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The article focuses on the accessibility challenges faced by visually impaired individuals, particularly at street intersections, and the role of Accessible Pedestrian Signals (APS) in addressing these challenges. It discusses the legal framework provided by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and related statutes, examines relevant court cases, and advocates for the implementation of APS as a solution to enhance the independent navigation of blind and low-vision pedestrians.

Some commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's 2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and especially the Court's 2021 decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez for limiting Congress' authority to confer standing by statute. For example, in his article, Injury in Fact Transformed, Professor Cass Sunstein argues that TransUnion is a "radical ruling" that uses the injury in fact standing requirement to limit the authority of Congress to enact only statutes that address harms that have a close relationship to traditional or common law harms. By contrast, Professor Ernst Young argues that the Supreme Court's injury in fact doctrine is justified in light of the history of equitable practice requiring a "grievance" rather than just a cause of action. The question of how much the TransUnion decision has narrowed Article III standing has resulted in a circuit split regarding when civil rights testers filing suits under the Americans with Disabilities Act have standing. The Tenth Circuit's 2022 decision in Laufer v. Looper and similar decisions in the Second and Fifth Circuits have read the TransUnion decision to limit but not eliminate the broad tester standing in the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman. By contrast, the First Circuit, in its 2022 decision in Laufer v. Acheson Hotels, LLC, explicitly rejected these decisions in the Tenth, Second and Fifth Circuits to conclude that the TransUnion decision had not overruled the expansive tester standing in Havens Realty. The Eleventh Circuit had previously taken a similar position as the First Circuit but did not explicitly disagree with other circuits. On March 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the First Circuit decision for the 2023-24 term. This is an important issue because a broad reading of the TransUnion decision could limit tester standing and affect many other federal statutes that go beyond traditional common law damages. This article will argue that one's view of standing issues depends heavily upon whether one favors expansive government regulation as a social good or is a libertarian skeptical of government regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the electronic age has taken hold of the global community, and digital devices have become the mainstay of human interaction, new accessibility barriers have emerged for people with disabilities. Although most courts now conclude virtual inaccessibility is an injury cognizable under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, great ambiguity surrounds the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing in online accessibility cases. Despite pleading for elucidation and clarifying principles, federal district courts have been left to navigate the uncharted territory of the digital injury-in-fact inquiry with exiguous guidance from higher courts. The resultant confusion in the federal courts has manifested itself as diametrically contradictory injury-in-fact holdings in factually identical cases, both inter- and intra-circuit. This Comment clarifies the digital injury-in-fact inquiry by identifying and dissecting four crucial issues dividing federal courts in ADA Title III online accessibility cases: (1) the location a plaintiff must intend to return; (2) the application of the geographic intent-to-return test factors in cyberspace; (3) the role of future injury; and (4) the scope of virtual standing. First, this Comment argues the destination of a plaintiff's intent to return is preordained by the type of injury alleged by the plaintiff. If a plaintiff alleges a purely virtual website injury, federal courts must assess the plaintiff's intent to return to the inaccessible website. If a plaintiff alleges a hybrid website injury, federal courts must assess the plaintiff's intent to return to the inaccessible website and intent to avail themselves to the goods or services of the public accommodation's brick-and-mortar location. Second, this Comment contends the geographic intent-to-return factors are not probative of a plaintiff's intent to return to a website. However, federal courts cannot merely remove the geographic factors from the intent-to-return test because the resulting analysis infringes on Supreme Court precedent. Rather, federal courts must substitute the intent-to-return test's geographic factors with factors appropriate in cyberspace. Third, this Comment asserts the injury-in-fact inquiry cannot be satisfied by past injury alone. Instead, federal courts must assess the plaintiff's likelihood of future injury. Finally, this Comment argues federal courts should not adopt a lenient approach to standing because a lenient approach is not necessitated by Supreme Court precedent, it is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, and it exacerbates the extant issue of serial litigation in online accessibility cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The wave of remote work that has swept the nation since the COVID-19 pandemic has upended traditional notions about how and where work is performed. Advocates for disabled workers have lobbied for remote work for decades because the standard American workplace is designed around the nondisabled worker. The ability to work remotely is crucial to many workers with disabilities; it often determines whether they can maintain a job. And yet, most employers have refused to embrace remote work as a disability accommodation. This knee-jerk resistance to remote work has often been based on assumptions, past practice, and a lack of imagination rather than a careful, evidence-based examination of what is feasible and reasonable in a particular situation. In litigation, courts typically side with employers, basing their holdings on evidentiary practices that inevitably elevate employers' concerns over those of employees. This Article makes two unique contributions to the literature on remote work accommodations. First, it identifies and categorizes these sometimes subtle, but usually dispositive, evidentiary practices and analyzes how each is legally unsound. What the pandemic has taught us about remote work further erodes the bases for these practices, rendering them indefensible. Courts should abandon these evidentiary shenanigans. Second, this Article studies federal remote work accommodations decisions between April 2020 and December 2022. Results are mixed, but there are hopeful signs that some courts are changing practices in light of the mountain of data our pandemic-induced nationwide remote work experiment has generated. This change would be a welcome development for disabled plaintiffs that would help ensure they have a fair chance in court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the Americans with Disabilities Act has become a significant source of confusing and controversial litigation over website accessibility. This confusion and controversy stems from the fact that the Americans with Disabilities Act and its accompanying regulations offer zero explanation as to how the Act applies to websites. Faced with a circuit split, due process concerns, and a lack of any meaningful technical guidance from administrative agencies, defendant website operators are desperate for clear guidelines for how to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act. Adding to this desperation is a barrage of opportunistic lawsuits, dubbed “surf-by lawsuits,” being filed nationwide against thousands of businesses whose websites are not entirely accessible. Because courts are unwilling to declare a measurable level of accessibility that satisfies the Americans with Disabilities Act as a matter of law, these defendants are forced to either spend the tens of thousands of dollars required to litigate their cases all the way, or settle. On the surface, it may seem like a good thing that these lawsuits are making the internet more accessible. However, the practical result of the current legal landscape is that almost every defendant will settle, regardless of how accessible its website is and regardless of whether any individual with a disability has actually been denied equal access. Most of the settlement agreements contain only a vague promise by the defendant to make the website more accessible. Furthermore, the disabled individual is unable to recover damages; only attorney’s fees are recoverable under the Act. This has led many to believe that the involvement of the disabled plaintiff is often pretextual. Rather than accept this flawed system, this author believes there are legal solutions to the confusion surrounding the Americans with Disabilities Act, which could be fairer to both defendants and individuals with disabilities. Part I of this Note begins by providing some background on the Americans with Disabilities Act and the standards used for measuring website accessibility. Part II describes the current state of the law, including a discussion of the circuit split, due process concerns, and judicial articulations of what the ADA requires from a technical standpoint. Finally, Part III advocates how to move forward with resolving the circuit split and creating clear technical standards for website accessibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses legal issues on disabilities and employment discrimination in the U.S., particularly the implementation of the 1990 Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) to protect people with disabilities. Also cited are how courts are adjudicating the interpretation of disability that denied protections to people with disabilities, and some court cases like Shell v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co. and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. STME.

The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") was enacted in 1990 to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Over time, as society has become more reliant on the internet, the issue of whether the ADA's scope extends beyond physical places to online technology has emerged. A circuit split developed on this issue, and courts have discussed three interpretations of the ADA's scope: (1) the ADA applies to physical places only; (2) the ADA applies to a website or mobile app that has a sufficient nexus to a physical place; or (3) the ADA broadly applies beyond physical places to online technology. In 2019, the Supreme Court turned down an opportunity to settle this circuit split through a case presenting the issue of whether the ADA applies to websites and mobile apps. This was before the COVID-19 pandemic forced our society to utilize online technology more than ever before. During the COVID-19 pandemic, schools switched to online learning, employees worked remotely, restaurants depended on takeout services through online ordering and consumers utilized online shopping to avoid crowded stores. These online activities and many others, however, may be inaccessible to millions of individuals with disabilities. If the ADA does not apply to online technology, businesses would not be required to design websites and mobile apps that are effectively accessible to individuals with disabilities. These individuals could therefore experience several disadvantages in an internet-dependent society. In 2021, do arguments for a narrow application of the ADA, which limits its scope to physical places only, seem persuasive? This Note discusses why ADA protections should apply beyond physical places, specifically to websites and mobile apps, and why this approach should be adopted nationwide. Without a uniform interpretation of the ADA's scope, uncertainty surrounding website accessibility litigation will continue as the utilization of online technology continues to increase. This Note also discusses other important aspects of ADA website accessibility litigation, such as establishing standing to sue and asserting statutory defenses against alleged discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA) and the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Department of Justice can solve predatory litigation. It mentions increase in website accessibility lawsuits where plaintiffs allege violations of Title III of the ADA. It also mentions DOJ promulgate regulations in which the level of website compliance will depend upon the website's intended use and website accessibility standards.

Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") to ensure that individuals with disabilities have access to society. This revolutionary piece of legislation implemented standards for which places of public accommodation must conform their business practices to. As a result, places of public accommodation are required to provide auxiliary aids to individuals who request them. This Note will first examine the background that has led to plastic straws being banned or removed from places of public accommodation. This Note will then discuss the negative consequences that banning plastic straws has on individuals with disabilities. These consequences can lead to the de facto exclusion of individuals with disabilities from public life, which is what the Americans with Disabilities Act sought to prevent. To avoid exclusion, this Note argues that plastic straws are the only type of straw that can serve as an auxiliary aid. Therefore, in order to comply with the ADA places of public accommodation must provide plastic straws. This ensures that individuals with disabilities can fully and equally enjoy their beverages. Finally, this Note will examine the impact this classification has on current actions being taken and propose simple steps to ensure that companies and government actors do not subject themselves to litigation that they can easily avoid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author presents a model of when and how coworkers judge the distributive fairness of workplace accommodations of employees with disabilities. Fairness judgments are made when accommodations are salient and relevant to coworkers. The author thus presents factors influencing the salience and relevance of accommodation. She also argues that fairness judgments are based on equity and need rules and therefore explores factors influencing equity comparisons and perceived warrantedness. Finally, the author suggests directions and ideas for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On September 20, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc. held that an employee requesting a multi-month leave of absence is not a "qualified individual" employee under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and that such leave is therefore not a reasonable accommodation as defined by the ADA. In so doing, the court split from its sister circuits and made a bright-line rule that categorically excludes certain employees with disabilities from protection under the ADA. This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit should have left more room for case by case inquiries into the specific circumstances of leave of absence requests to align with the underlying purposes of the ADA: providing individualized accommodations to employees with disabilities to ensure they have access to equal employment opportunities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article argues employers should be required to engage in the same interactive process with employees seeking religious accommodations as they are with employees seeking disability accommodations. The interactive process generally obligates the employer and employee to work together in good faith to determine whether the employee can be reasonably accommodated. Neither the Americans with Disability Act nor Title VII of the Civil Rights Act explicitly mandates the interactive process, yet courts routinely read this requirement into the former statute but not the latter. The practical effect of this distinction is that religious accommodations generally are more difficult to obtain, and employees seeking such accommodations have less control over the process and outcome. Consequently, employees may be forced to choose between their jobs and their religious beliefs--the very conundrum Title VII seeks to avoid. The legal justification for mandating the interactive process for disability accommodations but not religious accommodations is uncompelling, prompting a handful of courts to require the interactive process for both types of accommodations. More courts should follow suit. There is considerable upside, and virtually no downside, to extending the interactive-process requirement to religious accommodations. It benefits employees and employers alike by increasing the odds of a mutually agreeable accommodation, which in turn reduces the risk of litigation. Moreover, good-faith participation in the interactive process better positions a party to prevail when litigation does ensue. The interactive process also benefits courts, not only by lightening dockets through reduced litigation but also by providing a straightforward, highly adaptable, and familiar framework through which to more effectively evaluate accommodation claims. As religiousaccommodation requests increase, both in number and type, the interactive process can help reduce conflict by ensuring employers and employees work together to determine whether a reasonable accommodation is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article informs on efforts taken by Washington in providing representation to self-represented parties who are unable to participate in the adjudicative process due to a disability. It informs that judges need a process that allows them to comport with the mandates of the Americans with Disabilities Act which respect a party's privacy rights, and avoid ex parte communication. It also informs on efforts of Washington State Office of Administrative Hearings in addressing same.

The article discusses a hypothetical court case pertaining to a school child named K.G. whose mother filed a lawsuit against the Rural School District on account of the district's failure to evaluate K.G. on various occasions. It outlines considerations with regard to the monetary liability of the school's personnel under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) under which K.G. is supposed to fall.

A growing number of private lawsuits allege that businesses are violating Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act because their websites are inaccessible to disabled individuals. Courts remain divided, however, on the extent to which commercial websites are covered under Title III. Additionally, the Department of Justice has not promulgated commercial web accessibility regulations-- adding further uncertainty to the private enforcement regime. This Note argues that Title III broadly covers commercial websites, but that private enforcement is not positioned to spur lasting, broad-based Title III compliance. It proposes that large-scale litigation, state attorney general action, and state laws should be used to usher in commercial web accessibility according to globally accepted standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article claims in support of the idea that Title II applies to hosts providing public accommodations in the sharing economy. Topics discussed include the lawsuit against Airbnb alleging race discrimination, "Selden v. Airbnb, Inc.;" advancements in public accommodations that applies to the sharing economy; and regulation of landlords under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act.

The article discusses the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's ruling in the 2017 case Crowell v. Massachusetts Parole Board which deals with prison conditions and the court's determination that the U.S. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) applies to parole and incarcerated individuals with disabilities. The mistreatment of prisoners with mental impairments is examined, along with litigant Richard Crowell's memory, speech, and cognition problems and the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act.

The article reports on the impact of implementation of Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act on employment litigation in the U.S. Topics discussed include take of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on employment rights of people with disabilities; enactment of Americans with Disabilities Act for addressing the employment issues in the country; and Calvert v. AmeriCold Logistics court case addressing the same.

The article focuses on protecting people with mental disabilities from police brutality during arrests in the U.S. Topics dicussed include use of Americans with Disabilities Act for protecting the same; court case Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey on the same; and correlation between a police officer using deadly and victims of the same.

Captions make movies and television shows accessible to deaf or hard of hearing individuals. Through advocacy for deaf audiences and increased legal action, there have been great strides in getting more movies, shows, and other sources of entertainment captioned. Several pieces of federal legislation have contributed to the increased efforts to provide accessibility to disabled individuals, namely the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). State legislation, like California’s Unruh Act, has also contributed, however, despite advocacy and progressive legislation, the deaf and hard of hearing still face many hurdles when it comes to captioning. This Comment focuses on the Anthony v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment Inc. case, a consumer class action lawsuit brought by nine deaf and hard of hearing plaintiffs against major movie and television show producers and distributors for not captioning music and song lyrics in their features. After examining the district court’s holding of each legal claim in Anthony, this Comment explains that although the Anthony court correctly applied and followed Ninth Circuit precedent, it should have incorporated public policy considerations into its opinion. To deny full captioning to the deaf and hard of hearing is to deny them equal and full enjoyment of movies and television shows, which violates the purpose of the ADA and other disability rights laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses police violence against people with mental disabilities in the U.S. in relation to a question about whether police have a duty under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) to accommodate a person's mental illness during the course of an arrest. A wrongful arrest theory is addressed, along with modifications to police conduct and training. Lawsuits involving mentally disabled people and police procedures in the U.S. are assessed.

The focuses on the application of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to Transportation Network Companies (TNC) in the U.S. Topics discussed include discrimination suits brought against these companies under Title III OF ADA; analysis of qualification of TNCs as private providers of public transportation or public accommodations under the ADA; and Ramos v. Uber Technologies. Inc. and.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for their employees' sincerely held religious practices and beliefs as long as the accommodation does not pose an "undue hardship" on the conduct of the employer's business. But "undue hardship" is a vague term that has led to unclear, inconsistent, unfair, and even discriminatory precedent. This Note proffers a new framework for religious discrimination law through the incorporation of the "essential functions" provision of a similar law, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, in order to strike a fairer balance between the competing rights and interests of employers and employees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Americans with Disabilities Act ( “ADA ”) is recognized as one of the most significant pieces of civil rights legislation in American history and is aimed at protecting the rights of individuals with disabilities. Unfortunately, as the ADA has developed, some attorneys have exposed methods of exploiting the provisions of the ADA for personal, pecuniary benefits—fee-driven lawsuits for violations of plaintiff-friendly provisions of Title III of the ADA. As a result of this exploitation, record numbers of Title III disability cases are being filed by a small group of plaintiffs and attorneys who have created a lucrative “cottage industry ” of vexatious and profitable lawsuits that do little to protect individuals with disabilities or promote the spirit and purpose of the ADA. Vexatious ADA litigation frequently occurs under the guise of a meritorious suit ostensibly brought on behalf of an individual with a disability who is seeking equal access to public accommodations. However, once the lawsuit is filed it quickly devolves into a hunt for vulnerable small businesses that are not in full compliance with the ADA. By exploiting small businesses that are likely to settle quickly instead of engaging in lengthy, costly litigation, lawyers bringing these cases are able to quickly recover attorney’s fees. The profitability and ease with which these lawsuits can be brought has prompted some attorneys to find and file as many ADA violation suits as possible. While the attorneys generate high profits from these lawsuits, money is diverted away from the real need—correcting the underlying violation that justified the lawsuit and providing the disabled plaintiff with equality and accessibility. This Article addresses the need to reform the ADA to prevent vexatious litigation and to promote the underlying goals of the Act. Part I of this Article introduces the topic of vexatious litigation and the importance of remedying the effects of exploitation of the ADA. Part II provides an overview of the ADA and its efforts to increase accessibility to individuals with disabilities, emphasizing the provisions of the Act that create incentives to engage in vexatious litigation. Part III examines and analyzes the judiciary’s response to vexatious litigation under the ADA, and sanctions that have been issued to limit exploitation. Finally, Part IV provides recommendations to reform the ADA and state disability law counterparts, suggests corrective actions to address vexatious litigation, and identifies methods to promote equality for individuals with disabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges establishing marriage equality for same-sex couples marks a major shift in recognizing gay, lesbian, and bisexual people as a central part of the fabric of American society. Obergefell also marks the passing of the torch from "LGB" to "T"; the next civil rights frontier belongs to transgender people, for whom key barriers still remain. In January 2015, a transgender woman filed an equal protection challenge to a provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), which explicitly excludes several medical conditions closely associated with transgender people. In support of this challenge, lawyers for the plaintiff (and co-authors of this Article) advance a novel argument: transgender people are a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class entitled to heightened scrutiny. The authors further argue that the ADA's transgender exclusions are unconstitutional no matter what level of scrutiny applies because moral animus against transgender people is not a legitimate basis for lawmaking. This equal protection challenge paves the way for the extension of disability rights protection to transgender people under the Rehabilitation Act, Fair Housing Act, and state anti-disability discrimination laws that mirror the ADA. It also marks a new break for equality law--reaching far beyond disability rights to all laws that single out transgender people for disparate treatment. This challenge also informs the broader theoretical debate over the relationship between identity and impairment, and diagnosis and discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the court case Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco. Particular focus is given to how this case relates to the obligations of police officers and the rights of the disabled. Additional topics discussed include the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and insights on public policy and states rights regarding the topic.

The article looks at a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the "US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett" case in which the court held that the U.S. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) reassignment is not ordinarily reasonable where the employer has an established seniority system. It mentions that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has decided that employees with disabilities need not compete for reassignment stands in the "EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc" case.

The article discusses the classification of obesity as a disability under the U.S. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), and it mentions how several ADA-related litigation decisions are incongruent with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in the case Seff v. Broward County which deals with the voluntariness of the defendant's wellness initiative. The U.S. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the legal rights of disabled employees are examined.

The article discusses the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's ruling in the 2013 case K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified School District which deals with the legal rights of deaf and hard-of-hearing students under Title II of the nation's Americans with Disabilities Act. According to the article, the plaintiffs claim that their school districts were obligated to provide the students with Communication Access Realtime Translation (CART) speech-to-text and transcription services.

The article focuses on the reasonable accommodation of the mixed motive claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Topics discussed include discriminatory intent, aim of the ADA in the elimination of employment discrimination and judicial opinions related to the U.S. Supreme Court case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. It further discusses the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

The article offers information on the confusion regarding the elements of a failure to accommodate disability claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Topics discussed include the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, and discrimination statute. It also discusses the case of Seventh Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Foster v. Arthur Andersen regarding adverse employment action for disability claims.

The article discusses the legal aspects of wheelchair ramps and cyberspace in relation to Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act as of May 2013, focusing on various legal interpretations of the phrase "place of public accommodation," as well as efforts to prevent discrimination against people on the basis of disability. It states that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that streaming video company Netflix's website is not a place of public accommodation.

Prior to the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, relatively few cases proceeded past the initial inquiry of whether the plaintiff was covered by the ADA. Consequently, the scope of an employer's obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual with a disability remains under-developed and under-theorized. Now that the Amendments have made it easier for a plaintiff to prove he has a disability under the ADA, we can expect to see more courts struggling with many difficult reasonable accommodation issues. The current case law is chaotic, providing little guidance to employers and courts in determining whether an accommodation is reasonable, and making it impossible to discern any unified principle to explain the chaotic results. This Article does just that. It identifies the scope of an employer's obligation to reasonably accommodate its employees by proposing a unified approach to the reasonable accommodation provision. I am facilitated in this endeavor by relying on a case under Title III, the public accommodations Title of the ADA. In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, involving professional golfer Casey Martin's request to use a golf cart during the final rounds of the tournament, the Supreme Court held that the PGA Tour has to provide Casey Martin with a reasonable modification to its no-golf-carts rule because the modification did not "fundamentally alter" the nature of the public accommodation. This inquiry involved two questions: (1) whether the modification sought alter such an essential aspect of the game of golf that it would be unacceptable even if it affected all competitors equally; and (2) whether it give an unfair advantage to the individual with the disability. Although an employer is not a golf tournament, the standard from Martin can provide clarity to the vague "reasonableness" standard in Title I's reasonable accommodation provision. First, using the fundamental alteration standard, courts should determine whether the accommodation would "fundamentally alter" the nature of the employer/employee relationship. Second, when an accommodation places burdens on other employees, courts should determine if the accommodation causes an unreasonable burden by asking the analogous question from Martin of whether the accommodation would give an unfair advantage to the employee with a disability. Thus, although not a perfect fit, Martinizing Title I offers a helpful structure for providing a coherent, unified approach to the reasonable accommodation provision under the ADA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The distinction between antisubordination and anticlassification has existed since the 1970s and has been frequently invoked by scholars to advocate for certain readings of antidiscrimination law. The anticlassification principle prohibits practices that classify people on the basis of a forbidden category. In contrast, the antisubordination principle allows classification (or consideration of, for example, race or sex) to the extent the classification is intended to challenge group subordination. While most scholars writing about antisubordination and anticlassification have done so in the context of equal protection, this Article systematically applies antisubordination and anticlassification values to assess recent developments in employment discrimination law and explore how they might tell us something about the trajectory of employment discrimination jurisprudence. In 2009, the Supreme Court decided Ricci v. DeStefano, a landmark Title VII case, and in 2008 Congress passed two new laws: the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA). These changes potentially undermine the very normative foundation of employment discrimination law. This Article argues that the major employment discrimination statutes have until recently had a substantial antisubordination orientation, in that they were designed to respond to a history of discrimination and incorporate many provisions that expressly take account of forbidden traits (through doctrines like disparate impact and reasonable accommodation). This Article then explores how recent changes to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title VII, and the enactment of GINA may imperil the underlying normative foundation of employment discrimination law by turning toward and emphasizing anticlassification values at the expense of employment discrimination's antisubordinationist foundation. The Article concludes by evaluating the turn, questioning whether the antisubordination/anticlassification distinction is the most apt framework for evaluating employment discrimination law, and suggesting a few changes that may help preserve the valuable antisubordination foundations of employment discrimination law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses several court cases related to employment laws and legislation in the U.S. It emphasizes the "Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co." case which focuses on the statute limitations of the Equal Pay Act. It underlines the "Toyota Motor Manufacturing Kentucky Inc. v. Williams" case which concentrates on the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). It highlights the "Gross v. FBL Financial Services Inc." case which stresses the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).

The article looks at the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the case EEOC v. Kohl's Department Stores Inc. regarding the work in night shift by a employee who is having type 1 diabetes as a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The article discusses a court case wherein two women, the plaintiffs, with mental disabilities were allegedly discriminated by the North District of Georgia. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the unnecessary segregation of individuals with psychological disorders was considered to be unlawful discrimination. It states that the District committed a violation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The article discusses the provisions of the 1990 legislation and the Supreme Court decisions in relevance to the protection of the employees with disabilities in the U.S. The provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments of 2008 (ADAAA) that was enacted by the Congress to restore the rights of the employees with disabilities are outlined. In this regard, the effect of the ADAAA on the employment policies is also discussed.