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Two decades on from the collapse of Soviet dominance in Central and Eastern Europe and the flourishing cottage industry of 'transitological' studies attempting to explain the transitions in the region have reached a peculiar confluence concerning the relative importance of internal and external causes. Most analyses have focused on how best to achieve the practical transformation of the construction of functioning democracies and moribund planned economic institutions while acknowledging the significance of the global context in which capitalism was reconfigured in the region only incidentally. This paper develops a critique of this confluencebased on a Gramscian critical economy. The paper explores how the social transformation associated with the emergence of neoliberalism arose in the global political economy and then deploys an understanding of this in order to offer a more nuanced grasp of the historical emergence of transition, primarily in Poland, but to some degree throughout Central and Eastern Europe, as Poland's Shock Therapy approach to transition has been the paradigmatic exemplar and as such has significant ramifications throughout the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the major turning points for Turkish politics is the opening of its accession negotiations for European Union membership in 2005. The EU has significant leverage on countries aspiring for membership due to its political conditionality and through the applicant country's adaptation of its rules and laws to those of the EU. Thus, the process of membership negotiations impacts the applicant country's political process in a significant fashion. This paper proposes that as Turkey moves towards meeting the EU's standards in democracy as part and parcel of its accession requirements, the underlying anti-democratic tendencies and tensions in Turkish politics come to the fore front with the unexpected result that the process of democratization carries the danger of threatening the basis of individual rights and liberties in Turkey. This is because the democratization process that gained momentum in 2002 has led to a high degree of polarization in Turkish politics with the Islamists and secularists located at the opposite ends. This paper analyzes the main cleavages in Turkish politics; the Islamists versus the secularists and nationalists versus the globalists with respect to the issues of gender equality, the Kurdish problem and the role of the military in politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conference paper about European politics and society is presented which is prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association Conference, in Toronto, Ontario, on September 2-6, 2009. The paper discusses topics including the institutional multiplicity of democracy, and the choice of fair elections through the comparison of two electoral episodes in Portuguese history.

This paper seeks to understand one of the processes of change taking place in the so-called ‘New Europe’ in its process of enlarging the circle of states whose shared identity and core values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, makes them a value-based community with some specific qualities. The specific focus of this paper is ideational change at the domestic level and its consequences at the international level and vice versa. Interest is focused on the adoption of liberal democracy. Therefore, the main question that is addressed in the proposed paper is how and why a democratic norm set seems to have been adopted relatively easily is some Central and East European states, but with considerable difficulty or not at all in other similar states, despite the appearance of similar structural and practical circumstances. In addressing this question, the paper focuses on the way in which the mechanisms of socialization are used by three European organizations, namely the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In other words, is effective democratization related to the type of socialization mechanism employed? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the concept ‘interiorization’ (Poulantzas, 1974)provides us with a subtler understanding of the interrelated spatial fixesof the contemporary IPE that overcomes the more or less Kautskian/Leninistand Supranational/Intergovernmental dualisms that continue to characterisethe field. With regards to the economic structure, the concept allows usto grasp how it is possible for European capitalism to be subsumeddirectly within the social relations of US capitalism whilst stillmaintaining independent bases of competition. With regards topolitico-ideological structures, the concept allows us to understand why atransnational neo-liberal hegemony at the same time is a distinctly UShegemony, whereby the US state increasingly displaces externalities on therest of the world, including Europe, without this undermining theconsensual aspects of transnational relations. In a concluding section,the paper also demonstrates that the concept of interiorization is centralto the (terminal?) crisis of European social democracy: A Europeanbourgeoisie ‘interiorized’ with American capital is increasingly alienatedfrom European social formations and as a result is not amenable to theclass compromises which social democracy presupposes. This in turnundermines the capacity of social democracy to perform a ‘politics ofmediation’ over a wide range of cleavage structures. This undermining isdangerous as it has been essential to the very essence of European (socialand Christian) democracy in the post World War II period (cf. vanKersbergen, 1995). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Western European countries differ according to the ways in which they organize local government, not least in the manner in which mayors are selected, in the mayors' statutory positions and responsibilities, and the institutional relations between the council and the mayor/executive board. The institutional arrangements have been modified in several countries. Focal question in the paper is whether the institutional reforms have resulted in a revitalization of local politics and democracy. A first measure to revitalize local politics is a separation of local political powers. In Germany, the UK, Italy, and the Netherlands powers of the council as the representation of the citizenry at the one hand, and the Mayor or the Executive Board at the other, have been separated. They now both have their more or less exclusive statutory powers, tasks and responsibilities, in some cases resulting from the introduction of directly elected mayors. Question then is, whether these policies lead to a revitalization of local politics. Secondly, in a number of Western European countries governments have introduced direct elections for the mayor's office. Despite differences between countries, in all cases the assumption is, that direct mayoral elections do make a difference and that directly elected mayors will appear to be strong leaders. Question, however is to what extent is mayoral performance affected by selection procedures and the statutory position of the mayoral office? The results of a number of comparative empirical studies will be presented in the paper. It will become clear that there are huge differences in mayoral performance. Several factors influencing that performance will be identified. The most important conclusion is that mayoral selection procedures and statutory positions do affect mayoral performance, although not as much as expected. Other factors are at stake. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of external impulses on European democratization from 1830 to 1940. It distinguishes three types of diffusion, namely (1) the gradual spread of values and norms; (2) the diffusion of instrumental knowledge about the design of political institutions; and (3) the spread of situational judgments about the feasibility of initiating political change. The latter type of external impulse, derived from the attainment of substantial change in another polity, can produce dramatic waves of regime contention. But since the actual distribution of power in emulating countries often differs from the frontrunner, these conflicts produce various types of results. The paper discusses four types of outcomes of diffusion, namely (1) successful replication; (2) preemptive reform; (3) abortive replication; and (4) blockage of replication efforts. The latter two outcomes help explain why in European history, not only political liberalism and democracy diffused, but during certain time periods authoritarianism, corporatism, and fascism spread as well. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates about religious symbols in public places and the post-9/11 controversies about the compatibility of Islam and democracy within and beyond Europe indicate the coming of a major new conflict area in liberal democracies. This paper starts with the observation of an ongoing and in some respects increasing significance of religion in the politics of Western democracies and links it to processes of pluralization and globalization, which in turn are related to migration moves across the world. Based on a typology of nationality codes in 19 Western democracies, the paper asks what role religion, understood as confessional legacy, individual religiosity, institutional actors and Christian parties, play in shaping citizenship policies. It follows the "family of nations" concept in comparative policy research (Castles) and argues that the interplay of nation building, religious traditions and church-state-relations brings religion back into this highly secular policy domain. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has focused attention on the diversity and complexity of civil-social life in Russia and post-communist Europe, undermining normative and 'communist-legacy' explanations of the weakness of civil society in that region, and underlining the need for theory-building that is both generalizable and sensitive to the specifics of each individual case. This paper attempts to take another step in that direction, exploring how the ways in which elites in semi-authoritarian regimes compete for power - and the social meaning of the power they are competing for - shape the development of civil society. Examining elements of civil society, the paper presents evidence from extensive field research of key variations in the relationship between civic activism and power and argues that these variations can be traced back to crucial differences in the competitive incentives political elites in each context. Specifically, the prospects for civil society appear better when elites - even closed, corrupt and authoritarian elites - are forced to engage one way or another with society at large. The paper will argue that elite-led state-society engagement, regardless of its nature, is essential to building the framework on which citizens construct notions of justice and right, while disengagement and elite autonomy significantly impede the development of civic identities. Indeed, the evidence in comparative perspective suggests that civil society may do better when it is repressed than when it is simply ignored. This, then, points to the disengaged nature of the contemporary Russian regime, rather than its authoritarianism, as a major explanatory factor in the weakness of civil society in that country. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hannah Arendt conceptualizes an evolving "crisis of state sovereignty" and related "perplexities of the rights of man". This paper examines how Arendt addresses the problem by developing ideas for a new federal and republican Europe which may serve as a model for a democratic renewal with universalistic ties. While citizenship rights, according to Arendt, must be defined and limited, Arendt suggests a post-national decoupling of state and nation. Her conceptual foundations of cosmopolitan Euro-Republicanism also point to a new universal political responsibility and post-sovereign politics in the global age. The paper demonstrates that Arendt's reflections provide approaches to mediate the tensions between the two essential claims of liberal democracy, namely democratic self-rule and universalism. Arendt, it is argued, helps to theorize and justify the EU as a post-national political community in its own right but also provides a framework for a critical theory of the European Union and its shortcomings. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper is analyzing the 'realist' support for the current regime as well as the support for democracy as a set of 'idealist' principles in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It is also analyzing political support for non-democratic regimes as alternatives to democratic governance. The main conclusion of this paper is that mass public support for democracy as best form of government is encompassing an absolute majority of citizens in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Belarus as well as a relative majority of the Russian citizens. Political support for the current regimes is declining between 1992 and 2002 and collapsing in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia. This collapse of public support for the current political regime contributed to the 'revolutions' in Georgia and Ukraine. The share of supporters for authoritarian regimes in Russia and the other post-Soviet countries decreased from about one third to one fifth of the respective electorates. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the call for contributions to this conference the European Union (EU) was named as a singularly successful example of economic integration. There is little doubt it has been. Another widespread view (and indeed empirical correlation) links economic development with democratic governance. Thence the convenient expectation that by expanding east the new EU must be supporting the democratic consolidation of its formerly communist members. Unfortunately, this expectation is less than firmly based. This paper, first, makes the theoretically founded argument that the correlation between prosperity and democracy depends on a minimally equitable distribution of the created wealth. While this argument should not come as a surprise, the obstinacy with which its common sense is disregarded suggests that democracy, not to mention equity, are subordinate goals in this integration process. This paper, second, provides empirical support for this suggestion. First, a look at the EU's institutional structure and policy priorities reveals a clear imbalance in favor or the common market and in disfavor of a common fiscal and social policy as well as democratic accountability. While this imbalance is obvious to some, their attempts to rectify it are an uphill struggle. Second, a look at the EU's strategy vis-à-vis its candidate countries reveals a striking disregard for the socio-economic implications of transition and for EU-fostered technocratic threats to democratic consolidation. While formal democracy is of course a criterion for membership, other EU policies conflict with the development of democracy beyond minimal formal criteria. Thus, official rhetoric notwithstanding, the institutional design and policies of the enlarging European Union clearly aim more at creating wealth for the few than at empowering the many. Other attempts at regional integration should prioritize among the values to be realized before heedlessly copying the EU's design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to illuminate how the rule of law is understood in international peace-building activities by looking at the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The case is selected since Europe and the United States have been determining the contents of peace-building activities in Bosnia and had a distinct tendency to emphasize the rule of law. While there are multiple international agencies that were given peace-building tasks by the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, the paper focuses on the Office of High Representative, as well as the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the UN's and EU's police missions, as they have active roles in rule-of-law related areas. The paper finds that the importance of rule of law is recognized more strongly than before. The paper argues that it is partly because democracy has lost paramount importance as a peace-building strategy. In Bosnia where ethnicity-based forces have kept power through most post-conflict elections, democracy does not appear to be an effective tool for peace-building. The rule of law is expected to provide a strategic perspective which democracy may fail to create. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why have some of the newest members of the European Union consolidated their democratic transitions while others have lagged behind? This paper tests the hypothesis that the difference in democratic consolidation between Central and Eastern European countries could be attributable to factors associated with membership in international governmental organizations. Three countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, have consolidated their democratic political systems while three others, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, have not. This paper utilizes aggregate data to compare the differences in political outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe and measure the effect of the assistance provided by the European Union upon these political outcomes. This process of norm diffusion suggests ideational factors should be taken into account for democratization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the appearance of great variety, the most influential perspectives on development exhibit a basic intellectual unity. All focus on whole states or societies, and define them with reference to their advanced less advanced, or backward position relative to other states (and/or their superordinate or subordinate position in a global hierarchy of power). All adopt, or unintentionally reproduce (e.g. postcolonial and subaltern studies), schemas that define a tripartite or binary division of the globe. All accept a highly ideological reading of Europe's nineteenth century industrial expansion and use it, implicitly or explicitly, as a starting point and basis for comparison in studying contemporary developing societies. The result of these characteristic features of existing perspectives has been to systematically obscure the trans-local, trans-regional institutional complex that has underpinned global development since the late eighteenth century. This paper explores the trans-local social structures and transformations that brought into being and continue to shape the contemporary world order. Its central focus is the trans-local/cross-regional interactions and connections that, beginning in the late eighteenth century, brought about the development of dualistic economies within and outside of Europe; and how this circuit was reconfigured after the world wars by means of decolonisation, nationalism, 'first' and 'second' world development, and globalisation. What this perspective brings into view is a horizontal rather than vertical division of the world: the synchronic and interdependent development of dynamic focal points of growth throughout the world shaped, both within and outside of Europe, by translocal interaction and connection, as well as by local struggles and relations of dominance and subordination. The paper describes (1) local relations of power in Europe in the nineteenth century, (2) the trans-local circuit of exchange that connected the main export sectors of dualistic economies around the world, (3) the historical juncture that put European economies on a fundamentally different footing; and (4) how decolonisation, nationalism, and a global campaign to contain social democracy helped to reconfigure the circuit after World War II. It concludes (5) by drawing the implications of the analysis for how we understand globalisation today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The practice of enfranchising resident aliens lies at the heart of a theoretical debate among political scientists who study the institutions of sovereignty and citizenship. A number of such scholars cite this practice as evidence of the erosion both of the historical link between the nation and the state, and of the state's sovereign authority to define its political community. By contrast, other scholars argue that because these voting rights often are limited and discriminatory, they only reinforce the link between nation and state. Despite the centrality of this broad and ongoing debate to our understanding of sovereignty, citizenship and democracy, however, little is known about the conditions under which this democratic practice will emerge. This paper examines the political incorporation of aliens in three European democracies with widely varying experiences: Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Using these three cases, the paper finds considerable support for the nationalist thesis's emphasis on historical institutional factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What factors cause protests? Scholars have conducted cross-national analysis on determinants of protest. However, their studies have been paid less attention on institutional factors. This paper examines the importance of institutional factors in accounting for protest in 17 Western European democracies from 1980 through 1995. To deal with cross-sectional time-series count data, this paper uses Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) model with negative binomial distribution. Results show that institutional factors do matter in explaining the causes of protest. Especially, electoral system is strongly related with the number of protests: Proportional Representation (PR) system really decreases the number of protests more than any other electoral systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Of all the issues that democratic, trade union, and left wing political parties have tried to address in capitalist societies, the most difficult to challenge has been the issue of capital investment, from private investment to even their own pensions. Democratic and popular forces have been quite successful in establishing welfare states, forming trade unions, imposing regulatory controls on market activity, and achieving modest degrees of worker participation (at least in the most advanced industrialized democracies). Yet they have been generally incapable of obtaining any influence ? let alone control ? over the location of investment in these societies. This paper will examine the possibilities of raising questions of social democratic influence over private and pension investment in Western Europe. By examining the historic contours of the 20th century debates in Germany and Sweden, the two countries where the debate went the farthest, I hope to generate hypotheses as to whether this policy option might represent a viable tactic by the contemporary democratic left to both the pension and democratic deficit issues in Western Europe generally, and the EU specifically. Germany and Sweden have been chosen as critical case studies because their experiences can likely offer useful guidance about the concrete limits to utility of this approach. This paper is divided into three sections. First, it analyzes the issue of investment and private control and shows how difficult it has been for democratic societies to challenge private interests on this core issue. Despite the growing predominance of collective funds (e.g. private pensions and public social insurance funds), democratic societies have never been able to ?democratize? investment decisions. The general arguments raised against such radical proposals by traditional controllers of investment have been that they too directly challenge ?managerial autonomy? or, alternatively, such radical steps are unnecessary because the free choice of individuals to decide where to invest is the essence of individualistic shareholder democracy. Second, the paper looks at the origins of German and Swedish attempts to democratize investment via two different paths and two different kinds of political institutions. It then analyzes their evolution through the 1970s and 1980s and suggests why they ultimately were unsuccessful in achieving their respective goals. Third, the paper concludes with some speculative consideration ? and perhaps more questions than answers ? on the relationship between democracy and investment in societies, such as those in Western Europe and/or the EU, that are both democratic and capitalist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the new institutional architecture of Eastern Europe. It extends Lijphart?s study of democratic institutions to fourteen new democracies in Eastern Europe. In his analysis of advanced democracies, Lijphart found that ten institutional variables cluster on two clearly separate dimensions. This clustering does not occur in the new democracies of Eastern Europe; they do not fall clearly into Lijphart?s consensus and majoritarian camps. On the executives-parties dimension, Eastern European countries are basically consensus except for highly majoritarian forms of interest group representation. On the federal-unity dimension, they are even more divided. While they tend to have unitary, unicameral governments (both majoritarian traits), they have adopted highly consensual modes of constitutional amendment, judicial review, and central banks. While Lijphart suggests that his two types of democracy have a logical coherence, this paper attributes these hybrids to the circumstances prevailing at the time when new institutions were adopted. In particular, communist legacies and international conditions have influenced the choice of new institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Popular participation in the electoral process plays a very important role in enhancing the legitimacy of democratic regimes. However, democracies differ widely in the degree to which voters exercise their franchise. This paper examines the effect of political institutions on electoral turnout in the new democracies of East Central Europe (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia). The paper considers a number of hypotheses. First, electoral turnout should increase with the proportionality of the electoral system (Blais and Carty 1990, Cox 1999). Second, electoral turnout should be greater where concurrent elections are held to multiple political offices, such as a strong presidency or a second chamber. Conversely, nonconcurring elections should reduce voter turnout. Finally, the party system may also have an impact both on electoral turnout as well as the magnitude of the effect of political institutions: the more competitive the party system, the higher the turnout and the stronger the impact of the political institutions are expected to be. The selection of the four cases from a well defined geo-political region allows to control the comparison for a number of sociological and historical variables. At the same time, the institutional diversity among the four new democracies provides for an excellent laboratory to test the above hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature that has sought to explain the affects of the economy on voting is extensive. However, these findings are for the most part based on Western democratic models. Consequently, political scientists have failed to take advantage of the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe to see if these models are robust. Given the changes over the past decade, this paper tests the extent to which extant theories can be used to explain election outcomes in this region of the world. In this particular study, Polish monthly public opinion data is utilized to determine more accurately whom the electorate holds accountable during periods of economic stress in semi-presidential systems?the president or the prime minister. The findings in this paper suggest that a strong determinant of electoral accountability and the allocation of blame are dependent upon whether the government is unified or divided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previously it has been perceived as a citizen's duty to follow the news and to keep oneself informed about politics and current affairs. Recently however, it appears as if a growing number of citizens ignore the information opportunities given to them. Changes in the media environment have given people cross-nationally more of a choice as to which media diet they prefer, and for the American case, Prior (2007) have demonstrated that in an era of cable TV and Internet people more readily remove themselves from political knowledge and political action then they did before. In this paper we study how the public's consumption of news vs entertainment has developed over the last decade in countries with significantly different media systems. Is there a general increase in preference for entertainment across Europe, and has the gap between news and entertainment seekers increased like Prior documented for the US case? Who are the European citizens who remove themselves from news and current affairs in the environment of increased choice? Based on pooled data from five waves of the European Social Survey, covering more than 30 European countries from 2002 to 2010, using several innovative multilevel analyze techniques like fixed effect regression models with pseudo panel data (Verbeek 1995, Girma 2000, Jæger 2011), we demonstrate how national context or the media environment moderates the influence of individual level factors in news consumption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Clientelism remains to be an important channel of political mobilization in some mature democracies, despite a series of political reform aimed at making politics fair and transparent since the 1990s. By examining local political dynamics mainly in Italy and Japan, this paper argues that the resurgence of clientelism is a paradoxical result of recent reform. More specifically, the introduction of majoritarian electoral rules has intensified competition in each district and, therefore, given patrons incentives to secure firm political support from their constituencies through provision of patronage. Devolution has increased authority and discretion of the local elites, who have dominated clientelist exchanges at the local level. On the demand side of clientelism, the budget constraints facing countries since the 1990s have ironically raised value of patronage. Clients, or local constituencies, might compete even more fiercely for the limited public money. In the absence of substantial policy issues in dispute, clientelism thus continues to prevail as a means to mobilize political support. The authors also point to the significant effects of local electoral institutions which have helped clientelistic practices survive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the support for neofascist and populist parties across societies in Europe. Apart from the standard variables, such as immigration and unemployment as well as various supply-side variables, we also consider societal openness (defined on the basis of European Social Survey, 2004), welfare state and democracy. The main contribution of this paper is to establish the meta link between the three institutions (1) societal openness, (2) welfare state, and (3) democracy, and find out their impact on the support for extreme right in Europe. We first establish that, in more open societies the direct effect of openness on neofascist votes is negative; however, openness increases the neofascist support indirectly through immigration and unemployment. Moreover, we find that openness has no direct effect on the support for populist parties, but has indirect positive effects through unemployment. We also find that the effect of openness go hand in hand with that of welfare indicator within countries; however, the link between openness and democracy is less unambiguous. Our results are robust with respect to different classifications of extreme right parties and when endogeneity of immigration is controlled for. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By 2006 all of the post-communist states of East and Central Europe (ECE) had adopted laws on Freedom of Information (FOI). This is intriguing considering that it took most “traditional” democracies much longer to pass such laws. The paper asks why the laws were adopted so quickly in ECE and if they are truly effective. The study identifies three mechanisms that contributed to the adoption of FOI laws: a) pressure from civil society; b) unexpected consequences of membership in transparent international organizations; c) direct involvement by international actors. It argues that the differences in the processes leading to FOI law adoption in these countries have translated into differences in their effectiveness. I generate a series of hypotheses and test them by developing two gauges of effectiveness of FOI laws: 1) the public’s use of laws (based on the number of FOI requests received), 2) the implementation of laws by officials (based on the proportion of requests receiving answers). The research looks at developments in Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AAs the ideological gap between political parties' narrows and party identification decreases, parties need new strategies to attract voters. Politicizing political corruption is one option and this paper explores to what extent and with what results political parties have used the issue of corruption in European parliamentary elections between 1983 and 2007. 171 electoral campaigns in 32 European democracies are analyzed and the main results are that politicization of corruption is correlated with the level of corruption. Moreover, the issue is rather under than over politicized, implying that it is not a used as a populist strategy to win votes. Rather it is established mainstream parties that are the main champions of anti-corruption. Finally, the results show that corruption allegations quite substantially increase the likelihood of governmental turnover in medium and highly corrupt countries, whereas corruption is not politicized at all in low corrupt countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that a political reading of mobility is instrumental for understanding the role of democracy within globalised structures of power. Relegated to a socio-economic background that prompts new engagements with democracy, mobility has been neglected as a condition of possibility and as a form of democratic practice. Drawing on Georg Simmel's sociology of money, we show that practices of transversal mobility constitute democratic moments in relation to structures of power that are constituted across the territorial circumscription of national states. Mobility works directly upon structures of power through universal rights and the politics of the 'mob'. As democratic practices, both rights and mass politics rely on the principle of equality. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is describing and explaining the democratic revolutions and multidirectional regime changes, which occurred in the two decades between 1989 and 2009 in post-Communist Europe and post-Soviet Eurasia. It analyses at the beginning the decline of Communism and the failed attempts to reform Communist One-Party States in the period between 1970 and 1988 as stage one of democratization. The next section is dealing with the end of Communist regimes as second stage of democratization between 1989 and 1991. The following part is devoted to stage three of the democratization process, which is focusing on the creation of new democracies. The dynamics of post-Communist democratization is differentiated into three separate paths of development: the path towards consolidated and liberal democracies, the second path to partial and electoral democracies and finally the transformation of post-Soviet countries into illiberal autocracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper outlines how patronage ties might moderate otherwise polarizing categories in politics, such as those based in religious ideology or ethnic identity. Patronage networks can serve as an informal institutional means to incorporate diverse actors into the control structures of the state, effectively co-opting potential rivals to state control. Patronage structures can have these moderating effects in both non-democracies and democracies. The form or structure of patronage networks matters greatly here - as incorporating important individuals into the hierarchy can serve as an important means to entice their cooperation. But the content of the ties is also relevant. Encouraging the pursuit of material or resource interests can reduce elites' focus on ideological or identity interests that could otherwise prove difficult for the state to control. They also emphasize shared interests. Elites can agree on the pursuit of wealth or power - shared interests that provide a counter to oppositional categories based on ideology or identity. We sketch how patronage control mechanisms work through a diverse array of examples from the Middle East and Eastern Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates variation in women and men's paths to parliament. We draw on cross-national survey data of national and European parliamentarians from 15 west European democracies to analyze the function of gender in parliamentarian pathways. Comparing across these 15 democracies, we examine whether the function of gender in parliamentarian pathways varies by political, social and personal factors in parliamentarians' environments. Focusing in particular on the variation in the nature of gender-egalitarian political, social and personal contexts, we determine whether women and men converge, diverge or demonstrate stable distances in their pathway attitudes under these varied contexts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]