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By positively confirming identifications and linking relevant records of arrests and prosecutions, fingerprint analysis provides a basis for making fundamental criminal justice decisions regarding detention, charging, bail, and sentencing. In 1999, the FBI implemented the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)--a computerized system for storing, comparing, and exchanging fingerprint data in a digital format. The FBI's goal under IAFIS is to ultimately achieve paperless processing and to provide a response within 2 hours to users who submit criminal fingerprints electronically. Maximizing the benefits of rapid responses under IAFIS depends largely on how quickly criminal fingerprints are submitted by local and state law enforcement agencies. Concerns have been raised that, after arrests are made by some local or state law enforcement agencies, periods of up to 6 months may elapse before the criminal fingerprints are submitted for entry into IAFIS. GAO examined (1) the importance of IAFIS processing to local and state law enforcement agencies, (2) the progress these agencies have made toward the goal of paperless fingerprint processing, and (3) efforts being made to improve the timeliness of criminal fingerprint submissions. IAFIS processing of criminal fingerprints is important to local and state law enforcement not only for updating national databases but also for obtaining an individual's criminal history and, at times, for obtaining positive identification of arrestees. For a recent 8-month period (October 2002 through May 2003) that GAO reviewed, law enforcement agencies wanted a response from the FBI for 78 percent of the approximately 5.3 million sets of criminal fingerprints submitted to IAFIS. The extent to which these responses were used to either positively identify arrestees or obtain criminal history records is unknown. However, the FBI provided GAO with examples of how IAFIS responses prevented the premature release of individuals who had used false names at arrest and were wanted in other jurisdictions. Law enforcement agencies have made progress toward the FBI's goal of paperless processing of criminal fingerprints, although there is room for substantial improvement. The percentage of criminal fingerprints submitted electronically by state repositories to the FBI increased from 45 percent in 1999 to 70 percent in 2003. Also, for the recent 8-month period GAO reviewed, the overall average submission time for criminal fingerprints was 40 days (an average that encompasses both paper and electronic submissions)--whereas, before IAFIS, average submission times were much higher (e.g., 118 days in 1997). Although much progress has been made, many jurisdictions lack automation and have backlogs of paper fingerprint cards to be processed, in part because of competing priorities and resource constraints. Numerous efforts have been made to help improve the timeliness of criminal fingerprint submissions to IAFIS. To facilitate electronic processing, federal technical and financial assistance has encouraged law enforcement agencies to purchase optical scanning (Livescan) equipment for taking fingerprints and to establish automated systems compatible with FBI standards. GAO noted that the need for quick, fingerprint-based identifications--positively linking individuals to relevant criminal history records--is becoming increasingly important. Reasons for such importance are the mobility of criminals (many of whom have multistate records), the growing incidence of identity theft or identity fraud, the significance of homeland security concerns, and increasing demands stemming from background checksrequired for employment or other noncriminal justice purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the the Department of Defense's (DOD) initiatives to change export and procurement policies and procedures that relate to the transfer or sale of defense articles and services that may have national security implications. GAO noted that: (1) in 1999, DOD compiled a list of 81 initiatives designed to facilitate cross-border industrial relationships and address possible security risks; (2) at the time of this report, 43 of the initiatives are ongoing, 21 are completed, 17 have been terminated, placed on hold, duplicated other initiatives, or the status was uncertain; (3) 47 of the initiatives addressed disclosure of classified information, export controls, industrial base, and industrial security procedures and policies; (4) the remaining 34 initiatives focused on efforts to reinvent the Foreign Military Sales Program; (5) some of the initiatives were developed to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of internal business practices while others sought to change export and procurement policies; and (6) senior officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense were responsible for developing the initiatives and invited high-level officials from the military departments and the Departments of State and Commerce to participate in their discussions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides federal disaster assistance to help those in need respond to, prepare for, and recover from disasters. As the costs for disaster assistance have risen, FEMA has made disaster mitigation a primary goal in its efforts to reduce the long-term cost of disasters and minimize risk to property and individuals from natural or man-made hazards. Previous FEMA mitigation grant programs were formula-based and provided funds both prior to and after a disaster occurred. Fiscal Year 2003, marks the first-time FEMA has implemented a grant program that awards funds for mitigation activities on a competitive basis. This report presents information on (1) FEMA's processes and criteria for awarding planning and competitive pre-disaster mitigation grants to states and localities, and (2) the status of FEMA's efforts to implement the Fiscal Year 2003 Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program. We found, with regard to processes and criteria for awarding planning and competitive grant awards, that in 2003, Congress appropriated $150 million to initiate the implementation of a competitive pre-disaster mitigation grant program. This is the first-time FEMA has implemented a competitive mitigation grant program. The Fiscal Year 2003 Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program included approximately $13.7 million for noncompetitive planning grants and approximately $131.5 million for competitive pre-disaster grants for mitigation activities and technical assistance. Each of the 55 states and territories were eligible to receive approximately $250,000 in noncompetitive grants. FEMA awarded the competitive grants based on a ranking and evaluation process. FEMA assessed the applications for the competitive mitigation grants for eligibility and technical feasibility. FEMA then ranked and evaluated the applications using both quantitative and qualitative factors for selection of competitive award grants. We also found, with regard to implementation of the Fiscal Year 2003 Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program, that FEMA had obligated all of the $13.7 million in noncompetitive planning grants to 54 states and territories that applied. FEMA received 459 competitive grant applications. Approximately 40 percent of the competitive grant applications submitted by the states, tribes, and territories did not meet eligibility and technical feasibility requirements. FEMA attributes this to the short application period. FEMA identified 200 applications to award competitive grants. These applications have a value of $98.7 million and cover 37 states, 2 territories, and 6 tribes. FEMA expected to begin awarding the competitive grants mid-March 2004. FEMA plans to use lessons learned from the implementation of the Fiscal Year 2003 Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program to improve the program in the future. These lessons include (1) implementing a longer application period, (2) sequentially reviewing grant applications to reduce inefficient use of resources, and (3) making the e-Grant application form standard with paper applications to reduce processing time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent discovery of commercial nuclear power plants on a list of possible terrorist targets have focused considerable attention on the plants' capabilities to defend against a terrorist attack. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), an independent agency established by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to regulate the civilian use of nuclear materials, is responsible for regulating and overseeing security at commercial nuclear power plants. GAO was asked to review (1) NRC's efforts since September 11, 2001, to improve security at nuclear power plants, including actions NRC has taken to implement some of GAO's September 2003 recommendations to improve security oversight and (2) the extent to which NRC is in a position to assure itself and the public that the plants are protected against terrorist attacks. This testimony reflects the preliminary results of GAO's review. GAO will issue a more comprehensive report in early 2005. NRC responded quickly and decisively to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks with multiple steps to enhance security at commercial nuclear power plants. NRC immediately advised the plants to go to the highest level of security according to the system in place at the time and issued advisories and orders to the plants to make certain enhancements, such as installing more physical barriers and augmenting security forces, that could be completed quickly to shore up security. According to NRC officials, their inspections found that the plants complied with these advisories and orders. Later, in April 2003, NRC issued a new design basis threat (DBT), which establishes the maximum terrorist threat that a facility must defend against, and required the plants to develop and implement new security plans to address the new threat by October 2004. It is also improving its force-on-force exercises, as GAO recommended in its September 2003 report. These exercises are an important agency tool to ensure that the plants' security plans are adequate to protect against the DBT. While its efforts to date have enhanced security, NRC is not yet in a position to provide an independent determination that each plant has taken reasonable and appropriate steps to protect against the new DBT. According to NRC officials, the facilities' new security plans are on schedule to be implemented by October 2004. However, NRC's review of the plans, which are not available to the general public for security reasons, has primarily been a paper review and is not detailed enough for NRC to determine if the plans would protect the facility against the threat presented in the DBT. For example, the plans GAO reviewed are largely based on a template and often do not include important site-specific information, such as where responding guards are stationed, how the responders would deploy to their defensive positions, and how long deployment would take. In addition, NRC officials are generally not visiting the facilities to obtain site-specific information and assess the plans in terms of each facility's layout. NRC is largely relying on force-on-force exercises it conducts to test the plans, but these exercises will not be conducted at all facilities for 3 years. NRC's oversight of plants' security could also be improved. However, NRC does not plan to make some improvements in its inspection program that GAO previously recommended and still believes are needed. For example, NRC is not following up to verify that all violations of security requirements have been corrected or taking steps to make "lessons learned" from inspections available to other NRC regional offices and nuclear power plants. Moreover, if NRC needs to revise its DBT further as the terrorist threat is better defined, it will need longer to make and test all the necessary enhancements. The Department of Energy, for example, is currently reviewing the DBT for its nuclear facilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Department of Defense (DOD) contractors perform numerous services that require access to classified information. With access comes the possibility of compromise, particularly as foreign entities increasingly seek U.S. military technologies. To ensure the protection of classified information, the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) establishes requirements that contractors must meet. In administering the NISP for DOD and 24 other government agencies, DOD's Defense Security Service (DSS) monitors whether 11,000- plus contractor facilities' security programs meet NISP requirements. In response to a Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, GAO assessed DSS's oversight and examined DSS's actions after possible compromises of classified information. DSS cannot provide adequate assurances to government agencies that its oversight of contractor facilities reduces the risk of information compromise. DSS is unable to provide this assurance because its performance goals and measures do not relate directly to the protection of classified information. While DSS maintains files on contractor facilities' security programs and their security violations, it does not analyze this information. Further, the manner in which this information is maintained--geographically dispersed paper-based files--does not lend itself to analysis. By not analyzing information on security violations and how well classified information is being protected across all facilities, DSS cannot identify systemic vulnerabilities and make corrective changes to reduce the risk of information compromise. When a contractor facility reports a violation and the possible compromise of classified information, DSS does not always follow established procedures. After receiving a report of a possible information compromise, DSS is required to determine whether compromise occurred and to notify the affected government agency so it can assess any damage and take actions to mitigate the effects of the suspected compromise, compromise, or loss. However, DSS failed to make determinations in many of the 93 violations GAO reviewed and made inappropriate determinations in others. In 39 of the 93 violations, DSS made no determinations regarding compromise. For 30 of the remaining 54 violations, DSS's determinations were not consistent with established criteria. As a result, government agencies are not being kept informed of possible compromises of their information. In addition, weeks or months can pass before government agencies are notified by DSS of possible information compromises because of difficulties in identifying the affected agencies. In 11 out of 16 instances GAO reviewed, it took DSS more than 30 days to notify the affected agency that its information had been lost or compromised. DSS relies on contractor facilities to identify the affected government agencies, but some facilities cannot readily provide DSS with this information because they are subcontractors that have to obtain the identity of the government agency from the prime contractors. In one case, 5 months passed before a subcontractor facility could provide DSS with the identity of the government agency whose information was suspected of being compromised. Such delays limit the government agencies' opportunity to assess and mitigate any damage from loss or compromise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the challenges related to the information environment for the national security mission of the United States Department of Defense (DOD). It mentions the different dimensions of the Information Environment including cognitive, physical, and data-centric. It addresses the various DOD elements which are cyberspace threats, lack of resources, and the implications of new technologies.

The article reports the protection of the information environment objective, scope and methodology of the United States Department of Defense (DOD). It mentions various elements including elements: malign information, the information environment's effects on DOD's mission, threat actors to the DOD information environment, and institutional challenges.

The article describes the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) prior work related to the formation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security;s Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWWD) office, including findings from past reporting on CWWD programs. It addresses challenges and opportunities for the effective operations and implementation of key programs related to biodefense, nuclear security, and chemical security.

The article presents the discussion on enhancing U.S. efforts for understanding firearms sources and smuggling routes. Topics include building Mexico's capacity for disrupting trafficking such as forensics training, inspection equipment, and canines trained for weapons detection; and optimizing the use of U.S. government resources for addressing the threat to U.S. national security.

The article discusses a study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office which examined the benefits and costs associated with the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea. Topics discussed include the contribution of the overseas military bases to U.S. national and regional security, the funds obligated by the U.S. military for 2016 through 2019, and the burden sharing contributions made by Japan and South Korea.

The article reports on a study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to determine how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is implementing the 2016 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Grant Program to reduce extremism risk factors. Topics include the number of deaths due to violent extremist attacks and GAO's recommendations to the DHS like developing policy to document the rational behind the awarding of grants.

The article presents a study on the need for more progress for the Department of Defense (DOD)to complete statutory requirements of section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act . Topics include the extent to which DOD has made progress in implementing the requirements of section 911 and establishing cross-functional teams, comparison of DOD's actions to section 911 requirements, and recommendation to the DOD that it identifies and documents specific implementation steps.

The article presents a study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the Department of Defense's (DOD) Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC). Topics include the FFRDC's aim to develop solutions to counter threats to national security, the allocation provided to FFRDCs, and the reasons behind the use by the DOD of Study and Analysis (S&A) Centers for research.

The article offers information on the report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office regarding the long-standing challenges related to defending against biological threats. It discusses the efforts of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) National Biosurveillance Integration Center to integrate data across the federal government to enhance detection and situational awareness of biological events. It mentions the DHS's BioWatch program, for bioterrorism prevention.

The article discusses the April 2019 report on TSA's (Transportation Security Administration) covert testing program pertaining to passengers screening and checked baggage across U.S. submitted by Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team. It states the report covered several aspects including new test process covered all the three comprehensive risks, risk information not adequate, and limited progress in addressing vulnerabilities.

A ;letter is presented to the U,.S. Department of Homeland Security to provide an update on the overall status of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) implementation of Government Accountability Office's recommendations. Topics discussed include emergency preparedness and response; Border Security; Transportation Security; Infrastructure and Management to improve transparency and support more informed decision making.

The article offers information on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should improve the quality of unlawful border entry information. It mentions according to DHS, the U.S. has 6,000 miles of land borders, 95,000 miles of coastline, and 328 ports of entry; and also mentions the need for DHS to improve its measures for assessing its border security efforts.

The article presents review of the fiscal year 2017 entry/exit overstay report from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It mentions identifying overstays is important for national security, public safety, and immigration enforcement by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). It also mentions U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) receives, processes, and maintains documentation pertaining to a nonimmigrant's immigration status.

The article offers information on the report presented by the U.S. Government Accountability Office on the requirements of U.S. Department of Defense for implementation of plans for managing the military services. Topics discussed include information on the management of prepositioned stock programs; discussions on the National Defense Authorization Act which underlines national security threats, strategic mobility and service requirements; and the investment in prepositioned stocks.

The article informs that a report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) that recommends the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) clarifying criteria for using lowest price technically acceptable process. Topics discussed include use of the lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) process; regulations to defined by the National Defense Authorization Act; and the DOD's need to issue additional guidance.

The article presents a study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) that aims to make recommendations to address the challenges and actions taken by the Air Force in restoring readiness across the entire spectrum of conflict in the emerging security environment. The plans of the Air Force to grow its force in the context of rebuilding readiness are explored. The need to reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements and revise F-35 sustainment plans are also recommended.

The article reports that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is evaluating designs and locations for the border barriers. In response to CBP's fiscal year 2017 budget amendment and request for the supplemental appropriations, CBP received funding in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 to replace the existing primary pedestrian and vehicle fencing in high-priority areas.

The article reports that urgent actions are to be taken to address cybersecurity challenges faced by the U.S. Many of the systems contain personally identifiable information (PII) that makes it imperative to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of this information and effectively respond to data breaches and security incidents.

The article presents a study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) aimed at examining how the Defense Security Service (DSS) administers the National Industrial Security Program to safeguard federal government classified information that may be or has been released to contractors. The agency found out the move of the DDS to upgrade capabilities for the program while facing challenges in monitoring contractors. The recommendation for executive action is also explored.

The article discusses a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted to examine the extent to which Department of Defense(DOD) has analyzed the achievement of its goals for the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and implementing recommendations of GAO on BRAC 2005 to improve performance for any future BRAC round.

The article presents a report on border security from the U.S. Government Accountability Office for the needed actions to strengthen the performance management and planning for expansion of the Department of Homeland Security's Visa Security Program (VSP). Topics mentioned include VSP management and funding, visa adjudication process, and the automatic screening by the Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team for all visa applications submitted by VSP posts.

The article discusses the study of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) for the organizational challenges faced by the Department of Defense (DOD). It cites on the DOD implementation of the statutory requirements in section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act. The article also discusses the recommendation of GAO to DOD which include revising its organizational strategy, collaborating with key stakeholders and revising cross-functional team guidance.

The article presents a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) which focuses on the agency's review of physical security risk-management policies and practices of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as of January 2018. Topics included risk management process and vulnerability assessment methodology, effectiveness of the management process, and recommended executive action.

The article discusses the report to Congressional Addressees for a high-quality personnel security clearance process in the executive branch agencies in the U.S. It cites on the issuance of common federal adjudicative guidelines to sustain the reform effort. The article also discusses on the passage of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) to minimize the risks of unauthorized disclosures of classified information and the assessment of security-relevant information.

The article presents a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office on defense civil support. Topics discussed include failure of U.S. Department of Defense to develop a comprehensive plan for U.S. Cyber Command; importance of employee training; and impact of destructive cyberattack on U.S. economic and national security.

The article discusses the report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) entitled "Countering ISIS and Its Effects." The report discusses selected events related to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and U.S. and Coalition efforts to counter it, overview of Strategic Guidance for U.S. Efforts to Counter the ISIS, and mitigating threats to homeland security from ISIS.

The article discusses the use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to enhance the border security operations of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). It highlights the collaboration between the CBP with other government agencies to locate illegal entrants who are crossing the border. It also notes that the unmanned aerial systems are equipped with video surveillance cameras and radar technology for the doumentation of the border security activities.

The article discusses findings by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) which explores the aspects of improving defense space programs, to improve acquisition and management of military intelligence by the Department of Defense (DoD). Topics include the aspects of national security space management and organization, joint task force on national security space and challenges on military intelligence.

The article discusses the actions of the U.S. Coast Guard, recommended by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in order to develop acquisition plans through the Strategic Planning Directions and to improve the asset allocation process. The tables of the statutory missions of the coast guard which are divided into non-homeland security and homeland security missions are discussed. Also mentions the operation of the two types of aircraft and vessels by the coast guard.

The article discusses the effort of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to promote the importance of information sharing to enhance the national security of the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries. It states that the implementation of information-sharing agreements help strengthen the DHS's ability to protect the country and its citizens from terrorism. It also cites the contain inormations in the agreement such as terrorist identity and criminal history information.

A report on the challenges in biosurveillance and biodefense development and maintenance from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is presented. Topics discussed in the report include the development of biodefense enterprise strategies, the biosurveillance efforts of the Department of Homeland Security, and the challenges from these efforts.

The article presents a study from the U.S. Government Accountability Office concerning the acquisitions performed by the Homeland Security in fiscal year 2015. The study addresses the extent to which the key acquisition programs are meeting their schedule and cost goals and the extent to which DHS had addressed their affordability issues. Recommendations made by GAO include quantification of information when assessing funding gaps and conduct of assessments in a timely manner.

A report from the U.S. Government Accountablity Office on the Department of Defense's (DoD) major automated information systems (MAIS) as of March 30, 2016 is presented. A background of DoD is provided which aims to ensure national security and prevent war and depends on information technology to support warfighters. Also detailed are DoD's MAIS programs to sustain its key operations.

The article explores on the emergency communications of the Office of National Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the U.S. Information about the collaboration between ONCRC and DHS to help improve emergency communication operation in the NCR, is provided. Also mentioned is the major role of ONCRC in homeland securities.

The article focuses on report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) regarding homeland security in the U.S. as of December 2015. Topics discussed include joint responsibility taken by Federal Protective Service (FPS), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and General Services Administration (GSA) to protect federal real-property facilities, challenges of physical security and impact of FPS and GSA collaboration practices on operations at the facility level.

The article discusses a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) regarding the need for the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard to ensure problems arising during testing of the National Security Cutter (NSC). It informs about the plans of Coast Guard to submit corrective action plans regarding testing to the U.S. Navy. The report recommends the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to ensure clarification of NSC's cutter boat requirements.

The article focuses on a study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) regarding the U.S. Department of Commerce's Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) budgets, staffing and its effectiveness in addressing hotline complaints and regarding employee concerns. Topics covered include federal real property managed by the GAO, effective protection of technologies which are critical to the U.S. national security interests, and hotline practices provided by the GAO.

The article presents a study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office that involves analysis of policies and plans of the U.S. Department of Defence's (DOD) Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) Enterprise regarding the DOD's chemical and biological defense infrastructure capabilities. The study examines the extent to which CBDP has identified infrastructure capabilities to address to biological & chemical threats and managed duplication in its defence infrastructure.

The article discusses a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) presented to the Congressional Committees recommending that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) should strengthen management and guidance for protection of classified information. It mentions the damage to national security and risk to the lives of U.S. personnel due to unauthorized disclosures of classified information. It adds the information leaked National Security Agency contractor in 2013.

The article discusses a report issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office to address current status and cost of major space system acquisitions by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Topics discussed include Global Positioning System (GPS) III satellite program by DoD, challenges being faced by DoD in providing future space-based capabilities, and efforts being made by DoD along with the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration for national security space launches.

The article presents a report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) regarding errors in data of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) on congressional notification period. Topics discussed include the national security threats by Islamic organization Al Qaeda in the U.S., security assistance to Yemen provided by the U.S. and recommendations by the GAO to the DOD to improve data accuracy.

The article presents a study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the eligibility of federal employees and contractors who had unpaid federal tax debts for national security clearances. GAO identified additional mechanisms which could help federal agencies detect tax debts. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is encouraged by GAO to work with other agencies to collect federal debt information for national security clearance evaluation.

The article looks at a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to manage the risk associated with the management of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Topics discussed include to address the high risk of U.S. national and economic security, to manage the increased vulnerability to fraud, waste, and mismanagement at DHS and to modernize the financial management systems of the DHS.

The article discusses the risk-informed covert assessments and oversight of corrective actions to strengthen capabilities in the U.S. Noted is the challenge posed by the prevention of radiological and nuclear material entry in the country. It points out that the restriction involves resources like detailed procedures and policies, border protection personnel training, and specialized nuclear and radiological detection equipment.

The article discusses the U.S. Government Accountability Office report on regulation of defense acquisition program which provides competitive prototypes under the U.S. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. Topics discussed include review of national security objectives considering competitive prototyping, modification of defense guidance provided by the department of defense, and competitive prototyping requirement for the Navy's Fleet Replenishment Oiler (T-AO(X)) program.