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This paper asks how state attributes affect the degree to which two states' interests converge as a result of interaction within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). My previous research provides evidence that more interaction within IGOs is associated with greater interest convergence over time. However, not all pairs of states are expected to experience the same degree of convergence. In this paper, I propose that different types of similarity between two states can make state agents predisposed to the acceptance of new ideas from one another and thus enhance the degree to which intra-IGO interaction may lead to state interest convergence. Dyadic attributes hypothesized to condition the effects of interaction on interest convergence include regime type similarity and common culture. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dilemma of global slavery is increasingly troubling due to its greater prevalence in the world today. There are more slaves now than there have ever been in numbers and percentages. Although currently represented in different forms than previously seen, the specific aspect of human trafficking continues to be a growing industry in several regions of the world. The question thus becomes, what can be done to counteract this emerging epidemic? The purpose of this paper is to address the roles and effectiveness of numerous international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) by assessing their efforts to diminish the various forms of global slavery present in the world today. The goal of this study is not to evaluate and prove whether the roles IGOs play are positive or negative. Using both qualitative and quantitative analysis, this paper will situate the role of IGOs in the context of other players , including states, to discover how and if IGOs are effective. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rational choice institutionalists and constructivists have not resolved the long standing debate regarding the role of international institutions in the governance of cross-boundary externalities. In this paper, I develop an empirically testable, unified framework by theorizing the role of international institutions as a mechanism through which policy learning occurs. I construct a taxonomy to systematize policy learning. I map policy ideas into different types of learning—instrumental versus social policy learning. Social policy learning entails "lessons about the social construction of policy problems, the scope of policy, or policy goals," whereas instrumental policy learning entails "lessons about the viability of policy instruments or implementation designs (May 1992)." The type of policy learning that occurs inside an institution is contingent on its institutional design: formal information networks facilitate both social and instrumental policy learning while informal and semi-formal information networks facilitate instrumental policy learning. Social policy learning occurs far less often than instrumental policy learning. Social policy learning is rare in part because ideas associated with the social construction of problems are "sticky" and subject to path dependence and contentious politics. However, focusing events provide the impetus for major policy reforms that could alter the policy paradigm. My empirical evidence is drawn from comparative case studies of the Basel Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste (an intergovernmental convention) and the ISO 14001 (a market-driven governance system). My findings suggest that rational choice theorists are right about the role of international institutions when policymaking does not challenge the overall terms of an institution while constructivists are right about their role during focusing events when underlying policy ideas are up for debate.   ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Once peacekeepers are sent to a conflict, how long do they stay? While some might propose that missions remain in place until successful, we argue that this view is too simplistic. Missions disband before and after attaining success (as typically defined by scholars), suggesting that success and duration are two distinct concepts. Further, while success may inform duration, it is still unclear why success sometimes requires a longer commitment. More specifically, we ask what conflict characteristics are associated with longer peace operations..x000d..x000d.This study begins to uncover the conditions that affect peace operation duration. Using event history analysis, we examine all United Nations, regional Intergovernmental Organization, and multilateral coalition peace operations between 1948-2007. The results both enhance our theoretical understanding of peacekeeping and provide policy-makers with indicators to assist them in predicting the duration of contemplated missions. At a time when the demand for peace operations is growing, we argue that such an understanding is necessary for the efficient deployment of scarce resources and the effective management of conflict throughout the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IOs are often understood to be necessitated by the uncertainty that is a consequence of anarchy and externalities that are a consequence of interdependence. That many IOs are designed to alleviate asymmetries in development and security among states is less prominent in the literature. I look specifically at IOs mandated to alleviate and lessen the consequences of asymmetries existing in the international system and ask what factors influence IO performance in their role as agents. I investigate the disjuncture between understanding effectiveness as occurring at the cooperation level (among principals, often donor countries), and the domestic level (in recipient countries). I argue that how effectiveness is understood is a political question and its resolution has important consequences for how IOs exercise their authority as agents. Specifically, it influences how IO priorities are set, how oversight mechanisms are designed, and finally, who benefits from IO actions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can international organizations affect public opinion, and thus indirectly influence states’ foreign policies? Recent work claims either that people are influenced by IO decisions because some organizations are imbued with symbolic importance, or that people are sometimes influenced by IO decisions because they convey information about the merits of proposed policies or the intent of leaders to domestic and foreign audiences. Existing work relies on observational data to examine the implications of these claims. This paper presents an experiment that allows us to examine these claims directly. The experimental results show that citizens' foreign policy preferences can be influenced by IO decisions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A common claim in international relations theory holds that states will only join those international institutions with those regulations they intend to comply (Downs, Rocke & Barsoom 1996). In this paper, we oer a demonstration of when this claim might not hold. We construct a model of an authoritarian government's decision to accede to a human rights treaty. We demonstrate that authoritarian governments may use the signing of this treaty - followed by the willful violation of its provisions - as a costly signal to domestic opposition groups of their willingness to employ repressive tactics to remain in power. In equilibrium, we find that authoritarian governments that torture more are more likely to sign the treaty than those that torture less, as is consistent with Hathaway's (2007) empirical findings regarding the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We further predict that signatory regimes should enjoy longer terms in office than non-signatories - and we provide empirical support for this prediction. The model further suggests that CAT accession may reduce levels of torture; though many empirical tests may miss this relationship due to selection effects. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a new categorization of international organizations to account for the fact that within multilateral international organizations, states may engage in "bribery," in order to advance their policy preferences. Thus, to the traditional multilateral/bilateral categorizations we substitute a hard multilateral/soft multilateral and reciprocal bilateral/bilateral taxonomy. For illustration purposes, we use the well-known case study of Japan and the International Whaling Commission (IWC). Using a modified gravity model to analyze Japan's Official Development Assistance from 1973-2005, we find that Japan has a very traditional - and generous - assistance policy broadly defined, but when it comes to the IWC, some of the general principles driving the aid policy are put aside to possibly influence vote outcomes. Given this finding, we conclude that the IWC is best categorized as a soft multilateral organization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a veto players model, we evaluate how international actors and the cohesion of political parties affect policy production in Europe. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will argue that throughout its existence ASEAN has gradually deepened and broadened its institutional structure in tandem with a slow but steady change of many of its fundamental norms. It should be emphasized that these changes have been mostly rhetorical and have had very little de facto impact, nevertheless they have served to gradually build an institutional framework in which member states and global actors have become embedded through interaction and perceived benefits . Indeed, the crux of this paper's argument suggests that it is the painfully minimal nature of these adjustments that have been instrumental in securing such long-awaited changes in a region that has historically been so resistant to liberalisation. Consequently, now tied into an increasingly complex institutional framework, member states and global actors have become more committed to change ASEAN in order to maintain global and regional relevance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses "indexing theory" to assess American media coverage of two African genocides: Rwanda and Darfur. At question is the role media plays in foreign policy, that of "watchdog" or "policy supporter." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the interaction of exit strategies and veto rights in international organizations. I suggest that the way states use these bargaining strategies has broad implications for international cooperation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops the theory of international cooperation for global public goods based on a dynamic principal-agent model and shows the relationship among global public goods, hegemony, and international organizations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper bridges classical political philosophy and the empirical study of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) to suggest how INGOs can best perform humanitarian relief missions amidst armed conflicts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Second image reversed analyses abound in the literature, but none of them directly address the European Union as the dependent variable. An analytical framework is proposed here. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of international relations and comparative politics examine the various determinants of democratization. The international aspect of democratization is mostly perceived as a state to state process while Intergovernmental Organizations' (IOs) role on this process is disregarded. This paper attempts to empirically show the association between IOs and democratization. It concludes that IOs play a significant role in democratization process of authoritarian regimes and nascent democracies. In this paper, potential role of IOs over democratization is discussed theoretically. Second, an alternative way of measuring IOs democracy leverage is suggested. The major conclusions are threefold; Duration of membership in democratic IOs increases the levels of civil liberties but not political rights. The democratic leverage of IOs is prevalent for both political rights and civil liberties; and, there is no evidence that the trade with democratic IOs have indirectly promoted democratization in the member states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Commitment problems in cooperation sometimes lead states to form federal unions rather than international organizations. A model and case study illustrate. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do countries comply with international agreements? While scholars have done rigorous work to address compliance and enforcement in an international game, less analytical attention has been paid to domestic mechanisms of compliance. However, because international agreements have domestic distributional consequences, there exist domestic sources of enforcement. In this article, I develop an analytical framework of domestic accountability, where I identify specific channels of influence through which domestic constituencies can influence national compliance. Using a game theoretic model, I show that a government's compliance decision reflects the electoral leverage and the informational status of domestic constituencies. This framework further provides a theoretical rationale for why and how international institutions may influence states' compliance through domestic mechanisms. The European acid rain regime offers an empirical illustration of the domestic constituency argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paper examines the democracy (accountability and independence) of the United Nations -- a key issue for the 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I endogenize path dependence by reformulating international institutions as standards of cooperation. Japan's effort to secure a leadership role in the Bretton Woods institutions provides a useful case study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the systematic conditions under which international organizations expand. International organizations promote norms of bounded competition in various ways. They encourage states to communicate and consult to pursue political outcomes and discourage the use of violence and coercion. Should norms of cooperation fail, international organizations foster peaceful settlement mechanisms between states, particularly conflict management through third parties.

This paper examines the role that non-state actors, specifically inter-governmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations, play in the negotiations of multilateral agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the strategic interaction between donors of financial environmental aid, national governments and NGOs to show that international institutions can be successful in attracting countries' support for environmental protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes international climate negotiations to test rational institutional design hypotheses regarding flexibility as a solution to uncertainty problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If the UN strategically selects which conflicts to intervene in, then this could pose some serious problems to empirical research on UN effectiveness, in the form of both selection bias and omitted variable bias, because UN intervention may be endogenous to conflict resolution. This paper tests for such endogenous relationships by studying the factors that make UN intervention of various types, and requests of UN intervention, more or less likely. The analysis also provides insight into how authority of international organizations is established and in what conditions actors are most likely to give up short-term autonomy to strengthen the authority of a central institution like that of the UN. Using data from the International Crisis Behavior project, the results indicate that the UN is more likely to intervene when the intensity of conflict rises, that is, when the conflicts are ex ante less prone to conflict resolution. Similarly, actors are more likely to request UN intervention in violent crises, but the relationship does not appear to be monotonic. Finally, a Heckman selection model is used to demonstrate the biases that result if the endogenous relationships are not taken into account. The meaning and implications of these findings are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The wave of financial crises that hit emerging market countries in the 1990s highlighted the risks of global financial integration in the absence of a strong domestic institutional infrastructure. Drawing on the perceived lessons of the crises and models of international best practice, domestic reformers and international agencies alike have made financial sector institution-building a key priority. At one level the extent of institutional transformation has been extensive, from insolvency system reforms to improved banking regulation and supervision to the creation of new monetary instruments allowing for greater risk diversification. Yet, for all the evident change in emerging market financial sectors, there is significant variation in the extent to which formal institutional changes have affected actual practice and outcomes. Formal institutional change may be enforced to the letter, shelved and ignored, or modified to fit with extant institutions and domestic political realities. Given the possibility of multiple outcomes, this paper asks under what conditions and in what ways formal institutional change becomes consequential. In other words, when do institutions stick? The paper examines financial sector institutional reform in post-crisis Indonesia, the most severely affected of the emerging market crisis countries and the target of sustained institution-building efforts. I argue that for adopted institutions to "stick" they must be incentive-compatible with distinct "national systems of political economy." The paper elucidates the features of the Indonesian system of political economy and its effects on financial sector reform efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What characteristics make an external actor, such as an international organization or a foreign government, more or less likely to listen to the claims of a political group within another state? Must such claimant groups be unified and legitimate, both in the eyes of their supporters and as accords with international ideas of democratic representativeness? Under what conditions do the internal organizational characteristics of a group make its claims more or less credible? This paper examines the ways in which the degree of factionalization and the democraticness of a group seeking self-determination affects the international community’s perceptions of this group and the legitimacy of their claim for self-determination. Using the Minorities at Risk dataset as well as targeted qualitative comparisons, I test whether self-determination claimant groups are more likely to receive political support from international organizations--and tacit support for the validity of their claims--when the group displays the underlying tenets of democratic governance: representation, adherence to peaceful conflict resolution, and tolerance toward other minority groups. Understanding what drives the international response to self-determination claims helps us understand what impact sub-state or non-state actors have on the international relations of states and how domestic politics and international relations connected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a model on duration of the U.S. presidential use of force. An analysis of the dataset that covers from 1948 to 1998 suggests two theoretical implications. First, domestic factors have effects opposite to our conventional understanding. For instance, the introduction of the War Power Resolution, which Auerswald and Cowhey (1997) stressed the importance of in their study, does not lead to a shorter use of force. Second, instrumental choice between unilateral and multilateral uses of force matters. Since the U.S. is able to utilize collective legitimacy of international organizations to justify operations, duration of the presidential use of force is longer once the United States obtains formal authorization from the international organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ralph Bunche’s performance as an international civil servant will be examined in terms of a framework of performance criteria the paper will develop. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates how the existence of international institutions, combined with domestic politics, shapes the behavior of democratic leaders. While it seems unsurprising that leaders who are truly concerned about foreign policy outcomes will consult international institutions, our results show that leaders with private agendas can also be forced to behave like the former because of their electoral concerns. As a result, there is a welfare gain for domestic audiences when there are international institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some post-conflict societies experience repression and others do not? This paper examines the influence of interventions by intergovernmental organizations on repression levels after a civil conflict. Repression after civil war is an understudied phenomenon. The extant literature tends to focus on the presence or absence of war to measure peace after civil conflict and generally ignores the prevalence of violence perpetrated solely by the state. Analyzing repression in post-conflict societies from 1976 â€" 2000, I develop hypotheses that argue repression is affected by the type of intervention, length of intervention and types of agreements promoted by third-parties. A regression model is employed to conduct statistical analysis. The results support many of the hypotheses and suggest intergovernmental organization impact the levels of repression experienced after civil war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do states ever give up their independence to join federations? Existing theories compare states in federal unions to states pursuing self-sufficiency, and explain the choice for federation by noting benefits of scale such as wealth or security. This explanation is insufficient to account for federal unions, however, since states can get the benefits of scale more easily by cooperating through international organizations. States actually face a choice among three options: independent self-sufficiency, independence but cooperation via an international organization such as an alliance or customs union, or federation. Demands for military security, market access, or both, can lead states to form federations when two conditions are present: the leaders that govern those states perceive a benefit from closer cooperation, and states that would have disproportionately valuable investments at stake in cooperation refuse to cooperate through simple alliances or customs unions and hold out instead for a federation. A formal model and an analysis of 30 episodes of negotiated federation illustrate. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Where do states’ positions on intergovernmental conferences come from? Despite a large number of studies we simply do not know which factors determine states’ positions in specific cases and why. This paper analyses position making between ‘governments’ and ‘parliaments’ during two rounds of constitutional bargains and analyses the role of information asymmetries as intermediating factors in generating ‘influence on position’. The question asked is: Do governments enjoy relative autonomy vis-à-vis Parliaments that enables them to develop ‘positions’ they feel are in ‘the national interest’? Or is Parliament able to control and direct government behaviour during these rounds of international negotiations’ and secure an ‘efficient’ and legitimate parliament control? The conclusions indicate that Parliaments control governmental positions, but governments, on the other hand, are also able to exploit the negotiations to pursue certain ‘policy drifts’ depending on the level of conflict between the two actors. The research design used is a in dept single case study that analyses the position making during two rounds of constitutional reforms on a multitude of different issues varied over the conflict level between actors. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through a case study analysis of NGO access to the convention process, this study seeks to understand whether and how NGOs were included in convention texts. Many researchers focus on the struggle of NGOs to access meetings; most focus on the effect ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though there is some scholarly work which suggests that international regimes can alter state behavior, this does not seem to be the case with the international human rights regime. Past research examining the effect of human rights treaties on state behavior have found that these agreements do little to curb repressive practices. However, these studies all neglect to account for the fact that several of the state-level characteristics which are known to affect repressive practices also influence the likelihood of a state making a formal commitment to the human rights regime. States that commit and states that do not are likely to have very different domestic institutional features. Ignoring this problem makes it impossible to accurately infer the level of repression that would have been observed in a state had it not committed to the treaty in question. This paper uses propensity-score matching techniques to address this problem and allow for more valid inferences about the effects of human rights treaties on repressive practices. The results are quite interesting; effects vary quite a bit across treaties, ranging from mildly beneficial to extremely deleterious. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews an ongoing teaching approach and the impact that international associations and linkages have had on student learning. Specifically, this paper seeks to explore how professors can engage students in the comparative study of conflict at the nation-state level, by providing opportunities inside and outside of the classroom. The hypothesis posits that international opportunities within the classroom, the university and study abroad programs, benefit students both as undergraduates and graduate students. This paper will explore the use of “live-meetings” internationally between classrooms and students. This work stems from teaching experiences with students from the United States, Northern Ireland and the Middle East. It will also explore some of the ways to teach a course and link it with study abroad programs and international conferences between universities. The paper considers ideas for professors interested in establishing or expanding international connections. The project offers ideas to academicians for the use of broadcast media as a supplement to theoretical and more traditional forms of pedagogy as well. The work will culminate with an assessment of student feedback. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the link between "international trust" of individuals and government policies in international institutions. The literature on social capital has begun to investigate the transnational dimension of social trust, but there is little research on its implications for policy and the effects of institutions. This gap in the literature is addressed by testing established arguments about international institutions and domestic constituencies; the core argument posits that citizens' higher trust in an international organization (IO) makes it more likely that the respective leadership follows the country's obligations within this IO. Free-riding and/or cheating by disregarding these obligations is less likely the more domestic constituents display confidence in the organization, as they become less tolerable of such choices. I analyze opinion data from the World Values Survey and data on membership payments and arrears to the United Nations in recent years to examine the role of international social trust on the fulfillment of states' obligations. This research has implications for the theory and practice of international cooperation and contributes to the current debate on the domestic roots of cooperation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how peace agreements facilitate democratization. To this end, this paper uses the concept of legalized institutions to develop the thesis of the influence of the peace agreement on democratization. Previous works show that international institutions shape the expectations, interests, and behavior of actors and vary on many dimensions. In this light, the peace agreement is classified into one of international institutions. And more and more institutions are becoming increasingly legalized. Legalizations refer to a particular set of characteristics that institutions may process, such as the degree to which rules are obligatory, the precision of those rules, and the delegation of some functions of implementation of a third party. These elements serve as legalized constraints operating to change the parties’ behavior. In doing so, legalized institutions increase the credibility of actors’ commitments. Accordingly, this paper hypothesizes that the peace agreement serves as the legalized institution after armed conflicts and the legalized institution by the peace agreement contributes to democratization. This paper uses Conflict Termination data, Peace Agreement data, and POLITY IV data to support this hypothesis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains that the alliances women have with the state through relationships with women's organizations and international organizations (a) help to explain both the advances as well as the setbacks in addressing violence against women in Central America and (b) offer a new foundation for political agency through working relationships. Drawing on interview data from Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica with civil society, international organizations, and state agents, we argue that implementation of laws protecting women from violence depends on a strong, women's movement that has access to economic resources, and works in coordination with the state and international organizations. These linkages and relationships among institutions and women are the precondition for political agency. We will argue that this rational agency is best understood in terms of political citizenship in Aristotle's Politics rather than Lockean libertarianism or Kantian liberalism. Aristotelian accounts of political friendship can give an account of empowering women that is more substantial than libertarian or Kantian accounts. A particular nexus of human relationships are preconditions for full political agency. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the intersection between international organizations, the United States and other G8 members, and how these intersections and divergences have framed and shaped global HIV/AIDS policy. The objectives of this paper are three-fold, and begin with an attempt to place HIV/AIDS in the greater theoretical International Relations debate. How should HIV/AIDS be classified, as a human rights issue or as a security issue, and how do these designations change the way the disease is conceptualized in International Relations? The second objective is to investigate how international organizations have or have not been used to deal with the HIV/AIDS crisis and what effect this has had on prevention and treatment of the disease. This section highlights issues such as unilateralism vs. multilateralism in global HIV/AIDS policy as well as what this potentially does to the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy of the international organizations mentioned above in their ability to manage the HIV/AIDS crisis. The final objective is to investigate the use and influence of international law in dealing with the HIV/AIDS crisis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the endogenous strategic considerations in simultaneously creating, enlarging, and deepening an international union of countries within a framework of variable geometry. We introduce a coalition-theoretic model to examine the equilibrium.x000d.relationship between union size and scope. What is the equilibrium (stable) size and scope of an international union and how do these variables interact? When should we expect countries to take advantage of more flexible modes of integration and how does that possibility affect the pace and depth of integration? In tackling these questions, we characterize the various policy areas of cooperation with respect to their cross-country and cross-policy.x000d.spillovers, their efficiency scales, the heterogeneity of preferences, and the general cost structure. We then go on to show that the enlargement of a union and the widening of its policy scope are too symbiotic and mutually reinforcing dynamic processes under certain conditions. This is an exciting research puzzle given that current game-theoretic predictions have been at odds with the empirical reality of European integration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent quantitative study reveals that post-World War II international organizations (IOs) have witnessed great growth. UN Treaty Series also indicates the exponential increase in international treaties. What can explain this phenomenon of parallel boom? Is there correlation or causation between them? In this paper I will argue that the multilateralism initiated and supported by hegemony stimulates the organizational spread globally after the war and structures a new and prevailing institutional environment dominated by cooperative culture. It is this institutional environment that facilitates further cooperation through ideal diffusion and cognitive transformation. States learn that organizational cooperation can strengthen their own bargaining force and persuasion effect by augmenting voice opportunity. In turn, consequent boost of IOs consolidates the legitimacy and reliability of the institutional environment. The obvious effect of this institutional environment is just institutionalized cooperation between states by agreements. Additionally, IOs also serve as assurance for international agreements through information sharing and dispute resolution, which augment the practical feasibility of this institutional environment ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The core of "flexibility theory" in designs of international institutions hinges on the need to strike a balance between legalism and flexibility. What has been missed in debates is how to balance these two sides of the same coins and what would be the determinants of this balance. I suggest a flexibility theory of trade-off in multilateral trade institutions. Multilateral trade regimes can be located from full-scale flexibility to the maximum legalism. What determines their locations depends on what kinds of issue they deal with. If a regime mainly faces short-term problems such as coordination in economic crisis, the optimal point should be closer to legalism. On the other hand, if an institution manages long-term projects like free trade promotion and economic development through building trade coalitions, its optimal point is located in the direction of flexibility. The balancing act in optimal design depends on issue-specific. Therefore, if regime's main tasks have evolved, the optimal point of regime is also changed. The evolution of GATT/WTO regime illustrates this point clearly. Systematic empirical evidence is provided by investigating the major international trade regimes created from 1945 to 2000. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ability of health related crises to affect global populations, global markets and security, has created numerous linkages between health and other issues. As a result, cooperation and authority over health policy is highly fragmented. This fragmentation of health policy across multiple areas of international cooperation, pose a significant challenge for developing states attempting to address health crises. Little research has been done addressing the impact of overlapping institutional authority and it is unclear if the benefits of coordination in the areas of trade and conflict are maintained in health policy or if such benefits are constrained as a result of overlapping authority among multiple institutions. In addition to addressing the conceptual and theoretical aspects of overlapping authority, this paper uses data from HIV/AIDS programs within developing states to examine the effect of overlapping institutions. Using a large-N analysis as well as a detailed case study, this paper reveals that obligations to multiple international institutions constrains developing states ability to create and implement health policies and negates expected benefits of international cooperation within domestic level health policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have found an association between membership in regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and democracy, and IGO enforcement is often credited with explaining this link. But empirical evidence reveals great variation in whether IGOs actually do respond to violations of democratic norms, even in densely democratic regions. Why do IGOs impose costs on some norm-violating regimes but not others? Using an original dataset of elections and international democracy promotion from 1990-2005, I examine regional IGOs’ response to one type of democratic norm violation: election manipulation. I argue that an important, yet overlooked, factor explaining variation in enforcement is information on the nature and scope of norm violations. International election monitors help solve this problem by (a) revealing information on the effects of manipulation, and (b) generating publicity that increases the perceived need to take action. Quantitative tests show that negative verdicts from monitors increase the chances of IGO enforcement after flawed elections, controlling for other country-specific factors. Case studies of elections in Peru, Ecuador and Ukraine trace how monitors’ verdicts influence deliberations among IGO member states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International trade agreements, as one important type of international institutions, have been argued to be an effective tool to shape domestic politics. The paper looks into a particular kind of international trade agreementâ€"the protection of intellectual property rights and examines whether international institutions are able to be internalized to affect China’s progress on intellectual property rights. The paper hypothesizes that the central-locality relationship could prevent China from fulfilling its commitments made to reduce IPR infringement. Despite the agreement reached between the central government and WTO, the increasingly decentralized fiscal structure boosts local governments’ political autonomy and instigates their economic incentives to cover IPR infringement in their zone. The pursuit of local governments for their own interests and their expanding power enable them to ignore or circumvent the appeal from the central government. Thus the influence of international institutions must be contextualized in concrete political institutions. It is necessary to break up the integrity of a state’s authority and introduce a multi-level analysis regarding to the internalization of international institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increasingly, governments are choosing to govern human rights through international institutions â€" both agreements and organizations. Scholars debate whether this is good news for human rights practices around the world. A parallel literature attempts to specify the conditions under which states choose to join international human rights regimes and the extent to which they delegate enforcement. Very few studies, however, consider how the politics of institutional selection shape the politics of compliance. We bring these two literatures together by theorizing a unified model of state decisions to accede to human rights regimes along with their decisions to abide by those regimes. Using a unique dataset on membership in 77 human rights organizations and 44 human rights treaties, we assess whether prior levels of respect for human rights are correlated with accession to human rights regimes and then whether membership in these regimes influences state behavior. Our findings suggest that institutions alone do not screen at the membership stage. Moreover, the institutions themselves have independent little influence on behavior. Both of these findings suggest a key role for enforcement provisions to function as screening mechanisms. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globalization has made it difficult and almost impossible to effectively address issues within the limits of State/Country laws. One such issue is that of money laundering and terrorist financing. Since this issue poses a threat to the econimc well-being of countries, there is a necessity to cooperate and establish laws that all states would have to implement and yet states have been unwilling to compromise their sovereignity. This paper seeks to understand this dilemma between security and sovereignity by examing the regime of rules and laws that have been established by organizations like the Financial Action Task Force in dealing with money laundering and terrorist financing issue. In doing so this paper examines Robert Keohane’s concept of “governance dilemma” and Slaughter’s theory of “government networks” to understand international efforts to deal with money laundering and terrorist financing. Keohane states that although a world governed by international institutions is beneficial, it posses a threat to our liberty. Slaughter offers a solution to this dilemma in her theory of “government networks” will be formed to address issues at a global scale. Are these government netwroks afeature of the ML and TF regime? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing scholarship has made the claim that while democracies do not go to war, democratizing states are much more war prone than their fully democratic or authoritarian counterparts. This claim has generated a large literature and a substantial controversy. It is surprising that no dataset identifies in an acceptable manner the set of democratizing states. Neither the Polity IV project nor Freedom House have adequate scoring criteria for the task. That means any findings on the particular issue of democratization and war are debatable as they hinge on less than defensible empirical measures. This paper exploits a unique new dataset of democratizing states to cast new light on the question of political transititions and war-proneness. The dataset identifies democratizing states by the number and quality of national -level elections held. Consolidated democracies, fully closed authoritarian regimes, and semi-democracies are best identified by their electoral practices. The paper's findings call into question some established findings while suggesting ways to further establish the causal logic through which political transitions may bear on belligerent foreign policies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do legal institutions that limit governmental power promote order in democracies? In spite of the worldwide rule of law project, which is predicated on knowing the answer to this question, there is simply no systematic empirical test of the relationship between legal institutions that constrain arbitrary state power and democratic order. Indeed, the mainstream literature on democratic survival treats legal institutions as epiphenomenal, focusing instead on sociocultural, institutional and macro-economic explanations. Following North, Summerhill and Weingast (2000) we suggest that ensuring the democratic order requires the resolution of a commitment problem over physical integrity rights, property rights and others. Conceptualized in this way, legal institutions can preserve order when macro-economic or sociocultural factors might lead to disorder. We find that effective legal institutions are positively associated with democratic survival and negatively associated with violent political events, two central measures of democratic order. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]