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1. Perceived social norm and behavior quickly adjusted to legal changes during the COVID-19 pandemic

Author

Fabio Galeotti, Marie Claire Villeval, Fortuna Casoria, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), ANR-16-IDEX-0005,IDEXLYON,IDEXLYON(2016), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), and Dao, Taï

Subjects
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Economics and Econometrics, Public policy, Distancing, media_common.quotation_subject, 050109 social psychology, Laws, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General/D.D0.D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact, Social Distancing, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Article, 050105 experimental psychology, Perception, 0502 economics and business, Pandemic, Social Norms, 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences, 050207 economics, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, 0505 law, media_common, 050502 law, Government, JEL: I - Health, Education, and Welfare/I.I2 - Education and Research Institutions, Social distance, 05 social sciences, COVID-19, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D9 - Intertemporal Choice/D.D9.D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving, 3. Good health, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H1 - Structure and Scope of Government/H.H1.H12 - Crisis Management, Incentive, Norm (social), Psychology, Social psychology
Abstract

In response to the pandemic of COVID-19 and in lack of pharmaceutical solutions, many countries have introduced social and physical distancing regulations to contain the transmission of the virus. These measures are effective insofar as they are able to quickly change people's habits. This is achieved by changing the monetary incentives of rule violators but also by shifting people's perception regarding the appropriateness of socialization. We studied the effect of introducing, and then lifting, distancing regulations on the perceived norm regarding social encounters. We conducted an online incentivized experiment in France where we elicited the same participants' perceived norm and social distancing behavior every week for three months. We found that people shifted behavior and norm perception as soon as the government introduced or removed distancing measures. This effect was fast acting and long lasting. This is informative for future interventions, especially in light of a possible COVID-19 recurrence.

Published
2021
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2. Enriching the CAP evaluation toolbox with experimental approaches: introduction to the special issue

Author

Sophie Thoyer, Raphaële Préget, Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 (CEE-M), Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), and Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM)

Subjects
2. Zero hunger, Economics and Econometrics, Public economics, business.industry, 05 social sciences, Commission, Ex ante evaluation, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Agricultural and Biological Sciences (miscellaneous), Toolbox, Financial regulation, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture/Q.Q1.Q18 - Agricultural Policy • Food Policy, Agriculture, Political science, 0502 economics and business, Relevance (law), media_common.cataloged_instance, 050202 agricultural economics & policy, 050207 economics, European union, business, Common Agricultural Policy, media_common
Abstract

International audience; "As one of the first expenditure programmes of the European Union (EU), the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is regularly monitored and evaluated. Ex ante evaluation is a legal requirement of the EU’s Financial Regulation, responding to well-established guidelines under the ‘integrated impact assessment’ system. It is directly conducted by the European Commission (EC) and assesses the cost-effectiveness and the distributional consequences of proposed CAP reform scenarios. Ex post (retrospective) evaluation seeks to measure the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of CAP measures. Ex-post evaluation of the CAP is co-ordinated by the Commission’s Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development, in relation with MemberStates and is often carried out by independent experts, both at European leveland at national and/or regional levels..."

Published
2019
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3. A probative value for authentication use case blockchain

Author

Dominique Guegan, Christophe Hénot, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Labex ReFi, and University of Ca’ Foscari [Venice, Italy]

Subjects
Market capitalization, Cryptocurrency, Blockchain, Crypto-currency, Hash rate, 02 engineering and technology, Immutability, Business activities, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Mining, Evidential value, [MATH.MATH-ST]Mathematics [math]/Statistics [math.ST], 020204 information systems, 0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering, JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E4 - Money and Interest Rates/E.E4.E42 - Monetary Systems • Standards • Regimes • Government and the Monetary System • Payment Systems, Industrial organization, 0505 law, 050502 law, [SHS.STAT]Humanities and Social Sciences/Methods and statistics, Probative value, 05 social sciences, JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G1 - General Financial Markets/G.G1.G18 - Government Policy and Regulation, JEL: K - Law and Economics/K.K2 - Regulation and Business Law/K.K2.K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law, Attack, JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G32 - Financing Policy • Financial Risk and Risk Management • Capital and Ownership Structure • Value of Firms • Goodwill, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Business environment, [MATH.MATH-PR]Mathematics [math]/Probability [math.PR], Volatility, Proof-of-work system, [SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration, Proof-of-Work, Business, Database transaction, Regulation
Abstract

International audience; The Fintech industry has facilitated the development of companies using blockchain technology. The use of this technology inside banking system and industry opens the route to several questions regarding the business activity, legal environment, and insurance devices. In this paper, considering the creation of small companies interested to develop their business with a public blockchain, we analyse from different aspects why a company (in banking or insurance system, and industry) decides that a blockchain protocol is more legitimate than another one for the business which it wants to develop looking at the legal (in case of dispute) points of view. We associate with each blockchain a probative value which permits to assure in case of dispute that a transaction has been really done. We illustrate our proposal using 13 blockchains providing in that case a ranking between these blockchains for their use in business environment. We associate with this probative value some main characteristics of any blockchain as market capitalization and log-return volatilities that the investors need to also take into account with the new probative value for their managerial strategy.

Published
2019
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4. Does voting on tax fund destination imply a direct democracy effect?

Author

Antoine Malézieux, Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre de Recherche sur l'ENtreprise [Dijon] (CEREN), Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC) (BSB), Financial support from the Conseil Régional de Lorraine, the Tax Administration Research Centre and theNational Research Agency (program Investissements d’Avenir, ANR-10–LABX-93-0 and ANR-17-EURE-0001), aregratefully acknowledged., ANR-10-LABX-0093,OSE,Opening economics(2010), ANR-17-EURE-0001,PGSE,Ecole d'Economie de Paris(2017), Conseil Régional de Lorraine, Tax Administration Research Centre, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), and Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, Direct democracy effect, media_common.quotation_subject, Control (management), JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Compliance (psychology), Tax revenue, Voting, Honesty, 0502 economics and business, 050207 economics, health care economics and organizations, 050205 econometrics, media_common, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue, Public economics, 05 social sciences, Direct democracy, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Preference, Democracy, Commitment, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making, Business, Tax evasion game, Law, Finance, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
Abstract

International audience; Does giving taxpayers a voice over the destination of tax revenues lead to more honest income declarations? Previous experiments have shown that giving participants the opportunity to select the organization that receives their tax funds tends to increase tax compliance. The aim of this paper is to assess whether this increase in compliance is induced by the sole fact of giving subjects a choice—a “direct democracy effect”. To that aim, we ask participants to a tax evasion game to choose, in a collective or individual choice setting, between two very similar organizations which provide the same social (ecological) benefits. We elicit compliance for both organizations before the choice is made so as to control for the counter-factual compliance decision. We find that democracy does not increase compliance, and even observe a slight negative effect—in particular for women. Our results confirm the existence of a commitment effect of democracy, leading to favor more the selected organization when it was actively chosen. The commitment effect of democracy is however not enough to overcome the decrease in the level of compliance. Thanks to response times data, we show that prior choice on similar options as compared to a purely random selection weakens the preference for honesty. One important field application of our results is that democracy in tax spending must offer real choices to tax payers to improve compliance.

Published
2021
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5. La charité commence-t-elle à la maison pour réduire la pollution de l'air ? Une mise en évidence de l'altruisme intrafamilial

Author

Jason F. Shogren, Stéphane Luchini, Olivier Chanel, University of Wyoming (UW), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), The French Environment Ministry (Primequal grant no 36/98), The French ecological transition agency ADEME (Primequal grant CEPEM no 1862C0011), ANR-11-IDEX-0001,Amidex,INITIATIVE D'EXCELLENCE AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITE(2011), ANR-11-LABX-0061,OTMed,Objectif Terre : Bassin Méditerranéen(2011), ANR-16-CE03-0005,GREEN-Econ,Vers une économie plus verte : politiques environnementales et adaptation sociétale(2016), ANR-17-EURE-0020,AMSE (EUR),Aix-Marseille School of Economics(2017), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Chanel, Olivier

Subjects
media_common.quotation_subject, air pollution, Air pollution, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics, medicine.disease_cause, Altruism, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, 03 medical and health sciences, familial altruism, Willingness to pay, 11. Sustainability, 0502 economics and business, medicine, Economics, Air quality index, media_common, 050210 logistics & transportation, Contingent valuation, Public economics, 030503 health policy & services, 05 social sciences, Public good, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, 3. Good health, Test (assessment), Econometric model, field experiment, Modeling and Simulation, [SHS] Humanities and Social Sciences, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, 0305 other medical science, willingness to pay, contingent valuation
Abstract

International audience; We propose a structural econometric model that incorporates altruism towards other household members into the willingness to pay for a public good. The model distinguishes preferences for public good improvements for oneself from preferences for improvements for other household members. We test for three different types of altruism - ‘pure self-interest’, ‘pure altruism’ and ‘public-good-focused non-pure altruism’. Using French contingent valuation data regarding air quality improvements, we find positive and significant degrees of concern for children under the age of 18, which are explained by determinants related to health and subjective air quality assessment. All other forms of pure or air-quality-focused altruism within the family are insignificant, including for children over 18, siblings, spouses, and parents. This result suggests that benefit estimates that do not consider altruism could undervalue improvements in air quality in France.

Published
2021
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6. Can Economic Experiments Contribute to a More Effective CAP?

Author

Jesús Barreiro-Hurlé, Fabian Thomas, Sophie Thoyer, Ciaran Blanchflower, Tanja Šumrada, Laure Kuhfuss, Jens Rommel, Marianne Lefebvre, Liesbeth Colen, Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management (GRANEM), Université d'Angers (UA)-AGROCAMPUS OUEST, Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage, Université d'Angers (UA), Joint Research center, European Commission, University of Göttingen - Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, The James Hutton Institute, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU), University of Ljubljana, Osnabrück University of Applied Sciences (OS UAS), Hochschule Osnabrück, Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 (CEE-M), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), and Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)

Subjects
Computer science, Geography, Planning and Development, effectiveness, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, Order (exchange), 0502 economics and business, Agricultural policy, economic experiments, European Union, 050207 economics, Policy outcomes, Set (psychology), ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, Pace, 2. Zero hunger, Horizon 2020, 05 social sciences, Experimental economics, Evaluation tools, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, CAP, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D9 - Intertemporal Choice/D.D9.D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving, Replication (computing), Risk analysis (engineering), 13. Climate action, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics, 050202 agricultural economics & policy, Common Agricultural Policy
Abstract

International audience; In order to keep pace with the evolution of the objectives and means of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, evaluation tools also need to adapt. A set of tools that have proved highly effective in other policy fields is economic xperiments. These allow the testing of a new policy before its implementation, provide evidence of its specific effects, and identify behavioural dimensions that can influence policy outcomes. We argue that agricultural policy should be subject to economic experiments, providing examples to illustrate how they can inform CAP design. We identify the additional efforts needed to establish further proof-of- concept, by running more –and more robust –experiments related to the CAP. This can happen only by integrating experimental evaluation results within the policy cycle and addressing ethical and practical challenges seriously. To do so, researchers would benefit from a concerted European effort to promote the methodology across the EU; organise the replication in time and across Europ of experiments relevant for the CAP; and build a multi-national panel of farmers willing to participate in experiments. Steps are being taken in this direction by the Research Network of Economics Experiments for CAP evaluation (REECAP).; Face à l’évolution des objectifs et des moyens de la politique agricole commune de l’Union européenne, les outils d’évaluation doivent également s’adapter. Les expérimentations économiques sont un ensemble d’outils qui se sont avérés très efficaces dans d’autres domaine d’action des pouvoirs publics. Elles permettent de tester une nouvelle politique avant sa mise en oeuvre, fournissent des informations sur les effets spécifiques de cette politique et identifient les dimensions comportementales qui peuvent influencer ses résultats. Nous soutenons que la politique agricole devrait être l’objet d’expérimentations économiques et fournissons des exemples pour illustrer comment celles-ci peuvent éclairer la formulation de la PAC. Nous identifions les efforts supplémentaires nécessaires pour établir d’autres preuves de concept, en menant des expérimentations liées à la PAC plus nombreuses -et plus robustes. Cela ne peut se faire qu’en intégrant les résultats des évaluations expérimentales dans le cycle de la politique et en s’attaquant sérieusement aux défis éthiques et pratiques. Pour ce faire, les chercheurs bénéficieraient d’un effort européen concerté pour promouvoir la méthodologie à travers l’Union européenne ; organiser la réplication dans le temps et à travers l’Europe d’expérimentations pertinentes pour la PAC ; et constituer un panel multinational d’agriculteurs désireux de participer à ces expérimentations. Des mesures sont prises dans ce sens par le Réseau de recherche sur les expérimentations économiques pour l’évaluation de la PAC (REECAP).

Published
2021
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7. Does catch-and-release increase the recreational value of rivers? The case of salmon fishing

Author

Philippe Le Goffe, Carole Ropars-Collet, Qods Lefnatsa, Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires (SMART-LERECO), AGROCAMPUS OUEST, Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), and AGROCAMPUS OUEST-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)

Subjects
0106 biological sciences, Salmon fishing, Fishing, 01 natural sciences, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Choice experiment, 0502 economics and business, Fishing trip, 14. Life underwater, Socioeconomic status, Recreation, Valuation (finance), Recreational activity, business.industry, 010604 marine biology & hydrobiology, 05 social sciences, General Medicine, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, [SDE.ES]Environmental Sciences/Environmental and Society, Fishery, Geography, Catch and release, Agriculture, Value (economics), 050202 agricultural economics & policy, business, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation/Q.Q2.Q26 - Recreational Aspects of Natural Resources, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation/Q.Q2.Q22 - Fishery • Aquaculture, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C2 - Single Equation Models • Single Variables/C.C2.C25 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models • Discrete Regressors • Proportions • Probabilities
Abstract

International audience; Catch-and-release (C&R) could be an interesting management tool in recreational fisheries as long as mortality remains low and the anglers' well-being does not drop. We used a choice experiment to examine the potential of C&R angling as a monitoring tool for the salmon recreational fishery in Brittany (France) in summer 2017. Anglers were asked to choose between hypothetical fishing day trips differing in terms of their combination of relevant attributes and levels and distance to travel. From the analysis of respondents' trade-offs between the fishing trip's attributes, willingness-to-pay was estimated for each level of attribute. Our results show that anglers prefer unrestrictive regulations. On average, we observe that C&R has a depressive effect on the valuation of the fishing day. However, some socioeconomic groups positively value C&R. All in all, the majority of the anglers nonetheless hold a positive valuation of a C&R fishing day, which could therefore be used to generate economic returns for the river once the total admissible capture (TAC) is reached. Lastly, the fishing season, and especially the level of river use, impacts more on the value of fishing than C&R.

Published
2021
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8. Performance Feedback and Peer Effects

Author

Marie Claire Villeval, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), and Dao, Taï

Subjects
Marginal cost, Disappointment, peer effects, Social learning, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Social preferences, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Feedback, peer effects JEL codes: C9, Microeconomics, Incentive, M5, medicine, Economics, D91, J3, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, medicine.symptom, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Productivity, Rivalry, Externality, performance, JEL: M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M5 - Personnel Economics, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS
Abstract

This paper reviews studies conducted in naturally-occurring work environments or in the laboratory on the impact of performance feedback provision and peer effects on individuals' performance. First, it discusses to which extent feedback on absolute performance affects individuals' effort for cognitive or motivational reasons, and how evaluations can be distorted strategically. Second, this paper highlights the positive and negative effects of feedback on relative performance and rank on individuals' productivity and persistence, but also on the occurrence of antisocial behavior. Relative feedback stimulates effort by informing on the marginal return or the marginal cost of effort, and by activating behavioral forces even in the absence of monetary incentives. These behavioral mechanisms relate to self-esteem, status concerns, competitive preferences and social learning. Relative feedback sometimes discourages or distorts effort, notably if people collude or are disappointment averse. In addition to incentive schemes and social preferences, the management of self-confidence affects the way relative feedback impacts productivity. Third, the paper addresses the question of the identification of peer effects on employees' performance, their size, their direction and their heterogeneity along the hierarchy. The mechanisms behind peer effects include conformism, social pressure, rivalry, social learning and distributional preferences, depending on the presence of payoff externalities or technological and organizational externalities..

Published
2020
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9. Income hiding and informal redistribution: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Senegal

Author

Marie Boltz, Paola Villar, Karine Marazyan, Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), IEDES, UMR Développement et Sociétés, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), Institut national d'études démographiques (INED), Université de Namur [Namur] (UNamur), This work was supported by the CEPREMAP, the PSE Research Fund, the Sarah Andrieux Fund, the Chair G-Mond, the IRD, the UMR Développement et Société, the Agence Nationale pour la Recherche [through the program Investissements d'Avenir, ANR-10-LABX-93-01]. This research is also part of the NOPOOR project, which is funded by the European Union under the 7th Research Framework Programme (Theme SSH.2011.1) - Grant Agreement No. 290752., ANR-10-LABX-0093,OSE,Opening economics(2010), European Project: 290752,EC:FP7:SSH,FP7-SSH-2011-1,NOPOOR(2012), ANR-10-LABX-0093,OSE,Ouvrir la Science Economique - Opening economics(2010), Instutut d'Études du Développement de la Sorbonne (IEDES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1), and UMR Développement et Sociétés (DEVSOC)

Subjects
Lab-in-the-field experiment, Economics and Econometrics, Labour economics, Resource allocation decisions, Field experiment, 05 social sciences, 1. No poverty, Extended family, Redistribution (cultural anthropology), Development, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Informal redistribution, Africa, JEL: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O1 - Economic Development, 0502 economics and business, Economics, resource allocation decision, 050207 economics, Extended families, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics, Income observability, 050205 econometrics
Abstract

International audience; We estimate the hidden cost of social obligations to redistribute exploiting data from a controlled setting in urban Senegal, which combines lab-in-the-field measures and out-of-lab follow-up data. We estimate a social tax of about 9 percent. When given the opportunity to get hidden income, individuals decrease by 26 percent the share of gains they transfer to kin — mostly outside the household — and increase health and personal expenses. We expand on prior literature by both identifying the individual cost of informal redistribution and then relating it to postexperiment resource-allocation decisions, and by disentangling intra- and interhousehold redistributive pressure.

Published
2019
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10. Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games

Author

Jason F. Shogren, Stéphane Luchini, Antoine Malézieux, Nicolas Jacquemet, Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), Centre de Recherche sur l'ENtreprise [Dijon] (CEREN), Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC) (BSB), University of Wyoming (UW), University of Alaska-Anchorage, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Sozialforschung (WZB), Tax Administration Research Centre (TARC), Region Grand-Est, Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Université de Lorraine (UL)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Tax Administration Research Centre, University of Exeter (TARC), The authors thank the Conseil Régional de Lorraine for its financial support., Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), University of Exeter, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, media_common.quotation_subject, Declaration, oath, Tax evasion, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Compliance (psychology), honesty, Consistency (negotiation), JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H27 - Other Sources of Revenue, Honesty, 0502 economics and business, Economics, 050207 economics, Empirical evidence, 050205 econometrics, Law and economics, media_common, Commitment device, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance, Oath, 05 social sciences, commitment, part-time Lying, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Lying, Finance
Abstract

International audience; Using two earned income/tax declaration experimental designs we show that only partial liars are affected by a truth-telling oath, a non-price commitment device. Under oath, we see no change in the number of chronic liars and fewer partial liars. Rather than smoothly increasing their compliance, we also observe that partial liars who respond to the oath, respond by becoming fully honest under oath. Based on both response times data and the consistency of subjects when several compliance decisions are made in a row, we show that partial lying arises as the result of weak preferences towards profitable honesty. The oath only transforms people with weak preferences for lying into being committed to the truth.

Published
2020
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11. Money illusion, financial literacy and numeracy: experimental evidence

Author

Elisa Darriet, Marianne Guille, Mariko Shimizu, Jean-Christophe Vergnaud, Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de recherche en sciences de l'action (LIRSA), Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM] (CNAM), HESAM Université (HESAM)-HESAM Université (HESAM), Laboratoire d'économie mathématique et de microéconomie appliquée (LEMMA), Université Panthéon-Assas (UP2), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Université Panthéon-Assas (UP2)-Sorbonne Université (SU)

Subjects
Inflation, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science, media_common.quotation_subject, Context (language use), Monetary economics, Behavioral economics, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, 050105 experimental psychology, JEL: G - Financial Economics, PsycINFO Classification code: 2260, 2340, 2343, Numeracy, 0502 economics and business, Money illusion, Economics, 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences, JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy, 050207 economics, Empirical evidence, Applied Psychology, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics, media_common, [QFIN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin], 05 social sciences, 1. No poverty, Deflation, Behavioral sciences, Behavioral finance, Financial literacy, [SCCO.PSYC]Cognitive science/Psychology, Design of experiments
Abstract

We would like to thank the editor Stefan Trautmann, the two anonymous reviewers, Hélène Huber for their helpful comments and the LEMMA, University Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas for its financial support.; International audience; Money illusion is usually defined as the inability of individuals to correctly account for inflation or deflation when making decisions. Empirical evidence shows that money illusion matters in financial decisions, particularly those made by households. In this article, we analyze money illusion at the individual level within the context of financial choices and study its relationship with numeracy and financial literacy. To do so, we propose an original measure of money illusion via an experimental task. This task consists of a series of choices between a pair of simple bonds whose returns are affected only by inflation (or deflation). We provide a fine-grained measure of money illusion that is correlated with typical measures (questionnaires) of it. Moreover, we show that money illusion depends on the choice context (e.g., inflation or deflation) and participants’ abilities. Individuals with financial knowledge are less sensitive to money illusion than others, while there is no evidence of an impact of numeracy.

Published
2020
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12. The Effect of Group Identity on Hiring Decisions With Incomplete Information

Author

Fortuna Casoria, Christina Rott, Ernesto Reuben, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), New York University [Abu Dhabi], NYU System (NYU), Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam [Amsterdam] (VU), Management and Organisation, Tinbergen Institute, Dao, Taï, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
SDG 16 - Peace, group identity, adverse selection, Strategy and Management, Management Science and Operations Research, JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J7 - Labor Discrimination/J.J7.J71 - Discrimination, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Identity, Discrimination, JEL: M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M5 - Personnel Economics/M.M5.M51 - Firm Employment Decisions • Promotions, 0502 economics and business, ddc:330, D91, 050207 economics, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, J71, 050208 finance, SDG 16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, 05 social sciences, SDG 10 - Reduced Inequalities, Hiring, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Labor, Justice and Strong Institutions, D82, Economics: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory, hiring, 8. Economic growth, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, discrimination
Abstract

We investigate the effects of group identity on hiring decisions with adverse selection problems. We run a laboratory experiment in which employers cannot observe a worker’s ability or verify the veracity of the ability the worker claims to have. We evaluate whether sharing an identity results in employers discriminating in favor of ingroup workers and whether it helps workers and employers overcome the adverse selection problem. We induce identities using the minimal group paradigm and study two settings: one in which workers cannot change their identity and one in which they can. Although sharing a common identity does not make the worker’s claims more honest, employers strongly discriminate in favor of ingroup workers when identities are fixed. Discrimination cannot be explained by employers’ beliefs and, hence, seems to be taste-based. When possible, few workers change their identity. However, the mere possibility of changing identities erodes the employers’ trust toward ingroup workers and eliminates discrimination. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

Published
2020
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13. Social preferences and coordination: An experiment

Author

Raphael Soubeyran, Nicolas Quérou, Mamadou Gueye, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 (CEE-M), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), ANR-16-CE03-0005,GREEN-Econ,Vers une économie plus verte : politiques environnementales et adaptation sociétale(2016), Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL), Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine (LEDa), Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)-Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier (CEE-M), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro, Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 (CEE-M), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)-Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, and Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)

Subjects
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Economics and Econometrics, inequality, Inequality, media_common.quotation_subject, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics, Affect (psychology), Social preferences, Outcome (game theory), JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Microeconomics, 0502 economics and business, Economics, Coordination game, 050207 economics, 050205 econometrics, media_common, 05 social sciences, Stochastic game, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, coordination game, Negative relationship, inequality aversion, total payoff motivation, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making, Inequity aversion
Abstract

International audience; In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to analyze the effect of social preferences in a coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Inequality is increased by increasing the coordination payoffs of some subjects while the coordination payoffs of others remain unchanged. Theoretically, in this setting, inequality aversion may lead to a negative relationship between inequality and coordination success, while total payoff motivations lead to a positive relationship. Using a within-subject experimental design, we find that more inequality unambiguously yields a higher level of coordination success. Furthermore, this result holds even for subjects whose payoffs remain unchanged. Our results suggest that total payoff motivations drive the positive relationship between inequality and coordination success found in this experiment. Moreover, our data highlight that the order of treatment matters. Groups facing over time a reduction in inequalities reach the efficient outcome more often, over the entire experiment, compared to groups facing over time an increase in inequalities. This study thus contributes to understanding whether social preferences and variations in inequality affect the outcome of coordination problems.

Published
2020
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14. Is Informal Redistribution Costly? Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Senegal

Author

Marie Boltz, Paola Villar, Karine Marazyan, Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), IEDES, UMR Développement et Sociétés, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), Institut national d'études démographiques (INED), Université de Namur [Namur] (UNamur), and The authors are thankful to the CEPREMAP, the PSE Research Fund, theSarah Andrieux Fund, the Chair G-Mond, the IRD, and the UMR Développement et Sociétés for their financial support forthis research project. This project received the IRB certification of J-Pal Europe (CE/2014-005).

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, Labour economics, MIGRATION, 050204 development studies, Field experiment, informal redistribution, Social pressure, Development, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, INFORMAL ECONOMY, Willingness to pay, Income distribution, REDISTRIBUTION, income observability, Accounting, 0502 economics and business, Economics, EXTENDED FAMILY, 050207 economics, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics, Lab-in-the-field experiment, Informal sector, 05 social sciences, 1. No poverty, Extended family, Redistribution (cultural anthropology), JEL: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O1 - Economic Development/O.O1.O15 - Human Resources • Human Development • Income Distribution • Migration, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, INCOME OBSERVABILITY, JEL: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth, Africa, WILLINGNESS TO PAY, extended families, JEL: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O1 - Economic Development/O.O1.O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors • Shadow Economy • Institutional Arrangements, willingness to pay, Finance
Abstract

In Sub-Saharan Africa, individuals frequently transfer a substantial share of their resources to members of their social networks. Social pressure to redistribute, however, can induce disincentive effects on resource allocation decisions. This paper measures and characterizes the costs of redistributive pressure by estimating individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) to hide their income. The study estimates a social tax due to informal redistribution of 10 percent. Moreover, it shows that individuals are willing to escape from the redistributive pressure exerted mainly by extended family members.

Published
2019
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15. Estimating Social Preferences and Kantian Morality in Strategic Interactions

Author

Van Leeuwen, Boris, Alger, Ingela, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Department of economics, Tilburg University, Tilburg University [Netherlands], ANR-17-EURE-0010,CHESS,Toulouse Graduate School défis en économie et sciences sociales quantitatives(2017), DSR-SCD-UT1C, Service Publications, and Toulouse Graduate School défis en économie et sciences sociales quantitatives - - CHESS2017 - ANR-17-EURE-0010 - EURE - VALID

Subjects
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D3 - Distribution, Kantian morality, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Morality, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D84 - Expectations • Speculations, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C4 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics/C.C4.C49 - Other, Experiment, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, Social preference, Structural estimation, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, Other-regarding preferences, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Finite mixture models, B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Abstract

Theory suggests that a form of Kantian morality has evolutionary founda-tions. To investigate the relative importance of Kantian morality and social preferences, we run a laboratory experiment on strategic interaction in social dilemmas. We struc-turally estimate social preferences and Kantian morality at the individual and aggregate level. We observe considerable heterogeneity in preferences. Finite mixture analyses show that the subject pool is well described as consisting of two or three types: all display a Kantian moral concern, which they combine with aheadness aversion, behindness aver-sion, or both. The value of adding Kantian morality to well-established preference classes is also evaluated.

Published
2019

16. Referenda Under Oath

Author

Jason F. Shogren, Alexander James, Stéphane Luchini, Nicolas Jacquemet, Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), University of Oxford [Oxford], Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming, University of Wyoming (UW), ANR-10-LABX-0093,OSE,Opening economics(2010), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Departement Economy and Finance, University of Wyoming, and University of Oxford

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, media_common.quotation_subject, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Dichotomous Choice Mechanism, Hypothetical bias, Oath, Preference revelation, Dichotomous Choice Mechanism,Hypothetical bias,Oath,Preference revelation, Voting, Honesty, 0502 economics and business, Economics, 050207 economics, media_common, Law and economics, Valuation (finance), 05 social sciences, Public good, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics, Incentive compatibility, 050202 agricultural economics & policy, Null hypothesis, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
Abstract

International audience; Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a popular elicitation mechanism promoted in non-market valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we observe that people who sign an oath are significantly less likely to vote for the public good in a hypothetical referenda. We complement this evidence with a self-reported measure of honesty which confirms that the oath increases truthfulness in answers. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab and beyond.

Published
2016
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17. A classroom experimental game to improve the understanding of asymmetric common-pool resource dilemmas in irrigation water management

Author

Katrin Erdlenbruch, Stefano Farolfi, Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages (UMR G-EAU), Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad)-Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)-AgroParisTech-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 (CEE-M), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Département Environnements et Sociétés (Cirad-ES), Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad), Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad)-Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)-AgroParisTech-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad)-Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)-AgroParisTech-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro, Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier (CEE-M), and Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro

Subjects
Eau d'irrigation, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior, C10 - Enseignement, Computer science, 0207 environmental engineering, 02 engineering and technology, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Irrigation water, Education, Méthode d'irrigation, Resource (project management), 0502 economics and business, Cooperative equilibrium, WaterCommon-pool resource, Session (computer science), P10 - Ressources en eau et leur gestion, F06 - Irrigation, 050207 economics, 020701 environmental engineering, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty, Communication, 05 social sciences, ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING, Asymmetry, Environmental economics, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Test (assessment), Experimental game, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics, Common-pool resource, Gestion des ressources, Gestion des eaux, Key (cryptography), Ressource en eau, JEL: A - General Economics and Teaching/A.A2 - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics, Éducation agricole, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Abstract

International audience; We describe a classroom experimental game focusing on some key economic concepts surrounding water management. The game shows the case of an asymmetric common-pool resource: an irrigation system where players represent irrigating farmers. Dilemmas between individual and collective interests arise, and asymmetry of access to the resource renders it more difficult to reach a cooperative equilibrium. The game is used to test hypotheses about the influence of communication and of water availability on players’ cooperation, hence on the group’s ability to reach equilibrium. The game was used in multiple postgraduate teaching contexts. We show the example of a session played in Tunisia, where communication had a strong and positive impact on cooperation, and compare the results of that session with those of another played in South Africa, where different outcomes emerged from the game. We then discuss the advantages and the limitations of such an experimental game for teaching purposes.

Published
2020
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18. A psychometric investigation of the personality traits underlying individual tax morale

Author

Stéphane Luchini, Antoine Malézieux, Nicolas Jacquemet, Jason F. Shogren, Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), University of Exeter Business School, Departement Economy and Finance, University of Wyoming, University of Wyoming (UW), Conseil Régional de Lorraine, Conseil Regional de Lorraine, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), Université de Lorraine (UL)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and University of Exeter

Subjects
psychometrics, Economics and Econometrics, media_common.quotation_subject, tax evasion, Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous), Shame, 050109 social psychology, Context (language use), Empathy, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Compliance (psychology), 0502 economics and business, 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences, 050207 economics, Big Five personality traits, media_common, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 05 social sciences, Rational choice theory, morality, Morality, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Preference, personality traits, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents/H.H3.H31 - Household, Psychology, Social psychology, tax morale
Abstract

Why do people pay taxes? Rational choice theory has fallen short in answering this question. Another explanation, called “tax morale”, has been promoted. Tax morale captures the behavioral idea that non-monetary preferences (like norm-submission, moral emotions and moral judgments) might be better determinants of tax compliance than monetary trade-offs. Herein we report on two lab experiments designed to assess whether norm-submission, moral emotions (e.g. affective empathy, cognitive empathy, propensity to feel guilt and shame) or moral judgments (e.g. ethics principles, integrity, and moralization of everyday life) can help explain compliance behavior. Although we find statistically significant correlations of tax compliance behavior with empathy and shame, the economic significance of these correlations are low–—more than 80% of the variability in compliance remains unexplained. These results suggest that tax authorities should focus on the institutional context, rather than individual preference characteristics, to handle tax evasion.

Published
2019
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19. Do upfront investments increase cooperation? A laboratory experiment

Author

Fortuna Casoria, Alice Ciccone, Dao, Taï, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Institute of Transport Economics, University of Oslo (UiO), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, genetic structures, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Microeconomics, Experiment, Prisoners' dilemma, 0502 economics and business, Economics, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, 050207 economics, Investment opportunities, Enforcement, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Industrial organization, health care economics and organizations, 050205 econometrics, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games, 05 social sciences, Stochastic game, Prisoner's dilemma, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Cooperation, Upfront investments, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, Business, Laboratory experiment, Finance
Abstract

In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether decentralized upfront investments increase cooperation in settings where there is no enforcement mechanism and cooperation is not easily sustained voluntarily. Such investments are a cost that individuals incur before deciding whether to cooperate or not, and increase the payoff resulting from the choice to cooperate. We study whether the effect of investments on cooperation depends on the investments being voluntary or mandatory. While cooperation rarely emerges spontaneously when investments are not possible, we show that introducing investment opportunities boosts overall cooperation levels. If investments are low and voluntary, cooperation is lower than when the same investments are mandatory. For high investments, cooperation is not significantly different between the two conditions. This is consistent with low investments being interpreted as a signal for unwillingness to cooperate, triggering non-cooperative choices.

Published
2019

20. Experiments in macroeconomics: methods and applications

Author

Camille Cornand, Frank Heinemann, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Technical University of Berlin / Technische Universität Berlin (TU)

Subjects
Macroeconomics, 050208 finance, laboratory experiments, JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E0 - General, 0502 economics and business, 05 social sciences, Economics, ddc:330, 050207 economics, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, macroeconomics
Abstract

This chapter lays out in what ways laboratory experiments can be useful for macroeconomics and discusses some of the methods used in such experiments. Among the main advantages are: bench-testing of alternative policies, capturing strategic uncertainty and biases from standard preferences or Bayesian updating, and accounting for heterogeneity in agents’ expectations and behavior. It is explained how DSGE models are implemented in laboratory experiments and how heuristic switching models can be used to analyze expectations out of equilibrium. A short literature review provides some results from direct tests of the various elements of microfoundation on which DSGE models are built. The methods of testing consumption smoothing and informational frictions are discussed in more detail. While experimental macroeconomics is a growing field, which has been useful in many respects, this chapter also discusses its challenges and limitations.

Published
2019

21. Information (Non)Aggregation in Markets with Costly Signal Acquisition

Author

Mark DeSantis, David Porter, Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, emlyon business school, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), University of Alabama [Tuscaloosa] (UA), Chapman University, business school, emlyon, emlyon business school (EM), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Dao, Taï

Subjects
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Economics and Econometrics, Offset (computer science), Profit (accounting), Information Acquisition, Asset (computer security), Behavioral economics, Behavioral Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Profit (economics), Signal acquisition, Microeconomics, 0502 economics and business, Information acquisition, JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G1 - General Financial Markets, 050207 economics, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, health care economics and organizations, 050208 finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty, Prediction Markets, 05 social sciences, Cognition, Differential (mechanical device), Individual level, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Laboratory Experiments, Private knowledge, Value (economics), [SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration, Business, Laboratory experiment, [SHS.GESTION] Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration
Abstract

International audience; Markets are often viewed as a tool for aggregating disparate private knowledge, a stance supported by past laboratory experiments. However, traders' acquisition cost of information has typically been ignored. Results from a laboratory experiment involving six treatments varying the cost of acquiring signals of an asset's value suggest that when information is costly, markets do not succeed in aggregating it. At an individual level, having information improves trading performance, but not enough to offset the cost of obtaining the information. Although males earn more through trading than females, this differential is offset by the greater propensity of males to buy information such that total profit is similar for males and females. Looking at individual skills, we find that higher theory of mind is associated with greater trading profit, greater overall profit, and an increased likelihood of acquiring information while cognitive reflection is associated with greater profit but not a greater propensity to acquire information.

Published
2018
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22. Experiments on macroeconomics: methods and applications

Author

Cornand, Camille, Heinemann, Frank, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Technische Universität Berlin (TU), Dao, Taï, Edited by Arthur Schram and Aljaž Ule, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Technical University of Berlin / Technische Universität Berlin (TU)

Subjects
laboratory experiments, JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E0 - General, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, macroeconomics
Abstract

This chapter lays out in which respects laboratory experiments can be useful for macroeconomics and discusses some of the methods used in such experiments.

Published
2018
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23. Expériences économiques en économie agricole : état des lieux et dynamiques de recherche

Author

Sabrina Teyssier, Douadia Bougherara, Laurent Muller, Marielle Brunette, Lisette Ibanez, Christoph Heinzel, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière (LEF), AgroParisTech-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires (SMART), AGROCAMPUS OUEST-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble (GAEL), Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 (CEE-M), Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM), Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires (SMART-LERECO), Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP )-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019] (UGA [2016-2019]), Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM), AGROCAMPUS OUEST, Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), and Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP )-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019] (UGA [2016-2019])

Subjects
2. Zero hunger, Environmental economics, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture, 05 social sciences, Economie agricole, Agriculture, Economie expérimentale, économie expérimentale, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, food policy, Design of experiments -Modeling, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics, validité interne et externe, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture/Q.Q1.Q18 - Agricultural Policy • Food Policy, Political science, 0502 economics and business, biais hypothétique, 050202 agricultural economics & policy, 050207 economics, économie agricole, Humanities, tromperie
Abstract

International audience; Experimental economics is increasingly used in the field of agricultural economics. This article reports the main insights of a summer school organized in 2015 by the INRA SAE2 Department (Social Sciences, Agriculture and Food, Rural Development and Environment) in order to review existing research using experiments and to discuss the relevance of experimental methods in this area. We discuss the main methodological issues like financial incentives and the hypothetical bias, internal and external validity, and deception. We also show the relevance of economic experiments in helping public decision-makers and firms. We argue that economic experiments are a promising method in this field.; L’économie expérimentale est de plus en plus utilisée en économie agricole. Cet article rend compte d’une École Chercheurs organisée en 2015 par le Département SAE2 (Sciences Sociales, Agriculture et Alimentation, Espace et Environnement) de l’INRA afin de faire un état des lieux des travaux employant cette méthode et de discuter de son apport à l’économie agricole. Les auteurs examinent les défis méthodologiques comme les incitations monétaires et le biais hypothétique, les validités interne et externe ainsi que l’utilisation de la tromperie en lien avec les spécificités de la recherche en économie agricole, puis la portée académique et sociétale de travaux expérimentaux. Encore jeune dans ce champ, l’économie expérimentale ouvre la voie à des questions de recherche prometteuses.

Published
2017
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24. COOPERATION: THE POWER OF A SINGLE WORD? SOME EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON WORDING AND GENDER EFFECTS IN A GAME OF CHICKEN

Author

Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin, Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée à la Mondialisation (CREAM), Université de Rouen Normandie (UNIROUEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Homme et Société (IRIHS), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rouen Normandie (UNIROUEN), Normandie Université (NU), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and École normale supérieure - Cachan (ENS Cachan)

Subjects
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods, social dilemma, wording effects, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior, Economics and Econometrics, social dilemma,Game of Chicken,cooperation,label framing effects,wording effects,gender effects, 05 social sciences, cooperation, Social dilemma,Game of Chicken,cooperation,wording effects,gender effects.,Dilemme social,jeu de la poule mouillée,effet liés à la terminologie,effet de genre, Social dilemma, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Game of Chicken, 0506 political science, Framing (social sciences), 0502 economics and business, label framing effects, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, 050602 political science & public administration, Economics, 050207 economics, Social psychology, gender effects
Abstract

Wording has been widely shown to affect decision making. In this paper, we investigate experimentally whether and to what extent, cooperative behaviour in a Game of Chicken may be impated by a very basic change in the labelling of the strategies. Our within-subject experimental design involves two treatments. The only difference between them is that we introduce either a socially-oriented wording (‘I cooperate'/‘I do not cooperate') or colours (red/blue) to designate strategies. The level of cooperation appears to be higher in the socially-oriented context, but only when the uncertainty as regards the type of the partner is manipulated, and especially among females., On connaît l'importance des mots sur la perception des messages. L'impact de la terminologie employée sur la prise de décision a ainsi été largement docummenté. Dans cet article, nous tentons de répondre expérimentalement à la question suivante : dans quelle mesure le comportement de coopération dans un jeu de la poule mouillée est-il affecté par un changement mineur dans la dénomination des stratégies ? Notre protocole expérimental met en jeu deux traitements (soumis aux mêmes sujets). La seule différence entre ces traitements est que l'un utilise une terminologie qui met l'accent sur l'aspect relationnel des stratégies (‘je coopère'/‘je ne coopère pas'), tandis que l'autre opte pour une dénomination plus neutre de ce point de vue en recourant à des couleurs (rouge/bleu). Le principal résultat de l'étude est que les sujets tendent à coopérer davantage dans le contexte "relationnel", mais seulement lorsque l'incertitude concernant le type du partenaire dans le jeu varie, et les femmes plus que les hommes.

Published
2012
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25. Cooperation and framing effects in provision point mechanisms: Experimental evidence

Author

David Masclet, Douadia Bougherara, Laurent Denant-Boèmont, Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires (SMART), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-AGROCAMPUS OUEST, Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires (SMART-LERECO), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), AGROCAMPUS OUEST-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), and Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)

Subjects
framing effects, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior, Economics and Econometrics, Public economics, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods/H.H4.H41 - Public Goods, 05 social sciences, Public good, Public goods experiment, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Environmental resource, Framing effect, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics, Private good, Framing (social sciences), provision point, 0502 economics and business, Public goods game, Economics, 050207 economics, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, 050205 econometrics, General Environmental Science
Abstract

International audience; Andreoni (1995) showed that pure framing effects may influence contribution in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms (VCM) by comparing a standard public goods game, called the positive frame condition (giving to the public good), with a negative frame condition (taking from the public good) where the subjects' choice to purchase a private good makes the other subjects worse off. This paper aims at testing the robustness of such framing effects in the context of Provision Point Mechanisms (PPM). Our approach is original in that it combines both framing and provision point dimensions by comparing maintaining (taking from the public good) and creating (giving to the public good) contexts using Provision Point experiments. Consistent with previous findings, we find that individuals tend to be less cooperative in the maintaining frame than in the creating frame. Our results also show that the framing effects are stronger under a PPM than under a VCM and increase with the provision point level. These results may have important consequences for the management of environmental resources.

Published
2011
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26. The Effect of Perfect Monitoring of Matched Income on Sales Tax Compliance: An Experimental Investigation

Author

David Masclet, Claude Montmarquette, Cathleen Johnson, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations (CIRANO), Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal (UQAM), Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), CIRANO, Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en ANalyse des Organisations, Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), and Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, Direct tax, ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING, Tax reform, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Microeconomics, Tax credit, Ad valorem tax, Accounting, 0502 economics and business, Economics, 050207 economics, Sales tax, experimental economics, perfect monitoring, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, 050205 econometrics, Public economics, 05 social sciences, tax, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, ComputingMilieux_GENERAL, Value-added tax, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue, State income tax, Finance, Indirect tax, reference dependent effect
Abstract

International audience; Tar noncompliance is a quantitatively important phenomenon that significantly affects government revenues. and thus raises challenging questions about the determinants of tax reporting and the appropriate design of a tax system. This paper provides empirical insights regarding the nature of tar noncompliance, using an experimental approach to evaluate the effects of systematic sales tax monitoring and identify the determinants of sales tax compliance The results suggest that if perfect monitoring of a single revenue source is introduced without other complementary policies, an increase in tax revenues is not the likely, outcome as evasion increases for other revenue sources That is, the data suggest that once taxpayers have chosen their level of tax compliance, they, will try to recover their losses following any policy changes, even if it implies assuming more risks.

Published
2010
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27. Economic Experiments as a Tool for Agricultural Policy Evaluation: Insights from the European CAP

Author

Colen, Liesbeth, Gomez y Paloma, Sergio, Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe, Lefebvre, Marianne, Préget, Raphaële, Thoyer, Sophie, JRC Institute for Transuranium Elements [Karlsruhe] (ITU ), European Commission - Joint Research Centre [Karlsruhe] (JRC), Kiel University, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel (CAU), Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management (GRANEM), Université d'Angers (UA)-AGROCAMPUS OUEST-Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), JRC Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS), European Commission - Joint Research Centre [Seville] (JRC), Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL), Department of Agricultural Economics, Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage-AGROCAMPUS OUEST, Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Université d'Angers (UA), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro), Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro), Catholic University of Leuven - Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KU Leuven), School of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Western Australia, The University of Western Australia (UWA), Université d'Angers (UA)-AGROCAMPUS OUEST, Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage, Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain (UCL), University of Western Australia, Université d'Angers (UA), Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA). Nancy, FRA. Société Française d'Economie Rurale (SFER), FRA. Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (CIRAD), FRA., and Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage-AGROCAMPUS OUEST-Université d'Angers (UA)

Subjects
simulation économique, efficacité des politiques, [QFIN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin], JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture, enquête, [SDV.SA.AEP]Life Sciences [q-bio]/Agricultural sciences/Agriculture, economy and politics, économie expérimentale, adaptation du modèle, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, économétrie, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Economies et finances, dispositif d'évaluation, Economies and finances, politique agricole commune
Abstract

International audience; This article assesses the potential contribution of economic experiments to evidence-based policy making in the field of agriculture, with a special focus on the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP evaluation mostly relies on standard tools such as farm and market simulation models, calibrated with EU-wide statistical data; statistical and econometric analysis of survey data; and a range of qualitative methods such as interviews with stakeholders, focus group or internet-based public consultation. Yet, the CAP has changed considerably over the past decades, requiring adaptations of its evaluation toolbox. A detailed review of existing studies using economic experiments for designing and evaluating agricultural policies provides the backbone for a comprehensive assessment of the complementarity of experimental approaches with standard evaluation tools. The article further provides recommendations aiming at facilitating inclusion of economic experiments into the CAP evaluation toolbox based on conclusions drawn from a workshop organized with experts, academics, and policy makers of Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Commission.; Cet article étudie la contribution potentielle des méthodes expérimentales pour l'élaboration de politiques agricoles fondée sur des données probantes, en considérant en particulier le cas de la politique agricole commune de l'UE (PAC). L’évaluation de la PAC repose principalement sur des outils standard tels que des modèles de simulation d’exploitations et de marchés agricoles, calibrés avec des données récoltées à l’échelle de l'UE; des analyses statistiques et économétriques sur des données d'enquête; et une série de méthodes qualitatives telles que des entretiens avec les parties prenantes, des groupes de discussion ou des consultations publiques sur Internet. Pourtant, la PAC a considérablement changé ces dernières décennies, ce qui nécessite d’adapter ses méthodes d’évaluation. Un examen détaillé des études existantes mobilisant les approches expérimentales pour la conception et l'évaluation de politiques agricoles permet d’analyser la complémentarité des méthodes expérimentales avec les outils d'évaluation standards. A partir des conclusions d'un atelier organisé avec des experts, des universitaires et des décideurs politiques de la Direction générale de l'agriculture et du développement rural de la Commission européenne, cet article propose en outre des recommandations pour faciliter l'intégration des approches expérimentales dans les méthodes d'évaluation de la PAC.

Published
2016
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28. Is tax evasion a personality trait? An empirical evaluation of psychological determinants of 'tax morale'

Author

Jason F. Shogren, Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Antoine Malézieux, Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming, University of Wyoming (UW), Les auteurs tiennent à remercier tout particulièrement le Conseil Régional de Lorraine pour son concours financier., ANR-10-LABX-0093,OSE,Opening economics(2010), Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), ANR-10-LABX-0093/10-LABX-0093,OSE,Opening economics - Labex Ouvrir la Science Economique(2011), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), and Université de Lorraine (UL)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance, Évasion fiscale, 05 social sciences, [SHS.PSY]Humanities and Social Sciences/Psychology, 050109 social psychology, traits de personalité, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, 0502 economics and business, 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences, 050207 economics, Evasion fiscale, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Traits de personnalité
Abstract

International audience; Malgré un intérêt croissant pour les déterminants non-monétaires des comportements fiscaux (tax morale), la littérature récente apporte peu d'éléments empiriques sur le lien entre les caractéristiques de personnalité reliées à la moralité et la propension à l'évasion fiscale. Or de telles mesures sont nécessaires pour comprendre les canaux de transmission des dispositifs de lutte contre l'évasion fiscale. Pour pallier cette lacune, le présent article rend compte d'une expérience en laboratoire permettant d'observer à la fois les comportements de déclaration de revenu des participants et des mesures psychologiques issues de la littérature en psychométrie : soumission à la norme, empathie affective et cognitive, et propension à ressentir la honte et la culpabilité. Ces mesures sont combinées à l'aide d'une analyse en composantes principales afin d'en extraire les facteurs indépendants. Nos résultats montrent que la décision de frauder comme son intensité sont fortement liées à l'empathie affective, l'empathie cognitive et la dimension publique de la moralité (mesurée par la soumission à la norme et la propension à la honte). La propension à ressentir la culpabilité, en revanche, est sans effet. Surtout, le pouvoir explicatif global de ces mesures de moralité individuelles est relativement faible. Ce résultat remet en cause l'hypothèse d'une moralité fiscale intrinsèque, et met l'accent sur l'importance du contexte institutionnel pour comprendre les comportements d'évasion.; Despite an increasing interest in the non-monetary determinants of tax behaviors (also known as tax morale), the recent literature offers few empirical elements on the link between moral personality characters and tax evasion propensity. However, such measures are necessary to understand the transmission channels of policies targeted at fighting against tax evasion. To fill this gap, this paper reports a lab experiment allowing to observe participants' behaviors of income declaration and psychological measures from the psychometric literature: norm-submission, affective empathy, cognitive empathy, propensity to feel guilt and shame. These measures are combined through a Principal Component Analysis to extract independent factors. Results show that the decision to evade as well as its intensity are very highly related to affective empathy, cognitive empathy and public dimension of morality (measured by norm submission and propensity to feel shame). The propensity to feel guiltiness is, however, without significant effects. More importantly, the explanatory power of these individual morality measures is rather weak. This result challenges the assumption of an intrinsical tax morale and highlights the importance of the institutional context to understand evasion behaviors.

Published
2016
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29. Can lab experiments help design personnel policies?

Author

Marie Claire Villeval, Dao, Taï, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)

Subjects
Scheme (programming language), Knowledge management, peer effects, incentives, Laboratory experiments, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, JEL: M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M1 - Business Administration, Artificial environment, External validity, human resource management, M5, Incentives, ddc:330, C9, Evaluation, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Productivity, JEL: M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M5 - Personnel Economics, computer.programming_language, Behavior, evaluation, laboratory experiments, ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION, behavior, business.industry, Compensation (psychology), JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, J6, Incentive, J7, Peer effects, Human resource management, J3, Business, computer, Personnel policy
Abstract

International audience; Can a company attract a different type of employee by changing its compensation scheme? Is it sufficient to pay more to increase employees’ motivation? Should a firm provide evaluation feedback to employees based on their absolute or their relative performance? Laboratory experiments can help address these questions by identifying the causal impact of variations in personnel policy on employees’ productivity and mobility. Although they arecollected in an artificial environment, the qualitative external validity of findings from the lab is now well recognized.

Published
2016
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30. La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ

Author

Antoinette Baujard, Jean-François Laslier, Herrade Igersheim, Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Université de Lorraine (UL)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Ce travail a bénéficié d'une aide de l'Etat gérée par l'Agence Nationale de la Recherche au titre du programme « Investissements d'avenir » portant la référence ANR-10-LABX-93-01.This work was supported by the French National Research Agency, through the program Investissements d'Avenir, ANR-10--LABX_93-01., ANR-10-LABX-9301,LABX,ANR-10-LABX-9301, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), and ANR-10-LABX-0093,OSE,Opening economics(2010)

Subjects
expérimentation en laboratoire, Environmental Engineering, 05 social sciences, Vote, économie expérimentale, expérimentation In Situ, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, 0506 political science, 0502 economics and business, 050602 political science & public administration, 050207 economics, vote stratégique
Abstract

Cet article est une revue de la littérature sur les expérimentations de vote qui étudient les comportements des votants et les propriétés des modes de scrutin. Tout d’abord, nous décrivons les expérimentations menées en laboratoire autour de trois aspects principaux : résultats agrégés selon le mode de scrutin, vote stratégique, paradoxe du vote. Nous abordons ensuite les expérimentations In Situ, typiques de l’étude expérimentale du vote, consistant à tester en marge d’élections officielles d’envergure des méthodes de vote alternatives. Nous étudions le protocole expérimental, deux enseignements généraux – l’accueil et les réactions des électeurs – ainsi que deux enseignements spécifiques – la comparaison des résultats agrégés et la description de l’offre politique telle que perçue par les électeurs.

Published
2016
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31. L'économie à ses frontières (sociologie, psychologie). Quelques pistes

Author

Jérôme Gautié, Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), and Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
jel:C9, épistémologie, jel:B20, 05 social sciences, homo oeconomicus, jel:B41, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, impérialisme économique, 0502 economics and business, économie comportementale, JEL: B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches/B.B4 - Economic Methodology/B.B4.B41 - Economic Methodology, JEL: Z - Other Special Topics/Z.Z1 - Cultural Economics • Economic Sociology • Economic Anthropology/Z.Z1.Z10 - General, 050207 economics, jel:Z10, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance, JEL: B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches/B.B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925/B.B2.B20 - General, 050205 econometrics
Abstract

International audience; Cet article évoque brièvement quelques tendances récentes au sein du foisonnement des travaux économiques - tant théorique qu'empiriques - aux frontières de la sociologie et de la psychologie, et les questions qu'elles suscitent. Il aborde dans une première partie les deux formes contemporaines d'impérialisme économique (théorique et empirique), avant d'évoquer, dans une deuxième partie, quelques débats suscités par l'économie comportementale. La troisième partie s'interroge sur les conséquences des tendances à l'oeuvre sur l'identité de la discipline économique et sur ses relations à la sociologie et la psychologie.

Published
2007
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32. Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking

Author

Franz Dietrich, Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), and Ce travail a bénéficié d'une aide de l'Etat gérée par l'Agence Nationale de la Recherche au titre du programme « Investissements d'avenir » portant la référence ANR-10-LABX-93-01.This work was supported by the French National Research Agency, through the program Investissements d'Avenir, ANR-10-LABX-93-01.

Subjects
Sociology and Political Science, Preference change, Endogenous preferences, Anti terrorism, Criminology, dynamic inconsistency, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Politics, reciprocity, Reciprocity (social psychology), 0502 economics and business, 050602 political science & public administration, Sociology, 050207 economics, 05 social sciences, endogenous preferences, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, [SHS.SCIPO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Political science, 0506 political science, JEL: F - International Economics/F.F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory, Law, Terrorism, JEL: B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches/B.B4 - Economic Methodology
Abstract

International audience; Tough anti-terrorism policies are often defended by focusing on a fixed minority of the population who prefer violent outcomes, and arguing that toughness reduces the risk of terrorism from this group. This reasoning implicitly assumes that tough policies do not increase the group of 'potential terrorists', i.e., of people with violent preferences. Preferences and their level of violence are treated as stable, exogenously fixed features. To avoid this unrealistic assumption, I formulate a model in which policies can 'brutalise' or 'appease' someone's personality, i.e., his preferences. This follows the endogenous preferences approach, popular elsewhere in political science and economics. I formally decompose the effect of toughness into a (desirable) deterrence effect and an (undesirable) provocation effect. Whether toughness is overall efficient depends on which effect overweighs. I show that neglecting provocation typically leads to toughness exaggeration. This suggests that some tough anti-terrorism policies observable in the present and past can be explained by a neglect of provocation.

Published
2014
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33. Consumers' behaviour towards food safety: A litterature review

Author

Fontes, Maria Aguiar, Giraud-Héraud, Eric, Pinto, Alexandra Seabra, CIISA - Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária, Technical University of Lisbon, Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique (X-DEP-ECO), École polytechnique (X), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), UEIS - SAFSV, National Institute for Agrarian and Veterinarian Research I.P., Centro de Investigaçao Interdisciplinar em Sanidade Animal (CIISA), Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária-Technical University of Lisbon, Of Economics, Department, and Technical University of Lisbon-Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária

Subjects
Risk, Consumers' Behaviour, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics/D.D1.D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture/Q.Q1.Q13 - Agricultural Markets and Marketing • Cooperatives • Agribusiness, Food Safety, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Food Safety,Consumers' Behaviour,Risk
Abstract

This paper deals with the actual expectations of consumers on food safety and their predictable behaviour in case of foodborne outbreaks. We present an overview of the purchase process for risky products and we show the reason why the consumer has a specific behaviour with respect to the sanitary risk. Moreover, by taking the results of different works that focused these effects in the meat and fruit & vegetables sectors, we show how the real quality signals on the European market (organic production, designation of origin, private retail labels, etc.) could promote consumer confidence.

Published
2013

34. Destructive Behavior in a Fragile Public Good Game

Author

Ben Loerakker, Maximilian Hoyer, Nadège Bault, Frans van Winden, Experimental and Political Economics / CREED (ASE, FEB), Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED), Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA), Cognitive Science Center Amsterdam, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Dao, Taï

Subjects
Level playing field, Economics and Econometrics, spite, Welfare economics, spite,destructive behavior,public good,relationship,laboratory experiment, Social value orientations, Public good, laboratory experiment, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Constructive, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Framing (social sciences), destructive behavior, public good, Framing (construction), Phenomenon, Spite, Economics, relationship, Positive economics, Laboratory experiment, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Finance, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
Abstract

Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment - like damaging public goods - is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG) game which puts the opportunity for destructive behavior (taking) on a level playing field with constructive behavior (contributing). We find substantial evidence of destructive decisions, sometimes leading to sour relationships characterized by persistent hurtful behavior. While positive framing induces fewer destructive decisions, shifting the selfish Nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20%. Female subjects are found to be more inclined to use destructive decisions. Finally, subjects’ social value orientation turns out to be partly predictive of (at least initial) destructive choices.

Published
2013
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35. Redistribution de revenus et fourniture d'un bien public : une expérience

Author

Maurice, Jonathan, Rouaix, Agathe, Willinger, Marc, Montpellier Research in Management (MRM), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Université Montpellier 2 - Sciences et Techniques (UM2)-Université de Perpignan Via Domitia (UPVD)-Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School-Université de Montpellier (UM), Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut Universitaire de France (IUF), Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche (M.E.N.E.S.R.), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1), Institut des Sciences de l'Evolution de Montpellier (UMR ISEM), Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad)-École pratique des hautes études (EPHE)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Institut de recherche pour le développement [IRD] : UR226-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), ANR–08–JCJC–0105–01, Maurice, Jonathan, Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), ANR-08-JCJC-0105,CONFLICT,Conflicts Competition and Inequality : Experimental Evidence(2008), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Université Montpellier 2 - Sciences et Techniques (UM2)-Université de Perpignan Via Domitia (UPVD)-Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School-Université de Montpellier (UM), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Université Montpellier 2 - Sciences et Techniques (UM2)-Université de Perpignan Via Domitia (UPVD), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro), GLOBE. Grenade, ESP. Universidad de Granada., LINEEX. Valencia, ESP. Universitat de València (UV), ESP., École pratique des hautes études (EPHE), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Institut de recherche pour le développement [IRD] : UR226, Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Université Montpellier 2 - Sciences et Techniques (UM2)-Université de Perpignan Via Domitia (UPVD)-Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School, Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad)-École pratique des hautes études (EPHE), and Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Institut de recherche pour le développement [IRD] : UR226-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
théorème de Warr, Social Dilemma, économie, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H23 - Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods/H.H4.H41 - Public Goods, économie expérimentale, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, THEOREME DE WARR, Inequality, voluntary contribution, Redistribution, FOURNITURE D'UN BIEN PUBLIC, Public Good, Voluntary Provision, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, fourniture d'un bien public, redistribution, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
Abstract

Diffusion du document : Publique; We provide a new experimental investigation of the neutrality theorem of Warr (1983), according to which “when a single public good is provided at positive levels by private individuals, its provision is unaffected by a redistribution of income". Our experimental design differs from Chan et al. (1996) in that we redistribute within each group the total group endowment after 10 rounds, instead of comparing different income distributions across groups. We need therefore to control for the “restart effect” (Andreoni, 1988). To do so, we compare our two test-treatments, an unequalizing redistribution (EI) and an equalizing redistribution (IE), to two benchmark treatments for which the same sequence of 10 rounds is repeated twice either with an equal distribution (EE) or with unequal distribution (II). The constituent game has a unique interior dominant strategy equilibrium depending on income. Our data supports the neutrality theorem (after controlling for the restart effect) : redistribution does not affect the total amount of public good in none of the test treatments. However, the analysis of individual behavior shows that “poor” subjects over-contribute with respect to their Nash contribution, will “rich” subjects tend to play their Nash-contribution or under-contribute slightly. Furthermore, after a redistribution, both types of subjects tend to under-react : those who get poor do not reduce their contribution enough, while those who get richer do not increase sufficiently their contribution

Published
2013
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36. La baisse de la motivation conduit à la diminution des contributions volontaires

Author

Marc Willinger, Charles Figuieres, David Masclet, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Institut Universitaire de France (IUF), Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche (M.E.N.E.S.R.), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), and Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)

Subjects
Persistence (psychology), conditional cooperation, voluntary contributions, 05 social sciences, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods/H.H4.H41 - Public Goods, Internalism and externalism, Public good, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Ideal (ethics), experiments on public goods games, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, contribution, moral motivation, Turnover, 0502 economics and business, Public Good, game thoery, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods/H.H4.H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making, 050207 economics, Positive economics, Psychology, 050205 econometrics
Abstract

This paper provides a general framework that accounts for the decay of the average contribution observed in most experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good. Each player balances her material utility loss from contributing with her psychological utility loss of deviating from her moral ideal. The novel and central idea of our model is that peoples moral motivation is "weak": their judgement about what is the right contribution to a public good can evolve in the course of interactions, depending partly on observed past contributions and partly on an intrinsic "moral ideal". Under the assumption of weakly morally motivated agents, average voluntary contributions can decline with repetition of the game. Our model also explains other regularities observed in experiments, in particular the phenomenon of over-contributions compared to the Nash prediction and the so-called restart effect, and it is compatible with the conditional cooperation hypothesis.

Published
2013
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37. Temporal stability of risk preference measures

Author

Katerina Straznicka, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Dao, Taï

Subjects
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D9 - Intertemporal Choice, Temporal instability, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty, 05 social sciences, Time stability, Stability (learning theory), Experimental economics, Individual level, Time stability,Risk Preferences,Personality Theory,Experimental economics, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Market game, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Preference, Personality Theory, 0502 economics and business, Econometrics, Economics, 050207 economics, Laboratory experiment, Big Five personality traits, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Risk Preferences, Social psychology, 050205 econometrics
Abstract

We examine the temporal stability of risk preference measures obtained by different elicitation methods in a controlled laboratory experiment at two distinct times. Our results indicate remarkable temporal stability of risk measures at the aggregated level and temporal instability at the individual level. We control for the impact of, first, personality traits, and second, performance realized in a market game. When better market performers demonstrate more stable risk preferences, the impact of personality traits is marginal.

Published
2012

38. Professional identity can increase dishonesty

Author

Marie Claire Villeval, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
dishonesty, Multidisciplinary, experiment, Dishonesty, business.industry, media_common.quotation_subject, 05 social sciences, Identity (social science), Public relations, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, 050105 experimental psychology, Scientific evidence, 0502 economics and business, bank employee, 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences, Popular opinion, 050207 economics, business, Psychology, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, Behavioural economics, media_common, Financial sector
Abstract

An experiment shows that although bank employees behave honestly on average, their dishonesty increases when they make decisions after having been primed to think about their professional identity. See Letter p.86 Popular opinion has it that unethical business practices are prevalent in the culture of the financial sector. Ernst Fehr and colleagues sought scientific evidence to support this claim. They find that in a laboratory game designed to reveal dishonest behaviour, employees of a large international bank behaved by-and-large as honestly as the rest of us. But in tests designed to mimic the competitive nature of their profession, many of the bankers began to act dishonestly. Those from other industries and student volunteers did not show this effect. The authors conclude that if financial institutions are to regain our trust, they need to encourage honest behaviour by changing the norms associated with their workers' professional identity.

Published
2014
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39. Probability weighting and the 'level' and 'spacing' of outcomes: An experimental study over losses

Author

Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, centre international de recherche sur l'environnement et le développement (CIRED), and Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-AgroParisTech-Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad)

Subjects
High probability, Economics and Econometrics, 050208 finance, Losses, 05 social sciences, Stochastic game, Probabilistic logic, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Individual decision making under risk,Prospect theory,Losses,Probability weighting, Weighting, Individual decision making under risk, Homogeneous, Prospect theory, Accounting, 0502 economics and business, Econometrics, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, 050207 economics, Probability weighting, Finance, Mathematics
Abstract

International audience; The main goal of the experimental study described in this paper is to investigate the sensitivity of probability weighting to the payoff structure of the gambling situation--namely the level of consequences at stake and the spacing between them--in the loss domain. For that purpose, three kinds of gambles are introduced: two kinds of homogeneous gambles (involving either small or large losses), and heterogeneous gambles involving both large and small losses. The findings suggest that at least for moderate/high probability of loss do both 'level' and 'spacing' effects reach significance, with the impact of 'spacing' being both opposite to and stronger than the impact of 'level'. As compared to small-loss gambles, large-loss gambles appear to enhance probabilistic optimism, while heterogeneous gambles tend to increase pessimism.

Published
2009
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40. Group Identity and Social Preferences by Yan Chen and Sherry X. Li

Author

Marie Claire Villeval, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE), and Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines (ENS LSH)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods, biology, media_common.quotation_subject, biology.organism_classification, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Social preferences, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Core (game theory), Chen, Reciprocity (social psychology), Collective identity, Quality (business), 10. No inequality, Social identity theory, Psychology, Social psychology, JEL: H - Public Economics, media_common
Abstract

Beyond a summary of the paper, this review of “Group Identity and Social Preferences” by Yan Chen and Sherry X. Li highlights its exceptional impact on our understanding of group-contingent social preferences. This paper has made an important theoretical contribution by introducing group identity in the Charness and Rabin model of social preferences. The core of the contribution is to show experimentally that social identity influences distributional preferences, reciprocity, and welfare-maximizing behavior. In particular, charity increases and envy decreases when people are matched with an in-group compared to an out-group, and people are more likely to reward and less likely to punish an in-group than an out-group match. This paper has also contributed to methodological debates about the use of minimal group identity in laboratory experiments. It has inspired many research programs on the role of group-contingent preferences in various dimensions of decision-making in society. It is also important to emphasize its policy implications regarding how group-contingent social preferences could be activated to improve efficiency and the quality of social interactions in our segmented societies. This research agenda is more relevant than ever.

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