common good is an ambiguous notion. All those who found democratic governments argue that they are creating governmental structures that will benefit the common good. But what is the common good? The Declaration of Independence argues that British governance of the American colonies did not provide for the common good, and used this as a justification for revolution and independence. The Constitution of 1787 is a document intended to create a governmental structure to promote the common good. But there were two schools of thought at the time of ratification of the Constitution. Federalists argued that the Constitution was the best governmental structure by which the common good could be achieved. Anti-Federalists argued that the Constitution would impede the achievement of the common good. Did both groups define the common good in the same manner? This paper explores the common good in early American thought, using the Federalist and Anti-Federalist perspectives to survey the notion of the common good. It also explores philosophical and political conceptualizations of the common good and analyzes whether the Federalists and Anti-Federalists used the notion of the common good in a philosophical or political fashion to further their cause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a new data set on over 4,200 state legislators in 30 states, this paper systematically tests three competing theories of representation. The first, district congruence theory, suggests a close relationship between legislative roll-call voting and district opinion. Second, the responsible parties theory, argues that legislators' party affiliations will explain legislative voting. Finally, interest representation theory, maintains that legislators' votes will favor certain groups of supporters. Because policymaking at the state level usually happens under the radar screen, this research expects the more elite level theories (responsible party and interest representation) to explain state legislative decision-making. The results indicate broad support for the responsible parties thesis. Regardless of context, political parties enforce an impressive level of discipline on their members. Interest representation occurs most when legislators face easy reelection and when they come from more professional legislative institutions. Although electoral competitiveness is not found to significantly increase legislative responsiveness to district opinion, non-amateur legislatures are significantly more likely to nurture district congruence.

This paper examines differences in conservative attitudes on the Supreme Court. Using a political regimes type framework, we show how divisions among Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, reflect divisions among conservatives in the current political regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a discussion of three questions central to the practice of indigenous autonomy in southern Mexico. Why did the federal government grant it? Is it consistent with liberal democratic principles? Does it benefit indigenous Mexicans? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we use data for U.S. House members from 1974 to 2002 to test a series of models of sponsorship and cosponsorship behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper deals with an aspect of European political culture that is vital for the legitimacy of democracy. On the basis of data from the 1999 European Value Survey the attitudes of Europeans towards democracy is explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper moves beyond aggregate cross-sectional tests of a central hypothesis in the literatures and examines instead if democracy might influence growth differently depending upon the regional political context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the paper is to move beyond what I believe is a static view of representational boundaries. The argument will be forwarded that there are alternative ways to view representational boundaries beyond the district and the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Observers of democracy have long worried that it has the potential to degenerate into rule by the poor. Yet this has never happened in the United States. Is this because the U.S. has a relatively egalitarian class structure, or are there other reasons to be considered? For some of the ancient Greeks, democracy was a form of class rule, and the concern that poor majorities would threaten property rights has surfaced and resurfaced in democratic political thought ever since, including in the thinking of the American Federalists. In response to this concern, Aristotle suggested that an ideal democracy (or polity) would have a large middle class, and Alexis de Tocqueville believed that American democracy worked in part because there were no extremes of wealth here. However, if we wish to understand why democracy in America has never been a vehicle for rule by the poorer classes, class structure alone does not offer us an adequate explanatory framework. Ironically, the thinker who gives us the best clue as to why democracy does not become a vehicle for rule by the poor is Adam Smith, who understood the powerful grip that the dream of upward mobility can have on “poor men’s sons,” and who was aware of the peculiar admiration for the rich that seems to go with this dream. In short, what Smith recognized is power of ideology, culture, and class consciousness. The dream of upward mobility has had a powerful grip on the American imagination since at least the Jacksonian era, and today, according to one study, nearly 40 percent of all Americans believe that they either are in the top 1 percent of wealth-holders, or that they will be within their lifetimes. Under these circumstances, the concern that democracy will become rule by the poor seems moot—to say the least. But does not, then, a new concern arise? If such a large proportion of Americans identify themselves not just with the wealthy but with the extremely wealthy, how can the political interests of the non-wealthy be adequately represented? The dream of upward mobility would seem to cause citizens to vote not their own class interests, but the interests of a class of which they believe they will be a member some day. This paper traces the history of democratic thought about the implications of class structure for democracy. It then focuses on the rise of liberal populism in the United States in the early 19th century, and examines the continued power of the ideology of upward mobility. It considers explanations for the continued grip of this ideology on the American imagination, and it raises concerns about the future shape of democracy under these circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the case for supermajority rules under one form of deliberartive democracy [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Earlier research has demonstrated that there are significant differences in the determinants of the number of political parties in a system as a function of experience with democracy. In short, institutions have greater explanatory power in established democracies, and social cleavages appear more important in newer democracies. Yet existing work fails to distinguish among three rival interpretations for this pattern: that institutional effects are learned, that high levels of wealth break up patronage systems based on social cleavage patterns, and/or that differences in the social context within which democracy develops determine the number of parties. This paper employs a new data set to test these competing hypotheses in both cross-sectional and time-series, cross-sectional analyses. Preliminary evidence suggests that the length of experience with democracy per se is the most important determinant of the dynamics of party systems, providing support for the institutional learning hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

David Hume’s general way of studying politics is by means of an empirical and inductive method that seems consistent with his works on human knowledge and the passions. In the essay, ‘Of Civil Liberty’ for example, he says that political science is a branch of empirical inquiry, which by making observations of political life today and studying political history may yield general principles. These are in turn susceptible to refutation by further experience or other data. This empiricism leads him to doubt even that political science is now possible. The pool of relevant data is so small, he says, and humanity’s power of forming rational generalizations is so corrupted by passion and prejudice, that a science of politics may be something that we can hope to establish only in the future, if at all. In the same essay he writes, ‘I am apt to entertain a suspicion that the world is too young to fix many general truths in politics so that not only the art of reasoning is still imperfect in this science, as in all others, but we even want sufficient material on which we can reason.’ While this suspicion does not prevent him from venturing into political theory, his attitude toward it seems to exhibit the flexibility, originality, and tentativeness that is characteristic of his views on natural religion, science, morals, and other things. How strange it is, therefore, to turn to his essay, ‘That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science,’ in which all doubts about the extent of human knowledge seem to disappear. Here he claims to have discovered in politics certain, ‘causes and principles eternal and immutable.’ At another point he says that he has established, ‘an universal axiom in politics,’ and at a further one he describes a particular generalization as, ‘one of those eternal political truths, which no time nor accident can vary.’ Further, he stipulates that, ‘Effects will always correspond to causes,’ and then, when comparing two kinds of aristocracy, he says that ‘The different operations and tendencies of these species of government might be made apparent even a priori.’ The extravagance of the claims in this essay is inconsistent with his other writings, and the meaning of these claims is most confusing given the general bent of his theory of human knowledge. This paper attempts to explain Hume’s claims in this essay by reference to the context in which they were written and his rhetorical goals in composing the work. In short, Hume found it necessary to choose between being a good empiricist and a good citizen; and he chose the latter. This fact has consequences for how we should read his Essays and other popular works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a retrospective on the Green Party of England and Wales by examing changes within the party over its 30 years of existence. Utilizing the party?s Fundi-Realo divisions and its commitment to a deep green ideology for framing purposes, the retrospective focuses on changes concerning the party?s tactics and organizations. It is argued that as the party enters its fourth decade, it has, as a result of these changes, become a revitalized and innovative force within British politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What can political liberals say to so-called reasonable non-liberals? What kinds of language are likely to be persuasive in such circumstances? Do the normative foundations of a political liberalism preclude certain kinds of discourse? Do they provide an adequate vantage point for political and moral critique? In recent times, these questions have taken on special urgency. Both at home and abroad, critics of a political liberalism are anxious to know just what political liberals will say to illiberal or non-liberal minorities. On the one hand, critics charge that political liberals are too exclusionary, banishing (in particular) certain kinds of religious discourse from the public sphere. On the other, there is the concern that political liberals are too permissive, lacking the necessary moral resources to criticize oppressive practices and beliefs. This paper cuts at the heart of these questions by asking whether political liberals should uphold universal values. The argument is that they should not, because - at least as a matter of historical and empirical investigation - these values do not exist. What otherwise diverse communities do share, however, is a common set of political and social experiences - experiences belonging not to any one community in isolation, but rather to the accumulated historical records of many diverse societies. The crux of my argument will be to say that the relative attractions of a particular politics or society can be recognized cross-culturally by ordinary men and women. Those attractions are discerned not in the values those societies embody but in the practices of daily life. For that reason, political liberals needn’t bother with universal values, but they should uphold universal practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the history of political thought, there is a discernible tradition that has long made a distinction between the form and spirit of government. This decisively European (particularly French) tradition is best represented by Montesquieu, but also includes the likes of Hegel, Rousseau and Tocqueville. The central claim of this tradition is that types of governments have both a universal and a particular form. The constitutional (institutional and procedural forms) should be particular to contexts, but should still embody the universal principles that define the form, as that designates the type of government—e.g. a democracy as opposed to a monarchy. Yet, they suggest that for the constitutional form or type to be meaningful and descriptive of the society/country, it is necessary that the principles that underlie this type of government be evident in the mores, manners, and behavior (the spirit) of its people. In other words, the forms are a) only as meaningful and accurate as a description and, more importantly, b) only likely to be successful to the extent that they become embodied in the spirit of the people. In this paper, I will first fully develop the core arguments of this tradition in political thought. As I reconstruct the core content of this tradition, I will trace it through each of theorists cited above. Then, I will argue that this tradition has its orgins in Aristotle, who argued that the legislator should model the educative process after the fact that the sociological evolution of the individual is based first on nature, then on habit, and finally on reason. After having reconstructed this tradition and demonstrated its connection to Aristotelian thought, I will then suggest that the spirit/form tradition is a valuable theoretical tool. I argue that the spirit/form tradition establishes criteria by which a political scientist can: a) Evaluate the stability of a regime type within a country b) Evaluate the legitimacy of a government within a country and c) Suggest what alternative types of government might be better suited for a country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although nowadays a large number of regimes are formally democratic, democracy doesn?t work equally well in every place. Often, those groups who wielded power under the old authoritarian regime manage to continue wielding it under democracy, thus bypassing democratic mechanisms for government responsiveness. This paper focuses on one of the most common tactics used to subvert democratic contestation, namely electoral corruption. Electoral corruption is a common phenomenon and it can have decisive consequences in the outcome of elections, yet we don?t currently have a clear theoretical account of its workings. The standard view, implicit in most of the existing literature, is that electoral corruption makes most sense in close elections, when altering the vote count at the margin is most likely to change the outcome. While this view is adequate in some cases, it nevertheless fails to account for some of the main stylized facts about electoral corruption. For one thing, corruption is common even when elections aren?t close. Second, while the literature argues that perpetrators of electoral corruption should try to keep it secret, it is often surprisingly public. I develop a simple theory of electoral corruption that challenges the standard view. I pay special attention to the role that expectations play on the behavior of voters, a critical issue that the standard view largely ignores. Using simple models I show that under certain conditions that are particularly relevant to developing countries, a powerful ruler or ruling group may have incentives to engage in more electoral corruption than merely winning would require, to engage in such actions not only during and after the election but also before it, and to publicize rather than hide its corrupt activities. These findings may at first seem counterintuitive, yet they square well with both historical and survey evidence for a variety of countries and time periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of comparative state politics have successfully used national survey data to create aggregate measures of state-level ideology. Consequently, they have shown that state-level political ideology has a profound affect on policy outputs and outcomes across a wide range of public policy issues. In this paper, we suggest the political orientations of even more localized mass publics affect sub-national public policy outputs. Specifically, we argue that state politics research would be advanced by taking better account of the significant ideological variation found within individual states. These ideological dispositions are likely to affect policy implemented at the local level. Using methodology similar to that used by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) at the state level, we develop measures of county-level ideology by disaggregating statewide California Field Poll surveys, 1990-1999. We examine the relationship between this more localized measure of political ideology and a number of policies at the local level, including criminal justice, health care, educational services, welfare, and transportation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not Open For Discussion: A Psychological Account of Democratic Deliberation. Emily H. Hoechst Georgetown University ehoechst@mac.com Deliberative democracy involves exposure to otherness in ways a non-deliberative practice does not. Because deliberative democracy brings participants into direct contact with the views of others, it brings to the fore issues of recognition and identity, separation and relation, freedom and coercion. Deliberative politics is therefore uniquely risky because it requires self-reflection, articulation of one’s reasons, and exposure to criticism These requirements will often evoke anxiety, a response which in and of itself is problematic for the deliberative framework. What makes deliberative participants anxious is not just that they may lose the argument, cause, or vote. It is also the prospect of being personally rejected; of losing intersubjective affirmation from others. Rawls and Habermas have both developed theoretical mechanisms designed to alleviate this kind of anxiety. Both theorists are keenly aware of the psychological position of the other in politics. My argument in this paper is that both Rawls and Habermas rely upon a problematic psychology in structuring their deliberative contexts, one that actually may exacerbate conflict in deliberation, making it more difficult than it needs to be. The models of Piaget and Kohlberg (and Mead, for Habermas) all argue for a postconventional or abstract mode of moral reasoning, one that treats individuals as universal bearers of rights deserving of respect. My critique of this psychology, and the democratic theory that flows from it, is twofold: (1) Based on the psychological theory of D.W. Winnicott and Jessica Benjamin, I argue that Rawls and Habermas, while claiming to support an intersubjective understanding of deliberation, actually remain caught within an intrapsychic psychology. Rawls and Habermas both favor recourse to “the moral point of view.” What intersubjective psychology suggests is that such formulations can produce the undesirable consequence of complementary thinking; those who disagree are now not only “different” but also somehow “less moral,” an unnecessarily binary (either/or) way of thinking. Benjamin in particular suggests a different psychological framework, based loosely on Hegel, which allows difference to exist in a deliberative setting, even if the setting becomes more contentious as a result. (2) Based on the recent literature on the politics of recognition (such as Taylor, Honneth, and Markell) I argue that Rawls’ and Habermas’ deliberative settings are unresponsive to issues of identity and reciprocity. Both theorists engage in a kind of cognitive bracketing for political purposes which is (a) impossible, according to Arendt, and/or (b) undesireable under circumstances that seek more deliberative participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an empirical examination of the well studied but curiously still misunderstood relationship between democracy and war. In my opinion, this state of affairs is the result of four defects in how we think about the nature of conflict participation in general and about how democracy fits into that story in particular. First, we have too often employed the singular notion of conflict participation when we should instead be looking at the separate notions of the propensity to start wars and the propensity to reciprocate challenges which lead war. Second, we have overlooked how differences in the expected costs of war can disproportionately affect the decisions for war. While low cost wars will tend to fall under the radar of societal actors, high cost wars will attract not only not only the vocal minority but will also draw in a large proportion of the silent majority as well. Third, we have tended to focus on the perceived uniqueness of democratic conflict when we should be focusing on how democracy affects the general, universal patterns of conflict participation. Fourth and finally, we have too often resorted to explanations that are, at best, linked or related to democracy. This is problematic since it draws attention away from democracy as an explanatory factor. After all, if there is anything to the relationship between democracy and conflict, our analyses should not overlook the possibility that there is something inherent in democracy that is driving that relationship. I address these issues by constructing a explanation of democratic conflict frequency based on the simple fact that, all else being equal, democracies have a greater number of political actors. From this, I am able to make two deductions. First, democracies will face a greater range of political pressure, from full resistance against to full support for war, than will nondemocracies. Second, democracies will be more sensitive to high-costs wars but will be virtually equally sensitive to low-cost wars as nondemocracies. Putting these two arguments together, I conclude that while there will be little difference at the low end of the conflict cost scale, at the high end democracies will start fewer high-cost wars and will more readily respond to challenges that lead to high-cost wars. Using both two-by-two contingency tables and multivariate regressions which takes into account a host of controls (including polity type; institutional strength; major power status, geography and alliances), I test the hypotheses above for the period from 1816 to 1992. Given the amount of data available, I find general support for the model of democratic conflict participation outlined above. Moreover, while I find evidence of a democratic peace at the low end of the conflict cost scale, in the face of high cost wars, such patterns are overwhelmed by the effects of democracy described above. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

California’s political parties have endured some of the most dramatic shifts in institutional rules of any state in the nation. The state’;s parties were nearly legislated out of existence in the early 20th century by Progressive reforms like cross-filing, making the state a haven for politicians with strong personalities and weak party ties. Since the elimination of cross-filing in the 1950s, however, the states parties have experienced a resurgence, and today the state is widely considered ranked among the most ideologically polarized in the nation. In theory, these changes in party institutions should be reflected in the roll call behavior of the state’s elected officials. Indeed, a study of how legislators responded to such drastic changes in the partisan environment can teach us much about the durability of partisanship and the power of institutions to affect politicians’ behavior. However, no reliable long term indicators of roll call behavior exist for any state. The best indicators available in most states are interest group ratings, which are biased and often based on only a handful of votes. This paper takes advantage of a new dataset, compiled with the backing of the National Science Foundation, that consists of every vote cast in the California Assembly since 1900. It is the longest time series of roll call data ever collected for one of the United States. Through the use of the NOMINATE program (Poole and Rosenthal 1987), partisanship in the California Assembly can be seen to vary greatly in response to institutional changes. During the cross-filing era, for example, the Assembly was weakly polarized, with several Republicans voting in a more liberal fashion than several Democrats. Additionally, chamber voting was multi-dimensional, and several coalitions (geographical, urban-rural, and others) often challenged party as the dominant division on roll call votes. After cross-filing’s demise, however, the parties polarized dramatically, and chamber voting today is essentially unidimensional. Indeed, the modern Assembly is a considerably more partisan body than the U.S. House of Representatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can critical theory sensibly address the problems and perils of democratic politics in the XXIst century? On what basis? Rather, based on which model of democracy? In order to assess democracy today, the tools and conceptual framework of critical theory must undergo some changes and develop conceptual clarifications that allow it to grasp (and contest) the inegalitarian dynamics of democratic politics. In this brief paper I want to take issue with the proceduralist model of deliberative democracy espoused by Habermas and point the way to a new understanding of political interaction in contemporary democracies. I will base my critical appraisal on the critique of Thomas McCarthy to Habermas’ reliance on systems theory, on Seyla Benhabib’s understanding of the normative basis of a discourse theoretic framework and Nancy Fraser’s developments concerning the character and dynamic of political interaction in contemporary (‘real existing’) democracies. In order to present my case I will 1) Identify how the systems theoretic dimension impinges on Habermas development of the concept of power, before and after the turn to communicative power based on Arendt’s notion of political action. I will map and develop the dimensions of power identified by Habermas, paying particular attention to the differences between power as steering media and power as social potential. 2. Track the implications of a limited notion of power on understanding democratic politics, based on Nancy Fraser’s (and others) development preconditions to political interaction. 3. Present the idea that egalitarian reciprocity is not a fact (nor is equality of conditions), and point to a series of issues that have to be addressed in order to develop a model capable of dealing with the challenges of inequality and domination. I want to claim that these asymmetries are not restricted to availability of resources, information or ‘natural’ abilities. They are directly created by a dynamic of exclusion and a ‘subverted’ public sphere that have to be accounted for. And the key to understanding them is a modified notion of power. 4. Explore the possibilities for a deliberative democratic model that does not hinge on the notion of a separate systems action context. I want to claim, along the lines developed by Fraser but going beyond, that the forced differentiation created by systems theory necessarily hinders the capacity to appreciate the ways in which ‘the subversion of the public sphere’ has taken, and is taking, place. I do not intend to dispense or supplant the procedural deliberative model espoused by Habermas and Benhabib. I do claim, however, that a new conceptual framework can help us better understand the perilous reality of democratic politcs and develop alternatives for action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses evidence from Mexico to test two competing visions about how democracy produces responsive government. Electoral theories of democracy, such as accountability theory, posit that democracies are responsive to the public interest because citizens are able to use elections as a means of controlling politicians. Participatory theories explain levels of responsiveness as a function of a citizenry?s ability to articulate demands and influence government through a wider range of political action. I test hypotheses derived from these two theories, using an original dataset that combines electoral, socioeconomic, public-financial, and demographic indicators for virtually all of Mexico?s 2400 municipalities, from 1980 to 2000. Although most recent research on Mexico has emphasized the importance of elections as instruments of democracy, my data show that electoral competition has little effect on municipal government performance. Non-electoral forms of participation, on the other hand, are closely and strongly correlated with government performance. Most surprisingly, the data show no evidence of an interactive effect: a competitive electoral environment does not appear to be a necessary condition for participation to be influential. I argue that Mexico?s institutional context is responsible for the failure of elections to influence government responsiveness in Mexican municipalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I present two alternative paradigms of democratization The first paradigm is the dominant approach in contemporary comparative politics and is exemplified by the work of Robert Dahl. This dominant paradigm focuses on procedural aspects of democracy. The proposed alternative paradigm moves beyond procedure by drawing upon Aristolelian traditions to create an explicitly normative concept. This approach is teleologically oriented to the ends of a democratic polity and builds upon the work of contemporary Aristotelians. The aim is to adapt these Aristotelian concepts to an applied, alternate notion of democratization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although most scholars agree that an independent judiciary is indispensable for the functioning of democratic regimes and for establishing the accountability of executive and legislative branches, most students of democratization have shied away from studying the courts. In many new democracies, however, courts are among the most prominent political actors. In this paper, I argue that this judicial activism is not always in the service of democracy and the protection of civil liberties and can prevent the consolidation of the democratic regime. I focus on the structure and political functions of the Turkish Constitutional Court in comparison to its European counterparts. I argue that compared to constitutional tribunals in other democracies, the Turkish Constitutional court is democratically unaccountable. I also argue that the courts record suggests that it should be perceived as the guardian of the values of the state elite against the encroachments of the democratically elected institutions. The Constitutional Court was established in the aftermath of the 1960 military coup and was modeled after the German Constitutional Court. The powers of the court and its functions were further modified after the 1980 coup. Since Turkey’s last return to civilian rule in 1983, the court has annulled more than 300 laws and governmental decrees and has closed 18 political parties, including two of the largest political parties in the country. Despite this willingness to act against the parliament and the political parties, however, the court has failed to emerge as a guardian of civil liberties and democratic freedoms. The courts record shows that it has been willing to act against the political class, while it has been more reluctant to act against the state, particularly against the security forces and the military. When the constitutionality of an act of parliament or a cabinet decree is challenged and the case is referred to the Court for abstract review, the challenger can expect a favorable outcome in 72 percent of the cases. Not surprisingly the opposition has found referrals to the Constitutional Court an effective way for frustrating the policies of the government in power. Chances of success are less than 15 percent when a case is brought before the court for concrete review, where most questions concerning civil liberties and democratic are likely to arise. I argue that in unconsolidated democracies like Turkey, the courts, particularly constitutional tribunals, should be seen as “guardians of the state” In unconsolidated democracies democratically elected institutions have to share power with unelected guardians, often the military. The political empowerment of the courts in these countries is part of an attempt by the guardians to protect their interest after turning power over to the democratically elected officials. Although this encourages judicial activism, the activism is to protect the interest of the guardians and to ensure their continued privileges in the political structure at the expense of democratic consolidation and the protection of constitutional freedoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Factors Determining the Process of Democratization in Mexico By Clemente Quinones University of Connecticut Basically all the Latin American politics experts coincide that Mexico is now consolidating its democracy after going through a relatively long and arduous process of democratization beginning with the most substantial electoral change of the late 1970s. In his now classic study of modernization and post-modernization, Inglehart (1997) concludes that basically the whole world is in the post materialist wave, including developing regions of the world, such as Western Europe (16 nations), North America, Latin America, and Asia. Within the Latin American region, inglehart included Mexico. In a few words, the post materialist values are basically also part of Latin American (including Mexico) and Asian cultural assets. On his part, Putnam (1993) found that social capital (civic-ness) had a stronger impact on the Italian political institutions (government performance, turnout) than the economic factors of the modernization theory. So strong was this impact that economic advanced Italian regions appeared to have more successful regional governments because they happened to be more civic (Putnam, 1993). In this paper, I try to see the extent to which the post-materialist and social capital values affect the democratization process in Mexico. My hypothesis is that although these variables had an important role, there were also some other non-less-important factors, including domestic political leaders’ will and international variables, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other financial institutions. Using the World Value Survey data, I will apply a regression analysis whose dependent variable will be the democratization process and the independent factors will include different specific post-materialist and social capital values and some indicators of external factors and individual leaders’ pressure to democratize the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to the normative presumption that different human rights are mutually reinforcing, I argue that different human rights have different determinants and different effects. I show that judicial independence has a stronger effect on due process rights than on other types of rights, that democratization enhances political rights without necessarily improving the protection of other rights, and that a good economic environment does not entail improvements in the protection of rights across the board. In each case, I offer empirical evidence and suggest and test the observable implications of mechanisms that explain the relationships that I identify. Depending on the dataset used in each part of the paper, the number of countries in the analysis is as high as 135. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper advances a reading of Melville’s fascinating and troubling short story, “Bartleby the Scrivener,” that calls attention to what I contend is its underlying philosophical problem, namely, the problem of the will. The problem of the will is integral to American political self-understanding precisely because of its democratic and liberal politics. Yet rather than focus on broad political or philosophical doctrine, Bartleby induces us to examine the problem of will at a more basic level of moral psychology. The question driving the story is the following: what is the basis for vital, meaningful human action? Bartleby stands as a powerful critique of the orthodox American answer to this question. This orthodoxy holds that the basis for vital, meaningful human action is the human will. One acts with purpose and passion because one wills to act with purpose and passion. Moreover, it is with this claim that the general American ideology of self-determination and self-making finds its foundation. Yet it is precisely the human will that is so puzzling and problematic about Bartleby, that listless figure whose only will is to do nothing. In Bartleby’s case, the moral energy of the will has reached its limit. What sense can be made of such a condition? This is the issue faced by two seminal American philosophers of the will, Jonathan Edward and William James, and a brief examination of their insights will allow greater purchase on the puzzle of Bartleby. Taking their separate historical contexts into account, Edwards and James shared the observation that a presumed age of energetic social and moral will did not impassion but rather enervated souls. Neither the will to religious fervor nor the will to industrial fervor produced real moral vitality. Rather, they seemed to have the opposite effect, engendering passionless moral selves. Indeed, for both Edwards and James the problem lay with the willing soul itself. They understood that what enervates the willing soul is its proclivity to will ends that are not subject to its will. In living solely in the realm of deliberate will, the moral self vitiates its vitality. Failing to recognize its own limits, the will shuts down. On a social level, the perverse consequence of an ideology that encourages such a life of will is a widespread listlessness of willing souls. It is this listlessness that is Bartleby’s final condition. To such a condition, thinkers like Edwards and James counterpoise the Puritan idea of moral regeneration. Moral regeneration consists of the abandonment of will in such a way that it opens the self to a morally reinvigorating experience. For Edwards, that experience is constituted by divine grace; for James, the pluralistic universe. Yet the final image of Bartleby admiring a flower grown through the stones is chilling. It implicitly challenges us to discover the conditions for moral regeneration in a democracy increasing enclosed and constituted by the artifacts of human will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indices of democracy typically identify democracy with the set of institutions of government which have evolved in ?Western? representative political systems. But on the basis of this specific democratic model these indices produce an ?institutional fallacy? in measuring ?democratic quality?, because they fail to take into account the respective (societal, institutional) context. In this paper we propose a new concept and a new index based on this argument. We apply a minimal definition of democracy, which is based on the logic of individuals? self-determination. Our index takes into account the context and the degree of effective participation. We define the contextual attributes and the different possible institutional opportunity structures to ensure effective participation. We deduce assumptions about the causal relationship between context their effect on the optimal mixture of opportunity structures. We conclude with first considerations regarding the concrete operationalization and measurement of the respective elements of our model. We end with a short qualitative illustration (in German language) of the democratic quality of three European countries to exemplify our concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the recent popularity of American Political Development (APD) as a subfield of Political Science, there has been a resurgence of interest in ideology and American political thought among numerous scholars. However, the accepted place or role of the study of American political thought in APD is uncertain. This paper will examine the status of the study of political thought in the subfield of APD, discuss what contribution it might have to this growing subfield, and explore possible tensions between the study of political ideas and ideology and the study of history and institutions so fundamental to APD. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do democratic nations make the constitutional choices they do? More specifically, why do some nations choose presidential systems while others choose parliamentary (or mixed) systems? System performance is widely studied (Lijphart; Linz ). There is a modest literature on electoral systems (Horowitz; Shugart and Carey). But this question is little studied (Rokkan, Lijphart, and Shugart are exceptions) and only as case studies or small-n comparisons. Colonial legacy seems to predominate both for emulation and for rejection of the "parent" type of constitutions. But choosing constitutional arrangements appears more complicated than the legacy explanation posits. Previous experiences with democracy also matter, again both positively and negatively. More importantly, it is commonly suggested in the scant literature that a strategic bargaining between old parties and new parties, based on rational calculation about their future electoral performance, heavily influences the constitutional design of newly democratizing countries. In this paper we seek to “model” constitutional choices during the democratization events of the post World War II period with presidentialism, mixed-systems, and parliamentarism as the dependent variable. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Who gives to political parties, and why? Small individual donations to political parties are often seen as the least tainted form of political finance. Because of this, many countries have developed political finance policies which encourage individual giving. Despite this, there are wide cross-party and cross-national differences in the extent to which parties rely on donations, differences which persist whether finances are measured in absolute or relative terms. This paper explores some the reasons for these differences, using both survey and institutional data to examine how contemporary European parties benefit from cultural patterns of philanthropy, whether tax laws actually stimulate political contributions, and how parties’ fundraising strategies reflect these different patterns of individual giving. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the last two decades have seen a proliferation of comparative studies analyzing the impact of institutions over quality of government, most studies are geared towards the input side of the state. They examine the effect of democracy, electoral systems or veto players, factors dealing with incentives of those taking policy decisions, leaving a side the incentives of those implementing policies. Generally, we lack comparative studies of how public employees are selected and which incentives they have to deliver quality of government. With the exception of Rauch & Evans (2000), the literature has not taken into account the features of the output side of a state, such as the bureaucratic structure. But in turn, Rauch & Evans (2000) lacks control of factors of the input side of the state. This paper is bridging the gap between these two approaches by testing the bureaucratic structure hypothesis together with input-side factors. Data comes from a new expert survey covering more than 50 countries. Controlling for standard political variables, we check the impact that bureaucratic factors such as meritocratic recruitment, level of salaries and career stability have on effectiveness and corruption in the public sector. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the U.S. Supreme Court renders a decision, the Court’s opinion becomes a binding precedent. Moreover, Supreme Court opinions serve as the foundation for the language attorneys utilize in their litigation efforts. Given the significance of Supreme Court opinions, it is surprising that scholars have dedicated little systematic research to investigating the factors that contribute to the content of the Court’s opinions. In this paper, we examine whether, and under what conditions, lower courts influence the content of Supreme Court opinions. We argue that lower court opinions will influence the content of the Supreme Court’s opinions based on a number of factors, including the ideological proximity of the lower court to the Supreme Court opinion author, the prestige of the lower court opinion author, and the Supreme Court’s treatment of the lower court’s disposition of the case. We use plagiarism software to compare lower court opinions with the majority opinions of the Supreme Court during the 2002-2004 terms in an effort to connect the language of lower court opinions to the language of Supreme Court opinions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will highlight major features of the Chinese political system and elaborate a China’s model of democracy. In a world where democracy has been regarded as a universal value, the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been a suspect. There have been calls for democratizing the Chinese political system, implicitly after the fashion of Western democracies, in particular the American model. Few scholars have questioned the desirability of building a democracy in China, yet it is far from being clear what the Chinese model of democracy should be. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]